ETHICS
Universal Values
The term “value” means something that an individual or community believes has a worth that merits it being pursued,
promoted, or privileged. This can be a thing (money, food, art), a state of mind (peace, security, certainty) or a
behaviour that results from those things or states of mind (protecting innocents, telling the truth, being creative). A
value is not the same as a desire. To desire something means wanting a thing without much reflection on it; that is, a
desire might come from an instinct, urge, or physical need.
A value may originate in a desire or a series of desires, but a value arises after reflection on whether or not the thing
we desire is good. Philosophers focus on how we get from our desires to our values often by focusing on the word good.
One philosopher, G. E. Moore (1873-1958), argued that the word “good” cannot really be defined because there is no
standard against which we can discover what goodness means. He called this inability to define evaluative terms “the
naturalistic fallacy” because it assumes that there is something in nature or in reality that evaluative terms can match.
He argued that good was a non-naturalistic quality, because it cannot be verified by science (Baldwin, 2010).
Every individual will value certain things, states of minds or behaviours as these relate to his or her upbringing and
social context. Every community will privilege certain things, states and behaviours as a result of its geographical
location, historical trajectory, or ideational background. To claim that there are universal values, however, means
seeking to uncover something that applies across all persons and communities as a result of their very humanity. Such
universal values might be derived from scientific investigation, social science testing, or philosophical reflection. They
might also arise from more nefarious methods, such as imperial practices, ideological and religious proselytizing, or
economic exploitation. To explore universal values, then, requires attention not only to the values themselves but the
ways in which they have appeared in the current global order.
Values are the subject of ethical investigation. Sometimes the terms ethics, morality and values are conflated into one
subject. In English, it is common to use these terms interchangeably, but philosophers distinguish them in the
following way. Values and morals are closely related, though morals and morality, according to most philosphers,
result from rationality, while values might arise from social contexts, emotional dispositions, or rationality. As noted
above, a value is different from a simple desire, for the former is something that we want after some reflection upon
whether it is actually a good thing. Ethics, on the other hand, is the study of morals, including their origins, their uses,
their justifications, and their relationships.
There have been efforts to articulate universal human values. Professor Hans Kung, a Catholic theologian who teaches at
the University of Tubingen in Germany, helped to create a Parliament of World Religions which issued a Declaration
Toward a Global Ethic. The Hindu spiritual leader Sri Sri Ravi Shankar also issued a Universal Declaration of Human
Values. Both of these documents emphasize values, and overlap in many important ways. How can we find universal
values? There are many ways to investigate the existence of such values. Those approaches can perhaps be organized
into three broad categories: scientific, historical, and dialectic. These categories can be represented by three different
philosophers: Aristotle, Mencius, and Jürgen Habermas.
Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) is considered one of the three great philosophers of Ancient Greece. From Macedonia, he
moved to Athens as a young man where he became a student of Plato, another great philosopher (428-348 B.C.), who
himself was a student of Socrates (470-399 B.C.), perhaps the greatest Greek philosopher of antiquity. Socrates did not
write anything down, but interrogated the people of Athens about what they valued. In those interrogations, he would
often raise more questions than answers, pointing out how established traditions do not really reflect what is good for
the human person.
Plato, who wrote many dialogues using the person of Socrates as his main character, argued that ethics and values
should be understood through the idea of virtues, or the standard of excellence within particular activities as a guide
for how to act. For example, being a good captain means ensuring that a ship does not crash, that its goods and
people arrive safely at port, and that a ship remains seaworthy. When it comes to universal values, however, we are
talking about what it means to be not just a good pilot but a good human being.
Aristotle took Plato’s main idea about the virtues and tried to ground it in empirical observations; hence, he took a
scientific approach to finding out what is good and what is a universal value. Aristotle did this by comparing people to
other non-human animals and comparing different political communities. So, for Aristotle, to understand the virtue of
the human person means looking for those activities which the best people do and which make them happy.
He argued that there are two activities that differentiate human beings from all other animals: humans think and
humans live in political communities. We do know that other animals have some ability for critical reflection, such as
other primates and dolphins. And, we know that some other animals live in what look like organized political
communities, such as primates, dolphins, and even ants. But no other animals use language, giving humans the ability to
reflect critically on what they are thinking and doing. The Greek word logos means both language and reason, and it is
that word that provides Aristotle the key to finding the good and value for the human person. Humans are defined by
the combination of these two sets of activities. Aristotle concluded that the best possible person is one who engages in
two types of activity: critical reflection and political activity. He called the first set of activities the intellectual virtues
and the second set of activities the practical virtues.
Aristotle believed that people need to be educated into the virtues. Individuals might desire many things which they
believe will make them happy, such as wealth, food, drink, sex, or power. Each of these is important, according to
Aristotle, but all of them, on reflection, need to be enjoyed in moderation in order to become truly valued. Only by
using our rationality for thinking and creating a community in which thinking is encouraged, and in which education is
valued, can universal values flourish (Shields, 2016).
A second approach to discovering universal values is to focus on history and tradition. The Chinese philosopher
Mencius (372-289 B.C.) lived at roughly the same time as Aristotle. Just as Aristotle was a student of Plato who studied
under Socrates, so Mencius was a disciple of the great Chinese philosopher, Confucius (551- 479 B.C.). Some believe that
Mencius studied under the grandson of Confucius, though this is disputed. Mencius is sometimes called the “second
great Confucian scholar”, as he developed and improved upon the ideas of Confucius in important ways.
Confucius, perhaps the most famous Chinese philosopher, argued for a moral theory based on virtues. One virtue in
particular was the most important; ren, or benevolence to others. But this compassion was not directed at all people,
but rather to those within certain social systems, beginning with the family. This means that being a good person
means understanding one’s place in society and understanding the traditions and rules that arise from that place. A
central principle of Confucius is respect for one’s elders, a respect that would then radiate outward to respect for the
leaders of a society. These relationships are the focus of Confucian ethical and political thought.
Like Aristotle’s Greece, the culture in which Mencius lived had well-developed social, cultural and political structures.
Ancient China was a flourishing political system, though not without its problems. Indeed, Mencius lived during what is
sometimes called the “warring states” period in Chinese history when dynastic and political conflict was rife. Like
Aristotle, Mencius was born in one place (modern day Zhoucheng, a city in eastern China) and moved about, serving for
a time as a government official in Qi. In this role, he advised the government on their invasion of another province, Yan,
which they undertook, though Mencius resigned from his role because the ruler would not implement changes he
advocated.
