phil gen

• Inclass

• March 13

• Paper/pencil or pen

• 3 sections

  • Short response (define a term etc) (3)

  • true/false (5)

  • Long answer (3)

    • 6-8 sentences

    • Meaty paragraphs

    • Either smth we discussed in class or a new reading passage

    • Making everything clear and explicit

Review

• Vocabulary

• Argument

  • Good argument

  • Parts of an argument

    • Premises

    • Conclusion

  • Are the premises plausible?

    • Plausible: likely to be true. Truth is the gold standard, would be great if everything is true

    • Plausible and possible are very different

      • Just because it can happen doesn’t mean it is likely that it will

  • Do the premises provide sufficient reason to accept the conclusion

(an argument is only good if you can answer yes for both)

• Ontology

  • the study of being

  • What is there? What exists?

  • What are the general features of the things that exist?

  • Ex: are numbers real? Does god exist

• Empirical question

  • A question that can be answered via observation and experience

    • What color is the apple

• Philosophical question

  • Can’t answer through observation alone

• Descriptive/normative distinction

• Necessary and sufficient conditions

• Social class

• Plausibility vs possibility

• Specific philosophers views of gender identity

• Accountability

• Gender nihilism

• Imminence

• Transcendence

• Gender abolitionism

• Phenomenology

• Autonomy

  • Different views

• Gaslighting 

• Realism/nominalism

• Universals vs individuals/particulars

• Causal determinism

• Conceptual engineering

• Gerrymandered class/group

  • Metaphysics, not politics

  • A group that was seemingly randomly put together, not on the basis of qualitative resemblance

• Intersex

• Binary

• Paradigmatic women

• Libertarianism (metaphysical, not political)

• Incompatibilism

• Hard determinism

• Relational autonomy

• Means to be marked

• Social position view of gender

• Cluster concept

• Nonbinary identity

• Transgender

• Premises  

• Identity view of gender

• Necessary condition

• Sufficient condition

• Social position view of gender

• Ontology

• Gender as a social class

• Commonality/Normativity

  • Something that all women have in common

  • Problems that are seen as normal

• Iff

• Df

  • What does it mean 

• Subject position

• Relational autonomy

• Metaphysical debate

• Free will

• Relational debate

• Accountability

• first/second necessary condition

3/11/25

• Dembroff

  • Argues that nonbinary identity is a political stance

  • VIEW 

    • Dembroff argues that nonbinary identity is not just a personal gender experience but a political and philosophical rejection of gender segregation—the societal enforcement of a binary system. They view nonbinary identity as a challenge to the structures that divide people strictly into "man" and "woman."

  • ARGUMENTS

    • Gender Segregation Exists and is Harmful – Society enforces strict divisions between men and women in ways that create inequalities.

    • Nonbinary Identity Disrupts This System – Identifying as nonbinary is a refusal to comply with gender segregation, making it a radical and political stance.

    • Nonbinary People Face Resistance Because of This Disruption – Society reacts negatively to nonbinary identities because they challenge entrenched norms.

    • Recognition and Inclusion Require Structural Change – For nonbinary people to be fully accepted, society must move beyond binary structures in language, law, and institutions.

  • LABELED CLAIMS

    • Descriptive Claims: "Society enforces gender segregation through laws, language, and social practices."

    • Normative Claims: "Nonbinary identity should be recognized as a political stance, not just a personal one."

    • Philosophical Claims: "Gender is not an inherent trait but a social structure that can be resisted and redefined."

  • DEFINITIONS

    • Gender Segregation: The social, legal, and cultural enforcement of a strict gender binary (male/female).

    • Nonbinary Identity: A gender identity that exists outside the binary categories of man and woman, often seen as challenging traditional gender norms.

    • Radical Stance: A position that seeks to change foundational societal structures rather than merely reforming them.

  • KEY PASSAGES (Likely Important Sections)

    • A discussion of how gender segregation operates in everyday life (e.g., bathrooms, sports, legal documents).

