riverside_WiszMciPoAMCLXA=_4.11.24.docx

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Keep in mind we have your final test in this course. So it's just these two grand. The first one covering the first three units of this course material, and this one covering parts four and five of our syllabus course material, basically the War with Athens and the Fall of Sparta. That's only 10 or 11 lectures and that many class meetings worth of readings. As you begin to prepare for this exam, the single best thing you can do is to look at how you did on the first exam. If you haven't collected your first exam back from us yet, please come find me and the course assistants down here at the end of class. We've been bringing exams to class every day for people who want to pick them up. We have your quizzes too, but those are much less informative in terms of improving your work. a scene where you did great and not so great on the exam so that you can prepare accordingly for this coming one. You can also, after you've thought about it, looked at the first exam, started the review, were thinking about review, you can always reach out to us, to me personally, to one of the course assistants. I have office hours on the syllabus. You can contact the course assistants to make an appointment to see them. We're happy to talk to you about how best to prepare I mean, second exam. Incidentally, on that note, if you're expecting accommodations on the next exam following the set procedures, please send me an email sooner rather than later so I can make the decisions. All right, so the breaking of Sparta. The collapse of Spartan power after Lutra was sudden. Two things turned what might have been just a lost battle, and Spartans had lost battles in the past, into the disaster that it became. One was the breaking of the Spartan myth of invincibility. And the second was the strategic vision of Epaminondas, the commander of the Theban forces. I'm going to start today with the breaking of the myth. As I talked about last time, when the Spartans... This is a new truck. Right back there. Steven's won because in large part... because of the unorthodox tactics of a Pamanandis. It also had to do with the prior training of a Theban sacred band. You can blame fewer numbers of Spartiates in the battle line. There are various factors. But as I emphasized last time, it was the unusual and indeed very bold tactics of a Pamanandis that won that hoplite battle for the Thebans in a smashing fashion. As I said before, this was the first time in centuries that the Spartans had been bested in a hoplite phalanx battle, in a large-scale hoplite phalanx battle in centuries. This was stunning news to the Greek world that the Spartans had been thoroughly defeated. The last time a disaster like this happened was at Sfactoria Island in 424 during the Athenian War. As we saw then, humiliating defeat that the Spartans suffered. That wasn't a hotlight battle, it was a few hundred Spartans trapped on an island, ultimately surrendering to their being attackers. In the aftermath of that humiliation, the Spartan alliance fell apart. major allies like Karn and Thebes that had been fighting with the Spartans all along against the Athenians in the Athenian War refused to join the peace treaty that Sparta ended up negotiating with the Athenians. So furious they were with the Spartans for making the peace and perhaps beginning to doubt the ability of the Spartans to continue to successfully lead a war effort. against the impedance. Peloponnesian allies like Elis and Mantenea forsook the Peloponnesian League to join with Argos, Sparta's Peloponnesian rival, in a new league that Argos was putting together. This was in part fomented by those Corinthians again. Basically, Spartans Peloponnesian alliance was falling apart. It was only repaired when Sparta's reputation was restored with the smashing victory at the first battle of Nantanea in 418. We talk about that battle in detail as well. It was an overwhelming victory and a major hoplite clash. And Sinides, our historian for those events, tells us directly that this restored in Greek's minds the natural. supreme reputation of the Spartans. So this collapse of Spartan alliance following a humiliating defeat happened again in 370 BC. After the crushing defeat at Lutra in 371, Spartan reputation was damaged to the point where most of the allies that for decades had been counting on deserted Spartan alliance. even worse this time because Sparta couldn't even make excuses after Spactorilla that we know that they did. That is, they tried to brush off the accusation of cowardice by pleading the special circumstances of the island. We know that the Spartans did this. They tried to make excuses like this because our historian for the Athenian War, Thucydides, tells us they did. He says, when an Athenian ally, in order to insult one of the Spartan prisoners from the island, asked him whether the ones who had fallen were the real Spartans, in other words, you're just a cowardly schmuck. The reply was that, quote, spindles, by which he meant arrows, would be worth a great deal if they could pick out brave men from cowards. Or Mark, which was intended to show that the ones who died were simply the ones who came in the way of the stones and arrows. So you can't blame me, the surviving Spartan, you can't call me a coward just because I survived. It was just a matter of chance who lived and died in that impossible situation. We found ourselves. So this conversation reported by Thucydides captures, I think, the defense that we can expect that Spartans made of themselves for the humiliation of surrendering at Sphakteria. Luktruc, on the other hand, was a straight-up hop-like fight. There was nothing to say, nothing that the Spartans could say. to reassure their allies, who concluded from it that the Spartans had lost their mojo. Now, it didn't matter whether they lost their mojo. That's a technical, ancient historical term, by the way, mojo. It didn't matter whether this happened because of the dwindling number of Sparti citizens that was increasingly visible to allies who would march out on campaigns with the Spartans, or a lack of courage, or a lack of skill, or whatever. Doesn't matter what the reason was. The Spartans no longer seemed invincible in hoplite battle. Moreover, some allies had long chafed under Spartan leadership. As you know, the Peloponnesian League was originally formed not from Peloponnesian city states who just loved the Spartans and wanted to cozy up to them and make an alliance. Peloponnesian League was initially formed from city states conquered by the Spartans who instead of taking their land and trying to enslave their populace and turn them into helots as the Spartans had done very early in their history, instead defeated