Mencius adapted the teachings of Confucius, proposing four virtues: benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and
wisdom. Together, these virtues expand upon Confucius’ central one of benevolence, resulting in a fuller and more
comprehensive moral theory. But, like Confucius, Mencius believed that the family and the society provide the basis
for these virtues. To find these virtues, one needs to understand one’s place in a society and one’s respect for
tradition. Mencius argued that benevolence was most important, but he also believed that cultivating wisdom to
know just how to orient that benevolence was important as well. Because of this, he placed a great deal of emphasis
on education, as did Aristotle (Van Norden, 2017).
There are some parallels with Aristotle in terms of what counts as values but also some important differences. Both
Aristotle and Mencius see critical reflection on human life to be central; for Aristotle this translates into the
intellectual virtues, and for Mencius this translates into the virtue of wisdom. They differ, however, in how they see
the importance of politics. For Aristotle, the practical virtues mean cultivating a life in which one can participate
directly in politics; this perhaps arises from the fact that Aristotle lived in Ancient Greece which was a democracy.
Mencius does not place as much emphasis on all humans being political actors, though he himself certainly
participated in politics. Rather, because of the social and political contexts of his world, Mencius, like Confucius, placed
more emphasis on respecting one’s elders and rulers and recognizing one’s place in society and the family. Both, though,
believed that the human person flourishes when educated.
Comparing these two philosophers, we can see how we might come to the same conclusions about universal values
(the value of education and wisdom) and yet disagree about others (the value of participating directly in politics or
being ruled by wise rulers). We can also see how the methods of the two philosophers differ in coming to their
conclusions; Aristotle sought to observe the natural world to come to his conclusions while Mencius observed the social
context to come to his conclusions. There are other philosophers from different cultures who come to similar
conclusions. For instance, the Arab philosopher, al-Farabi (872-951) came to similar conclusions as Aristotle concerning
the relationship of the natural world to ethics.
In today’s interconnected world, there is another way of seeking to find universal values, which we might call the
dialectic. This method involves engaging in debate and dialogue with others who come from different perspectives in
order to come to some consensus about what we all agree upon. One modern day philosopher who advocates for this
approach is the German Jürgen Habermas (1929-). In his early life, Habermas was a Marxist thinker, but he moved away
from strict Marxism to embrace a more nuanced critical theory. His association with a group of philosphers living in
Frankfurt led him to be associated with the Frankfurt School, which sought to combine critical reflection on social and
economic matters with an appreciation for democratic principles.
Habermas proposed what he called “an ideal speech situation” as a way to capture how ethical and political dialogue
took place. This is an imagined approach to dialoguing about complex issues in which all persons are equally able to
discuss and debate their positions. The goal of such a situation is to find some consensus by which the community can
advance its ideas and values. Habermas has written about how modern democracies can capture this approach
through combining the roles of legislators and judges; the legislatures provide a space to debate making laws while
judiciaries provide a space for debate about legal disagreement. He has also argued that the European Union provides
an example of how an international order might be designed that will lead states and their peoples to peacefully
interact in order to advance certain values.
This method differs from both the scientific and the historical. Rather than relying on abstract scientific observation
or respect for historical traditions, the dialectic approach points to the creation of spaces in which disagremeents and
differing political views can be aired in order to reach some consensus. Underlying it is the presumption that universal
values do exist, but that they can only come about through finding the space to debate differences. Furthermore,
there is the need to continually recreate those spaces to ensure that future disagreements can be resolved (Bohman
and Reig, 2017).
One example of how the consensus model might work can be found in the way in which the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) was created. Rights are not the same as values, for they express a particular normative ideal
that arose out of liberalism. Underlying the UDHR, however, are important values, such as the values of human
security, free speech, and equality. These values could be expressed in language other than rights, but they do
represent something close to a body of universal values.
More importantly, the process by which the UDHR came into existence mirrors the consensus model described above.
The UDHR was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948. The idea for such a
document was proposed in the General Assembly in 1946. The United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC),
one of the six main organs of the United Nations established by the United Nations Charter in 1946, was tasked with
developing the document, and to do this it created a drafting committee chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt. The drafting
committee included individuals from around the world, representing very different political, religious and ideological
beliefs. The drafting efforts were aided by an international commission organized by the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which published a book compiling 20 essays on whether or not there
existed any shared rights authored by intellectual leaders from around the world. The book included contributions from
some of the most famous religious and philosophical figures of the day, including Mahatma Gandhi. As one of the
contributors, the French Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain, said about the deliberations of the Commission:
It is related that at one of the meetings of a UNESCO National Commission where Human Rights were being discussed,
someone expressed astonishment that certain champions of violently opposed ideologies had agreed on a list of
those rights. Yes, they said, we agree about the rights, but on condition that no one asks us why. That “why” is where
the argument begins. (Ackerly, 2017)
The UDHR is not a long document, with a preamble and 30 articles. The Declaration is not legally binding, though it did
inform the language of the two binding covenants on human rights which came into existence in the 1960s and have
been signed by almost every country in the world. The Declaration focuses on rights but it also emphasizes the
importance of dignity and the value of the individual person. Today, the United Nations Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) has made the promotion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights a
central element of its work
Again, rights are not the same as values. But what this shows us is that it is possible to find some consensus on broad
human values, in this case expressed in terms of rights.
How Moral Character is Developed
Moral Character
Damon (1988) identified six ways that social scientists have defined morality: (1) an evaluative orientation that
distinguishes good and bad and prescribes good; (2) a sense of obligation toward standards of a social collective; (3) a
sense of responsibility for acting out of concern for others; (4) a concern for the rights of others; (5) a commitment to
honesty in interpersonal relationships; and (6) a state of mind that causes negative emotional reactions to immoral
acts. This categorical scheme may not accommodate all useful definitions, particularly the more substantive definitions
offered by philosophers and theologians, but they reflect the wide variety of definitions and the need for an explicit
operational definition that can guide programming and research. A number of authors proposed definitions of moral
character in rather traditional terms. For example, Wynne and Walberg (1984) wrote that moral character is “engaging
in morally relevant conduct or words, or refraining from certain conduct or words”. Others, such as Piaget (1969)
focused on the source of one’s behavior as being especially important. He said that the essence of morality is respect for
rules and that acting on internalized principles (autonomy) represents a higher level of morality than performance based
on rules imposed by others (heteronomy). Others, such as Pritchard (1988) focused on moral character as a personality
construct: “a complex set of relatively persistent qualities of the individual person, and the term has a definite positive
connotation when it is used in discussions of moral education“ . Berkowitz (2002) said that moral character is “an
individual’s set of psychological characteristics that affect that person’s ability and inclination to function morally” . Still
others, such as Havighurst (1953) equated morality with altruism. Lickona (1991) attempted to connect psychological
and behavioral components when he said that “Good character consists of knowing the good, desiring the good, and
doing the good—habits of the mind, habits of the heart, and habits of action” .