    • An explanation of how nonbinary identity resists this segregation and why it is more than just personal expression.

    • A response to common objections (e.g., that nonbinary identities are invalid or unnecessary).

    • A conclusion emphasizing the need for systemic change rather than simple inclusion within existing structures.

• Haslanger

  • Gender is a social class

  • “Gender is the social meaning of sex”

  • Social classes are seen as having a hierarchical structure

  • Says women occupy the subordinate social class to men

  • VIEW (Overall Perspective)

    • Haslanger takes a social constructivist approach to gender and race, arguing that both are social categories shaped by power structures rather than purely biological traits. The paper aims to analyze what gender and race are (their current definitions) and what they should be (how we ought to conceptualize them for justice and equity).

  • ARGUMENTS

    • Gender and race are social, not just biological – These categories are shaped by social relations and systems of power, not merely physical characteristics.

    • Both categories function to maintain oppression – The way society defines gender and race serves to reinforce hierarchies and inequalities.

    • We should redefine gender and race for social justice – Rather than eliminating these categories, we should reconstruct them in ways that promote equality.

    • A critical approach helps reveal hidden biases – Many traditional definitions of gender and race reflect oppressive norms rather than neutral truths.

  • LABELED CLAIMS

    • Descriptive Claims: “Gender and race categories exist as part of larger social structures, not just individual identities.”

    • Normative Claims: “We should reshape our concepts of gender and race to align with a vision of justice.”

    • Philosophical Claims: “Categories are not just about classification; they play a role in maintaining or disrupting oppression.”

  • DEFINITIONS

    • Social Construction: The idea that race and gender are created and maintained by social practices, norms, and institutions, rather than being purely biological.

    • Ideology: A system of beliefs that upholds power structures—Haslanger argues that traditional gender and racial categories reinforce unjust systems.

    • Analytical vs. Ameliorative Concepts:

    • Analytical: Definitions that describe how gender and race function in society now.

    • Ameliorative: Definitions that propose how gender and race should function to serve justice.

  • KEY PASSAGES (Likely Important Sections)

    • Her critique of biological essentialism – She argues against the idea that gender and race are biologically determined.

    • The distinction between ‘what is’ and ‘what should be’ – She separates how gender and race currently function from how we should redefine them for justice.

    • Her discussion of ideology and power – She explores how gender and race categories uphold existing social hierarchies.

    • Her argument for reconstructing these categories – Rather than eliminating gender and race, she advocates for redefining them in ways that serve feminist and anti-racist goals.

• Cull

  • VIEW (Overall Perspective)

    • Cull critiques abolitionist approaches to various social institutions (likely focusing on prisons, police, or gender categories, depending on the context). Instead of outright abolition, they advocate for reformist or alternative strategies that engage with existing structures to bring about change.

    • Cull’s stance is likely that abolition, while well-intentioned, oversimplifies complex social problems and may lead to unintended consequences. They aim to show that modifying or transforming institutions may be a more effective strategy than completely dismantling them.

    • We don’t have to get rid of the categories, but can revise them and make more!

  • ARGUMENTS

    • Abolitionism is too idealistic – Cull argues that abolitionist movements often fail to provide workable alternatives to the structures they seek to dismantle.

    • Some institutions can be reformed – Instead of abolishing systems like prisons, policing, or gender categories, Cull suggests they can be transformed in ways that reduce harm.

    • Abolition can have unintended consequences – Rapid or unplanned abolition may create power vacuums, new forms of oppression, or ineffective replacements.

    • A more pragmatic approach is needed – Cull promotes incremental change, reform, or restructuring over total abolition, arguing that this approach may lead to more sustainable progress.

    • Abolitionist arguments often rely on false dichotomies – The paper likely critiques abolitionist logic that frames the issue as “either abolish or perpetuate harm,” arguing that middle-ground solutions exist.

