Philosophy of Mind
LECTURE 7 - CONSCIOUSNESS & THE NATURAL METHOD
Central question: How can we study consciousness from a materialistic perspective?
1. THE EXPLANATORY GAP
1.1 Phenomenal Consciousness → Ned Block
Conscious experiences or qualia
1.2 Th Explanatory Gap
We can learn how someone experiences something via
introspection
reports
PROBLEM: How can materialism account for phenomenal consciousness? → by Joseph Levine
HARD PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS
1.3 Two Interpretations of the Explanatory Gap
The epistemological interpretation
It is not the world it’s us
materialistic explanation is possible
but there is a problem of how we think
we lack the cognitive capacities and epistemic tools
The metaphysical interpretation
its not us its the world
not possible
because qualia are not physical
materialism is wrong
→ but does phenomenal consciousness really pose a problem for materialism?
2. ARGUMENTS AGAINST MATERIALISM
2.1 What is it like to be a bat → Thomas Nagel
PROBLEM: materialistic theories are objective they cannot explain the subjective experiences → consciousness itself is left out
Is this really a problem? NO!
does not show that materialism is wrong, just that there is an epistemological problem.
Nagel is an optimist
2.2 Mary the super-scientist
THE INTUITION: Mary has learned something new! → yellow-quale
→ so materialism is false, there is non-physical things
Is this really a problem? AT FIRST YES
→ the argument is problematic for two reasons:
Our intuitions can be mistaken and they are not same for everyone → Daniel Dennett
It is too demanding, a theory on weather would not be refuted because it does not create storms
2.3 Phenomenal Zombies → David Chalmers
If phenomenal zombies exist can exist, then phenomenal traits are not physical traits
→ materialism is false
Is this really a problem? NOT REALLY
Argument itself is problematic:
The fact that we can imagine does not mean that they can exist!
Chalmers presupposes that which he has the prove.
Then why are phenomenal zombies important?
They give rise to intuitions against dualism → un-intuitive even for dualists.
major challenge for materialism → they need to explain why they are conceivable but not possible
Real life cases (those these [→ s] mean zombies are real? NO because physical differences have led to this, and they do not behave how they would have normally) SO PROVES OPPOSITE ACTUALLY
→ homicidal somnambulism
→ blindsight
2.4 Not Smart Enough → Colin McGinn
A materialist explanation is possible but we do not have the right cognitive capacities.
Two ways to explore mind-body relation:
Start with brain → neuroscience
Start with mind → introspection
→ Both fail
Is this really a problem? YES & NO
NO → it is possible, there is no metaphysical problem
YES → There is an epistemological problem
SOLUTION: THE NATURAL METHOD!
3. THE NATURAL METHOD ( INTERDISCIPLENARY) → Owen Flanagan
3.1 The Penfield Homunculus
Penfield discovered motor and sensory strip by natural method
3.2 Depression
Need the natural method to understand
4. SUMMARY
epistemological and metaphysical gap
materialism faces several challenges
we are better off with natural method
LECTURE 8 - THE GRAND ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUSNESS
How to make sense of the idea that consciousness is an illusion? → the case of perception
1. EASY & HARD PROBLEMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS
1.1 Easy and Hard Problems of Consciousness
Hard: problems that resists our best scientific methods
Easy: problems that are directly susceptible to the standard methods of cognitive science
1.2 Addressing the Hard Problem of Consciousness
PESSIMISM
→ Thomas Nagel: we do not have the right concepts now (maybe not a very radical pessimist)
→ Colin McGinn: we are not smart enough
OPTIMISIM
→ tackle the easy problem first (neural correlates of consciousness)
→ hard problem? given that consciousness is an illusion the question is explaining why this illusion is generated -Daniel Dennett
1.3 The Illusion of Consciousness
Daniel Dennett → the hard problem as an illusion problem
1.4 Weak and Strong illusionism
weak illusionism: consciousness is not what it seems to us or as it is usually described → Daniel Dennett and our focus!