While most researchers support a multidimensional aspect to moral character, especially Lickona’s (1991) advocacy of
cognitive, affective, and behavioral components, several authors support additional components. For example, Narvaez
and Rest (1995) suggest that the skills of moral and character development should be considered in terms of four
psychological components. They say that the focus should be on the internal processes and behavioral skills that are
required for moral behavior and propose that sensitivity, judgment, and motivation emerge from the interaction of
cognitive and affective processes.
1. Ethical Sensitivity—the perception of moral and social situations, including the ability to consider possible actions and
their repercussions in terms of the people involved;
2. Ethical Judgment—the consideration of possible alternative actions and the rationale for selecting one or more as
best;
3. Ethical Motivation—the selection of moral values most relevant in the situation and the commitment to act on that
selection;
4. Ethical Action—the ego strength combined with the psychological and social skills necessary to carry out the selected
alternative.
For Huitt (2000), moral character incorporates the underlying qualities of a person’s moral or ethical knowledge,
reasoning, values, and commitments that are routinely displayed in behavior. Character is associated with the quality of
one’s life, especially in terms of moral and ethical decisions and actions. As described in framework for developing the
whole person, Huitt (2004) placed moral character is one of three core elements that are dynamically related to both
the personal and social aspects of one’s life. That is, development in each of the ten identified domains and the other
core elements of spiritual development and personal style influence the development of one’s moral character and this
development, in turn, influences development in the ten domains and the other core elements. Berkowitz (2002)
identified seven psychological components of the “moral anatomy,” and urged scientists and educators to begin
reconstructing the “complete moral person.”
1. Moral behavior (prosocial, sharing, donating to charity, telling the truth)
2. Moral values (believe in moral goods)
3. Moral emotion (guilt, empathy, compassion)
4. Moral reasoning (about right and wrong)
5. Moral identity (morality as an aspect self-image)
6. Moral personality (enduring tendency to act with honesty, altruism, responsibility
7. “Metamoral” characteristics meaning they make morality possible even though they are not inherently moral.
Vessels’ (1998) divided cognition into moral knowing and moral reasoning. He addressed will or volition by examining
the intersections between moral feeling and both thinking (empathy, motivation) and knowing (values, beliefs), and by
defining moral behavior as intentional by definition. According to Vessels, the intersection of moral knowing, reasoning,
feeling, and behaving yields conscience, which reflects one’s
(a) past thoughts, feelings, and behavior,
(b) one’s present thoughts and feelings, and
(c) one’s view of the future in terms of feeling compelled to act morally.
He agrees with the other researchers in that moral character includes both personal and social aspects, which he
describes as personal and social integrity. There is a great deal of overlap among these psychological-component models
of moral character, particularly the conceptual models of Berkowitz (1998), Damon (1988), Huitt (2000), Lickona (1991),
Navarez and Rest (1995), and Vessels (1998). Their conceptual models bare some resemblance to those proposed by
Plato, Confucius, and Freud (Vessels). Differences are largely a matter of emphasis rather than substance. It seems
reasonable to conclude, therefore, that character is a multi-faceted psychological and behavioral phenomenon that
involves the predictable co-occurrence and inter-connectedness of its many psychological and behavioral components
with the level of character being determined by the consistency and strength with which these components co-occur in
response to challenging life events.
Philosophical and Scientific Foundations
For centuries, philosophers have debated the proper focus of moral education and character education. Library shelves
are filled with persuasive arguments about the proper focus: moral judgment, moral sensitivity, moral values, moral
emotion, moral reasoning, moral intention, moral action. Each focus corresponds to a “school of thought” or cluster of
psychological and philosophical explanations of morality and/or moral development. Each has a basic assumption about
human nature (good, bad, neither good nor bad) and related prescriptions for social action and educating children.
Reminiscent of Dewey (Gouinlock, 1994) and in keeping with Berkowitz’s (1998) call for re-constructive the complete
moral person, Damon (2002) states that it is time to move beyond the endless debates and “. . . take as our target of
moral instruction the whole child—habit and reflection, virtue and understanding, and every system of judgment, affect,
motivation, conduct, and self-identity that contributes to a child’s present and future moral life” (p. xi). Similarly,
Berkowitz said that we must ask how each theory advances our knowledge and not view them as incompatible or
mutually exclusive. The different philosophical positions led researchers to develop different hypotheses regarding
moral character and its development and collect different types of data. This, in turn, has brought the field to its current
state of development where it might appear to a naïve onlooker that there are an infinite variety of theoretical
positions. However, from a sizeable collection of psychological, sociological, and psycho-physiological theories of
morality and moral development, it is possible to extract four theory types:
1. External/Social, which includes behaviorists and sociologists who commonly view morality as a product of external
imposition in the form of consequences and/or the intentional transmission of social rules and norms, respectively;
2. Internal, which includes nativists and sociobiologists who commonly focus on genetic and maturational influences;
3. Interactional, which is divided into subcategories of instinctual (psychoanalytic, psychosocial, and socio-analytic
theories that view human nature as instinctual, undeveloped, and in need of control or socialization) and maturational
(cognitive- and affective-developmental theories and social-learning theories that view human nature as good.); and
4. Personality/Identity, which includes theories that find virtue rooted in personality and personal identity
Stages of Moral Development
Kohlberg’s theory on the stages of moral development was a modification of the work performed by Jean Piaget, the
Swiss psychologist. While Piaget described moral development as a two-stage process, Kohlberg identified six stages
within three levels. Kohlberg proposed that moral development was a process that continued throughout a person’s
lifespan. In order to isolate and describe these stages, Kohlberg presented a series of difficult moral dilemmas to groups
of young children of different ages. He then interviewed them to and out the reasoning behind each of their decisions,
and to see how moral reasoning changed as children grew older.
