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Epiphenomenalism Notes

Epiphenomenalism

Definition of Epiphenomenalism

  • Epiphenomenalism is a physicalist theory of mind. It posits that mental events, like thinking, imagining, experiencing, and desiring, are non-physical events.
  • These mental events are considered by-products, side-effects, or epiphenomena of micro-physical events in the brain.
  • According to epiphenomenalism, mental events, though real, are causally inefficacious, meaning they never cause human behavior.

Physicalism in the Philosophy of Mind

  • Strong Physicalism: Definition not provided in the transcript.
  • Weak Physicalism: (with respect to human persons): Definition not provided in the transcript.

Mental Event/Brain Event Dualism vs. Identity Theory

  • Identity Theory: A particular mental event or act M (e.g., perceiving, introspecting, reasoning) is numerically identical to a particular brain event P (e.g., a neural event).
    • Brain events are observable in principle via the five senses with instruments like microscopes and brain scanners.
  • Mental event/brain event dualism: Identity theory is rejected, and mental events are considered distinct from brain events.

Argument for Mental Event/Brain Event Dualism: The Different Properties Argument

  • Mental event/brain event dualism: Mental events are not numerically identical to brain events, and mental events are real.
  • Brain events are, in principle, observable by way of the five senses (e.g., neural events are micro-physical events observable via brain scanning devices).
  • Mental events (e.g., experiencing a red ball, imagining a red ball, thinking that 2+2=4) are, in principle, not observable by way of the five senses, but rather by introspection.
  • Brain events have the essential property of being observable by the senses, whereas mental events do not have this essential property.
  • Premise: If x and y have different essential properties, then x and y are not numerically identical.
  • Conclusion: It is not the case that mental events are numerically identical to brain events.
  • Assumption: Mental events are real.
  • Therefore, mental event/brain event dualism is true.

The Mental as Epiphenomenal

  • The mental is real but doesn't cause any effects (in contrast to dualistic interactionism).

Causal Interaction Diagram

  • Two-way causal interaction between the mental and the physical is generally represented as:
    • [M.E. #1] \longrightarrow [M. E. #2]
    • \ \ \ ^ \ \ \ \ | \ \ \ \ |
    • \ \ \ | \ \ \ \ |
    • \ \ \ V \ \ \ \ [P. E. #2]
    • [P. E. # 1]

Epiphenomenalism: Mental Events Do Not Cause Physical or Other Mental Events

  • E: Mental events do not cause physical, or even other mental, events
    • [M.E. #1] \ \ \ [M.E. #2] \ \ \ [M.E. #3]
    • \ \ ^\ \ \ ^\ \ \ ^
    • \ / \ \ \ / \ \ \ / \
    • \ | \ \ \ | \ \ \ |
    • [P.E. #1] --------> [P.E. #2] --------> [P.E. #3]

Argument for Epiphenomenalism: Strength of Scientific Explanations

  • If (i) mental event/brain event dualism is true, and (ii) we can give a good explanation of all human behavior entirely in terms of micro-physical events (neural, molecular, atomic, sub-atomic), then epiphenomenalism (E) is true.
  • Mental event/brain event dualism is true.
  • We can give a good explanation of all human behavior entirely in terms of micro-physical events.
  • Therefore, E (Modus Ponens).

Readings of the Strength of Scientific Explanations Argument

  • Reading #1: Considers the present ability to give a good explanation.
    • (1*) If (i) mental event/brain event dualism is true and (ii) we can *right now* give a good explanation… then (iii) E is true.
    • (2) Mental event/brain event dualism is true.
    • (3*) We can *right now* give a good explanation…
    • (4) Therefore, E is true.
  • Reading #2: Considers the eventual ability to give a good explanation.
    • (1**) If (i) mental event/brain event dualism is true and (ii) we can *eventually* give a good explanation… then (iii) E is true.
    • (2) Mental event/brain event dualism is true.
    • (3**) We can *eventually* give a good explanation…
    • (4) Therefore, E.

Libet Experiments as a Defense of Epiphenomenalism

  • Subjects watched a clock and waited for a conscious urge to move their finger.
  • They noted the time of the conscious volition.
  • This was compared to the time their finger moved and the readiness potential (neural signature in the motor cortex).
  • The readiness potential precedes the conscious volition, which precedes the finger movement.
  • Some suggest this shows freewill is illusory; acts of freewill are epiphenomenal in relation to the readiness potential.

Potential Problems with Epiphenomenalist Interpretations of Libet Experiments

  • The readiness potential may be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for freely willing.
  • The experiments don’t control for antecedent acts of freewill causing the readiness potential (subjects choosing to follow instructions).
  • The experiments assume that a person acts freely only if they are conscious of acting freely or experience a sense of agency.
  • The Libet experiments misconstrue freewill as passive (waiting for an urge) rather than active.
  • Libet experiments only study arbitrary movements (finger-flicking), not acts of freewill based on reasons and intentions.

Problem of Self-Refutation for Epiphenomenalism

  • Philosophy and science assume mental events/acts can cause other mental events/acts.
  • Epiphenomenalism claims no mental events cause anything.
  • Any argument for epiphenomenalism entails either that epiphenomenalism is false or that the argument is not a good explanation.
  • Therefore, any argument for epiphenomenalism is problematic according to epiphenomenalism.

Agent Argument Against Epiphenomenalism (E)

  • If E is true, then our beliefs, desires, volitions, etc., never cause our body to do anything; psychological explanations are never good explanations of human behavior.
  • Our beliefs, desires, volitions, etc. are sometimes causally efficacious; psychological explanations are sometimes good explanations of human behavior.
  • Therefore, E is false (Modus Tollens).