Untitled Flashcards Set

Power needs authority to be respected

BROADLY AGREED TO RULES AS TO:

•WHO IS AUTHORISED TO MAKE THE RULES

•HOW TO THE RULES ARE MADE

•HOW THE RULES ARE ENFORCED

•WHAT THE LIMITS ARE ON WHAT THE RULES CAN DO

THESE ARE NEEDED TO KEEP LAW’S POWER LEGITIMATE AND ‘SAFE’ FROM BEING USED ABUSIVELY

MANAGING, WEILDING AND TAMING POWER

HOW IS POWER DISTRIBUTED AND CONTROLLED?

• The state

• The creation and legitimacy of the state

• Power of the state

• Exercises of state power

• Law and elections as constraining state power

• The relationship between citizens, the state and power

WHEN LAW and THE LEGAL SYSTEM FAIL TO LEGITIMATELY MANAGE THEIR POWER…

THEY LOSE or ABUSE

Constitutionalism 

• Tools 

• Structures

• New zealands way

CONSTITUTIONS REFLECT SOCIAL CONTRACTS

 AS TO THE RULES OF STATE POWER 

CONSTITUTIONALISM is a Proposition that State Power is Bounded by Obligatory Rules 

CONSTITUTIONALISM is a Proposition that State Power is Bounded by Obligatory Rules on which the Legitimacy of Government depends

RULES ABOUT TAMING RULING POWER:

•THE EXTENT OF STATE POWER

•HOW THAT POWER SHALL BE EXERCISED, WHO SHALL EXERCISE IT, and BY WHAT MEANS THOSE WHO EXERCISE  THAT POWER ARE CHOSEN

•HOW THE CONSTITUTIONAL RULES THEMSELVES ARE CHANGED

•CONSTITUTIONALISM is ABOUT ‘INSTITUTIONALISED REVOLUTION’

(rather than with guns, bombs, and knives!)

Constitutionalism as Systematic Rules about ‘the making, content, operation, enforcement and change’ of Legal Rules

•PRIMARY Rules

•The Rules of a legal system which govern Everyday Conduct

•SECONDARY Rules

•The Rules about determining what the Primary Rules are.

•The Rules about by whom and how Primary Rules are made and enforced.

•The Rules about how the people making the Primary Rules are chosen.

•The Rules about how the Primary (and Secondary) Rules themselves may be changed.

•The Rules about Settling Disputes about Primary & Secondary Rules.

•

•SECONDARY Rules

•Rule of Recognition (What Counts as Law?)

•Rules of Change (How are either Primary or Secondary Rules authoritatively Changed?)

Rules of Adjudication (How are violations of or disputes about the Rules settled?)

TWO basic methods of constitutionalism

•Regularise exercises of state power (process based) through Constitutional rules

AND/OR

•Limit exercises of state power  (rights based) through Constitutional rules

Both are underpinned by the idea of ‘legitimacy’.

•Correct people and institutions exercising power using correct procedure  

Or

•Correct people and institutions exercising power using correct procedure   and within acceptable limits

CONSTITUTIONALISM is about

•The STRUCTURE OF THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE AS WELL AS THEIR USE of WHICH POWER and HOW

•RULES/Law about form, function, structure of government; its powers; exercises of those powers, the extent of those powers.

•The ORGANS and PROCEDURES by which legal and government DECISIONS ( LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, and JUDICIAL) are made.

•The RELATIONSHIP between the ORGANS of STATE POWER (ex: Separation of Power, Rule of Law, Parliamentary Sovereignty)

•The RELATION of the INDIVIDUAL with the STATE (ex: voting rights, freedom of speech, Bills of Rights, etc)

•The RELATION of GROUPS with the STATE (ex: Treaty of Waitangi)

CONSTITUTIONS are intended to:

•REGULARISE EXERCISES OF POWER;

•LIMIT POWERS OF GOVERNMENT OVER PEOPLE;

•LIMIT MAJORITIES’ POWERS OVER MINORITIES;

•PROTECT MAJORITIES FROM RASH ACTIONS TO THEMSELVES;

•ENABLE PEOPLE TO CONSTRUCT, CHANGE and DIRECT their government and law in a peaceful manner.

