The Nature of Statutes
- Congress writes statutes to set policy—so-called legislative supremacy.
- Judges’ constitutional duty: implement congressional policy if the statute is constitutional.
- Interpretation = uncovering “legislative intent,” i.e., what Congress sought to achieve with the chosen words.
Sources of Difficulty in Interpretation
- Language limitations
- Words are inherently imperfect; they cannot anticipate every factual permutation.
- Human drafters are fallible and cannot foresee the future.
- Political compromise often forces vague or sloppy wording.
- Result: even “simple” statutes hide complex interpretive puzzles.
Teaching Illustration: “No vehicles in the park.”
- Originated in 1950s debate between H. L. A. Hart (Oxford) & Lon Fuller (Harvard).
- Apparent simplicity masks interpretive challenges.
- Immediate “core” / “easy” applications (Hart’s term):
- Cars, trucks, motorcycles.
- Purpose analysis supports this: safety, noise, exhaust, congestion.
- Hard cases introduced for classroom analysis:
- Bicycle ridden into the park → ticketed.
- Ambulance driven into the park for an emergency → ticketed.
1. Ordinary Meaning
- Supreme Court directive: always start here.
- Rationale: Congress chose these words; begin by asking how ordinary readers would understand them.
- Method:
- Examine how the key term is used in common language.
- Dictionaries offer empirical snapshots of usage.
- Example with “vehicle” (American Heritage definitions):
- “A device or structure for transporting persons or things; a conveyance.”
- “A self-propelled conveyance that runs on tires; a motor vehicle.”
- Ambiguity arises when multiple definitions plausibly fit—lawyers label the statute ambiguous.
- Bicycle = fits def. 1 (broader), not def. 2 (narrower & motorized).
- Ambulance = fits both definitions ⇒ no lexical ambiguity, yet policy concerns still surface.
2. Purpose / Policy (Teleological Approach)
- If text alone doesn’t resolve the ambiguity, ask: Which reading better serves the statute’s policy?
- Inferring policy:
- Common sense (noise, safety, pollution) often suffices.
- Legislative history & preambles (not discussed in depth here) can provide explicit statements.
- Application:
- Bicycle:
- Noise/exhaust concerns absent.
- Collision risk exists but may be less than cars & is tied to typical recreational park use.
- Result: many interpreters exclude bicycles from prohibition or regulate separately.
- Ambulance:
- Clearly a vehicle, yet banning it defeats life-saving emergency response—an absurd result.
- Judges often craft an implicit exception (“unless the vehicle is engaged in emergency services”).
- Justifications for judicial flexibility:
- Congress legislates in broad strokes, cannot list every exception (e.g., ambulances, police cars, sanitation trucks).
- Courts sometimes “rewrite” to avoid absurd or counter-purpose outcomes, assuming Congress would have done so with greater foresight.
- Textual meaning and statutory purpose form a feedback loop:
- Text first → reveals possible meanings.
- Purpose second → filters those meanings by alignment with legislative goals.
- Only rarely should courts override plain meaning due to absurdity doctrine.
Practical & Philosophical Implications
- Shows tension between fidelity to enacted text vs. faithful execution of legislative policy.
- Raises debates on judicial activism vs. restraint:
- Should judges ever deviate from clear words to achieve policy coherence?
- Fuller (natural law leanings) vs. Hart (legal positivism) famously disagreed.
- Real-world stakes: traffic enforcement, emergency response, environmental protection, individual liberties.
Take-Away Checklist for Interpreting Any Statute
- Identify the operative text.
- Ask: Does ordinary meaning clearly resolve the dispute?
- If ambiguous, articulate the competing definitions.
- Investigate statutory purpose/policy.
- Consider whether one reading produces an absurd or unintended result.
- Decide which interpretation best harmonizes text & purpose—recognizing limits on judicial rewriting.
Use the bicycle vs. ambulance hypotheticals as recurring references whenever analyzing statutory interpretation problems: they crystallize how ordinary meaning, policy, and the absurdity doctrine interact.