Level 1 - Preconventional morality
Preconventional morality is the first stage of moral development, and lasts until approximately age 9. At the
preconventional level children don’t have a personal code of morality, and instead moral decisions are shaped by the
standards of adults and the consequences of following or breaking their rules.
For example, if an action leads to punishment is must be bad, and if it leads to a reward is must be good.
Authority is outside the individual and children often make moral decisions based on the physical consequences of
actions.
Stage 1. Obedience and Punishment Orientation. The child/individual is good in order to avoid being punished. If a
person is punished, they must have done wrong.
Stage 2. Individualism and Exchange. At this stage, children recognize that there is not just one right view that is handed
down by the authorities. Different individuals have different viewpoints.
Level 2 - Conventional morality
Conventional morality is the second stage of moral development, and is characterized by an acceptance of social rules
concerning right and wrong. At the conventional level (most adolescents and adults), we begin to internalize the moral
standards of valued adult role models.
Authority is internalized but not questioned, and reasoning is based on the norms of the group to which the person
belongs.
A social system that stresses the responsibilities of relationships as well as social order is seen as desirable and must,
therefore, influence our view of what is right and wrong.
• Stage 3. Good Interpersonal Relationships. The child/individual is good in order to be seen as being a good person by
others. Therefore, answers relate to the approval of others.
• Stage 4. Maintaining the Social Order. The child/individual becomes aware of the wider rules of society, so judgments
concern obeying the rules in order to uphold the law and to avoid guilt.
Level 3 - Postconventional morality
Postconventional morality is the third stage of moral development, and is characterized by an individuals’ understanding
of universal ethical principles. These are abstract and ill-defined, but might include: the preservation of life at all costs,
and the importance of human dignity.
Individual judgment is based on self-chosen principles, and moral reasoning is based on individual rights and justice.
According to Kohlberg this level of moral reasoning is as far as most people get.
Only 10-15% are capable of the kind of abstract thinking necessary for stage 5 or 6 (post-conventional morality). That is
to say, most people take their moral views from those around them and only a minority think through ethical principles
for themselves.
• Stage 5. Social Contract and Individual Rights. The child/individual becomes aware that while rules/laws might exist
for the good of the greatest number, there are times when they will work against the interest of particular individuals.
The issues are not always clear-cut. For example, in Heinz’s dilemma, the protection of life is more important than
breaking the law against stealing.
• Stage 6. Universal Principles. People at this stage have developed their own set of moral guidelines which may or may
not fit the law. The principles apply to everyone.
E.g., human rights, justice, and equality. The person will be prepared to act to defend these principles even if it means
going against the rest of society in the process and having to pay the consequences of disapproval and or imprisonment.
Kohlberg doubted few people reached this stage.
One of the best known of Kohlberg’s (1958) stories concerns a man called Heinz who lived somewhere in Europe.
Heinz’s wife was dying from a particular type of cancer. Doctors said a new drug might save her. The drug had been
discovered by a local chemist, and the Heinz tried desperately to buy some, but the chemist was charging ten times the
money it cost to make the drug, and this was much more than the Heinz could afford.
Heinz could only raise half the money, even after help from family and friends. He explained to the chemist that his wife
was dying and asked if he could have the drug cheaper or pay the rest of the money later.
The chemist refused, saying that he had discovered the drug and was going to make money from it. The husband was
desperate to save his wife, so later that night he broke into the chemist’s and stole the drug.
Reason and Impartiality as Requirement for Ethics
Impartiality as a concept
It is all too easy to assume that the word impartiality must denote a positive, unitary concept – presumably a concept
closely linked with, if not identical to, morality. This, however, is simply not the case. Rather, there are various sorts of
behavior that may be described as ‘impartial,’ and some of these obviously have little or nothing to do with morality. A
person who chooses an accountant on the basis of her friends’ recommendations may be entirely impartial between the
various candidates (members of the pool of local accountants) with respect to their gender, their age, or where they
went to school. Yet if her choice is motivated solely by rational self-interested considerations then it is clear that the
impartiality she manifests is in no way a form of moral impartiality. To take a more extreme case, consider an insane
serial killer who chooses his victims on the basis of their resemblance to that some celebrity. The killer may be impartial
with respect to his victims’ occupations, religious beliefs, and so forth, but it would be absurd to regard this as a form of
moral impartiality.
The word ‘impartiality’, then, picks out a broad concept that need not have anything to do with morality. In this broad
sense, impartiality is probably best characterized in a negative rather than positive manner: an impartial choice is
simply one in which a certain sort of consideration (i.e. some property of the individuals being chosen between) has
no influence. An analysis along these lines has been proposed by Bernard Gert, who holds that “A is impartial in respect
R with regard to group G if and only if A’s actions in respect R are not influenced at all by which member(s) of G benefit
or are harmed by these actions” (Gert 1995, p.104). Thus, for Gert, impartiality is a property of a set of decisions made
by a particular agent, directed toward a particular group.
Gert’s analysis captures the important fact that one cannot simply ask of a given agent whether or not she is impartial.
Rather, we must also specify with regard to whom she is impartial, and in what respect. Gert’s analysis, then, permits
and indeed requires that we make fairly fine-grained distinctions between various sorts of impartiality. This is necessary,
since one and the same agent might manifest various sorts of partiality and impartiality towards various groups of
persons. Consider, for instance, a university professor who is also a mother of five children, and who is currently acting
as a member of a hiring committee. Such an agent might be impartial between her children with respect to the care they
receive (while preferring her own children over others in this respect), and also impartial between the various job
candidates; but it is clear that these two uses of the word ‘impartial’ denote very different practices. In particular, the
idea of merit applies in one case but not the other: to be impartial between job candidates is presumably to select
between them on the basis of merit, whereas to be impartial between one’s children is not to think of merit at all, but
rather to provide equal protection and care to all.