Constitutions as:

•“Supreme or Superior” (Higher) Law or Authority 

•“Fundamental” Law  (Foundational)

Which is either written or unwritten but still perceived as absolutely binding (unless changed through procedures perceived to be appropriate and legitimate for that purpose (i.e. The correct secondary rules))

The Path of the Idea in Modern times

•Modern idea of a constitution – emerged from the Enlightenment/age of reason in mid-late 18^th century – US/French Revolutions saw the emergence of ‘modern constitution with a focus on government as opposed to traditional constitution focus on the state.

Paine Rights of Man 1791 argued a constitution possesses 4 key features:

•1. It must have a real existence – it is a thing, specifically a document.

•2. Constitution is an antecedent (​​a thing that existed before or logically precedes another.) to a government – government must be made only ‘by the people’.

•3. It must be comprehensive – fully specifies powers and duties of government.

•4. Constitution has the status of fundamental law. It is the law of law making.

Many of the Tools and Principles of Constitutionalism are aimed at the regularisation and/or rendering safe, the exercise of power

Ideas such as:

•REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

•FEDERALISM

•BICAMERALISM

•SEPARATION OF POWERS

•FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (Civil, Political, Human)

•FREEDOM OF SPEECH

•FREEDOM OF PRESS

•DUE PROCESS

•JUDICIAL REVIEW

•ACCESS TO JUSTICE

•MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY

•RULE OF LAW

•DEMOCRATIC PROCESS

•LEGITIMACY

•PARTNERSHIP/COMITY

•are all tied to the experiences of abuse of power and trying to avoid such abuses in the regular exercise of power.

Constitutions and Entrenchment

POSSIBLE LEVELS OF ‘ENTRENCHMENT

•ABSOLUTELY ENTRENCHED

•Can never be legitimately changed

•SUPERMAJORITIES or SUPERPROCESS or BOTH

•Can be legitimately changed only through some sort of supermajority vote, or through some special, more complex and demanding process than that which ordinary legislation requires (Electoral Act 1993 section 268 lists other sections of the Electoral Act which can only be changed by a supermajority or by referendum)

•ORDINARY PROCESS

•Can be legitimately changed through ordinary legislative process (Electoral Act 1993 section 268 itself can be changed by ordinary process)

Whether any Constitution is effective depends on the effectiveness of theCONVENTION of Constitutionalism itself:

•There must be a CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURAL: Do the actors involved feel themselves bound to respect the authority of the rules of the constitution?

•

•This depends on the social values attached to:

•DEMOCRATIC PROCESS - (Representation norms/ Rights norms)

•ORDERLY PROCESS – (Rights norms/Representation norms)

•INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM - (Representation norms /Rights norms)

•RULE OF LAW (Rights norms, Process Norms)

•FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS (Rights/Representation norms)

•The relation of political units within the state also is fundamental:

•

PARTNERSHIP/COMITY – (Representation / Rights)

Why British Constitutional Experience Relevant to NZ’s Unwritten Constitution 

•NZ constitutional arrangements and rules grew out of the historical constitutional developments informing the Crown when it signed the Treaty of Waitangi.*

•The Westminster system of government and lack of formal constitutional arrangements continues to influence NZ approach to constitutional and governance issues.

*The Treaty of Waitangi is a foundational element of NZ constitution and will be discussed in more detail in Lectures 3 & 4.  We will also discuss the importance of legitimacy to any constitutional arrangement,  and whether the New Zealand constitution can claim legitimacy without effective inclusion of the Treaty of Waitangi.

British Constitutional Development

•Points to Note:

•1. A reluctance to commit basic rules to writing – government operates within rules of procedure and precedent rather than written principle.  Rationale? Constitutional understanding comes through experience that cannot be reduced to formal rules that would constrain the incorporation of experience into the practice of exercise of constitutional power.

Governments rely on procedures and precedent rather than rigid written rules. The rationale? Constitutional understanding evolves through experience, and strict formal rules could limit the ability to adapt and incorporate that experience into governance.

•2. Two themes emerge through this constitutional history – authority and liberty.  The struggle between these opposing themes has driven constitutional development.