city states the Peloponnesian League. But over time, most city-states came to appreciate what it meant to be an ally of the Spartans, a member of the Peloponnesian League, acting under the leadership of the Spartans, but nevertheless a member of the League. They did have input. The League did have input on what wars they would undertake, what pieces they would make. And best of all, they would be fighting alongside the invincible Spartans battle not lined up against them on an open field likely to be to end up dead. So the Peloponnesian League was, even if there were definite advantages to being a member, this was not something that was originally a matter of choice. Some city-states did ultimately join the Peloponnesian League for the strategic advantage they saw, not because they were defeated by the Spartans in battle. But it seems that in the decades since the Athenian War in particular, Palipinnesian League allies of the Spartans had begun to have reason to resent the Spartans. Sources like Xenophon and Pausanias report that many of the allies that fought, apparently grudgingly, alongside the Spartans at Lutra, hated them. Reported that these allies hated the Spartans and were in fact happy to see them defeated. This is the Spartans analog. Put that animosity together with the now shattered reputation of the Spartans as consummate winners in hotline warfare. And it's spelled disaster for Sparta. We see this disaster come to fruition in 370 BC, when Spartans desperately needed to gather an army to fend off a Theban invasion that they knew was incoming. Spartans knew that Pamanandus planned to gather allies and launch an invasion of Laconia itself. So Sparta desperately needed to gather an army to fend this off. Elis refused to join them. So did almost all the Arcadian cities refuse to join. In fact, there occurred just then a civil struggle in Arcadia that resulted in the creation of a new democratic and very anti-Spartan coalition. And losing the Arcadians as allies was especially damaging to the Spartans because Arcadia was known for its large population, at least if you put all the city-states of Arcadia together, it totals up to a large population, and being capable fighters. And for decades, the Spartans had relied on city-states like Mantena, Teguia, or Comenos and others to fill out their battle line. So when they refused to support the Spartans and in fact went over to the Thebans, this was the worst possible time. It was the worst possible time because now, more than ever, the Spartans alone wouldn't be able to put up a credible fight. They had lost 400 Spartiate full citizens at the Battle of Lutra. This left probably something like 700 Spartiate full citizens alive in Sparta. Just as bad as the loss to most allies was another deficit the Spartans found themselves facing with the collapse of their reputation. The humbling of Sparta cost them the loyalty of many Spartan Parioic corps. free Spartans, not memphal citizens, not being able to participate in the Spartan assemblies or become Spartan officials, but nevertheless free individuals living in the territories of Petonia and

Messenia who had always fought alongside the Spartans. Many of them failed to show up. to fight alongside the Spartans as the Theban invasion loomed. And many of the helot troops that the Spartans had freed. And they were down the base that we've been talking about in recent weeks. Many of them also deserted. During the coming invasion, something unprecedented would happen, in fact, on this front. At this moment, the Spartans were also greatly disheartened by the fact that large numbers of the perioikoi and the helots even conscripted in the army were escaping from the city and going over to the enemy. All this shows how important Sparta's supreme reputation had been in holding together the Spartan alliance to this point, but even classes within the Spartan state itself. And though actual Sparti fighting power had been declining over the years from the smaller and smaller numbers of Homoloi who could show up in the battle line on any given campaign, for decades after the Athenian War, Sparta had continued to wield dominating power on the battlefield. They were able to do this because of Perioikoi, Aeneodamides, and thousands of allied troops Now, without those allies, without many of the perioikoi, Sparta was an unprecedented state of weakness. So in the years immediately following Lutra, Sparta found itself vulnerable in a way it had rarely been before, I suggest never been before, except maybe the very earliest days of Spartan history, abandoned by most of their allies, and even many who lived in Laconia and Messenia abandoned them. as well. The question is, would Peminondis and the Thebans take advantage of this Spartan weakness to make this not just a temporary state of vulnerability but a permanent one? I'll get to that next. First any questions about what I've been talking about, the loss of Spartan reputation for intensibility? So you're reading for today in Plutarch's biography of Aegiselaus, focuses on Aegiselaus. He is, of course, the senior Spartan king. The other Spartan king, Cleombrotus, died at the Battle of Lutra. His son stepped forward to be the other royal family's king. But Aegisalaus, as the senior commander, the experienced one, seems to have taken the lead in Spartan policy as he had been doing for decades. Now Plutarch is always interested in character, and he spends most of the time in the six or so chapters that you read talking about Aegeus Aelaus's personality and the reactions of people around him to the things he did and the things he said. How would you say Aegeus Aelaus comes across in the reading that you had for the day? reading about situations Sparta found itself in, the actions of Agiselaus, the crisis after Lutra facing invasion by the Thebans. What's the general impression you get about Agiselaus? Positive, negative, funny, not funny, yeah? I would say positive. this erode leader in a lose-you situation doing his best. Yeah. Very good. Anyone else remember anything from this account that makes you? Yeah. It also made it seem like he was arrogant and just BSing his way through things. Very good. Yeah. BSing his way through things, but BSing his way very skillfully through things in a way that didn't cause. Well, I was going to say it didn't cause resentment, but there was resentment of Spartan leadership pretty much evident in the readings for Dedette, whether it was his biesere or not, I don't know. But yeah, good. Anyone notice anything else about Agisolaus' portrayal in the reading for Dedette? Well, I think that it was generally a positive portrayal, but a positive portrayal of someone in a very difficult circumstance, and arguably someone who bears a fair amount of the blame for the circumstances