strong illusionism: consciousness does not exist
2. THE GRAND ILLUSION
2.1 Perceptual Illusions
Müller-Lyer
rubber hand illusion
2.2 What it is Like to See?
one of the central ideas: perception seems to involve the construction of mental representations → related to intentionality/aboutness
mental representations: mental imagery of things that are not actually present to the senses → Alva noe: this is the GRAND ILLUSION
2.3 The Tree Assumptıons of Vision Science
“perceptual experience is rich and detailed”
it feels as if we perceive a whole scene
“perceptual experience has definite content”
it feels like we can always answer “what do you see” (if you took a snapshot you could compare)
mental pictures (explains 1 and 2)
visual experience involves the construction of mental pictures (or representations)
It is because perception involves the construction of mental pictures that it is rich and detailed and the content is definite
2.4 The Pictures-in-the-head View of Perceptual Experience
but is this really what perception is? we have reasons to think it is NOT
→ the GRAND ILLUSION
3. SUPPORTING THE GRAND ILLUSION
3.1 The Homunculus Problem and the Theatre of the Mind
Homunculus problem: who is that picture for?
Theatre of the mind: Cartesian conception of the mind: thoughts happen in a separate place from our body and the world → when we think of perception as the picture-in-the-head view we re still buying into this belief
3.2 Gappy Vision
although visual experience does not feel gappy it certainly is!
CHANGE BLINDNESS
challenge for picture-in-the-head view: how can we not remember → needs an explanation
AMODAL PERCEPTION
capacity to fill in the details or complete obstructed objects → you can see the cat behind bars as a whole
BLIND SPOT
active filling in: the blind spot is not simply ignored
if vision is gappy, why doesn’t it feel that way?
4. TACKLING THE GRAND ILLSUION
4.1 Some Lessons
vision might involve rich and detailed representations → other reasons to think that there are representations involved
not much is preserved
→ we need to incorporate these lessons to our theories
two alternatives (if we accept grand illusion):
REPRESENTATIONAL: accept representations in a way that can address these challenges
NON-REPRESENTATONAL: rethink perception
4.2 The Representational Alternative → Ronald Rensink (adjusted representational view)
no complete and detailed representations (so schema)
instead there is top-down process: hyperactive brain: high-visual processing rather than starting at the retina
→ schema to compare with info from the low-level (visual) processing
schemas only goal is to guide
the feeling of rich and detailed vision is because of schemas
4.3 The Non-Representational Alternative → Kevin O’Regan & Alva Noe
No representations at all → what change blindness suggests
seeing is a way of exploring the world
the world is its own model
this is the SKILL THEORY OF PERCEPTION (related to enactivism): perception is active and involves the exercise of skills or practical knowledge
the reason why perception feels rich and detailed is because the world is
5. SUMMARY
one response to the hard problem of consciousness is that phenomenal consciousness is an illusion
visual experience as a grand illusion: feels rich and detailed
if we accept grand illusion there is two alternatives (representational and non-representational) to explain why perceptual experience feel the way it does
LECTURE 9 - CONSCIOUSNESS & ATTENTION
Is consciousness is just an attention?
1. FOLK CONCEPTION OF ATTENTION
1.1 A Primer on Attention
withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with others
PERCEPTION: attention selects from input
ACTION:
→ control of attention
→ attention for guidance
MEMORY: attention passes on information for other tasks
CONSCIOUSNESS: attention could explain that some information is conscious → FOLK CONCEPTION OF ATTENTION
1.2 Attention and Folk Psychology
folk psychology: theory of the mind that allows us to understand, explain, and predict the behavior of others → NOT SCIENTIFIC!
folk conception of attention is tied to how we experience attention
→ spotlight metaphor
→ experiential highlight
1.3 The Spotlight Metaphor
not listening to your friend when hungry and focusing on their sandwich
linked to the theatre of the mind!
representation of contents, attention structures our experience
1.4 The Experiential Highlight Theory
Emphasis!
