16B

Stuart Britain and the Crisis of Monarchy, 1603-1702

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SECTION THREE From republic to restored and limited monarchy, 1649-78

Topic 16 Cromwell, the Protectorates, the Major-Generals and relations with the Political Nation

Key Question B: Why did the Republic finally collapse in 1660?

The end of the Major-Generals

The rule of the Major-Generals was short-lived for the following underlying reasons:

while some of the Major-Generals took to their task with zeal and enthusiasm, overall they were too inconsistent in their policies to establish a coherent military rule;
their overbearing military presence in local affairs totally alienated the majority of the Political Nation (the landed gentry);
the Major-Generals were heavily compromised by their close association with several unpopular issues: the obvious sign of military rule, their lower social origins, the growth of religious radicalism, higher taxation and unwanted interference in local government.

At the beginning of the Second Protectorate Parliament, the occurrence of two other events ensured the end of the Major-Generals:

The Case of James Nayler, 1656: In 1656, the Quaker James Nayler caused a serious public disturbance by re-enacting Christ’s entry into Jerusalem on the first Palm Sunday by riding into Bristol on a donkey surrounded by adoring women. He was arrested by local magistrates and sent to London for trial. MPs decided to make an example of Nayler by using his House of Commons interrogation as a forum to warn that such blasphemous behaviour was a consequence of too much religious toleration. Cromwell was on good personal terms with the Quaker leader, George Fox, and had intervened on occasion to prevent Quakers being prosecuted. He was therefore appalled by the self-

righteous zeal shown by MPs in subjecting Nayler to a series of brutal punishments, which included the branding of his tongue with a ‘B’ for ‘Blasphemer’. Cromwell angrily wrote to the Speaker of the House to inform him that there was nothing in the Instrument that conferred on them the legal powers they had claimed in denying Nayler his liberty of conscience.

The defeat of the Militia Bill, 1657: In the summer of 1656, under the urgent need to raise further funds to maintain the system, the Major-Generals had collectively attempted to influence the elections for the Second Protectorate Parliament. During this Parliament’s first session, John Desborough, the leading spokesman for the Major-Generals, introduced a Militia Bill which would renew the Decimation Tax on a permanent basis. MPs decisively rejected the bill by a vote of 124-88 in February 1657. In doing so, they were rejecting the rule of the Major-Generals itself. Cromwell was already well aware of the unpopularity of the regime – the protest slogan ‘No swordsmen, no decimators’ had been widely voiced around the country. He therefore allowed the system to lapse early in 1657, bringing an end to the Republic’s latest political experiment.

The offer of the Crown to Cromwell

Following the defeat of the Militia Bill, a faction known as the ‘new Cromwellians’ emerged. This was a group of mostly civilian (i.e., non-Army) MPs who believed in the virtues of the old system of government and social order, but were also sufficiently flexible to accept that the Protectorate could be reshaped to incorporate the new values that had been developing in England since the Civil War. It was their belief that the more Cromwell could be distanced from his allies in the military, the more the Protectorate would become acceptable as a form of government for the majority.

The new Cromwellians formalised their views in an alternative document to the Instrument. Published in March 1657 and called The Humble Petition and Advice, this was a call for a new regime with the following key features:

Cromwell would be King, not just Lord Protector;
the House of Lords would return as a chamber nominated by Cromwell to balance the power of the Commons;
Parliament would gain the power to nominate the great offices of state, would approve all taxation and would oversee the cutting of the number of soldiers in the Army to ease the burden of taxation;
there would be regular elections and limited religious toleration;
provision would be made for a hereditary succession.

This constitution appealed to Cromwell on the grounds that it granted him legitimate and lawful authority directly from Parliament, which, as a political conservative, is what he wanted. For the new Cromwellians, the Humble Petition would restore a system where the powers and privileges of the leader were well-established and known to everyone. This, in their eyes, was safer than embarking on another new and uncertain constitutional experiment.

When the plans of the new Cromwellians became public, it provoked an angry confrontation between the Lord Protector and the Army Generals. In a meeting with around 100 officers, Cromwell blamed the Army for many of the constitutional crises of the 1650s. He told them it was time “to lay aside arbitrary proceedings so unacceptable to the nation” and instead build the government upon more solid foundations. The following month, Parliament voted to offer Cromwell the kingship by a majority of two to one. A week later, the Humble Petition was presented to him on the understanding that he had to accept or reject the whole package of reforms, including the Crown, outright.