Many attempts to characterize impartiality fail to respect the distinction between the broadest, most formalistic sense
of the notion, and a more specifically moral impartiality. To say, for instance, that an impartial choice is one that is free
of bias or prejudice is to presuppose that we are dealing with a certain sort of impartiality, that which is required or
recommended by morality, or at least worthy of moral approbation. ‘Bias’ and ‘prejudice’ are loaded terms, suggesting
not only that some consideration is being excluded, but also that the exclusion is appropriate and warranted. Similarly,
the idea that impartiality requires that we give equal and/or adequate consideration to the interests of all concerned
parties goes well beyond the requirements of the merely formal notion. (In the coin toss case, it is quite clear that Phil’s
claims to the heirloom are not being given equal or adequate consideration.) As a characterization of moral impartiality,
however, this suggestion is perhaps more promising, at least in some contexts.
The Impartial Point of View
It is characteristic of modern moral thought to see impartiality as a requirement of, if not a fundamental component
of, morality. However, the precise nature of this connection remains disputed. As Brad Hooker has pointed out, there
are at least three levels at which assessments of moral impartiality may be made. First, one may ask whether moral
rules are being impartially applied. Second, impartial benevolence may be used as a direct guide to practical
decisions. And third, the content of first-order moral rules may be assessed from an impartial standpoint. (Hooker
2010).
Let’s begin with the idea that to act morally is to act from the standpoint of impartial benevolence. Many writers have
simply assumed that to assert the importance of impartiality in the context of morality just is to accept the idea of acting
from such a perspective. It is generally agreed that some sort of close connection obtains between morality and
impartiality. Indeed, the phrases ‘moral point of view’ and ‘impartial (or ‘impersonal’) point of view’ are sometimes used
interchangeably to refer to the imagined impersonal perspective from which, it is supposed, moral judgments are to be
made. As noted above, however, the word ‘impartial’ is a general term with many particular species; it follows that the
phrase ‘impartial point of view’ is itself ambiguous. At most, it might be that the moral point of view constitutes one sort
of impartial point of view.
It is not clear, however, that the demands of impartial benevolence are sufficient to exhaust those of morality.
Treating a person appropriately and respectfully may well require certain sorts of emotional and/or cognitive responses:
sensitivity to her needs and values, empathy for her suffering, and the like. But if these responses are pictured as the
results of positive traits or attributes (and not simply as, say, the result of a lack of bias or prejudice), then it is not clear
that merely being impartial between persons is sufficient to guarantee that one will possess and display the necessary
sensitivities. Indeed, characterizations of impartial agents which proceed in negative terms (that is, by defining various
preferences, emotions or bits of information that she does not possess or that do not move her) often risk picturing the
impartial agent as impersonal and even indifferent (Henberg 1978; Brandt 1954).
A second problem for the claim that the moral point of view is identical with (some version of) the impartial point of
view – or indeed, for any view which identifies morality and impartiality in the direct sense – is that it seems plausible
to regard some forms of moral partiality as morally admirable, and perhaps even morally required (Blum 1980;
Cottingham 1983, 1986, 1996; Jeske & Fumerton 1997; Jollimore 2001; Kapur 1991; Kekes 1981; Keller 2013; MacIntyre
1984; Oldenquist 1982). Loyalty to one’s family, community or country, for instance, is commonly regarded as a virtue.
Yet such an attitude is a clear and indeed paradigmatic example of partiality, requiring that an agent feel and act
differently toward one set of persons than she does toward humanity in general. Similarly, certain specific moral duties
arising from certain particular relationships seem to involve partiality in an irreducible manner. Parents, for example, are
thought to be morally obliged to take special care of their own children; to regard one’s child as merely one among
millions would be regarded as highly eccentric if not monstrous. Of course, some moral duties do require that an agent
be impartial in performing them. But on common sense moral views at least, impartiality seems mostly to be required in
the context of specific roles – such as when a person is acting as a judge, an umpire, a journalist, or a representative of
some public institution; or, perhaps, when we are evaluating and selecting first-order moral rules. (Baron 1991; Blum
1980; Cottingham 1983). The idea that impartiality is a pervasive and universal moral requirement that should be
directly manifested in our thoughts and practices during daily life seems to contradict our ordinary moral intuitions.
Whether there exists such a thing as morally admirable partiality is the main issue that separates the so-called partialists
from the impartialists. Partialists, in general, tend to claim that morally admirable partiality does exist, that it cannot be
reduced to any form of impartiality at a more fundamental level, and that these facts pose a serious problem for those
who claim that morality and (some form of) impartiality are identical, or even closely related. Impartialists, by contrast,
either deny the existence of morally admirable partiality altogether, or hold that any apparent cases are in fact
ultimately reducible to impartial standards (see section 6). Thus impartialists hold that – contrary, perhaps, to
appearances – impartiality is, indeed, a pervasive and universal requirement of morality.
Feelings and Reason: Upsurge of feeling is natural and what we do with them makes us ethical or non-ethical
Feelings and Reason
There is no consensus about a standard use of ‘reason,’ but it is frequently used as a contrast or complementary term
for ‘faith.’ On this view, reason stands for the faculties of rational reflection, sensations and experience, memory and
inference, and any a priori or a posteriori judgments that may be exercised without relying on a religious faith that is
unsupported by reason. In this schema, faith is beyond reason, but it may or may not be incompatible with reason.
Such usage is not, however, uniform, for some philosophers argue that the content of religious faith (e.g., there is a
Creator God and Redeemer) is supported by reason.
Feelings (anger, love, hate, happiness) are sometimes distinguished from reason in ethical theory and thought to be in
tension, though more recent works by Robert Solomon and others treat emotions as essentially involving reason. Anger,
for example, involves a person condemning or feeling rage on the basis of reason, e.g. a belief that a wronged injury has
occurred. In religious ethics, there is debate over the voluntariness of emotions (is a person responsible for their
emotions?), the relationship of emotions and action (e.g. perhaps one can have a duty to engage in loving action, but it
is more problematic to suppose that a person can have a duty to feel love as an emotion), and the ethical status and
definition of emotions (e.g. what is the difference between love and lust?).
Conscience
Conscience is the power to discern what appears to be morally right or wrong, a virtue or vice. Religious ethicists debate
the extent to which a person’s conscience is normative: if a person’s conscience leads her to think X is morally required,
does she have a duty to do X? Problem cases include persons whose conscience may be disordered but not due to any
blameworthy act of the person herself.