the Spartans now found themselves in. One of the reasons that Spartans might have blamed G. Solausius was his policy that resulted And even if he wasn't the one to have fought the battle and lost the battle of Lutri, it was his fellow king, Clem Brontis, nevertheless it was his policy that set them on the way to this devastating defeat. So the Spartans might have blamed him for that. The reading also suggests that he got blamed for other things as well. I'll get to that in a moment. What did he decide? One of the most momentous decisions that G. Solaus had to make in the aftermath of the Lutre, though, was what to do with the tresantes, the tremors. the Tremlerts. The Tremlerts is a word that the Spartans gave to any Spartan who had shown cowardice in battle. And by Spartan definition, cowardice in battle basically means surviving a battle which Sparta lost. How could you have been appropriately courageous and fought Orgally retreat or not, if you seeded the field of battle to the opponent. Any Spartan was immediately under suspicion for having survived a battle which was a clear defeat. And Lutra was the clearest kind of up-right defeat possible. And you had the situation. of hundreds of surviving Sparti 8 soldiers, representing probably a third to, somewhere between a third and a half of all surviving Sparti 8 citizens, all of whom oil up. back in the city, and according to the Spartan law, they're supposed to suffer severe consequences. They're allowed to be slapped by anyone who sees them. They're supposed to give up their seats at events for fellow Spartans. They're not supposed to be given Spartiate women in marriage. They're supposed to be humiliated at every point. But what do you do if you just don't have many Spartiates left? And Jesus, he clearly thought that if you It would be a mistake for the Spartans to visit the normal shaming punishment on the survivors of Lutra. And so he decided to, when given the power by the Spartans to make a decision about the matter, he decided to let the laws sleep for a day. By missing means the laws regarding how Tresantes are supposed to be shamed. Let the laws sleep for a day. They'll resume in full force tomorrow. And by this little dodge, I don't know if we call this the essary, but whatever it is, it's a clever dodge that lets the Spartans not. cost themselves two-fifths of their entire citizen population and continue on as best they can. But alongside the point about the Trisantes, which Egislaeus and the Spartans had to settle, there's another thing you may have noticed coming out in the Plutarch reading for today, and that was the problem of dissension in Sparta. Tremblers! The solution that Aegeus Aelaus posed to the Trembler problem, Plutarch endorses in part because he saw the great fears among the Spartans of civil strife. Civil strife generally in Sparta and in particular if they had been punished the way the laws normally indicate. Plutarch says, these survivors were a large powerful group who it was feared might stir up a revolution. not just a wise move because the Spartans needed every living citizen they could, but because if they could have done something drastic, tried to overthrow the Constitution, take things into their own hands rather than suffer the humiliation that one would normally expect. Revolution in Sparta? One of the things we've talked about in this course is how proud the Spartans always were about their constitution, their traditional laws, and the stability of the Spartan state. Other city-states can have. political civil strife between Democrats and oligarchs and have tyrants seizing power and let the other city states suffer this and we Spartans can take advantage by intervening and putting the regime we want in power. That's great for them, but for us, Sparta has always been secure in its reverence for Spartan traditions, Spartan law. And so this is a serious problem if now it's a realistic possibility. that there could be political revolution at Sparta. It would be shocking if we didn't already know that there was quite a bit of class tension already going on in Sparta before, even before the luchric catastrophe, as we discussed last week. Further on in Plutarch we hear about 200 men who mounted a short-lived rebellion. They, in the course of the Theban invasion, they occupied a building in the Spartan town, and they refused to follow orders. So... This rebellion, if that's what it was, it's hard to tell exactly who these 200 people were. Plutarch calls them, quote, 200 men who had long been unreliable and worthless, unquote. Well, that's a bit of a value judgment, isn't it? Unreliable and worthless to whom? So that's our only clue for who these 200 were. Maybe a lot of the 200 were Jupo Mayones, Spartans who had lost their state. citizenship for economic reasons or other reasons. Maybe there were Neodemal Dacian there. Maybe there were full Spartan citizens, either folks who've been at Lutra or not been at Lutra. We don't know who made up these 200. But here's another real crisis. At precisely the time that Sparta cannot afford to have internal discord, now, Aegean Salaus defused the situation with a clever bit of theater. Does anyone recall what Aegean Salaus did to defuse this rebellion of 200 men who had taken over a building. So. And he says, like, oh, you guys were given false orders. You've got to go to this place instead. That's my bad. Right. He pretended he didn't know what was going on. Oh, no, no. You guys aren't supposed to be here. You guys were supposed to be stationed at that place. And this is my fault. It wasn't clear where you were supposed to go. But you guys are supposed to go there. And so go ahead. And Plutarch says they were kind of aware of it. But sort of relieved because probably they had been, after they had taken this building and decided, yeah, we're going to, they're beginning to think, well, this is pretty stupid. We might all end up dead. What's the G. Suleyman? You might burn this building down while we're in it. You know, they may have had, began to have regrets or they weren't clear what their plan was. And so G. Suleyman, knowing this, played this, this little

