POLI107 week 3 additional reading - Folch's Repression, political threats...' 2013

Repression and Dictatorial Survival

• Repression is a tool dictators use to stay in power, alongside mobilizing political support.
• The article aims to analyze if repression helps dictators maintain power.
• Repression is found to increase the likelihood of a dictator's survival.

Types of Repression and Their Effects

• Political Terror: Effective against threats from organized groups.
• Restrictions on Civil Liberties: Prevent collective action.
• Political terror reduces nonviolent/regular exits. Restrictions deter both violent and non-violent exits.

Introduction

• The research questions whether more repressive dictators survive longer.
• Examples: al-Assad's regime in Syria and Moi's regime in Kenya are presented.
• The article examines which types of repression are effective against different threats, addressing simultaneity between survival and repression.

Repression and its Determinants

• Little comparative study exists on whether repression actually works.
• Repression definition: Government actions restricting/violating political and civil liberties to maintain political quiescence.
• Repression correlates with internal/external conflict and feasibility of collective action.
• Trade openness decreases state repressiveness.
• Dictatorships use force due to smaller power coalitions and limited mechanisms to channel citizens’ demands.

Distinguishing Threat and Repression Types

• The research uses the risk of losing power as a direct measure of threat.
• Dictator exits can be irregular/violent (coups, assassinations) or regular/nonviolent (resignations, elections).
• Repression has violent (violations of personal integrity) and nonviolent (restrictions on civil liberties) components.
• Restrictions deter collective action by limiting coordination. Violations eliminate individuals/groups deemed threats.

Sticks and Autocrats’ Tenure

• Dictators use repression when expected benefits (staying in power) exceed costs.
• Violent repression (physical abuses) aims to defuse challenging activities or eliminate threats.
• Restrictions on civil rights aim to prevent coordination and collective action.
• Violent repression may decrease legitimacy, while restrictions on civil rights have lower legitimacy costs.
• Violent repression's effect on violent/irregular exits is indeterminate; it may deter or escalate violence.
• Restrictions may hinder collective action, making irregular exits less likely.
• Restrictions can thwart the ability of the opposition to organize.
• Political terror can intimidate opposition voters and candidates.

Methodology

• A simultaneous equations model is used to address endogeneity between autocrat exit and repression.
• Equation 1: Pr(AutocratExit) = δ1 * Repression + β1 * X + ε_1
• Equation 2: Repression = δ2 * AutocratExit + β2 * Z + ε_2
• Two-stage model is employed to estimate the equations.

Data

• Data on authoritarian leaders from 94 countries are used.
• Leader exit data from Archigos dataset and Svolik (2012).
• Autocrat Exit coded 1 if ruler replaced, 0 if not.
• Political Terror Scale (PTS) measures violations of physical integrity (1-5 scale).
• Freedom House’s civil liberties index measures restrictions on civil rights (1-7 scale).
• Control variables: regime type, oil rents, foreign aid, ethnic fractionalization, urban population, total population, GDP per capita, past instability, cold war dummy, neighbors’ polity, armed conflict.

Results: Sticks and Survival

• Repression works: repression variables are negative and statistically significant.
• Increased political terror isn't significantly effective in preventing violent or irregular exits.
• Restrictions on civil liberties effectively reduce likelihood of violent and irregular ousters.
• Both types of repression significantly decrease risks of nonviolent or regular exits.
• Using political terror is more effective than restrictions on civil liberties for nonviolent exits.
• Violent repression has a significant negative impact on the likelihood of an autocrat being removed by a coup.

Conclusion

• Repression significantly reduces the likelihood of a dictator being replaced.
• Political terror reduces the likelihood of regular/nonviolent exits and coups. Restrictions on civil liberties prevent both regular and irregular exits.
• Autocrats become vulnerable when their capacity to limit civil rights is constrained.
• Violent repression is likely to lead to escalation effects and defections.