Guilt and Shame
There is a distinction between objective guilt and feelings of guilt. One may be guilty of some act (betrayal of a friend)
and yet have no feelings of guilt. Likewise, one may have feelings of guilt (one feels guilt for surviving an accident), and
yet have not objective guilt (it isn’t their fault they survived). Customarily, it is assumed that you can only be guilty of
what you are responsible (but this might not always be the case.
Shame is often thought to differ from guilt insofar as you may feel shame over something you have no control over. A
white European male may feel shame about the European colonization of Africa, even though he has might not be
blameworthy as an individual.
Courage
Ancient, medieval, and some modern uses of the term in English presuppose that courage involves the perceived risk-
taking for a good, or at least an ostensibly good cause. Risk-taking that is not for the good has customarily been
described with other terms such as boldness or recklessness in the context Aristotle uses in describing an excess that
fails to achieve a golden mean (moderation).
Reason and Emotion in Ancient Sources
While the current, and in our view the most plausible, account of emotions construes the feelings in terms of cognitive
judgments (anger cannot successfully be analyzed only in terms of physiological sensations, for the sensations may be
present without anger), the emotions are often considered quite different from reason in Ancient Greece. So, consider
these lines from Medea just before she kills her children to avenge the betrayal of Jason:
“Go, leave me; I cannot bear to see you longer. Overcome by grief, now I understand what I am about to do; Passion
–that cause of our most dire woes – has vanquished my rational power.”
It would be not just a stretch (but false) to claim that there is a unified account of emotion, passion, and desire, on the
one hand, and reason on the other in Ancient Greece, but the tension between the two is poignant. A particularly brutal
portrait of someone being taken over by passion (in this case it is the rage of the wolf or Lyssa) is when Diomedes goes
berserk on the battlefield before the City of Troy in the Iliad. In general (and making this claim at the risk of over
simplification), the philosophers often portrayed evil as something that is unnatural or something that is an aberration
or perversion of something that ought to be good. And while following one’s good or natural law is what we ought to
do, sometimes doing so can be at a great price, as when Antigone follows a law that is deeper and takes primacy over a
King’s edict (she honors her brother by burying his body notwithstanding King Creon commands that the brother’s body
be left unburied, and thus disgraced). In the play Antigone, we seem to see that NOMOS (the rule of law) is more
ancient and authoritative than the rule of Kings.
In response to the madness of disordered passion (whether this is in the shape of the Minotaemotion and peace of
mindur that Theseus must slay with the help of the beautiful Ariadne or the madness that is instilled by Dionysus in the
Bacchae) philosophers sought to use their skills in calming the soul and enhance the role of reason in human affairs. In
Isocrates’ Panegyrics, philosophy “was given to the world by our city.” Philosophers were not all opposed to a life of
passion and desire. Indeed, Aristotle thinks that feeling pleasure in right ways is essential for a person to be good. But
such feelings must be in moderation.
The 7-Step Moral Reasoning Model
Moral reasoning is sometimes affected by emotions which blinds us from deciding and seeing what acts are needed to
do what is right from wrong. So in order to decide and do what is actually right, we must do these steps in order to
fairly do an act and not be bias about anything.
1.First step in the Moral Reasoning Model is to gather the facts.
Some moral dilemmas can be resolved just by clarifying facts of the case in question. But in more complex cases,
gathering the facts is the indispensable first step before any ethical analysis and reflection of the case. In examining a
case, we want to know the available facts at hand , as well as any facts presently not known but that need to be
determined. We must ask not only “what do we know?” in order to generate an intelligent, ethical decision.
2. Second step is determining the ethical issues.
The moral issues should be correctly stated in terms of competing interests. It is these conflicting interest that
practically make for a moral dilemma. The issues must be presented in a P vs. Q format to reflect the interest that are
colliding in a specific moral dilemma. For instance many ethical decisions, especially at the end of a patient’s life, can be
stated in terms of patient autonomy (or someones right to make his/her decision about medical care) vs. the sanctity of
life (the duty to preserve life).
3.Third step is identifying the principles that have a bearing on the case.
In any moral dilemma, there are sure moral values or principles that are vital to the rival positions being taken. It is very
significant to recognize these principles, and in some cases, to decide whether some principles are to be weighted more
heavily than others.
4.Forth step is listing the alternatives.
This step involves coming up with the various alternative courses of action as part of the creative thinking included in
resolving a moral dilemma. Though there will be some alternatives which you will rule out without much thought, in
general , the more alternatives that are listed, the better the chance that your list will include some high-quality ones.
Also, you may come up with some very creative alternatives that you had not considered before.
5.Fifth is comparing the alternatives with the principles.
This step involves eliminating alternatives according to the moral principles that have a bearing on the case. In many
cases, the case will be resolved at this point, since the principles will remove all alternatives except one. The purpose of
this comparison is to determine is not forthcoming, then the next step in the model should be considered. Some of the
alternatives, at the least, may be rejected by this step of comparison.
6.Sixth step is weighing the consequences.
If the principles do not produce a clear decision, then a consideration of the consequences of the remaining available
alternatives is in order. Both positive and negative consequences are to be considered. They should be informally
weighted since some positive consequences are more beneficial than others, and some negative consequences are more
detrimental than others.
7.The last but not the least step is making a decision.
Since deliberation ought not to go on forever, a decision must be made at some point. It must be realized that one
common element to moral dilemmas is that there are no easy and painless solutions to them. Normally, the decision
that is made is one that possesses the least number of problems or negative consequences, not one that is devoid of
them.
The Difference Between Reason and Will
Reason
The faculty of reason has two employments. For the most part, we have engaged in an analysis of theoretical reason
which has determined the limits and requirements of the employment of the faculty of reason to obtain knowledge.
Theoretical reason, Kant says, makes it possible to cognize what is. But reason has its practical employment in
determining what ought to be as well. This distinction roughly corresponds to the two philosophical enterprises of
metaphysics and ethics. Reason’s practical use is manifest in the regulative function of certain concepts that we must
think with regard to the world, even though we can have no knowledge of them.