•3. Authority of  Norman feudal monarchy imposed after Conquest 1066 on existing English social order (example of colonisation) – Coke argued common law pre-existed conquest, so conquest was then subject to ancient laws – common law was source liberties – justification of political struggle for liberty were appeals for restoration of ancient liberties: Magna Carta 1215, Petition of Rights 1628 and Bill of Rights 1688. (Does this echo Tikanga & Treaty debates?)

In 1066, a man named William the Conqueror invaded England and made himself king. He brought a new system of government where the king had strong control, but land was divided among nobles who ruled over the people. This changed how England was run.

Later, a legal thinker named Sir Edward Coke argued that England already had laws before William took over. This meant that the king was not above the law and had to follow the old rules. These old laws became the basis for people fighting for their rights.

Over time, people pushed back against kings who tried to take too much power. They demanded a return to their "ancient rights," leading to important documents like:

• Magna Carta (1215) – Forced the king to respect certain rights.

• Petition of Right (1628) – Limited the king’s ability to tax or imprison people unfairly.

• Bill of Rights (1688) – Further restricted the king and gave more power to Parliament.

This argument about old rights vs. new rulers is similar to debates in colonized countries, like the discussions about Māori law and the Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand.

Competing Narratives

•17^th Century conflicts between royalist and parliamentary forces – absolute monarchy challenged by emerging parliamentary lobbies – issue where governmental authority resided?

Who should hold the real authority in government—the king or Parliament? These conflicts eventually led to the end of absolute monarchy and the rise of a constitutional monarchy, where the king had to follow laws set by Parliament.

•Revolution 1688 marked beginning of a modern constitution but full of ambiguity – what were the roles/relationships between king, lords, commons.

England’s government shifted from an absolute monarchy (where the king had total control) to a constitutional monarchy (where the king’s power was limited by laws and Parliament)

•Whig interpretation of English constitution – triumph of liberty over absolute sovereign power – rejection of ‘legalisation’ of constitution – law a conservative force that defers to authority therefore lack of formalism required to maintain liberties of people.

Whigs believed the 1688 Revolution was a victory for freedom, limiting royal power and strengthening Parliament.

However, they rejected the idea of a rigid, written constitution. Instead, they saw the common law and evolving traditions as the best way to protect people’s liberties. A formal, legalistic constitution could actually restrict freedom because law tends to preserve authority rather than challenge it. By keeping the system flexible, liberties could be protected through political action rather than fixed legal rules.

•Blackstone’s Commentaries (1765–9) basic legal principle of the constitution was that of the sovereign authority of parliament – notion of Crown in Parliament – expression of state sovereignty not democratic governance.

Blackstone’s Commentaries (1765–1769) emphasized Parliament's supreme power in making laws, with the Crown in Parliament as the ultimate authority. This idea focused on state sovereignty rather than democratic governance, meaning power rested with Parliament, not the people.

•Dicey – Lectures on the Law of the Constitution (1885) – aim to lay bare constitutions legal fundamentals  - defined as ‘all rules which directly or indirectly affect the distribution or exercise of the sovereign power of the state.’ – rules both formal laws and informal conventions – 3 guiding principles – legislative sovereignty of the Crown-in-Parliament,(authority)  the universal rule through the constitution of the ordinary law (rule of law) (liberty) and the role of constitutional conventions. When in conflict, resolution through conventions.

In Lectures on the Law of the Constitution (1885), Dicey aimed to explain the legal fundamentals of the constitution. He defined the constitution as all the rules that affect the distribution or exercise of the state’s power, including both formal laws and informal conventions.

Dicey identified 3 guiding principles:

1. Legislative sovereignty of the Crown-in-Parliament (authority).

2. The rule of law as a universal principle (liberty).

3. The role of constitutional conventions.

When these principles conflicted, conventions (unwritten practices) were used to resolve the issue.

•Bagehot –The English Constitution (1867) – political scientist account of constitution –the reality of the constitution was that there was no separation between executive and legislative powers with Cabinet being the most powerful institution in the British system – Crown maintained a symbol of unity (dignified const.) but system of government works through disciplined party division – more realistic assessment of how constitutional power works (efficient const.)– Victorian constitution was a ‘club government’ worked on high level of trust and common code of conduct (CONVENTIONS).