change in qualitative features of experience (could happen with sound as well)
how do these two metaphors relate to each other? COMPLIMENT EACH OTHER (the light can also change the way they look)
1.5 Two Elements of the Folk Conception of Attention
Attention is dynamic
→ can be active or passive
Attention is contrastive and selective
→ background/foreground
2. THEORIES OF ATTENTION
2.1 Challenges of the Folk Conception
three main challenges:
DISSOCIATION BETWEEN ATTENTION & CONSCIOUSNESS
sometimes we are not aware that we are paying attention
INATTENTIONAL BLINDNESS - the gorilla (kinda like change blindness)
→ important factors: attentional goals and expectations
INVOLUNTARY SACCADIC MOVEMENTS
CORTICAL BLINDNESS(BLINDSIGHT)
SMOOTH PURSUIT
ATTENTIONAL PRIMING EFFECT: occurs when attention is influenced without awareness
what does this tell us about the folk conception?
→ attention is not what it appears to be
THE TWO NEURAL MECHANISMS
voluntary and involuntary attention are supported by different neural systems
→ VENTRAL SYSTEM:
the “what” (cognitive process)
top-down visual processing: using schemas to interpret what we see
bottom-up attention: external guidance
→ DORSAL SYSTEM:
the “where” (action control)
bottom-up visual processing: stimulus shapes our perception
top-down attention: internal guidance
ventral + dorsal interaction = flexible attention (cocktail party effect)
what does this tell us about the folk conception?
→ unified theory of attention, UNLIKELY
MANY FORMS OF ATTENTION
voluntary/involuntary
on/off vs degrees
exogenous/endogenous
focal/global
what does this tell us about the folk conception?
→ unified theory of attention, UNLIKELY
given these challenges there are two strategies we can follow (reductionism and non-reductionism)
2.2 Reductionism (competitive bias / broadcasting)
focus on one aspect (neural mechanism) and ignore others (how attention feels like)
contrary to folk psychology, attention only has one role
attention should be identified with this role
two functions (theories):
THE BIASED COMPETITION MODEL OF ATTENTION
exposed to a large amount of information but only the relevant information is processed
THE WORKING MEMORY MODEL OF ATTENTION
attention is responsible for broadcasting (encoding) information to working (short-term) memory
attention is necessary and sufficient for consciousness!
Challenges to reductionism:
attention is more loosely connected to memory than previously thought
leaves out how attention feels
also leaves out how how it paly an important role in our cognitive lives
2.3 Non-Reductionism
try to give a unified version of attention that does justice to the folk conception
many forms of attention
cannot find it in the brain (does not mean that we should ignore science!)
goes back to folk conception
two theories:
THE STRUCTURING VIEW OF ATTENTION → Sebastian Watzl
attention structures and organizes our conscious experience (foreground/background)
it is contrastive
there is consciousness without attention: objects in the background does not disappear
there is attention without consciousness: only because there are mechanisms associated with attention that can be activated without consciousness
THE RATIONAL-ACCESS VIEW OF ATTENTION → Declan Smithies
aim is to capture the role of attention and how it feels
role: select information
mode of consciousness
draws on Ned Block’s distinction between phenomenal (background noise) and access consciousness (if its useful, e.g. blindsight) → ATTENTION
Consciousness is necessary for attention
→ there is no attention without consciousness: we are always aware of the information available to rationally control our actions
→ there is phenomenal consciousness without attention: cocktail party effect
challenges of non-reductionism?
is not successful at its aim of unifying attention (still talking about one aspect)
2.4 What If Attention is an Illusion?
MAJOR CHALLENGE: we need attention to study consciousness
3. SUMMARY
given the challenges of the folk conception we discussed three theories (reductionism, non-reductionism, illusionism)
LECTURE 10 - THE UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS
in what sense is consciousness is a unified phenomenon?
1. THE BINDING PROBLEM
1.1 Binding Problem
even though the neural mechanisms that support this experience are complex, diverse, and parallel
1.2 Multisensory Integration
One sense modality: vision etc.
multi-sensory binding: across different senses
ventriloquism
McGurk effect
1.3 The Binding Problem and Attention
occurs when we pay attention
is the binding problem just the problem of attention?
if that’s the case attention is the mechanism
but they dissociate:
attention is important for binding: white dog mistaken for black because it was behind a black bag
There is binding without attention: catching an object that is thrown at you
1.4 The Binding Problem and the Self
we also experience our”selves” as one, even though there are many thing that make up the “self” → BINDING
2. SUPER-UNITY & DISUNITY
2.1 Split-Brain Patients (Disunity)
less unity than usual
double consciousness: has consciousness in these patients split?