Kant believes that, “Human reason is by its nature architectonic.” That is, reason thinks of all cognitions as belonging
to a unified and organized system. Reason is our faculty of making inferences and of identifying the grounds behind
every truth. It allows us to move from the particular and contingent to the global and universal. It infers that “Caius is
mortal” from the fact that “Caius is a man” and the universal claim, “All men are mortal.” In this fashion, reason seeks
higher and higher levels of generality in order to explain the way things are. In a different kind of example, the biologist’s
classification of every living thing into a kingdom, phylum, class, order, family, genus, and species, illustrates reason’s
ambition to subsume the world into an ordered, unified system. The entire empirical world, Kant argues, must be
conceived of by reason as causally necessitated (as we saw in the Analogies). We must connect, “one state with a
previous state upon which the state follows according to a rule.” Each cause, and each cause’s cause, and each
additional ascending cause must itself have a cause. Reason generates this hierarchy that combines to provide the mind
with a conception of a whole system of nature. Kant believes that it is part of the function of reason to strive for a
complete, determinate understanding of the natural world. But our analysis of theoretical reason has made it clear that
we can never have knowledge of the totality of things because we cannot have the requisite sensations of the totality,
hence one of the necessary conditions of knowledge is not met. Nevertheless, reason seeks a state of rest from the
regression of conditioned, empirical judgments in some unconditioned ground that can complete the series. Reason’s
structure pushes us to accept certain ideas of reason that allow completion of its striving for unity. We must assume the
ideas of God, freedom, and immortality, Kant says, not as objects of knowledge, but as practical necessities for the
employment of reason in the realm where we can have knowledge. By denying the possibility of knowledge of these
ideas, yet arguing for their role in the system of reason, Kant had to, “annul knowledge in order to make room for faith.”
Reason and Freedom
For Kant, as we have seen, the drive for total, systematic knowledge in reason can only be fulfilled with assumptions that
empirical observation cannot support. The metaphysical facts about the ultimate nature of things in themselves must
remain a mystery to us because of the spatiotemporal constraints on sensibility. When we think about the nature of
things in themselves or the ultimate ground of the empirical world, Kant has argued that we are still constrained to think
through the categories, we cannot think otherwise, but we can have no knowledge because sensation provides our
concepts with no content. So, reason is put at odds with itself because it is constrained by the limits of its transcendental
structure, but it seeks to have complete knowledge that would take it beyond those limits.
Freedom plays a central role in Kant’s ethics because the possibility of moral judgments presupposes it. Freedom is an
idea of reason that serves an indispensable practical function. Without the assumption of freedom, reason cannot act.
If we think of ourselves as completely causally determined, and not as uncaused causes ourselves, then any attempt
to conceive of a rule that prescribes the means by which some end can be achieved is pointless. We cannot both think
of myself as entirely subject to causal law and as being able to act according to the conception of a principle that gives
guidance to my will. We cannot help but think of our actions as the result of an uncaused cause if we are to act at all and
employ reason to accomplish ends and understand the world.
So reason has an unavoidable interest in thinking of itself as free. That is, theoretical reason cannot demonstrate
freedom, but practical reason must assume it for the purpose of action. Having the ability to make judgments and apply
reason puts us outside that system of causally necessitated events. “Reason creates for itself the idea of a spontaneity
that can, on its own, start to act–without, i.e., needing to be preceded by another cause by means of which it is
determined to action in turn, according to the law of causal connection,” Kant says. In its intellectual domain, reason
must think of itself as free.
It is dissatisfying that he cannot demonstrate freedom; nevertheless, it comes as no surprise that we must think of
ourselves as free. In a sense, Kant is agreeing with the common sense view that how we choose to act makes a
difference in how I actually act. Even if it were possible to give a predictive empirical account of why we act as we do,
say on the grounds of a functionalist psychological theory, those considerations would mean nothing to me in my
deliberations. When I make a decision about what to do, about which car to buy, for instance, the mechanism at work in
my nervous system makes no difference to me. I still have to peruse Consumer Reports, consider my options, reflect on
my needs, and decide on the basis of the application of general principles. The first person perspective is unavoidable,
hence the deliberative, intellectual process of choice is unavoidable.
Will
The will, Kant says, is the faculty of acting according to a conception of law. When we act, whether or not we achieve
what we intend with our actions is often beyond our control, so the morality of our actions does not depend upon
their outcome. What we can control, however, is the will behind the action. That is, we can will to act according to
one law rather than another. The morality of an action, therefore, must be assessed in terms of the motivation
behind it. If two people, Smith and Jones, perform the same act, from the same conception of the law, but events
beyond Smith’s control prevent her from achieving her goal, Smith is not less praiseworthy for not succeeding. We
must consider them on equal moral ground in terms of the will behind their actions.
The only thing that is good without qualification is the good will, Kant says. All other candidates for an intrinsic good
have problems, Kant argues. Courage, health, and wealth can all be used for ill purposes, Kant argues, and therefore
cannot be intrinsically good. Happiness is not intrinsically good because even being worthy of happiness, Kant says,
requires that one possess a good will. The good will is the only unconditional good despite all encroachments.
Misfortune may render someone incapable of achieving her goals, for instance, but the goodness of her will remains.
Goodness cannot arise from acting on impulse or natural inclination, even if impulse coincides with duty. It can only
arise from conceiving of one’s actions in a certain way. A shopkeeper, Kant says, might do what is in accord with duty
and not overcharge a child. Kant argues, “it is not sufficient to do that which should be morally good that it conform to
the law; it must be done for the sake of the law.” (Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Akademie pagination 390)
There is a clear moral difference between the shopkeeper that does it for his own advantage to keep from offending
other customers and the shopkeeper who does it from duty and the principle of honesty.(Ibid., 398) Likewise, in another
of Kant’s carefully studied examples, the kind act of the person who overcomes a natural lack of sympathy for other
people out of respect for duty has moral worth, whereas the same kind act of the person who naturally takes pleasure in
spreading joy does not. A person’s moral worth cannot be dependent upon what nature endowed them with
accidentally. The selfishly motivated shopkeeper and the naturally kind person both act on equally subjective and
accidental grounds. What matters to morality is that the actor think about their actions in the right manner.
We might be tempted to think that the motivation that makes an action good is having a positive goal–to make people
happy, or to provide some benefit. But that is not the right sort of motive, Kant says. No outcome, should we achieve it,
can be unconditionally good. Fortune can be misused, what we thought would induce benefit might actually bring harm,
and happiness might be undeserved. Hoping to achieve some particular end, no matter how beneficial it may seem, is
not purely and unconditionally good. It is not the effect or even the intended effect that bestows moral character on an
action. All intended effects “could be brought about through other causes and would not require the will of a rational
being, while the highest and unconditional good can be found only in such a will.” (Ibid., 401) It is the possession of a
rationally guided will that adds a moral dimension to one’s acts. So it is the recognition and appreciation of duty itself
that must drive our actions.