charade. Oh no, no. You're not supposed to be here. you guys are supposed to be there. Go ahead and take your positions, and everything will be fine. And it worked. The men did what they were supposed to do, followed his orders. Of course, then G. Salaus identified who the ringleaders were and had them put to death. But so it wasn't like it was zero consequence for this. But so. So. Aegeus and Laos, if you will, brazened it out, right, and managed to diffuse this situation so you didn't have open civil war in Sparta. And then Plutarch talks about a different group of men. This time he specifies as Spartiates, a number of members of the Homoyoi, who met in a house to plot a rebellion. Aegeus and Laos learned about this plot. He consults with the EFORs, five annual SPARC officials, about what to do. And presumably getting the agreement of the EFORs, he had these men seized and immediately executed. Luthorpe remarks, this is very unusual, that Sparta has laws. And there is usually a trial for people who are accused of serious crimes. People aren't just executed at the word of the king or the king of the ethors. But that's what happened here. I think that's a measure of the real crisis that Sparta was facing, invaded by even, surrounded by enemies, danger of internal revolt. So Plutarch's focus on Aegiselaus and the fractures within Sparta that the king had to deal with make it a bit difficult to understand what's happening strategically. That is what your reading today was. There's very little in your reading today. You may have wondered, who's this epitome on us again? And why is Sparta getting invaded? And why aren't they marching out and fighting a hoplite battle the way the Spartans always seem to do outside of Sparta? Challenge them at the isthmus? the Boer of Argos or in Arcadia or something. The larger picture of what's going on is a little bit hard to glean from Plutarch with his fascination with leadership and with the G. Soleus personal. But if we supplement Plutarch's account with others' accounts that I didn't have you read for today, we can see what Epaminondas the Theban commander was up to. And it's brilliant. So Epeminondas invades Laconia in 370 BC, the year after the Battle of Lutra, with a huge army. There are Thebans, of course. There are other Boeotians. The question of are the Boeotian cities going to be independent, that was pretty much settled with the crushing of the Spartan army at Lutra. Thebes was able to compel, intimidate, most of the other Boeotian city-states to join its cause. So you had Thebans. You had Boeotians. You had former allies of the Spartans, like many Arcadians, fighting alongside them. Many tens of thousands of soldiers. They invade Laconia, ravaging and pillaging as they come, approaching the city of Sparta itself, the town of Sparta itself. They stay for months, doing as much destruction as they possibly can in Laconia. in 369, showing doubling the destruction and showing the impunity with which he can invade. to devastate Sparta. These invasions completed the humiliation of the Spartan state. It started with crushing unexpected battle of Lutra. And here, it comes to fulfillment. Now, what's interesting is that Epimon on this never manages to assault the town of Sparta itself and capture the town of Sparta. You might have expected this to happen because it has overwhelming forces and unlike most Greek city-states, Sparta did not have defensive walls. The Spartans had always prided themselves on not needing walls around their town. Who would dare to invade Sparta? If you do that, you have to fight the Spartans and y'all know what happens when you fight So they don't have defensive fortifications. We might have thought it would be a relatively easy task for Epaminondas to assault the town. Now, there are a number of things that might explain it. For one thing, we're told in 370, the Erotas River was in full flood when Epaminondas invaded. So the river was a real barrier. Would have made it very difficult for an army. one bank of the river and it would have been very difficult for the state to make it. than those casualties. It's also the case that G. Salaus was smart enough not to be baited into an open field battle. That's what Epaminondas was clearly trying to do, trying to parade his destruction of Spartan territory right in front of the eyes of the Spartans in town and get a G. Salaus to come out and fight a pop-like battle and be overwhelmed and crushed with odds far worse than he had at Lutra. And Adesilaus refused to take the bait. The similarity with the situation during the Athenian War when Pericles had the Athenians adopt a defensive strategy and refused to come out of their town to go fight the Spartans in open battle. Adesilaus was, in a sense, copying that same strategy. Whatever Epaminondas's reasons. Doesn't really matter. The Spartans had been helpless. They were helpless to drive the Thebans out of their territory. As we've seen, the Helots and Perioikoi deserted. It's not just that they didn't show up to fight alongside the Spartiates. They deserted to the Theban camp. Most of the Spartan's allies, of course, had already abandoned them. Spartan women were affected as well, Putar tells us. Spartan women had never seen the fires of an enemy army camped in their territory, right outside their city. as proud Spartan generals had over the years been wont to say to outsiders, well our women have never seen the fires of an enemy army, well now they were. And according to Plutarch, they didn't react particularly well, they carried on loudly and distractingly, and hurt things rather than helping things. It must have been shocking and deeply demoralizing for all the inhabitants of the town of Sparta, men, women, children, to see what was going on. And it's in times like these that the previous that previous social divisions bear bitter fruit. It's easy for a city, a nation, a community of any kind really, to hang together, even a sports team, to hang together to get along when things are going well. Right? It's easy to get along when everything is going fine, when your community is prospering, you are winning battles or contests of whatever kind. the defeated Lutru. So again, these social divisions that I've talked about before, it was more manageable because it was clear that the Spartan state was enjoying enormous success. They were the most influential city-state in the Greek world by far. But Sparta's sudden plunge after 371 brought to light all sorts of internal problems. Aegeus Aelaus, who had been an extremely popular leader, as Plutarch makes clear in his biography, was now having to defend himself against dark mutterings about not just policies that he had undertaken, like his near constant battles with thieves over the years, dark mutterings about we never should have made a Jisaleas king. He's lame. There was a prophecy. Sparta should never have a lame king and we appointed a Jisaleas king over a able-bodied person and that was a mistake right at the beginning. You might recall the arguments about this from early in the reading on in Plutarch's Bible, the fate of the Jisaleas. At the time the idea had been no he's the lame king would have been appointing the illegitimate son of king over the legitimate claim which was the G. Solaus' and so what if he limps a little bit. That's not really what the prophecy meant and at the time the Spartans accepted this and made a G. Solaus king and you