Acc. to Sperry & Koch, YES!
is this right? why doesn’t this generalize
only noticeable in these experiments
single consciousness: only one hemisphere has consciousness → seems strange
Consciousness is not that split because people frown when they guess wrong!
Mereological fallacy: misconception that hemispheres itself has consciousness but only we as a whole have consciousness
Confabulation: does not happen only to patients, happens to everyone → spin doctor
2.2 Synaesthesia (Super-unity)
more unity than usual
how do we know they are telling the truth? “pop-out” test
2.3 Mis-Binding
sometimes we even experience unity and continuity where there is none → we see the same movement when actually the middle part is going the opposite way
3. SOLUTIONS TO THE BINDING PROBLEM
3.1 Dualism
the immaterial mind (soul) gives unity to consciousness
dualistic interactionism by Pepper and Eccles
the mind unifies consciousness by selecting and integrating neural activity, not the neural mechanisms itself
But dualism is still highly problematic!
3.2 Materialistic Accounts
the neural correlates of binding
research by EEG
BINDING BY SYNCHRONY → Crick & Koch
binding occurs when neurons fire synchronously → synchronous gamma oscillations
is this causation or correlation?
only answers the easy problem
INTEGRATED INFORMATION THEORY → Tononi
binding occurs when the information is integrated
only when no specific location but generated by causal interactions throughout the system
can be measured (phi)
does this solve the hard problem? NOT REALLY → integration can be found in other systems that do not require consciousness
ENACTIVISM
similar to SKILL THEORY OF PERCEPTION (to perceive is to do something, interaction with the environment)
not something that fills n the gaps between sensory input and motor output
but arises when interaction with the environment
embodied actions
qualia arises because experience is an exercise of sensorimotor skills
unity because of one single sensorimotor project
Does this solve the problem?
→ explains split-brain
→ but not problem of dualism
3.4 Unity as an Illusion
CONFABULATION
FRIDGE METAPHOR: we know unity is there only when we draw attention to it
4. SUMMARY
discussed the binding problem
saw cases of super-unity and disunity
which puts pressure on the reality of our experiences
various solutions to the binding problem: dualism, materialism, illusionism
LECTURE 11 - CONSCOIUSNESS & THE SELF
is there such thing as (conscious) self?
1. PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SELF: SOME THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS
1.1 The Brain-Swapping Alien Scientist
which body are you in? Which one is you? do you still exist?
1.2 The Teletransporter
who is the real you? would you mind if one of these individuals was destroyed? if yes, which one?
1.3 The Ship of Thesus
am i my body? but my body is constantly changing!
1.4 Intuitions about the Self
you think you are your body:
teletransporter preserves you because it is a perfect physical copy
you think you are your soul:
your “self” is lost at the teletransporter because it only rebuilds your material structure
substance dualism
perhaps there is no self at all!
then why do we feel like there is? → acc. to Derek Parfit there are two ways to answer this question:
ego theory: it feels like there is a self, because there is actually a self! (interested in the thought experiment)
bundle theory: self is an illusion! (thought experiments are meaningless)
2. THE EGO THEORY
2.1 Dualism & the Ego Theory
the self is immaterial
substance dualism
popular (religions and children)
2.2 Materialism & the Ego Theory
the self is material
but this is problematic!
Richard Double → there is no material thing in our body that remains the same (THESUS’S SHIP)
we need an alternative! → there is no self!
3. THE BUNDLE THEORY
just collection of experiences but no subject who has these experiences
3.1 Buddhism
anatta = no self
“self” is just a term that we use to refer to a set of elements
3.2 David Hume
our memory creates the idea of continuity and personal identity
but when we introspect we do not find a self
we are just a collection of sensation
3.3 A Category Mistake
asking what the self is without the independently of a collection of mental states (sensations and experiences) is a category mistake
3.4 Rejection of the Bundle Theory (Thomas Reid)
Humethere must be a self because it simply feels like it → phenomenology
but this is just intuition!