Evidence suggests that Cromwell certainly gave the offer of kingship much thought. During the spring of 1657, rumours that Cromwell was seriously considering becoming King led to a series of petitions from Army officers urging him to reject such a course. Cromwell agonised over the decision for several more weeks. At the same time, he wore down Parliament’s insistence that the package was non-negotiable. When it was clear that he could accept the constitutional basis of the Humble Petition without accepting the crown at the same time, he gave his final answer: the offer of kingship was rejected.

Cromwell’s acceptance of the Humble Petition in a modified form represented a compromise. He had now strengthened the civilian base of the Protectorate, but the Army still remained the major force within it. This was clear in the way that Cromwell used his authority to appoint a large number of his officer colleagues to seats in the restored Upper House. Since this chamber of 40 members had the power to veto legislation, this gave them considerable power. For committed republicans, however, the new arrangements were simply kingship in another name. Subordinating the will of Parliament to the power of the Army was again condemned, and the Humble Petition was criticised as no more than a ‘meaningless tinkering’ with the existing system.

In July 1657, a month after Cromwell’s second formal installation as Protector, Parliament went into recess. Already there were signs that the adoption of the Humble Petition had not solved England’s problems. Cromwell was obliged to dismiss from the Council John Lambert, creator of the Instrument of Government, and six other long-standing colleagues, for refusing to declare loyalty to the new constitution. This suggests that Cromwell had failed in his aim of establishing a government sufficiently representative to be widely acceptable.

When the second session of the Second Protectorate Parliament began in January 1658, republicans who had been excluded from its first session on the grounds that they were ‘unfit persons’ according to the Instrument of Government, could now return. Led by Sir Arthur Haselrig, they immediately launched into an attack on the Humble Petition, blaming it for high taxation, investing too much power in the Protector and maintaining the Army’s illegitimate influence in politics.

Cromwell’s difficulties were increased by the depletion of his key supporters in the Commons, the ablest of whom he had nominated to sit in the Upper House. Fearing that a petition circulated by the republicans that called for the abandonment of the Protectorate and the restoration of the Rump was gaining favour, Cromwell ended the session prematurely in February 1658. In his closing speech, he warned that Charles Stuart was readying himself to restore the monarchy, and was about to seize upon the chaos caused by the dissension within Parliament and the Army by launching an invasion force. In what sounded like an emotional farewell to Parliament, he ended on a note of defiance: “Let God judge between you and me”.

By mid-1658, the regime was in deep financial crisis, heavily dependent on loans from the City of London. Yet there was some good news – a naval victory over Spain at the Battle of the Dunes, suggesting that the nation had regained God’s favour. Government continued to function relatively effectively, even if there were no major reform initiatives. There was even thought of summoning another Parliament. However, with his own health in decline, Cromwell had to contend with the deaths of both his son-in-law and daughter in August. A month later, Cromwell himself died. His effigy lay in state for two months before being buried with full ceremony. The Protectorate passed smoothly to his nominated successor and eldest son, Richard.

Republican divisions and relations with the Political Nation, 1658-60

Oliver Cromwell had managed to maintain an uneasy balance between the demands of the various groups within the Political Nation through his personal authority and power. However, he had failed to create a self-sustaining system of government, despite experimenting with several different constitutional arrangements. Consequently, his son Richard inherited a power vacuum in which four main political groupings vied for influence:

the Army;
republican MPs;
Presbyterians;
members of the various radical sects.

To these can be added a fifth element, the royalists, encouraged back into action by the death of Cromwell and the inexperience of the new Protector.

An important division had also begun to open up in the Army:

a number of the more senior officers, led by John Lambert, wished to maintain the Protectorate regime laid out by the Instrument of Government, and believed they could control Richard Cromwell;
the lower ranks tended to side with the sectaries in calling for a reinstatement of the Rump Parliament – these soldiers were religious radicals who were particularly unhappy that the new Protector seemed to have Presbyterian sympathies.

Given the situation, it was perhaps unsurprising that Richard Cromwell’s Protectorate would quickly fall apart. What was not so predictable, however, was the fact that this would trigger a series of events which within two years had brought about the end of the republic and the restoration of the monarchy.