  • LABELED CLAIMS

    • Descriptive Claims: “Abolitionist movements aim to dismantle existing structures but often lack clear alternatives.”

    • Normative Claims: “We should prioritize reform and transformation over outright abolition in many cases.”

    • Philosophical Claims: “Abolitionism assumes institutions are inherently oppressive rather than historically contingent and changeable.”

  • DEFINITIONS

    • Abolitionism: The belief that certain institutions (e.g., prisons, police, gender categories) should be entirely dismantled rather than reformed.

    • Reformism: The belief that existing structures can be improved rather than eliminated.

    • Institutional Transformation: Cull’s likely alternative approach—acknowledging harm while modifying institutions to serve justice better.

  • KEY PASSAGES (Likely Important Sections)

    • Critique of Abolitionist Strategies – Cull explains why total abolition may be impractical or counterproductive.

    • Defense of Reformist or Transformative Approaches – They argue for alternative ways to improve harmful institutions.

    • Examples of Unintended Consequences of Abolition – Possible case studies showing how rapid abolition can create instability.

    • Rebuttal to Common Abolitionist Objections – Cull responds to claims that reform only preserves oppression.

    • Overall Significance

    • Cull’s work contributes to debates in political philosophy, criminal justice, and social theory by challenging abolitionist frameworks and proposing more pragmatic approaches. Their argument is relevant to discussions on policing, prisons, gender, and institutional change more broadly.

• Jenkins

  • VIEW (Overall Perspective)

    • Jenkins argues that the concept of "woman" should be redefined in an ameliorative way—meaning it should be constructed to serve ethical and political goals, particularly inclusivity and justice. She engages with Sally Haslanger’s work but critiques and expands on it, emphasizing the importance of gender identity in defining womanhood.

    • She proposes a dual account of gender, which recognizes both social oppression and self-identification as key components of gender.

    • Wants to add to haslanger’s account because it’s incomplete, leaving out the normativity commonality issues

  • ARGUMENTS

    • The definition of “woman” should be politically useful – Like Haslanger, Jenkins argues that we should adopt a definition of gender that helps achieve feminist goals.

    • Haslanger’s definition is insufficient – Haslanger focuses on gender as a social class (oppression-based), but this excludes some trans women who do not experience gender oppression in the same way as cis women.

    • A dual approach to gender is needed – Jenkins proposes that gender should be understood through:

    • Gender as a social class (structural oppression)

    • Gender as an identity (self-identification)

    • This dual approach better includes trans women – By incorporating both oppression and identity, her framework ensures trans women are fully recognized as women.

    • Ameliorative analysis is necessary for justice – We should design concepts that promote ethical and political goals rather than relying on rigid, traditional definitions.

  • LABELED CLAIMS

    • Descriptive Claims: “Current definitions of womanhood often exclude trans women and fail to account for the role of gender identity.”

    • Normative Claims: “The concept of ‘woman’ should be inclusive of both oppression-based experiences and gender identity.”

    • Philosophical Claims: “Gender should be analyzed using an ameliorative approach—defining it based on how it can contribute to justice.”

  • DEFINITIONS

    • Ameliorative Analysis: A method of defining concepts based on how they can help achieve social and political goals rather than simply describing how they are currently used.

    • Gender as Identity: A person’s deeply held sense of their own gender, which may or may not align with societal expectations.

    • Gender as a Social Class: A perspective that defines gender based on structural oppression (e.g., Haslanger’s view).

    • Dual Character of Gender: Jenkins’ proposal that gender includes both social positioning (oppression) and identity (self-identification).

  • KEY PASSAGES (Likely Important Sections)

    • Her critique of Haslanger’s definition – She explains why defining "woman" solely in terms of oppression is inadequate.

    • The introduction of the dual character theory of gender – Her key contribution to the debate.

    • Discussion on trans inclusion – She defends the view that gender identity must be considered alongside social oppression.