4. ANOMALOUS SELVES
4.1 Desired from the Ego & Bundle Theories
ego theory cannot point to a specific thing
→ should explain what the self could be
bundle theory is counterintuitive
→ should explain why we feel like there is a self
NEXT: ANOMALOUS CASES OF THE EXPERIENCE OF THE SELF
→ dissociative identity
→ split-brain patients
4.2 Split-Brain Patients
is there two selves?
difficult to investigate because only left hemisphere can report
4.3 Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID)
Mrs. Beauchamp (and her other personality that hates here → Sally)
does Mrs. Beauchamp have multiple selves?
if sally is an illusion why can’t we say that about Mrs. Beauchamp?!
4.4 Theories of the Self & Anomalous Selves
ego theory → PROBLEMATIC:
not everyone feels one conscious self
there might be multiple selves
we do not even know what the self is
bundle theory:
can easily avoid these problems
there is not 1 or 2 self but 0
there may be multiple streams of consciousness but that is it
5. THEORIES OF THE SELF
5.1 Neuroscientific Models of the Self (EGO)
GAZZANIGA’S VIEW
self is a functional brain region in the left hemisphere
→ EGO THEORY
MACKAY’S VIEW
two levels of brain function:
Executive function: unconsciously goal-oriented
Self-controlling function: determines goals (conscious) → this is the self!
→ EGO THEORY
5.2 Enactive Theories of the Self (BOTH)
self emerges in the interactions with the environment
we have the sense of being a self because we have experiences!
INTERACTIONS WITH THE WORLD → Shawn Gallagher
our sense of self is caused by the fact that we experience the world from our personal, embodied perspective → embodied interactions
THE SELF AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCT → Saunders
self arises from relationship with others (social roles)
is enactivism an ego or bundle theory? COULD BE BOTH
boundaries become blurry
→ info in phones part of identity (Andy Clark)
→ self is scattered in our actions that connect us to the world (Alva Noe)
5.3 Narrative Theories of the Self (BUNDLE)
Daniel Dennett, in favor of bundle theory
self is an illusion connected to the metaphor of “theatre of the mind”
→ ego theoriests believe the theatre
but we should give up that belief → self is fiction
self arises from storytelling, language (the self as THE CENTER OF NARRATIVE GRAVITY)
5.4 Metzinger’s Phenomenal Self-Model (BUNDLE)
we should not ask what the self is but WHY it arises → bundle
we can never really know the world as it is but only as it appears in our experience → representationalist
many things we cannot experience → not part of our conscious model of the world
our representations are transparent → we never know we do not experience the world directly
PHENOMENAL SELF MODEL:
why? EVOLUTIONARY FUNCTION (hide food, money for your future SELF!)
anchored in our embodied experiences and the perspective from which we experience the world
virtual reality avatar
6. SUMMARY
two ways to approach the self (ego and bundle)
ego and enactive theories (environment or brain) → although enactivism can be bundle
bundle such as Dennett’s narrative theory, Metzinger’s phenomenal self model (illusion)
LECTURE 12 - CONSCIOUSNESS & FREE WILL
is free will an illusion too?
1. GETTING THE CONCEPT RIGHT: WHAT IS FREE WILL?
two principles:
→ The principle of alternative possibilities
→ The ultimate cause principle (follows from the other)
2. THE DEBATE OF FREE WILL
2.1 Determinism
Natural laws determine everything! (state of all physical particles + laws of nature) NO FREE WILL → actions do not exist
alternative → dualism
2.2 Dualism & Determinism
soul is not material → not subject to natural laws
But dualism is not compatible with science!