know had him regretted it for most of his time as monarch but now all the old doubts. religiously observant, pious Spartans, you'd expect them to go to this sort of thing. Hmm, we're suffering catastrophe now. What God did we anger? What ritual did we not perform? What prophecy did we not follow? This is natural, honestly, in any human community, any point in history, to be looking for these sort of external explanations on why God or the gods or the universe is making us suffer so badly right now. in this spiritual or divine sense. So, Jizalans had to deal with that stuff too. And then there was the various threatened rebellions among the H'moyoi, 200 men. The negative social pressures I talked about as before building unhealthily burst forth, weakening Sparta internally at a time when it needed all of its resources. Now, Pamanandus knew how imitant the Spartans were. He didn't necessarily know about the internal dissensions, but in the end, G. Suleius seems to have done a pretty good job of tamping down the internal dissensions, preventing them from breaking out into an all-out civil war or coup. Pamanandus didn't necessarily know that stuff was going on, though he might have guessed. He could see how many former Spartan allies were now lined up on his side, not on the Spartan side. Deserters, we know that there were many deserters leaving Spartan territory, heading to his army. They probably told the Pamanonists about some of the internal troubles that Aegisalaus was facing. And that may be one reason why Pamanonists never seriously assaulted the town of Spartan. Right? making them watch him parade his army around, burning buildings, outlying buildings down and destroying crops and doing it without any opposition at all from the Spartans, would further crush Spartan spirits and indeed might help foment internal disagreements among the Spartans. community that is squabbling internally is to directly attack it from the outside. Well then the whole community, kind of just for their own survival, has to band together. Maybe a panmanon has figured, this is far worse. Let's just make them watch and let them destroy themselves. Now, Spartan did not, in the end, tear itself apart with internal discord, as probably a credit to Aegeus Aelaus, as Plutarch concludes. But this didn't save Spartan's situation. There was more bad news to come. During one of his two invasions, Epaminondas

moved his forces into Mycenaeum, territory long held by Spartan. And he didn't just. loot and burn. In fact, he didn't do any looting and burning while in Messenia. Instead, he established a new city-state called Messenia at the site of Mount Athome, where rebels in the last Hellot rebellion had staged their central fortress. He established the city-state of Messenia to be the heart of a newly independent polis called Messenia. All inhabitants of Messenia who wished could join this new city-state, this new free and independent city-state. And we are told that most did. And indeed, not just from those still in Messenia, but exiled Messenians from various parts of the Greek world, we are told, return. back to Messenia to join this new free city state and help it flourish. This was an enormous problem for Sparta. Not only is now Sparta losing maybe close to half, two-fifths anyway of their total territory, their farmland, their population, not only are they losing that, they're having a hostile enemy set up right on their border. Because you know the Messenians are going to hate the Spartans. They've been enslaved for centuries by the Spartans, repeatedly murdered in the course of the year, having war declared on them by the Spartans every year. Whenever they manage to put together a rebellion, it's put down bloodily, and the re-enslavement begins. Finally, the Messenians, thanks to this outside action by a pen and on this, have their freedom, have a city state set up. And Sparta is going to have to deal with this very hostile enemy right on their border, carved out of their own national territory. Jiminandus was not done. He also helped organize. this new league in Arcadia. The Arcadian League. I talked about how there had been the beginnings of the confederation among the Arcadians. The Pamanondas helped establish this confederation. Some of the divisions that had long separated different city states in Arcadia had always played upon because they were all supposed to be allies of Sparta, but if two of them started fighting each other, the Spartans could pick sides and overwhelm and make that side win. By playing them off once against the other, it made it easier for the Spartans to keep Arcadian cities as members of the Peloponnesian League. Well now, as a united ethnic confederacy, Arcadia could stand against Sparta. They formed a league with a rather democratic character that is different city-states of Arcadia would send delegates to a federal congress if you will, and to talk about national policy for the Arcadians. And They even founded a new capital, a city-state called Megalopolis in the south, Arcadia. So that was going to be sort of the capital, if you will, of the... So again, rendering permanent or yearly permanent, the alienation of Spartan resources, Spartan allies that happened naturally with the collapse of Africa. Luke 3. With these moves, if they were allowed to stand, the Pamanandas would permanently cripple Spartan. down. For better or worse, Agis and Lansin, the Spartans, did not want to let this thing. They wouldn't accept the arrangements that Epaminondas was making. The rest of the Greek world accepted them. The Spartans didn't, though. They remained isolated, separate from agreements that were being made in Greece, common peace agreements that were being negotiated in the rest of Greece, because those agreements would include Messenia as a signatory, as an independent power, and Maneuropolis of the Arcadia. These new arrangements, so devastating to Spartan power, were accepted by the rest of the Greek world, not by the Spartans. They refused any peace treaty that acknowledged even a peace treaty that would prevent further depredation of Spartan territory. They refused any treaty that would acknowledge Messenia as an independent polis. And Sparta continued to fight small battles when they could to try to reestablish their influence with their closest neighbors. For example, in 368, they did win a small victory in Arcadia at the so-called Tierless Battle. Plutarch mentions this very briefly. But these were local struggles, and they didn't succeed. reattach the massive Arcadians to the Peloponnesian League, and they were never able to recover Messenia, re-enslave its population, and take back its lands. So the struggles were unsuccessful, and they were also relentlessly local. Sparta was forever done waging war for dominance over