Compliance: Superficial agreement with a group to fit in (temporary).
Identification: Adopting group behavior because of a desire to belong (semi-permanent).
Internalisation: Deep conformity, where beliefs are genuinely accepted (permanent).
Supporting Evidence & Evaluation:
Kelman (1958): Identified the three types of conformity, explaining different levels of social influence.
Sherif (1935): Autokinetic effect study – supports informational social influence (ISI) leading to internalisation.
Criticism & Counterarguments:
Hard to distinguish between identification and internalisation.
Studies lack ecological validity (lab-based).
Normative Social Influence (NSI): Conformity due to a desire to fit in and avoid rejection.
Informational Social Influence (ISI): Conformity due to a desire to be right, especially in ambiguous situations.
Supporting Evidence & Evaluation:
Asch (1951): Participants conformed to avoid standing out (supports NSI).
Lucas et al. (2006): More conformity in difficult maths problems (supports ISI).
Criticism & Counterarguments:
Individual differences – some people are less likely to conform (locus of control).
NSI & ISI can occur together, making them hard to separate.
123 male students asked to compare lines in a vision test.
Confederates gave incorrect answers.
75% conformed at least once.
Conformity rate was 36.8% when confederates were unanimous.
Supporting Evidence & Evaluation:
Replicated and found consistent results – suggests reliability.
Criticism & Counterarguments:
Artificial task – lacks ecological validity.
Culture & era-dependent – Perrin & Spencer (1980) found lower conformity in later UK study.
Ethical issues – deception.
Group size: Conformity increased up to 3 confederates, then leveled off.
Unanimity: A single dissenter reduced conformity to 25%.
Task difficulty: Harder tasks increased conformity (ISI).
Supporting Evidence & Evaluation:
Lucas et al. (2006): More conformity when answers were harder (supports ISI).
Bond & Smith (1996): Meta-analysis confirmed group size impact.
Criticism & Counterarguments:
Findings not generalisable – only American males tested.
24 male students randomly assigned to be guards or prisoners in a simulated prison.
Guards became brutal, prisoners became submissive.
Study stopped after 6 days due to extreme behavior.
Participants conformed strongly to their social roles.
Supporting Evidence & Evaluation:
Abu Ghraib prison abuses (2003) show real-world conformity to social roles.
Criticism & Counterarguments:
Ethical issues – distress caused to participants.
Demand characteristics – participants may have acted how they thought they should.
Reicher & Haslam (2006 – BBC Prison Study): Found prisoners resisted authority – challenges Zimbardo’s conclusions.
Participants instructed to give electric shocks to a learner for wrong answers.
Authority figure encouraged them to continue.
65% obeyed up to 450V (highest level).
Many showed distress but still obeyed.
Supporting Evidence & Evaluation:
Sheridan & King (1972): Similar findings when real puppies were used – supports Milgram’s study.
Criticism & Counterarguments:
Ethical issues – deception, psychological harm.
Orne & Holland (1968): Argued participants didn’t believe shocks were real (lacks internal validity).
Proximity: Closer proximity to victim decreased obedience (40%).
Location: Obedience dropped in less prestigious settings (47.5%).
Uniform: Authority figures in uniform led to more obedience (Bickman, 1974).
Supporting Evidence & Evaluation:
Hofling et al. (1966): 21/22 nurses obeyed unethical doctor instructions – supports real-world obedience.
Criticism & Counterarguments:
Culture-bound findings – higher obedience in some cultures.
Agentic State: Obedience occurs because individuals see themselves as an agent of authority.
Legitimacy of Authority: People obey because they recognize authority figures as justified.
Supporting Evidence & Evaluation:
Blass & Schmitt (2001): Students blamed experimenter (supports agentic state).
Kilham & Mann (1974): Australians showed lower obedience – suggests cultural differences.
Criticism & Counterarguments:
Doesn’t explain individual differences in obedience.
Some people have a personality type that makes them more obedient.
Measured using the F-scale.
Supporting Evidence & Evaluation:
Elms & Milgram (1966): Obedient participants in Milgram’s study scored higher on F-scale.
Altemeyer (1981): High RWA (Right-Wing Authoritarianism) linked to higher obedience.
Criticism & Counterarguments:
Correlational – doesn’t show causation.
Political bias – ignores left-wing authoritarianism.
Social Support: Presence of allies reduces conformity/obedience.
Locus of Control (Rotter, 1966):
Internal LOC: More independent.
External LOC: More likely to conform/obey.
Supporting Evidence & Evaluation:
Asch (1955): Social support reduced conformity.
Holland (1967): Internals resisted Milgram’s shocks more.
Criticism & Counterarguments:
LOC only matters in certain situations (Twenge et al., 2004).
Consistency, commitment, flexibility help minorities influence the majority.
Supporting Evidence & Evaluation:
Moscovici (1969): Consistent minority had more influence than inconsistent minority.
Criticism & Counterarguments:
Artificial tasks – lack ecological validity.
Minority influence leads to social change through snowball effect and cryptomnesia.
Supporting Evidence & Evaluation:
Nolan et al. (2008): Normative influence helped reduce energy consumption.
Criticism & Counterarguments:
Change takes a long time and may not always occur.