Richard Cromwell as Protector: Having not been a soldier of any notable rank, the younger Cromwell relied increasingly on civilian advisers with conservative sympathies. The military soon urged him to relinquish his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, which he refused to do. Although some of the leading officers supported him, the bulk of the Army was not to be won over. There was still deep resentment over the perennial problem of arrears of payment: the total now owed was £900,000, but the Protectorate had a debt of £2.5 million. Cromwell’s only response was to call Parliament in an attempt to raise money.

The Third Protectorate Parliament, January to April 1659: Although pro-Protectorate conservatives were in the majority among the 549 MPs, it was the republican minority which proved much more active and vocal. Led by Sir Arthur Haselrig, they bitterly denounced one person holding so much power and attempted to win the support of the Army, which was now suspicious of Cromwell due to his insistence on continuing as Commander-in-Chief. In response to this growing alliance, Presbyterian MPs began to discuss the reduction of the Army and introduced a resolution that the Council of Army Officers should sit only with the permission of Parliament, and that local militias should be brought directly under parliamentary control. Cromwell was swiftly told that unless he immediately terminated the session, he could no longer count on the Army’s loyalty. Fearful of another civil war, Parliament was duly dissolved, and the Lord Protector went into self-imposed exile.

The end of the Protectorate: With Parliament dissolved, power was now effectively back in the hands of the Army Council. However, in order to give their authority some semblance of legitimacy, the Council recommended the recalling of the Rump in May 1659. Cromwell, having failed to summon loyal troops from Ireland and Scotland, was forced to his resign from his position as Protector. Three factors explain his failure:

1. his inability to fashion a government free of Army control;

2. the strength of the republican campaign against the Protectorate;

3. the financial bankruptcy of the government.

Richard Cromwell was not especially incompetent, but effective government in the political vacuum left by his father’s death required a leader of extraordinary talent, which he did not possess.

The return of the Rump, May to October 1659: Now leading the affairs of the nation were two men with diametrically opposed views: Lambert (the leading Army General) and Haselrig (the leading republican MP). The Rump proceeded to act as if the intervening six years had never taken place. It claimed sole constitutional legitimacy and told the Army that it had a duty to obey the Parliament it had restored. On 13 May, Lambert presented a new petition, the Humble Petition and Address of the Officers which contained fifteen articles for a new constitution, primarily to protect the Army’s position. Haselrig and the Rump, however, would accept no reduction of the Commons’ authority. Any faint possibility of the two groups managing to work together disappeared when the Rump also indicated that it had no intention of considering the Army’s requests for reform, nor would it vote funds for the troops’ arrears of pay. It then tried to curb the influence of the Army in the localities by putting the local militias in the hands of extreme sectaries (mainly Fifth Monarchists, Quakers and Baptists). This development aroused fears of a national coup by religious fanatics. An outpouring of pamphlets gave the superficial impression that the radical forces were much stronger than they were, and something approaching nationwide panic set in.

Booth’s Rising, August 1659: The relationship between MPs and the Army was temporarily resurrected by news of a Royalist uprising in Cheshire. Sir George Booth, its leader, had fought for Parliament in the Civil War but his Presbyterian sympathies had now drawn him towards the call for a ‘free Parliament’, which essentially meant a royal restoration since it was widely believed that a freely-elected Parliament would invite Charles Stuart to return as King. As it was the disgruntled Presbyterians, rather than Royalist supporters of Charles, who were making the challenge, Booth’s Rising can be seen as more an expression of anti-Rump sentiment than a genuinely pro-Stuart movement. Ultimately, Lambert’s forces crushed the insurrection at Winnington Bridge in August 1659, but in doing so allowed rumours to surface of the growing Quaker influence within the Army. This only exacerbated Parliament’s fears of growing religious radicalism, making the regime even more unstable.

Although there was now an opportunity for the radicals to establish a hold on power, the divisions between them (for example, some wanted a return of the rule of the ‘saints’, others a single-chamber secular parliament) made a unified approach impossible. The truth was that no settlement could satisfy the wide range of political and religious opinion held among the radicals. Moreover, no settlement stood a chance unless it first met with the approval of the Army.

The Committee of Safety, October to December 1659: The crushing of Booth’s Rising had made John Lambert a hero of the Army’s rank-and-file in their growing dispute with the Rump. On his return march from having defeated the rebellion, Lambert’s army drew up The Derby Petition, which contained the following clauses:

the Rump’s failure to reform was condemned;
an Upper House should be created to restrict the legislative authority of the Rump in the House of Commons;
all Army leaders should be promoted to the rank of General and be confirmed in their command;
the Army should be given the authority to purge all local corporations that had not actively opposed the recent Royalist risings.