Greece generally. The most important battle that the Spartans fought in this period was the second battle of Mantenaea that happened in 362 BC. After engineering the collapse of Spartan power in Greece, the Thebans made an effort for a primacy of their own. And for close to ten years, the Thebans succeeded in being the most powerful and influential city-state. But they kept having to fight to maintain their power. their position as dominant city-state. They fought battles north of Boeotia, and occasionally had to come to the Peloponnese and settle things to their satisfaction in the southern part of Greece. And they were successful, as I say, for close to 10 years, despite having to constantly fight. The army that Pamanondas and fellow Athibian like Pelopidas had put together became a very experienced and skilled army. The sacred band was still part of it. Pamanondas was a tactical genius and so was able to do keep winning on the battlefield. In 362 what happened was that there was a reaction against thieves in Nantanea, one of the Arcadian battle where the Thebans were lined up with some Arcadians and the Spartans marched north and joined other Arcadians and the Spartans doing everything they could to try to tear apart this Arcadian League. reestablished their preeminence. And they fought a large hoplite battle, the second battle of Manchinaea. Now Sparta was defeated by the Thebans again, reinforcing the lesson of luchtra. Whatever the Spartans might do locally, when it comes to a great big hoplite confrontation against major foes like the Thebans, the norm for the Spartans now seems to lose, whether it's about the Spartans themselves no longer being as valorous as they used to be, or not enough of them, or whatever, who cares? Now they generally lose. But Epemennonus ends up dying at the Second Battle of Mantumea, as occasionally happens to generals. battles, they're at risk, and he ends up dead, slain by a Spartan during that battle. Now you might think that Epaminondas' death proved to be a blessing for Sparta, but really it wasn't much of a blessing for Sparta. It was more of a curse for thieves. Thieves' effort to achieve the pinnacle of sort of the greatest hegemony in the Greek world collapsed with the death of Epaminondas. He had been the architect of their tactical victories and their strategic plans. Supremacy collapses. City states in the Greek world, there is no dominant city state in the Greek world. But Sparta is one of the weaker ones now, right? Because the damage had been done. Everything that the Anonymous had done in Arcadia, in Visenya had fatally weakened the Spartans. And they were unable to. ever regain supremacy. All right, any questions about what I have said so far? Yeah. So with Sparta being a militaristic society, I feel like their city would reflect that. So their city didn't have walls, but is there suggestion from the archaeology that the city perhaps is laying out in a defensive structure? layout so that they could more easily defend it with their men with the hop lights kind of plugging up roads and the such. Good question. And the answer to that is... Archaeology of Sparta itself is very difficult because there's a modern town called Sparti that is right on top of ancient Sparta. I wonder where they got the name Sparti. Anyway, it's the same town. It's still occupied, but it's all over exactly where the Spartan town center was. We know a few places. Archaeologically, we have found signs of certain buildings and districts in Sparta, but most of it, know what it looked like. We haven't even found the agora, the central marketplace of any Greek city state. We don't know where that is. And so I can't actually answer that question. But like with most Greek city states, the town center was on elevated ground. There was elevated ground. There were defensible locations. There wasn't a forbidding citadel like the Acropolis of Athens or the Candomia of Thebes. terrain. It was, like most city states, they could have attacking a city is difficult if there are defenders prepared to block up the approaches. It is a more difficult thing to do. And Sparta did have the advantage of the Erotas River flowing right by the town which was in flood and they could defend that. That's what our, that's the only indication our sources say about read into that episode of the G. Salaus, finding that the men have occupied a certain building and say, no, you're not supposed to be stationed here. You men are supposed to be here. We might read from that, oh, OK, there was a defensive plan, right? And they were going to have men blocking up certain buildings and alleyways and entrances. But that's sort of weak tea right there. We don't have direct testimony. We'll just have to depopulate Spartine to send to give a full answer to your question. Anything else? and I talked to the mayor of Sparty. Nice guy. He wasn't talking to me, it was part of a conference. Spartans love to have conferences, the Spartians love to have conferences talking about the glory of their old days, and the Spartan mayor was part of this, and English University was organizing. Anyway, I died breast. So after the 360s, Sparta was crippled as a major power in the Greek world, and it would remain so. Never again in Greek history would Sparta lead united Greek armies or achieve the position of the single preeminent city-state in Greece. So the question arises. What exactly explains why Sparta fell

so far so fast? Because right before Luthor, they were at the pinnacle of the power of influence. And right after it, all this stuff happened that I've been explaining today. What were the key factors that explains how this catastrophe could have happened to Sparta? Now, BluTARC had a few things to say in your reading for today, but this is not an issue that we are going to discuss today. This is what our next class is really going to be about, trying to answer this question, trying to figure out what's the best explanation. Toward that end, your only reading for next time is a journal article written by a scholar of ancient Greek history. called the decline of Sparta. George Cockwell is the name of the scholar who wrote it. Now. A scholarly article is a kind of reading that we have not yet done in this class. So I'm going to take a few minutes to talk about what this is and how to read this sort of thing. Now if you're an advanced history major or an advanced, otherwise experienced in doing scholarly readings of this kind, But I have learned in many years of teaching here at IU and at other universities That you cannot just assume that the undergraduate students who show up in your classes Know what to do with something like this Know how to read something like this and get the most out of it It's certainly different from on the one hand, most of the