In The English Constitution (1867), Bagehot argued that the real way the British government worked wasn’t as formal as it seemed. While the Crown was seen as a symbol of unity, the government itself worked through political parties and divisions, which made decisions.

Bagehot described the system as a “club government”—a way of governing that relied on trust and shared understanding among politicians. This meant there weren’t always strict rules or laws in place; much of the system was guided by unwritten practices or conventions (agreements on how things should work, even if they weren’t officially written down).

•20^th century saw change through arrival of democracy – universal adult suffrage achieved 1928 (1893 in NZ) – produced little constitutional upheaval though considerable political conflict –Jenning’s The Law and the Constitution 1933 – noted like Dicey law and constitution distinct entities – no authoritative constitutional legal framework, little attention to the constitution itself.

In the 20th century, more people were allowed to vote, with universal suffrage (the right for all adults to vote) achieved in the UK by 1928 and in New Zealand by 1893. While this gave more people a voice, it didn’t lead to big changes in the constitution, though it did cause political debates and conflicts.

In Jennings’ book (1933), he said that the law and the constitution are two different things. There wasn’t a clear legal system or set rules for the constitution, and not much focus was placed on how it was structured or applied.

•From 1970s emergence of literature on need for reform – constitutional renewal as a precondition for economic regeneration.

In the 1970s, there was a growing body of literature (books, articles, etc.) arguing that the constitution needed to be reformed. These writers believed that renewing the constitution was essential for economic regeneration—meaning that improving the way the government worked could help improve the economy.

•NEW ZEALAND HAS AN ‘UNWRITTEN’ CONSTITUTION

•NEW ZEALAND HAS CONSTITUTIONAL ‘ARRANGEMENTS’

New Zealand has an 'unwritten' constitution means that not all of New Zealand's rules and laws about government are written down in one single document. Some parts are based on customs or practices.

New Zealand has constitutional 'arrangements' means that New Zealand's system of government works through a combination of laws, traditions, and practices that guide how power is shared and exercised.

SEPARATION OF POWERS and RULE OF LAW ARE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPTS:

IT UNDERPINS THE IDEA OF ‘RULE OF LAW’

“ IT MAY BE TOO GREAT A TEMPTATION TO HUMANE FRAILTY APT TO GRASP AT POWER, FOR THE SAME PERSONS WHO HAVE THE POWER OF MAKING LAWS, TO HAVE ALSO IN THEIR HANDS THE POWER TO EXECUTE THEM, WHEREBY THEY MAY EXEMPT THEMSELVES FROM OBEDIENCE TO THE LAWS THEY MAKE, AND SUIT THE LAW, BOTH IN ITS MAKING AND EXECUTION, TO THEIR OWN PRIVATE ADVANTAGE, AND THEREBY COME TO HAVE A DISTINCT INTEREST FROM THE REST OF THE COMMUNITY, CONTRARY TO THE END OF SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT.”

It may be too tempting for people to grab power if the same individuals who make the laws also have the power to enforce them. This could allow them to avoid following the laws they create, using the law for their own benefit, and creating a situation where they have different interests from everyone else. This goes against the purpose of society and government.

Case of Prohibitions - only Courts can decide cases, not the King: "not to be decided by natural reason but by artificial reason and judgment of law, which law is an art which requires long study and experience..."

Case of Proclamations (the King may not change the Common Law; the King cannot create new law w/out Parliamentary assent: "...the King cannot change any part of the common law, nor create any offence, by his proclamation, which was not an offence before, without parliament."

In the Case of Proclamations, it was decided that the King cannot change the common law or make new laws without the approval of Parliament. In other words, the King cannot make something a crime just by announcing it; Parliament must agree first.

Fitzgerald v Muldoon affirms this for New Zealand (next Week).

IN NEW ZEALAND ‘RULE OF LAW’ is a FUNDAMENTAL Const’l DOCTRINE

IT IMPLIES a FUNCTIONAL SEPARATION BETWEEN:

LAW MAKING, (LEGISLATURE)

LAW ADMINISTERING, (EXECUTIVE)

and LAW ADJUDICATING POWERS (JUDICIARY)

PARLIAMENT ABIDES BY RULE OF LAW BY CONVENTION

THE EXECUTIVE IS LEGALLY REQUIRED TO ABIDE BY RULE OF LAW

Fitzgerald v Muldoon! 