The Rump interpreted this as a direct attempt by the military to usurp political authority. Haselrig proposed that Lambert and his fellow petitioners be removed and imprisoned. However, it was Lambert who seized the initiative first and established the Army’s dominance: by 13 October, all Parliament buildings were surrounded by soldiers who denied entry to Rump MPs. Power now lay with the Council of Officers, who tried to give their military rule a semblance of legitimacy by appointing a ‘Committee of Safety’, composed of the officers and a few token civilians to form an interim government while different options could be considered.

The opposition of General Monck: The Council of Officers had effectively dispersed the Rump, but it had not won universal acceptance of all the Army Generals. This soon became evident when General George Monck, the commander of the Army’s forces in Scotland, protested at the treatment of the MPs. Having negotiated with members of the expelled Rump, who offered him the post of Commander-in-Chief if he came to London to support their cause, Monck began to march his army south towards the capital. The Council of Officers first tried to dissuade Monck from opposing them, then despatched Lambert north to intercept him. But his forces were no match for Monck’s in terms of either morale or discipline, and were scattered around the Yorkshire area, having barely put up a fight.

Monck’s actions gave a visible lift to opponents of Army rule. Widespread disturbances started to occur in major cities, and the Navy declared itself against the Committee of Safety. Protest petitions poured into London, where the Committee still sat, and to Monck as he continued his journey south. The common themes of discontent were:

the ongoing dire economic circumstances;
the tyranny of military rule;
the need for a restoration of ‘ancient liberties’ through a free Parliament … or monarchy.

The Army Officers bowed before this flood of opposition and disbanded the Committee of Safety, which was replaced by another return of the Rump.

The second return of the Rump, December 1659 to February 1660: The re-installed Rump was now in a strong position. Lambert and the Army leaders were removed and Monck, now the most powerful general in the country, was installed as Commander-in-Chief. However, it then proceeded to throw away its advantages by trying to settle old scores rather than tackling England’s most pressing problems. Half the serving officers of the Army were removed, and the corruption and nepotism that accompanied the appointment of their replacements demonstrated the Rump’s lack of integrity. Its growing unpopularity was evident in a widespread refusal by traders and merchants to pay parliamentary taxes. Rump MPs then further illustrated their ineptitude in their treatment of Monck. Rather than honouring him as their saviour, they sought to restrict his influence politically by burdening him with the task of restoring law and order in London, which was still in a volatile mood. Monck, however, proved to be more than a match for the MPs. Having fulfilled his assignment, he refused to withdraw from politics, insisted the Rump honoured a promise it had made not to sit beyond May 1660 and outmanoeuvred the sitting MPs by forcing them to readmit the ‘secluded’ members, i.e., those who had been debarred by Pride’s Purge in 1648.

The restored Long Parliament, February to March 1660: According to official records, the Long Parliament of 1640 was still technically in existence because it had never been legally dissolved. Monck’s insistence that the MPs who had been secluded in 1648 were now returned yielded several striking results:

the political balance shifted away from Haselrig’s republican faction;
the most committed and influential republicans were now excluded from the government altogether, notably Lambert;
a former Cromwellian general who was now a Royalist sympathiser, Edward Montague, was appointed Commander of the Navy;
having made arrangements for the holding of ‘free elections’ (i.e., lifting restrictions on royalist or conservative candidates) for a new parliament, the Long Parliament voted to finally dissolve itself.

Lambert made one last bid to save the republican cause. A number of regiments supported him in a show of force, but the bulk of the Army declined to challenge Monck. Crucially, this included Desborough and Fleetwood, the other leading officers, and Haselrig, the leading civilian republican. In a final engagement at Edgehill, Lambert’s army was defeated and he was captured.

Whether a Stuart restoration had been Monck’s intention all along remains unclear, but it is significant that he had been in a very cordial dialogue with Charles since July 1659. Having overcome the republicans militarily, the election results for what became known as the Convention Parliament undermined them politically, as over 60 pro-monarchists took seats in the new House of Commons, while many others were elected who harboured royalist sympathies. When they assembled on 25 April 1660, their first act would be to consider the terms upon which Charles Stuart would be invited to claim the throne as the rightful King of England.