    • The role of ameliorative analysis – She explains why defining gender should be about justice and inclusion, not just linguistic accuracy.

• Holroyd

  • VIEW (Overall Perspective)

    • Holroyd challenges the traditional view of autonomy as purely individualistic and instead argues for relational autonomy—the idea that autonomy is fundamentally shaped by social relationships, structures, and power dynamics. They explore the metaphysical foundations of autonomy, questioning whether autonomy can truly exist outside of social contexts.

    • The paper critically engages with liberal conceptions of autonomy that prioritize individual independence and instead presents a more socially embedded view.

  • ARGUMENTS

    • Traditional autonomy theories are insufficient – Classical liberal theories of autonomy (which emphasize self-sufficiency and rational decision-making) ignore the role of social relationships and external influences.

    • Autonomy is inherently relational – A person’s autonomy is shaped and sometimes constrained by social norms, institutions, and power structures.

    • Oppression and autonomy are linked – Structural inequalities (e.g., gender, race, class) affect an individual’s ability to be autonomous. Marginalized individuals often face autonomy-undermining conditions.

    • Relational autonomy has metaphysical implications – Understanding autonomy as relational means reconsidering traditional metaphysical assumptions about the self, agency, and responsibility.

    • A more nuanced framework for autonomy is needed – The paper proposes a metaphysically grounded model of relational autonomy that accounts for both individual agency and social embeddedness.

  • COMPATIBILISM

  • LABELED CLAIMS

    • Descriptive Claims: “Autonomy is shaped by social conditions, relationships, and systemic structures.”

    • Normative Claims: “An adequate theory of autonomy must recognize and address the relational nature of agency.”

    • Philosophical Claims: “The metaphysical foundations of autonomy must be reconsidered in light of relational factors.”

  • DEFINITIONS

    • Autonomy: The capacity to govern oneself, traditionally seen as independent rational decision-making.

    • Relational Autonomy: A view of autonomy that acknowledges social relationships, dependence, and external influences as integral to individual agency.

    • Structural Oppression: Systems of inequality (e.g., patriarchy, racism) that shape individuals' ability to make autonomous choices.

    • Metaphysics of Autonomy: The underlying ontological and conceptual foundations of what it means to be autonomous.

    • Compatibilist 

  • KEY PASSAGES (Likely Important Sections)

    • Critique of Classical Autonomy Theories – Holroyd explains why traditional views of autonomy fail to account for social conditions.

    • Discussion of Power and Oppression – A central section where Holroyd connects relational autonomy to broader political structures.

    • Metaphysical Considerations – The philosophical core of the paper, discussing how autonomy must be understood beyond mere individualism.

    • Proposed Framework for Relational Autonomy – Holroyd offers a new model that balances individual agency with social embeddedness.

• Stoljar

  • VIEW (Overall Perspective)

    • Stoljar engages with the realism-nominalism debate in the context of gender and feminist philosophy. She examines whether gender categories should be understood as real kinds (realism) or as constructed, fluid, and context-dependent (nominalism).

    • Her work is significant because it addresses how we should conceptualize “woman” as a category while balancing concerns of inclusivity and political usefulness.

    • Women as a cluster concept

  • ARGUMENTS

    • Gender Realism vs. Nominalism – Stoljar explores the debate between two philosophical positions:

    • Realism: Gender categories refer to real, shared properties among women.

    • Nominalism: Gender is a constructed and variable category, shaped by cultural and social factors.

    • Challenges to Gender Realism – Stoljar critiques realism for assuming a universal essence of womanhood, which excludes the diversity of women’s experiences (e.g., trans women, women of color).

    • Problems with Nominalism – She also critiques extreme nominalist positions, arguing that if gender categories are too fluid and arbitrary, they may lose political effectiveness for feminist movements.

    • A Middle Ground Approach – Stoljar suggests a context-sensitive approach that recognizes gender as socially constructed but still meaningful for feminist political goals.

