Climate Change and Brazilian Foreign Policy

Guiding Questions

• How do “two level games” shape state foreign policy?

• What factors have historically shaped Brazilian foreign policy?

• How have global environmental concerns impacted Brazilian foreign policy?

• How have recent elections impacted Brazilian foreign policy?

• Why do developing countries “hedge” in international politics?

Introduction

• Combating environmental insecurity requires cooperation at the international level, which can be tough to achieve given domestic-level constraints. Environmental insecurity arises from issues like climate change, deforestation, and resource scarcity, which can lead to social unrest and economic instability. International cooperation is essential, but often hindered by differing national interests and domestic pressures.

• Putnam 1988: What states can achieve at the international level is shaped by what they can negotiate at the domestic level, even when:- States have an incentive to cooperate.

  • States recognize cooperation is required.

• International politics is a “two level game,” linking international and domestic politics. This framework highlights that international agreements must be ratified and supported domestically to be effectively implemented, creating a complex interplay between international negotiations and domestic political considerations.

• In a unipolar context, support from a hegemon can boost the possibility of cooperation, but the US is divided on climate change. A hegemon's backing provides resources and political leverage, yet internal divisions within the hegemon can undermine its ability to effectively promote and enforce international agreements.

• Resolution must recognize environmental insecurity disproportionately impacts developing states, despite developed states being disproportionately responsible for creating the problem. Addressing environmental insecurity requires acknowledging historical injustices and ensuring that solutions do not exacerbate existing inequalities between developed and developing nations.

Structural Factors Shaping Brazilian Foreign Policy

• Vigevani and Cepaluni 2013:- Power: Brazil is the largest country in South America. Brazil's size and geographic location give it significant regional influence and the potential to lead South American initiatives.

  • Interdependence: Brazil emphasizes regional and international institutions and pushes for greater influence for developing states. Brazil advocates for stronger roles for developing countries in global governance structures to better represent their interests and address global challenges.

  • Pushback against neoliberalism prior to Bolsonaro, likely to return under Lula. Brazil's historical resistance to neoliberal policies reflects a desire to protect domestic industries and reduce dependence on foreign capital.

  • Rainforests characterized as “lungs of the Earth,” creating leverage. The Amazon rainforest's critical role in carbon sequestration gives Brazil leverage in international climate negotiations, allowing it to demand compensation and support for conservation efforts.

  • Ideas: “Autonomy via diversification.” Brazil seeks to reduce its vulnerability by diversifying its economic and political relationships, avoiding over-reliance on any single country or region.

Political Factors Shaping Brazilian Foreign Policy

• Vigevani and Cepaluni 2013:- The President and Foreign Ministry are dominant in foreign policy. The President and Foreign Ministry centralize decision-making in foreign policy, allowing for quick responses to international events but also potentially limiting input from other government agencies or civil society.

  • Public opinion “matters” in shaping policy, but the executive is given wide berth on foreign policy. While public opinion can influence the broad direction of foreign policy, the executive branch typically has significant discretion in specific decisions and actions.

  • Domestic politics impact decisiveness at the international level. Internal political divisions and instability can undermine Brazil's ability to commit to and implement international agreements, reducing its credibility on the global stage.

  • Lula was imprisoned over corruption but eventually released. Lula's imprisonment and subsequent release reflect deep-seated issues of corruption and political polarization in Brazil, with implications for its international reputation and leadership.

  • Rousseff impeachment. Dilma Rousseff's impeachment highlights the fragility of Brazilian democracy and the potential for political crises to disrupt foreign policy priorities.

  • Bolsonaro broke political norms. Bolsonaro's disregard for political norms strained relationships with traditional allies and raised concerns about Brazil's commitment to international cooperation and human rights.

  • Corruption constrains political influence. Corruption undermines trust in government and diverts resources away from development and diplomacy, limiting Brazil's ability to effectively pursue its foreign policy goals.

Brazilian Foreign Policy and Climate Change

• Tollefson 2013:- Prior to 2004, leaders sought to boost the economy at the expense of natural resources.- Deforestation boosted agriculture but caused internal displacement and exacerbates climate change.

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  • Post-2004, leaders sought to boost economic growth and reduce the impact of climate change via “Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation” (REDD).- Provides an opportunity for the developed world to compensate the developing world for maintaining natural resources via offsets.

• But are offsets enough?- May not change behavior.

  • May provide openings for corruption.

• Tollefson 2013:- Connections between civil society and governments can prevent international business from exploiting offsets.

  • The global economic downturn and Brazilian political instability may threaten long-term viability.

Enter Jair Bolsonaro

• Continued a trend of radical right-wing populists gaining power with ramifications for Brazilian foreign policy. The rise of radical right-wing populists in Brazil has challenged established norms of diplomacy and international cooperation, leading to greater unpredictability and a more nationalistic foreign policy.

• Brazil had been seen as a leader on climate change. Brazil's previous leadership on climate change positioned it as a key player in international efforts to address global warming, with significant influence in negotiations and partnerships.

