Many people disregard evidence conflicting with their established beliefs.
This study investigates the brain mechanisms involved in belief maintenance despite counterevidence.
Neuroimaging was conducted with 40 self-identified liberal participants.
Participants faced arguments opposite to their strong political views in an fMRI setting.
Increased activity was noticed in the default mode network (DMN) when political beliefs were challenged.
DMN is linked with self-representation and disengagement.
High belief resistance correlated with:
Increased activation in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC);
Decreased activity in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC).
Participants changing their beliefs exhibited lower BOLD signals in the insula and amygdala when confronted with counterarguments.
Emotions play a crucial role in resistance to belief change.
Shared understanding is vital for science, culture, and mutual cooperation.
Cognitive flexibility enhances human knowledge and social collaboration.
Direct challenges to core beliefs often encounter resistance, leading to decreased openness.
Belief maintenance may be coupled with negative emotions due to conflicts with new information.
Possible rationalization strategies employed include:
Discounting the source of evidence;
Formulating counterarguments;
Seeking social validation for original beliefs.
The emotional significance of beliefs impacts resistance to change.
Stronger social identity beliefs tend to be harder to alter.
Disengagement and Inward Focus: Resistance may involve disengagement from external stimuli, activated by the DMN.
Emotion and Resistance: Feelings may evoke activity in regions like the amygdala and insula during belief challenges.
40 healthy, right-handed liberals with strong convictions.
Ages ranged from 18 to 39 years.
Subjects received compensation ($20/hr) and provided informed consent, with medial approval from USC IRB.
Each involved 8 political and 8 non-political statements.
Statements were matched with discrediting challenges directly influencing belief strength.
A survey collated background information and political affiliations.
Participants then underwent fMRI scans while evaluating statements and challenges.
Included post-challenge belief ratings using a Likert scale.
Greater changes in belief were noted for non-political versus political challenges:
Political belief change averaged 0.31;
Non-political belief change averaged 1.28.
Participants maintained belief reductions weeks later, confirming significant resistance to changing political beliefs.
Faster comprehension of political statements compared to non-political ones.
Duration of responses longer for political challenges.
Quick belief rating shifts noted post-challenges, faster for political statements.
Challenges rated averagely as 3.63 (credibility) and 3.92 (challenge intensity).
Increased credibility ratings correlated with higher belief changes.
Significant activity observed in various brain regions when evaluating beliefs, especially:
DMN regions during political challenges;
Increased activity in DLPFC and OFC for non-political challenges.
Correlations found between item persistence and specific regions (OFC negatively, DMPFC positively).
Activity in specific emotional regions (insula and amygdala) linked to belief persistence differences among participants.
The study highlights how individuals engage their cognitive systems to defend established beliefs.
DMN activation aligns with the notion of engaged internal processing during belief challenges.
Emotional structures exhibit dynamics during belief evaluation, influencing resistance to change.
The investigation correlated belief change with unique content types: political versus non-political.
Unclear generalization for conservatives or individuals with varying political beliefs due to participant biases.
Belief defense mechanisms utilize neural pathways for internal cognition, influenced by emotions when confronted with contradictions.
Findings underscore the significance of acknowledging emotional influences within beliefs and cognitive reasoning.