and our will does seem to depend on our physical make-up
→ Phineas Gage
→ automatic actions
→ alien hands
→ anarchic hands
so alternatives THAT ACCEPT MATERIALISM:
→ Hard determinism
→ Libertarianism
→ Compatibilism
2.3 Hard Determinism
INCOMPATIBILISM: determinism true, no free will
2.4 Libertarianism
INCOMPATIBILISM: determinism is false, there is free will
2.5 Compatibilism
Determinism is true AND free will exists (soft determinism)
3. THE EXPERIMENTS OF LIBET
3.1 Libet’s Experiment
decision is already visible in the brain before the conscious decision
3.2 Reactions to the Libet’s Experiment
timing measure issues
the action is banal
materialism: nothing new
free won’t
shows NOTHING
4. CRITICISM OF THE VARIOUS POSITIONS IN THE DEBATE
4.1 Arguments Against Compatibilism
two principles of free will reject determinism!
we can rethink the notion of free will
→ but that just changes the discussion
4.2 Arguments Against Libertarianism
dualism and rejecting determinism are unscientific!
4.3 Arguments Against Hard Determinism
Quantum physics teach us that the world is not determined but event are probabilistic
→ not a good argument, just means that the world is now determined by random physical events
Hard determinism needs to explain phenomenology
The illusion of no will: sometimes we mistakenly feel like we have no will
→ Micheal Fanday against spiritism
→ Jay Olson and the Mind-Influencing Machine
→ Schizophrenia
and other times we feel like we are acting out of free will when we are not
→ magicians
→ Daniel Wegner and Ouija Board
4.4 Conclusions on the Debate
hard determinism wins!
5. MORAL IMPLICATIONS
5.1 The Danger of Rejecting Free Will
we are AMORAL CREATURES
5.2 Handling the Risk
do not reveal this → free will illusionism
spread the news, maybe won’t be disastrous → compassion, discourage retribution
SELF-KNOWLEDGE: accept the illusion (less guilt…)
LECTURE 13 - THE FUNCTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS
why is there consciousness at all?
1. PRIMER ON EVOLUTIONARY THEORY
1.1 Mindless Design
organisms are designed to survive in a certain environment → good fit
how can we explain this good fit? three possibilities:
nothing but an accident
DIRECTED DESIGN: God has orchestrated it
LAMARCKISM: CONSCIOUS STRIVING → giraffe necks (first theory of evolution)
MINDLESS DESIGN: paths to functionality
→ against lamarckism
→ natural selection by Darwin
1.2 Evolution and Natural Selection
undirected change
(variation, selection, heredity) → against panadaptationism (every trait is adaptive and beneficial)
1.3 Different Worlds
what can we learn about human mind from animal minds?
2. ANIMAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS
2.1 The Problem of Other Minds
can we ever know whether others have conscious minds?
animals?
→ automata
→ higher and lower order consciousness
→ conscious with life
→ panpsychism: everything has a conscious mind
2.2 Learning About Animal Consciousness
Physicalism and behavioral (flexible and complex/ pain) indicators
problems:
different areas → p
new research → p
intelligence and consciousness not related → b1
requires classification of intelligence (biased) → b1
back to the phenomenal zombies → b2
pain and suffering not the same, pain can be unconscious → b2
Self- recognition (different versions animal to animal)
Mind-reading (reflective thought) → chimps do not have a theory of mind
Imitation
these do not lead to answers!
3. THE FUNCTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS: FOUR ALTERNATIVES
3.1 Consciousness Inessentialism & Epihenomenalism
did not have to evolve → could have been unconscious
painfulness of pain has no causal role
epiphenomenon: arises from physical events that has no causal effect on physical events (zombies)
3.2 Consciousness has no Independent Function
rejects panadaptationism: consciousness is a by-product
3.3 Consciousness has an Adaptive Function
emergent property: depends and arises from the whole organism not from just parts
surface property: emergent property that is adaptive (painfulness of pain)
has a social function: tool for ding natural psychology
challenges:
involves cartesian theatre (first-person) → homunculus problem
implausable that natural selection acted on subjective experience rather than cognitive capacity it accompanies
3.4 Consciousness is an Illusion
illusion itself is beneficial:
Müller-lyer
Metzinger on the self: food for future you
free will moral
Daniel Dennett: it results from both natural and cultural evolution