Mock Trial Cases
People v. Samuel J. Gardner - The defendant appealed a judgment imposed upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of arson in the third degree and attempted grand larceny in the second degree. The appellate court held that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence where the People represented evidence establishing that the fire was neither accidental nor the result of natural causes, and that the People presented overwhelming circumstantial evidence that the defendant set the fire and had the financial motive to do so
People v. Lloyd Lewis - The defendant allegedly set fire to a barn he owned. The barn contained farm implements and a vehicle. The building and the personal property were all insured against the loss or damage by fire. The Court of Appeals reserved the second-degree arson conviction, holding that proof of motive was essential to conviction of arson based on circumstantial evidence. In this case, the appellate court determined that there was no evidence to submit to the jury from which it might draw the inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v. Lewis Moore - The defendant was convicted of two counts of attempted arson. In dismissing one of the convictions, the appellate court held that the evidence regarding insurance on the building and the contents was admissible in arson prosecution as being relevant to motive.
People v. Sharon Venkatesan - The defendant was charged with, and convicted of, arson in the third degree, related to the fire that destroyed her home. As evidence of motive, the People established at trial that a bank was in the process of foreclosing on the defendant’s home. The People also proved that the defendant had purchased a personal property insurance policy about one week after receiving a notice of eviction and about one month before the fire. The appellate court held that the valid reasoning and permissible inferences could lead to a rational trier of fact to conclude that the instant defendant was guilty of arson in the third degree.
People v. James Mills - The appellate court reserved the defendant’s second-degree arson conviction. The court wrote that: In assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, which in this case was wholly circumstantial, we must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom, and we must then “‘determine whether the jury reasonably concluded ‘ that the defendant’s guilt was proven to a moral certainty” (People v. Betancourt) Applying this standard, the court concluded that the jury’s verdict was not supported by legally sufficient evidence in that said evidence was not “inconsistent with the defendant’s innocence” nor did it “exclude to a moral certainty every other reasonable hypothesis”
People v. Daniel J. Hamilton - The defendant was convicted of arson in the second degree. On appeal, the court determined that the prime issue to be resolved was whether the defendant’s guilt was established beyond a reasonable doubt. The court found that there was a lack of credible evidence indicating that the defendant had possession of, or access to, an accelerate on the night of the fire. In reversing the conviction, the court held that there was insufficient circumstantial or direct evidence showing that the defendant committed the arson.
People v. McKinley Smith - On a pre-trial motion, the Nassau County Court dismissed a count of the indictment that had charged arson on the ground that the fire investigator had testified before the Grand Jury that the fire was deliberately set. On the District Attorney's appeal, the appellate court reinstated the arson charge. However, the appellate court, in agreeing with the County Court and citing People v. Goldberg, People v. Johnson, People v. Abreu, held that the fire marshal’s testimony violated the rule against an arson investigator expressing an opinion that a particular fire was caused by arson. It is exclusively within the province of the finder of fact to determine an ultimate fact issue in the case.
People v. Samuel J. Gardner - The defendant appealed a judgment imposed upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of arson in the third degree and attempted grand larceny in the second degree. The appellate court held that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence where the People represented evidence establishing that the fire was neither accidental nor the result of natural causes, and that the People presented overwhelming circumstantial evidence that the defendant set the fire and had the financial motive to do so
People v. Lloyd Lewis - The defendant allegedly set fire to a barn he owned. The barn contained farm implements and a vehicle. The building and the personal property were all insured against the loss or damage by fire. The Court of Appeals reserved the second-degree arson conviction, holding that proof of motive was essential to conviction of arson based on circumstantial evidence. In this case, the appellate court determined that there was no evidence to submit to the jury from which it might draw the inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v. Lewis Moore - The defendant was convicted of two counts of attempted arson. In dismissing one of the convictions, the appellate court held that the evidence regarding insurance on the building and the contents was admissible in arson prosecution as being relevant to motive.
People v. Sharon Venkatesan - The defendant was charged with, and convicted of, arson in the third degree, related to the fire that destroyed her home. As evidence of motive, the People established at trial that a bank was in the process of foreclosing on the defendant’s home. The People also proved that the defendant had purchased a personal property insurance policy about one week after receiving a notice of eviction and about one month before the fire. The appellate court held that the valid reasoning and permissible inferences could lead to a rational trier of fact to conclude that the instant defendant was guilty of arson in the third degree.
People v. James Mills - The appellate court reserved the defendant’s second-degree arson conviction. The court wrote that: In assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, which in this case was wholly circumstantial, we must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom, and we must then “‘determine whether the jury reasonably concluded ‘ that the defendant’s guilt was proven to a moral certainty” (People v. Betancourt) Applying this standard, the court concluded that the jury’s verdict was not supported by legally sufficient evidence in that said evidence was not “inconsistent with the defendant’s innocence” nor did it “exclude to a moral certainty every other reasonable hypothesis”
People v. Daniel J. Hamilton - The defendant was convicted of arson in the second degree. On appeal, the court determined that the prime issue to be resolved was whether the defendant’s guilt was established beyond a reasonable doubt. The court found that there was a lack of credible evidence indicating that the defendant had possession of, or access to, an accelerate on the night of the fire. In reversing the conviction, the court held that there was insufficient circumstantial or direct evidence showing that the defendant committed the arson.
People v. McKinley Smith - On a pre-trial motion, the Nassau County Court dismissed a count of the indictment that had charged arson on the ground that the fire investigator had testified before the Grand Jury that the fire was deliberately set. On the District Attorney's appeal, the appellate court reinstated the arson charge. However, the appellate court, in agreeing with the County Court and citing People v. Goldberg, People v. Johnson, People v. Abreu, held that the fire marshal’s testimony violated the rule against an arson investigator expressing an opinion that a particular fire was caused by arson. It is exclusively within the province of the finder of fact to determine an ultimate fact issue in the case.