SOME of the Many WAYS TO SEPARATE AND LIMIT POWER

•Separating Functions (Const Act 1986, Convention, Fitzgerald...)

•Separating Actors (State Sector Act 1988, Convention)

•Separating Institutions (Const Act 1986, Judicatory Act 1908, Supreme Court Act 2003)

•Separating Territories

•Separating Areas of Authority/Jurisdiction (local government, tribunals, agencies, specialist courts, State Sector Act 1988)

•Enumerating Powers (Treaty? Magna Carta? 1688 BOR)

SOME METHODS OFMAINTENANCE OF SEPARATIONS and LIMITATIONS OF POWER IN NEW ZEALAND

Interlocking Checks and Balances (Jud. Review of Executive, Min. Responsibility to Parliament, Judicial Interpretation of Statutes,  Parliamentary Legislating Legal reforms)

Isolation and Insulation (Judicial Independence; Parliament governs its own procedures, polices its own rules; Executive does foreign affairs independently)

“Dispersal”  Who ever makes the laws is also subject to them (Tito Phillip Fields case)

Some Methods Used in other Jurisdictions, but not here (any more):

Bicameralism (two houses, usually based on different grounds of representation)

Federalism (subunits of the larger State have their own sources and areas of independent exercises of legal authority)

IN NEW ZEALAND OUR BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL RULES ARE PROCEDURALLY ORIENTED AND ARE THOSE OF A CONVENTIONALLY Limited PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY:

•We have a Democratically and Freely Elected House of Representatives which deliberates and passes bills, and which controls its own internal affairs. 

•Bills passed by the House become Law (Statutes) when signed by the Sovereign or her representative. The Sovereign acts on democratic advice.

•We have Independent Common Law Courts which interpret and apply Statutory Law as well as the Common Law, and which protect our Common Law Rights (This is reflected in the cases you’ll Study on Crown Liability in Tort, in Contract and at Public Law).  

•We have a Representative Responsible Executive Government which must always act under Law (Entick v Carrington), as determined by the Courts, which must maintain the Confidence of the House, and which is Responsible to the House.

•We have the Sovereign who wields the Prerogative Power on Democratic Advice, unless exercising the ‘Reserve Powers’ to assure representative government or to preserve the Constitution. 

•We have a Common Law Doctrine and a ‘Conventional’ Understanding that Parliamentary Law is the Highest Law. We also have cases indicating there are limits to this.

•Parliamentary Power is bounded by Conventional Rules, including Separation of Powers and Rule of Law, and Constitutional Conventions are enforced through Political and Electoral Sanctions.

•We Do NOT have a Fundamental (Creating) or Higher (Superior) legal document which sets out our Constitution or its arrangements.  This is why Parliament could exempt itself to retain authority to legislate contrary to the guarantees set out in the Bill of Rights 1990.

The basics for constitutionalism 

 (according to de Smith)

•EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY TO AN INDEPENDENT AUTHORITY (Rule of Law, Fitzgerald v Muldoon, BORA 1990)

the government must answer to an independent body (such as the courts or a watchdog) to ensure it follows the law and acts fairly.

•REGULAR, BROADLY OPEN ELECTIONS, WHICH ELECT (one way or another) THE GOVERNORS AND THE LAW MAKERS ( Section 17 Const Act 86, Electoral Act 93)

•FREE OPPOSITION (1688 BOR, BORA 1990)

Free opposition means that individuals and groups have the right to criticize or oppose the government without fear of punishment. This is a key aspect of a democratic system, allowing for debate and accountability.

•CIVIL LIBERTIES (what are these?) PROTECTED BY AN INDEPENDENT AND EFFECTIVE JUDICIARY (Fitzgerald v. Muldoon, Sections 23 & 24 Const Act 1986, Senior Courts Act 2016 (Replacing the Judicatory Act 1908 & Supreme Court Act 2003), 1688 BOR, NZ Bill of Rights 1990)

Civil liberties are basic rights and freedoms that protect individuals from government overreach. These include freedoms like freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and the right to a fair trial.

THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RULES THAT SUSTAIN OUR CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS ARE:

“CONVENTIONS”

  NOT LAW

NOT CUSTOM

MORE IMPORTANT THAN EITHER

SOURCES and LOCATIONS of the New Zealand constitution 

•Imperial Legislation (see Imperial Laws Application Act 1988)

•New Zealand Legislation (Const Act 1986, BORA 1990, Human Rights Act 93, as amended, Supreme Court Act 2003) (Ref Docs)

•Customary Common Law

•Convention (underpins or governs many of these)

•Judicial Precedent (Fitzgerald v Muldoon, Mäori Council v AG)

•Treaty/Te Triti

•Commentaries

•Statutory Interpretation

•International Law

•Prerogative Instruments

•Parliamentary Custom/Rules

•Rules set out in the Cabinet Manual

•Standing Orders of Parliament

•Traditions

Constitutional Institutions

•Sovereign/Governor General – ss. 2-5 Constitution Act 1986;

•Legislature – ss. 10-13 Constitution Act;

•Parliament – ss. 14-20 Constitution Act;

•Executive – ss. 6-9 Constitution Act;

•Judiciary – ss. 23-24 Constitution Act; Judicature Act 1908;

•State Services – State Sector Act 1988 and Amendment Act 2013;

•Electoral Commission – Electoral Act  1993 ss. 4 – 8;

•Political parties – ss. 62 – 71B Electoral Act.

Notice that core principles and doctrines of the constitution are ultimately  respected and upheld by convention

THINGS LIKE: 

 “RULE OF LAW”

“DEMOCRACY”

“FREEDOM OF POLITICAL DEBATE”

“CIVIL RIGHTS”

“INDEPENDENCE OF JUDICIARY”

“NATURAL JUSTICE”

Not written although written about (conventions) 

ACCEPTED AS NECESSARY AND BINDING BY THE ACTORS

 TO WHICH THEY APPLY

DEFINE RELATIONS BETWEEN ORGANS OF GOVERNMENT AND

BETWEEN THE SOVEREIGN AND THE GOVERNMENT

OBLIGATORY (see Hart on Obligation)

NON JUSTICIBLE

FUNDAMENTAL

Obligatory: People in government are expected to follow them.

Non-justiciable: Courts can't enforce them.

Fundamental: They are essential to how government works.

Conventions are obligatory 

 (from Hart on Obligation)

•Serious Social Demand for Conformity (regardless of legal rules)

•Seen as ‘NECESSARY to maintain [constitutionalism] or some prized feature of it.’

•Often conflict with personal interest, a duty to society ‘involving sacrifice or renunciation’

•Internally accepted as a valid reason for acting in a certain way, violation does not merely predict trouble but gives others a good reason for hostility.

Examples of conventions 

•The Governor General must assent to bills approved by a majority of the House of   Representatives

•Parliament does not legislate tyrannically

• The Governor General appoints the leader of the majority (or majority coalition) as the Prime   Minister

• The Governor General appoints as Ministers the people the Prime Minister recommends.

• The Institution of and workings of Cabinet

• The Governor General acts only on advice of the Executive Council in matters such as   declaring war,

•  making peace, making treaties, etc.

• The Government resigns if it no longer commands a majority in the House.

• Ministerial Responsibility

• Public Service Anonymity

• The Executive & the Legislative branches don’t criticize the Judiciary

• Parliament doesn’t make ‘LEGISLATIVE JUDGMENTS”, i.e. Parliament respects Rule of LAW and doesn’t interfere in Court Cases or the business of the Courts

• Parliament makes, polices and enforces its own internal rules with no interference from the   Courts

• Cabinet Manual itself, which governs Ministers and Cabinet conduct and is binding but not law enforceable by the Courts

• Standing Orders, which govern the House’s legislative process, internal affairs and MPs conduct in the House and are binding but are not law enforceable by the Courts.

Recognising a convention

•IS THERE A PRECEDENT?

•DID THE ACTORS CONSIDER THEMSELVES

 BOUND BY A RULE?

•IS THERE A REASON FOR THE RULE?

Such as does it ultimately work to:

PROMOTE RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES

or 

PREVENT TYRANNICAL EXERCISES OF LEGAL POWERS

Conventions are considered… 

OBLIGATIONS

BY (&ON) CONSITUTIONAL  ACTORS