Statistical Infrequency: Behavior is rare/uncommon in the population.
Deviation from Social Norms: Behavior goes against societal expectations.
Failure to Function Adequately: Struggles with daily life (Rosenhan & Seligman criteria).
Deviation from Ideal Mental Health: Absence of positive traits (Jahoda’s criteria).
Gottesman (1991): Found that schizophrenia occurs in only 1% of the population, supporting the idea that rare conditions are statistically infrequent.
Does not differentiate between desirable and undesirable traits (e.g., high IQ is rare but not abnormal).
Cultural bias: What is statistically rare in one culture may not be in another.
Rosenhan (1973): "Sane" participants admitted to psychiatric hospitals despite behaving normally, showing that social norms influence diagnosis.
Cultural bias: Norms vary (e.g., hearing voices may be seen as religious insight in some cultures but psychosis in Western medicine).
Social norms change over time (e.g., homosexuality was considered a disorder in the DSM until 1973).
Human rights issues: Can be used to control people (e.g., political dissidents labeled as mentally ill).
Rosenhan & Seligman (1989): Proposed criteria for dysfunction (e.g., distress, unpredictability, irrationality).
Jahoda (1958): Suggested this overlaps with deviation from ideal mental health.
Subjectivity: What defines "adequate" functioning? Some people may be content despite appearing dysfunctional.
Cultural differences: Expectations of functioning vary (e.g., independence in Western societies vs. reliance on family in collectivist cultures).
Jahoda (1958): Identified six criteria for ideal mental health, including self-actualization, autonomy, resistance to stress.
Unrealistic: Few people meet all criteria, meaning most could be seen as abnormal.
Cultural bias: Focuses on Western ideals (e.g., self-actualization is less relevant in collectivist societies).
Cultural bias: Definitions of abnormality differ across societies.
Subjectivity: Some criteria (e.g., social norms, functioning) are context-dependent and open to interpretation.
Overlap between definitions: Failure to function and deviation from ideal mental health are similar in judging well-being.
Two-Process Model (Mowrer, 1960):
Acquisition by Classical Conditioning (associating fear with a stimulus).
Maintenance by Operant Conditioning (negative reinforcement through avoidance).
Supporting Evidence & Evaluation:
Watson & Rayner (1920) – Little Albert: Showed how fears can be learned through classical conditioning.
Criticism & Counterarguments:
Ignore biological factors – some phobias (e.g., spiders) may be evolutionary (Seligman, 1971).
Not all phobias result from trauma – some people develop phobias without a clear conditioning event.
Systematic Desensitisation (SD): Gradual exposure combined with relaxation techniques.
Flooding: Immediate and intense exposure to the feared stimulus.
Supporting Evidence & Evaluation:
Gilroy et al. (2003): Found SD effective for spider phobia.
Wolpe (1958): Flooding successfully treated a girl with a car phobia.
Criticism & Counterarguments:
Ethical issues – flooding can cause extreme distress.
Doesn’t address cognitive aspects – only targets behavior, not irrational thoughts.
Beck’s Negative Triad: Negative thoughts about self, world, and future.
Ellis’ ABC Model: Depression arises from irrational beliefs (Activating event → Beliefs → Consequence).
Supporting Evidence & Evaluation:
Grazioli & Terry (2000): Found cognitive vulnerability predicted post-natal depression.
Clark & Beck (1999): Found strong support for cognitive distortions in depression patients.
Criticism & Counterarguments:
Cause or effect? – negative thoughts may be a symptom, not a cause.
Ignores biological factors – depression linked to neurotransmitters (e.g., serotonin).
Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy (CBT): Identifies and challenges irrational beliefs.
REBT (Ellis): Restructures beliefs through disputing irrational thoughts.
Supporting Evidence & Evaluation:
March et al. (2007): CBT as effective as antidepressants in treating depression.
Hollon et al. (2006): CBT more effective at preventing relapse than medication.
Criticism & Counterarguments:
Not effective for severe cases – some patients require medication first.
Patient motivation needed – therapy requires active participation.
Genetic Explanations: OCD may be inherited (COMT & SERT genes linked to neurotransmitter imbalances).
Neural Explanations:
Low serotonin linked to OCD.
Overactive basal ganglia may cause compulsions.
Supporting Evidence & Evaluation:
Nestadt et al. (2010): Found higher OCD concordance in identical twins than fraternal twins.
Hu (2006): OCD patients had lower serotonin levels than non-OCD patients.
Criticism & Counterarguments:
Reductionist – ignores environmental factors (e.g., trauma).
Twin studies don’t show 100% concordance – suggests other influences.
SSRIs (Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors): Increase serotonin availability (e.g., fluoxetine).
Alternatives:
Tricyclics (older antidepressants, more side effects).
Benzodiazepines (anti-anxiety drugs).
Supporting Evidence & Evaluation:
Soomro et al. (2008): SSRIs significantly more effective than placebo for OCD treatment.
Pigott & Seay (1999): SSRIs reduce OCD symptoms in most patients.
Criticism & Counterarguments:
Side effects – SSRIs can cause nausea, headaches, and insomnia.
Not a cure – drugs manage symptoms but don’t address the underlying cause.