readings you've done in this course have been ancient source readings. Authors like Lucidides and Plutarch and Herodotus, most of these readings are primary sources. So primary source is the source contemporary and sort of an eyewitness to events that they talk about. Some of our ancient readings like Plutarch aren't contemporary with events they're talking about, but Plutarch read contemporary eyewitness accounts in this library, so those things are now lost to us. So we look to Plutarch to tell us things about, oh, I don't know, what Aegeus Aeolus was like when the Thebans invaded Spartan territory. So you've mostly been reading ancient sources, because they're the most direct information we have in trying to figure out what was going on in ancient Sparta. You've also occasionally had textbook readings. a textbook like Pomeroy's History of Greece, or some other textbook, Treatment of Ancient Greece. A brief reading that summarizes a bunch of events, just to give you a sense of what was generally going on. And then you come here and in lecture, I've reinforce some of that, or I'd assume that you knew that, so I didn't have to lecture all those details. I could lecture about other things, right? So those are the two sorts of things you've been reading. This is different. So I wanna start with the basics. I just a minute ago described this reading as a journal article written by a scholar of ancient Greek history. Cavalierly assuming you all know what this is, can anyone tell me? What a scholar is. When I talk about written by a scholar of ancient Greek history, a scholarly article, what the hell is a scholar? Anyone know? Give me a guess. Yes. studies and writes about that field of... Excellent. Someone who studies and actively writes about it. But most of the time when we talk about scholars, 99% of the time it's not just any dude or gal who studies... What sort of position do most scholars have? What's their job? Guesses. Construction worker, no. Yep. professors at universities. Right? People like me. I'm a scholar. I'm in fact a scholar of ancient Greek history. I'm a scholar of ancient Greek history not because I'm lecturing to you today. A, there are lots of teachers out there who can lecture to you about Greek history or Spartan history, and they aren't necessarily scholars. They may be just very skilled teachers who can read up on the subject and lead you in discussions of the ancient texts, which they themselves can rewrite, but they're not necessarily scholars. You are attending a research university. IU is the leading research university There are many research universities around this country, around the world. What makes IU a research university is that many or most of the faculty here, the professors who teach you their courses, are scholars. To get this job, to hold this job, I have to publish things. I have to write not just blogs on some website somewhere. I have to publish scholarly books and scholarly articles. Or, I don't get this job. Or, when it's time for me to come up for a promotion and tenure, they say, what have you published Robinson? I say, uh, I started an article once. They say, see you later. Good luck getting a job somewhere else. You may have heard the expression publish or perish. Maybe you haven't heard this. Publish or perish. This is sort of the credo that many academics have. If you are a scholar seeking to be a professor somewhere, or you're a professor somewhere and you want to attain promotion, keep your job, you've got to publish. You've got to publish things. So that leads me to my next question. So this guy, George Cockwell, is a scholar of ancient Greek history. He was not an Indiana University professor. He was a professor at Oxford for many years. Fairly well known. You could Google George Cockwell, and it'll come right up. And you'll get a decent-sized Wikipedia page telling you about the teaching positions he held and the various books that he published and such. So we've established what a scholar is, right? So Cockwell is one of these. He's a professor who was an expert. And I'll tell you, particularly, he was an expert on fourth century BC Greek history. So he wrote a book about Philip of Macedon. He wrote many articles, including this one, about different aspects of fourth century warfare and diplomacy. He wrote things about our best sources. So he wrote introductions to books about Xenophon. I've talked about Xenophon a fair amount in this class, because he's an important source for this period of history. You've read small bits of Xenophon's account of various points. So anyway, that's the sort of stuff, and that's who Cockwell is. Second question. I call this a journal article. What is a journal article? tell me what a journal market is, even in vague general terms. Can anyone tell me what journal this article was published in? Yeah? Classical Quarterly? Yeah! There's a little footnote here right after the title. Reprinted, because actually this copy that I made was from a collection of articles about Sparta. But originally this appeared in a journal. Classical Quarterly, volume 33, 1983. So this is not a new piece. This is about 40 years old. 1983, 3-5-400, by permission of the Classical Society and of the Order. So, it was appeared in Classical Quarterly. What is Classical Quarterly? That's the journal. What does it mean that Classical Quarterly is a journal? Does anyone have just a general sense of what an academic journal is? Yeah. It's not usually a collection, it's a periodical. So it comes out twice a year, three times a year, once a year, and in it are articles that scholars from around the world submitted to the journal, hoping that they would publish their article. But what happens when you submit a manuscript for an article, I mean at some point, Cockwell submitted this blob of text to Classical Quarterly, said please publish this for me and they didn't just publish it. It's a peer reviewed journal. Most academic journals are peer reviewed. What does that mean? That means they don't just say, oh George Cockwell I like him. Let's publish it. They take that text, they strip away all evidence of who the author is, and they send it out blind to a couple of other scholars around the world who volunteered to vet the article. They don't get paid for it. It kind of sucks. I sometimes do this. I don't get paid for it. I feel like it's just sort of my obligation to the profession. It also gives me an advanced look at things that might get published. But anyway. And they came back, and the readers said, oh, this is a good piece. We like it. And Classical Quarterly then said, OK, clock well. Here are some suggestions. It was suggested you look up this book here, and you fix that footnote there. But you fix those, you're in. So he did that, and here it's in. Scholarly