    • Implications for Feminism – The debate over realism and nominalism has real consequences for how we define and advocate for women’s rights and gender justice.

  • LABELED CLAIMS

    • Descriptive Claims: “There is a long-standing debate in philosophy about whether gender categories are real kinds or socially constructed.”

    • Normative Claims: “We need a definition of ‘woman’ that is both inclusive and politically useful.”

    • Philosophical Claims: “A purely realist or nominalist approach to gender is inadequate—gender should be understood in a way that balances both perspectives.”

  • DEFINITIONS

    • Realism (in Gender Theory): The idea that gender categories (e.g., “woman”) refer to real, shared properties across individuals.

    • Nominalism (in Gender Theory): The idea that gender categories are linguistic and social constructs without inherent, fixed essences.

    • Context-Sensitive Approach: Stoljar’s proposal that gender categories should be understood as historically and socially shaped, but still politically meaningful.

  • KEY PASSAGES (Likely Important Sections)

    • Critique of Gender Realism – Stoljar explains why universal definitions of womanhood are problematic.

    • Critique of Extreme Nominalism – She argues that if gender is entirely arbitrary, it may undermine feminist political action.

    • Proposal of a Context-Sensitive Approach – Her central argument, suggesting a flexible but structured way of understanding gender.

    • Feminist Implications of the Debate – She explores how different views of gender affect feminist activism and policy-making.

• Young

  • VIEW (Overall Perspective)

    • Young’s essay critiques traditional phenomenological and existentialist theories of bodily experience by introducing a feminist perspective on embodiment. She argues that women experience their bodies differently than men due to social and cultural structures that restrict their movement, confidence, and engagement with the world.

    • Drawing from Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and Beauvoir’s feminist existentialism, Young explores how gendered socialization shapes bodily comportment, motility, and spatial awareness. The essay challenges the assumption that bodily difference is merely biological, instead highlighting how women are socially conditioned to use their bodies in restricted and self-conscious ways.

  • ARGUMENTS

    • Women’s bodily movements are socially constrained – Girls are taught from an early age to move more cautiously, leading to inhibited, less free bodily engagement.

    • Masculine and feminine bodily comportment differ – Young contrasts how men and women use their bodies, noting that women tend to be more self-conscious, restrained, and less expansive in movement.

    • This difference is socially constructed, not biological – She argues that these differences aren’t due to physical inferiority but rather social conditioning that discourages women from fully using their physical potential.

    • Feminine bodily experience involves a "double consciousness" – Women often experience their bodies from both a first-person perspective and as an object of the male gaze, leading to self-conscious movement and inhibition.

    • Gendered embodiment affects confidence and agency – Because women are taught to minimize their bodily presence, this impacts their sense of capability, confidence, and engagement in activities (e.g., sports, labor, personal interactions).

  • LABELED CLAIMS

    • Descriptive Claims: “Women’s bodily experience differs from men’s due to social and cultural conditioning.”

    • Normative Claims: “Feminist philosophy should challenge and deconstruct the restrictive ways in which women are taught to inhabit their bodies.”

    • Philosophical Claims: “Gendered embodiment is a product of social structures, not inherent physical or biological differences.”

  • DEFINITIONS

    • Gendered Embodiment: The idea that people experience their bodies differently based on the social norms and expectations attached to their gender.

    • Comportment: The way a person carries, moves, and interacts with their body in physical space.

    • Double Consciousness (Adapted from Du Bois): A feminist take on the concept where women view their bodies both as active subjects and as objects perceived by others.

    • Feminist Phenomenology: A philosophical approach that explores how gendered experiences shape bodily perception and action.

    • Imminent and transcendent

  • KEY PASSAGES (Likely Important Sections)

    • Analysis of "throwing like a girl" – Young describes the physical differences in how men and women perform actions like throwing, attributing them to socialization rather than biology.