• Bolsonaro sees climate change as a “Marxist plot.” Bolsonaro's view of climate change as a “Marxist plot” reflects a broader skepticism towards environmentalism and multilateralism, leading to policies that prioritize economic growth over environmental protection.

• Brazil had also been seen as successfully wielding soft power. Brazil's effective use of soft power, through cultural exports, development assistance, and diplomatic engagement, enhanced its international standing and influence.

• Boosted ties with the Trump administration and other adherents of “illiberal democracy.” Bolsonaro's alignment with the Trump administration and other “illiberal democracies” signaled a shift away from traditional alliances and a preference for countries with similar nationalist and anti-globalist agendas.

• Angered China by visiting Taiwan. Bolsonaro's decision to visit Taiwan angered China, highlighting the tensions between economic interests and political alignment in Brazil's foreign policy.

• Angered Palestine by recognizing Jerusalem, with ripple effects throughout the Middle East. Brazil recognizing Jerusalem angered Palestine and had ripple effects throughout the Middle East, demonstrating the sensitivity of religious and territorial issues in international relations.

• Homophobic comments cast doubt on support for human rights. Bolsonaro making homophobic comments cast doubt on support for human rights, undermining Brazil's reputation as a defender of human rights and potentially affecting its relationships with countries that prioritize these issues.

Lula Re-Enters the Scene

• Winter 2022:- The return of Luiz Inácio Lula de Silva (aka Lula) to the presidency is part of an observable pattern in Latin American politics where voters turn to politicians from a “more successful” time to “sort out” current problems.

  • Symbolic of Naím’s “ideological necrophilia”.

  • Nostalgia is boosting expectations that Lula will restore economic growth, reinforce democracy, and reverse deforestation.

  • BUT it is unclear if a “return to yesteryear” will achieve this.

• Winter 2022:- Economic growth + social spending associated with first two terms are not replicable.

  • Free market reforms under predecessor lowered inflation + promoted stability.

  • Presidents get credit/blame for economic realities they do not control.

  • Chinese demands for Brazilian commodities (beef, iron, sugar, etc.) boosted the economy.

  • Unlikely to be revived; China is spurring domestic consumption.

  • Record of fiscal discipline + income redistribution reinforced popularity.

  • The working class + industrialist coalition is tougher to maintain now.

Linking the International and the Domestic

• Castañeda 2016; Winter 2017; Winter 2022- BRIC economic growth had important ramifications for governments.- Created a larger middle class.
  - Connected domestic interests with international civil society.

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  • But several Latin American countries are now facing economic and political difficulties.- Slowing BRIC growth hampers rise.

    • Corruption hampers effectiveness.

• Castañeda 2016- Economic and political challenges can be put to good use if they motivate political reform.

  • Latin American citizens are pushing back against corruption.

  • Political instability is utilized to demand better governance, which in turn boosts security.

  • Transparency is the only way forward for developing democratic states.

  • Regaining trust at the national/local level is key for projecting international power.

Is Lula Enough?

• Winter 2022- Latin America remains a region of promise, with:- Efforts at re-democratization in the 1980s.
  - Market-based economic reforms in the 1990s.
  - Efforts to curb income inequality in the 2000s.

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  • …but needs leaders who “not only distribute wealth but also help create it” via reforms in education, “green energy”, trade, etc.

  • Not advanced by “South-South ties” and balancing China and the US.

  • Younger voters are discouraged by the weak emphasis on sustainable development.

Hedging and Foreign Policy

• Greater support for sustainable development among younger voters is not unique to Brazil; it is observed in developed AND developing democracies.

• The emphasis on “restoration of South-South ties” and maintaining good relations with all relevant powers is also not unique to Brazil; it is observed in most developing states.

• Spektor 2023- Developing countries have a long history of “hedging” relations, that is, “avoid[ing] costly entanglements” with larger powers to “keep all their options open.”

Hedging in the Post-Cold War Era

• Spektor 2023- The desire for flexibility is critical where the distribution of power is uncertain.

  • Balancing DC, Beijing, and Moscow is critical for states in the Global South. Balancing relations with Washington, D.C., Beijing, and Moscow is essential for countries in the Global South to navigate geopolitical complexities and maximize their strategic options.

  • May frustrate alliance partners who would like more definitive support. “Hedging” strategies can frustrate alliance partners who seek more definitive support, as they prioritize flexibility over firm commitments.

  • “Hedging” states see alliances as “partnerships of convenience.” Alliances viewed as “partnerships of convenience” reflect a pragmatic approach to international relations, where cooperation is based on shared interests rather than ideological alignment.

  • Lula condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine but refused EU efforts to send military resources to Kiev. Lula's condemnation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, coupled with his refusal to support EU military aid to Kiev, illustrates Brazil's nuanced position in balancing its relationships with global powers.

  • “Avoid[ing] pressure to choose” NOT promoting a “non-aligned” identity, differing from the Cold War era. Unlike the non-aligned movement of the Cold War era, contemporary hedging strategies focus on avoiding pressure to choose between major powers rather than promoting a distinct non-aligned identity.

  • Impacted by domestic politics, which may limit the range of options. The range of foreign policy options available to a country is often constrained by domestic political considerations, such as public opinion, economic interests, and institutional dynamics.