Moral Theories and Mental Frames and Why They Are Important
Moral Theories
Through the ages, there have emerged multiple common moral theories and traditions. We will cover each one briefly
below with explanations and how they differ from other moral theories.
Consequentialism
Consequentialist theories, unlike virtue and deontological theories, hold that only the consequences, or outcomes, of
actions matter morally. According to this view, acts are deemed to be morally right solely on the basis of their
consequences. The most common form of consequentialism is utilitarianism.
Deontology
Deontological theories base morality on certain duties, or obligations, and claim that certain actions are intrinsically
right or wrong, that is, right or wrong in themselves, regardless of the consequences that may follow from those
actions. What makes a choice or an action right is its conformity with a moral norm. Thus, an agent has a duty to act
in accordance with a moral norm, irrespective of the (potentially beneficial) effects of acting otherwise.
We might say that parents, for example, have an obligation to take care of their children. On a deontological view,
parents must fulfill this obligation, even if breaking the obligation were to result, for the parents, in some great
benefit (increased financial savings, for example).
The deontological view holds that some actions cannot be justified by their consequences. In short, for the deontologist,
the ends do not justify the means.
Indeed, Immanuel Kant, whose formulation of deontological ethics is perhaps the most well known, wrote that one must
“act so that you treat humanity, both in your own person and in that of another, always as an end and never merely
as a means.” As with other deontologists (Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, for example), Kant held that the basis of our
moral requirements is a standard of rationality. In the case of Kant, the standard is a categorical imperative. This single
principle of rationality comprehensively includes all of our particular duties.
Justice as fairness refers to the conception of justice that John Rawls presents in A Theory of Justice. This conception of
justice concerns society’s basic structure—that is, “society’s main political, constitutional, social, and economic
institutions and how they fit together to form a unified scheme of social cooperation over time.”
Rawls constructs justice as fairness in a rather narrow framework and explicitly states, “Justice as fairness is not a
complete contact theory. Its purpose is to show how we ought to allocate a cooperative surplus of resources to
individuals in society. As a result, justice as fairness relies on two implicit assumptions about the societies in question:
first, social cooperation is possible and can work to everyone’s mutual advantage, and second, there exists a
moderate surplus of available resources to be distributed. Justice as fairness cannot be used to determine the just
distribution of sacrifices to be made by a society’s members when resources are scarce. More generally, it cannot help
us identify just social policies in societies where background conditions (e.g., scarcity of natural resources, cultural
barriers, war) have eliminated the possibility of mutually advantageous social cooperation.
The process for determining how the basic structure should be arranged is based on a thought experiment in which
rational, mutually disinterested individuals choose principles of justice from behind a veil of ignorance, a condition
that specifies they do not know specific details about themselves (e.g., personal values, race, gender, level of income)
or the society in which they live (e.g., societal stage of development, economic circumstances). However, when
choosing these principles, the parties do possess general social, psychological, and economic knowledge, and they also
know that the circumstances of justice obtain in the society to which they belong.
From this hypothetical initial situation, which Rawls calls the “original position,” these individuals will presumably
endorse two principles of justice. The first, known as the equal liberty principle, is that “each person is to have an equal
right to the most extensive scheme of basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others,” and the
second is that “social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both reasonably expected to be to
everyone’s advantage, and attached to offices and positions open to all.”
Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism states that actions are morally right if and only if they maximize the good (or, alternatively, minimizes
the bad). Classical utilitarians like Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill (as well as many contemporary utilitarians)
take ‘the good’ to be pleasure or well-being. Thus, actions are morally right, on this view, if and only if they maximize
pleasure or well-being or minimize suffering.
This approach is sometimes called hedonistic utilitarianism. For hedonistic utilitarians, the rightness or our actions are
determined solely on the basis of consequences of pleasure or pain.
Utilitarian theories may take other goods into consideration. Preference utilitarianism, for example, takes into account
not just pleasures, but the satisfaction of any preference.
Utilitarianism can also be divided along other lines. Act-utilitarianism claims that we must apply a utilitarian calculation
to each and every individual action. By making this calculation, we can thereby determine the moral rightness or
wrongness of each action we plan to take.
Rule-utilitarianism eases the burden that act-utilitarianism places on practical reasoning by establishing moral rules
that, when followed, brings about the best consequences. Rule-utilitarianism can be illustrated by the rule “do not kill.”
As a general rule, we would be better off, that is, the best consequences, or state of affairs, would be brought about, if
we all followed the rule “do not kill.”
Virtue Ethics
Virtue ethics takes its philosophical root in the work of the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle. Virtue theories claim
that ethics is about agents, not actions or consequences. Living an ethical, or good life, then, consists in the
possession of the right character traits (virtues) and having, as a result, the appropriate moral character.
Unlike deontological accounts, which focus on learning and, subsequently, living by moral rules, virtue accounts place
emphasis on developing good habits of character. In essence, this means developing virtuous character traits –
dispositions to act in a certain way – and avoiding bad character traits, or vices of character.
Character traits commonly regarded as virtues include courage, temperance, justice, wisdom, generosity, and good
temper (as well as many others). This approach to normative ethics also emphasizes moral education. Since traits of
character are developed in youth, adults are responsible for instilling in their children the appropriate dispositions.
Framing
A frame of reference, or point of view, refers to the way we look at a given situation. How a person views that
situation can affect her understanding of the facts and influence how she determines right from wrong.
Some frames minimize or even omit the ethical aspects of a decision. For example, studies show that if people are
prompted to frame a situation only in terms of money or economic interests, they often leave out ethical
considerations.
In a famous study, a day care center having difficulty with parents picking up their children on time started charging a
fine for being late. Parents then reframed the issue from an ethical one (“It’s not nice of me to burden the staff in this
way”) to a business one (“I can buy the staff’s time by paying this fine”). Late pick-ups increased rather than decreased
due to this change in the parents’ frame of reference.
So, by remembering to consider the ethical implications of any situation, we can keep ethics in our frame of reference
when making decisions.