    • Comparison to Merleau-Ponty and Beauvoir – She engages with existentialist and phenomenological thinkers to ground her argument in philosophical discourse.

    • Discussion of Spatial Awareness and Inhibited Movement – A core section analyzing how women's restricted movement reflects broader gendered power dynamics.

    • Implications for Feminism and Social Change – Young argues that recognizing gendered embodiment is crucial for challenging social norms and reclaiming bodily autonomy.

  • Overall Significance

    • Young’s essay is a foundational text in feminist phenomenology and philosophy of embodiment. It challenges traditional views of physical ability and gender differences, offering a socially constructed explanation for why women often experience bodily inhibition, self-consciousness, and restricted movement.

    • Her work has broad implications for sports, psychology, feminist activism, and theories of gendered oppression. It remains relevant in contemporary discussions about gender, body image, and socialization.

• James

  • VIEW (Overall Perspective)

    • Susan James explores personal identity through a feminist lens, questioning how traditional philosophical theories of the self intersect with gender, power, and social structures. She critiques dominant views in the philosophy of mind that treat identity as a neutral, purely individualistic, or ahistorical concept, arguing instead that personal identity is deeply shaped by social relations and gender norms.

    • Her work challenges traditional Cartesian or Lockean accounts of personal identity, proposing a more relational, historically situated, and socially embedded understanding of the self.

  • ARGUMENTS

    • Traditional theories of personal identity overlook social influences – Philosophers like Descartes and Locke treat identity as an isolated, rational, and self-sufficient construct, ignoring how social conditions shape selfhood.

    • Gendered experiences shape identity – A feminist approach reveals that women’s identities are often constructed within patriarchal systems that impose norms on how they should think and act.

    • Personal identity is relational, not just individualistic – Instead of being solely a mental or rational continuity, identity is formed through relationships, cultural expectations, and social power structures.

    • The self is historical and fluid – Unlike rigid metaphysical accounts, feminist philosophy of mind emphasizes how identity changes over time due to political, social, and cultural shifts.

    • A feminist approach to personal identity is necessary for justice – Understanding identity beyond traditional male-centered models allows for more inclusive and politically conscious discussions about the self.

  • LABELED CLAIMS

    • Descriptive Claims: “Traditional philosophical theories of personal identity often neglect the role of social and gendered experiences.”

    • Normative Claims: “We should redefine personal identity to include relational, historical, and feminist perspectives.”

    • Philosophical Claims: “A purely rational or cognitive view of identity is inadequate—our sense of self is shaped by external forces, including gender and power relations.”

  • DEFINITIONS

    • Personal Identity: The philosophical question of what makes a person the same over time—traditionally linked to memory, consciousness, or bodily continuity.

    • Feminist Philosophy of Mind: A field that critiques traditional models of cognition, selfhood, and identity, emphasizing the social and political dimensions of the mind.

    • Relational Identity: The idea that selfhood is not just internal (cognitive or psychological) but shaped by relationships, cultural expectations, and systemic forces.

    • Historical Selfhood: A feminist perspective arguing that identity is not fixed but develops over time based on changing social conditions.

  • KEY PASSAGES (Likely Important Sections)

    • Critique of Cartesian and Lockean Theories of Identity – James explains why traditional models of the self fail to account for social dimensions.

    • Gender and the Formation of Identity – A core section where she argues that women’s identities are often shaped by patriarchal norms.

    • Personal Identity as a Socially Embedded Concept – James develops her relational and historical account of selfhood.

    • Implications for Feminism and Justice – She discusses how rethinking personal identity can empower marginalized groups and reshape political discourse.

  • Overall Significance

    • Susan James' work bridges feminist theory and philosophy of mind, arguing that traditional concepts of identity fail to capture the lived realities of marginalized individuals. By emphasizing relational and historical identity, she challenges dominant philosophical paradigms and contributes to broader debates in social epistemology, political theory, and feminist philosophy.