  • For example, farming interests pressuring Bolsonaro to drop efforts to balance Beijing with growing US ties. Farming interests pressuring Bolsonaro to drop efforts to balance Beijing with growing US ties highlights the role of economic lobbies in shaping foreign policy decisions.

Hedging in the Post-Cold War Era

• Spektor 2023- Legacies of colonialism in the Global South inform strategy. The legacies of colonialism in the Global South continue to shape foreign policy strategies, influencing perceptions of international power dynamics and historical injustices.

  • Not solely intended to extract material concessions per se. Hedging strategies are not solely intended to extract material concessions, but also to assert autonomy and protect national interests in a complex and uncertain world.

  • US efforts to create a “rules-based order” ring hollow because the US has intervened in the politics of other states and supports authoritarian regimes when it is in its interests. US efforts to create a “rules-based order” are viewed skeptically due to its history of interventionism and support for authoritarian regimes when it suits its strategic interests.

  • The US promotes ideas associated with peace while providing weapons and assistance to allies in conflicts. The promotion of peace by the US is undermined by its provision of weapons and assistance to allies in conflicts, creating a perception of hypocrisy and double standards.

  • At the same time, the Global South recognizes that China and Russia engage in “barbaric and inhumane” and/or “bullying” behavior. The Global South recognizes that China and Russia engage in “barbaric and inhumane” and/or “bullying” behavior, leading to a cautious approach in their relations with these powers.

Hedging in the Post-Cold War Era

• Spektor 2023- Although some developing states favor a multipolar world, it is unclear if they would benefit because strong states have an interest in preserving their influence, while developing states have an interest in leveraging their influence. While some developing states may favor a multipolar world, it is uncertain whether they would benefit, as strong states seek to maintain their influence and developing states aim to leverage their own.

  • American hegemony creates opportunities for developing states + US. American hegemony can create opportunities for developing states and the US, providing avenues for cooperation and mutual benefit but also posing challenges to autonomy and sovereignty.

  • “Hedging” states are unlikely to permanently align with China or Russia because governments seek to maintain their flexibility. “Hedging” states are unlikely to permanently align with China or Russia, as governments prioritize flexibility to pursue their national interests and adapt to changing geopolitical circumstances.

  • Citizens favor more engagement with the West and support progressive reforms more in line with democracies. Citizens in developing states often favor greater engagement with the West and support progressive reforms that align with democratic values, influencing government policies and international relations.

Hedging in the Post-Cold War Era

• Spektor 2023- Developing states are “open” to working with the hegemon when it suits their interests. Brazil is a classic example. Developing states are “open” to working with the hegemon when it suits their interests, with Brazil serving as a prime example of a country that balances its relationships with multiple global powers.

  • Key questions:- Does the US recognize these opportunities?

    • Is the US willing to “do the work” to cultivate these relationships?

Hedging and Opportunities to Combat Climate Change

• Spektor 2023- The US could gain influence in the Global South by taking issues of concern seriously.

  • Working with developing states to combat climate change could combat environmental insecurity AND manage “China’s rise and Russia’s reassertion of power”.

  • …and by recognizing that states in the Global South should not be expected to reflexively follow Western foreign policy positions. Recognizing that states in the Global South should not be expected to reflexively follow Western foreign policy positions is crucial for fostering genuine partnerships and addressing global challenges effectively.

  • The US SHOULD NOT tell developing states to cut ties with China but should let China “reveal itself” to developing states. The US should refrain from telling developing states to cut ties with China, allowing China to “reveal itself” through its actions and policies.

  • The US SHOULD recognize issues of fairness + legitimacy will be raised. The US should recognize and address issues of fairness and legitimacy in its interactions with the Global South, fostering trust and cooperation.

  • The Global South expects the West to “walk the walk,” not just “talk the talk.” The Global South expects the West to “walk the walk,” not just “talk the talk,” demonstrating a commitment to its stated values and principles through concrete actions and policies.

Conclusions

• Climate change presents security challenges for ALL states because environmental security, civic security, and economic security are all impacted.

• …but the nature of environmental issues creates challenges for getting the necessary cooperation to resolve the problem. The nature of environmental issues presents challenges for achieving the necessary cooperation due to conflicting interests, varying priorities, and the complexity of global environmental governance.

• The environment as a “public good” creates collective action problems because each state has an incentive to cooperate but also has incentives to defect. The environment as a “public good” creates collective action problems, as each state has both incentives to cooperate and incentives to defect, making international cooperation difficult to achieve.

• Foreign policy is a “two level game,” with the ability to finalize international agreements shaped by domestic politics.

• Resolution is also impacted by power.

• The hegemon’s commitment to resolution “matters.”

• Differences in approach between developed and developing states “matter.”

• Any agreement MUST include BOTH developed and developing states.

• In an environment where stronger states are jockeying for influence and where developing states are “hedging” relations with stronger states.

• Suggests a growing role for geostrategy in responding to common challenges.

• Is that consistent with the “End of History”?

• Does it suggest we are witnessing a “Return to History”?