articles like this are. how the academic profession works. Now, who reads Classical Quarterly? How many people in this room have a subscription to Classical Quarterly? No one. Of course not. Undergraduates are not going to subscribe to Classical Quarterly. It'll cost you hundreds of bucks. Most of your articles are going to have nothing in there if any interested in all of you. Why would you do that? Libraries subscribe to Classical Quarterly. They either get the physical journal in their stacks or nowadays increasingly they just have a digital subscription. So you log on to IUCAT or whatever your local university library system is Classical Quarterly and then you can find volume 33 from 1983 and you can find this article and you can look it up. So libraries have this, research libraries like the Wells Library at IQ, IQ at IU, we've got Classical Quarterly. Any research university is going to have Classical Quarterly and other major journals like this, and not just ancient history, name your discipline, there are academic journals where scholars are writing things for each other. That's the other point I'm making here. These things were not written for you. They were written for other scholars. So why am I inflicting this academic article, most of them are not particularly well written either, because I don't get my job because I have I'm able to produce something of substantial research that is good enough to get published in places like Classical Quarterly. And by the way, when I write a book it's the same thing, but instead of a journal, I'm going to an academic press like Cambridge University Press or Cornell University Press. And I'm sending

them my book manuscript. And I say, please publish this. And they say, hmm, we'll send it to some readers. And the readers will decide if it's any good and if we're willing to publish this for them. whether it's a journal article like this or an academic monograph published with some university press, the scholar who writes it is writing mostly for other scholars. Calcwell here had a particular purpose in writing this. Why am I having you read this if this is written for other scholars? Partly because this is a good exercise for you to read things that are a little challenging and not ordinary for undergraduate reading, which would be a textbook or a primary source in history class. Also because this is a very illuminating article on precisely the question that we are asking today Why did Spargo fall so suddenly and so quickly? And I'm also doing this because since you've been studying the Spartans for months, a lot of the references here to other events in Greek history or Spartan history aren't going to perplex you, you'll have at least a vague recollection of what the article is talking about. So I think that you'll be able to follow it. But I want to help you follow it by doing a little exercise in the next three minutes of class. I would like everyone to read the first two paragraphs and answer a couple of questions about it. I hope the text is large enough for you to read. I want you to read these two paragraphs and tell me what is the subject of this article, what question is he going to explore, and number two, what is his thesis going to be? Read on. Okay. usually with academic articles, just like with papers that we professors assign you as students to write, you can discover in the opening paragraph or two what the thing is about and some hint about what position the writer is going to take. Sometimes it's only kind of a hint, other times the person comes right out and says, my thesis is that blah, blah. How about this time? What is Cockwell trying to discover here? What is the question that he's trying to answer? Anybody? Yeah? On the. That's the question he's going to support. How do you know that? How did you conclude that? Well, it's at the end. It's the very end sentences. right. Bye. Right. So the last sentence of the first paragraph kind of sums up what this paragraph was saying. Sparta's army was unequal to the military genius of Hemanon this. He's sort of asserting that because how is he able to assert that? Has he, say, written on this subject before? Why, yes he has. In Classical Quarterly News Series 26, 19, 76 to Unite 4, I argue that the defuse of Sparta in 371 was not due to the pursuit of unwise policies. There were unwise policies, blah, blah. But what it was, Sparta failed for military reasons. Her army was unequal with military geniuses and panomists. But he's telling you he's not done with that. However, when one reads that in Lutra, an army of 10,000 op-lites, there were only 700 Spartis, one might wonder, hmm, maybe Cockwell wasn't totally right about this in his article. Maybe the real cause wasn't just a military tactical thing, that there were deeper root causes. And so, he's telling you that this article is going to ask the question, how far then was the failure of Sparta internal, social system. Now, so we know what he's going to try to answer and we know a bit about his background, why he's on this subject. Has he given a hint about what his thesis is going to be? What his conclusion is going to be? What is answer to this question? Anyone? Can you find a sentence in here where he says, I am going to argue? No, you can't. He's playing a little bit of scholarly hide the ball. But. If you read this carefully, you can probably come to an educated guess. He's already published an article that said it was the tactical genius of a Pamanandas that crushed the Spartans. And now he's saying, well, there is some evidence that there were other things that issue, population issues. How far was the failure of Spartan internal rather than the genius of a Pamanandas? Now, if he completely changes his mind from And he decides that now it's all about internal stuff. Maybe he'll argue that it was all internal stuff. But let me tell you, ladies and gentlemen, we don't change our minds correcting our own published work that often. You can probably guess that he is going to come to a conclusion that reinforces the argument he made in 1976, where he talked about the battle of lutra specifically. He was talking about what I was talking about the other day. of the day, the movement of this force of troops here and there, and the moves that Pamanandas was making and stuff. He is going to reinforce his conclusion that it was the genius of the Pamanandas, not Sparta's screw-ups. And so his assessment of the failure of Sparta being internal or social system, he's probably going to come to a skeptical conclusion about that. But you're going to have to read the article to find out. So we've read the first two paragraphs. I don't know, 18 more pages to go. This is your whole only reading assignment for next time. Please read it and we will talk about Coughwell's thesis.