POLS 455 Final Exam Study Guide

Chapter 8 Interrogations and Confessions

confession

When a person implicates himself or herself in criminal activity following police questioning and/ or interrogation.

admission

When a person can simply admit to involvement in a crime without any police encouragement.

due process voluntariness approach

The requirement that any confession be voluntary under the “totality of circumstances.”

Brown v. Mississippi (297 U.S. 278 [1936])

Police officers resorted to whippings and other brutal methods in order to obtain confessions from three Black defendants who were later convicted based on their confessions alone. The Supreme Court analyzed this case under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause and found the convictions invalid because the interrogation techniques had been so offensive.

Williams v. United States (341 U.S. 97 [1951])

It had been made patently clear that physical brutality to coerce a confession violates the Fourteenth Amendment.

Colorado v. Connelly (479 U.S. 157 [1986])

Typically, a confession will be considered involuntary if (1) the police subject the suspect to coercive conduct and (2) the conduct is sufficient to overcome the will of the suspect. The court will also look at the totality of circumstances to determine if the suspect’s vulnerabilities and condition, coupled with the police conduct, led to giving an involuntary confession.

Messiah v. United States (377 U.S. 201 [1964])

Established the rule that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee to counsel in all “formal criminal proceedings” is violated when the government “deliberately elicits” incriminating responses from a person.

deliberate elicitation

Is a tactic in which officers create a situation likely to induce a suspect into making an incriminating statement.

or

In the Sixth Amendment right to counsel context, deliberate elicitation occurs when police officers create a situation likely to induce a suspect into making an incriminating statement.

United States v. Henry (447 U.S. 264 [1980])

The Supreme Court focused on whether the officers “intentionally creat[ed] a situation likely to induce Henry [the defendant] to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel.”

formal criminal proceedings

In the Sixth Amendment right to counsel context, either a formal charge, a preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.

fair examination rule

The requirement that a witness, including the defendant, at either a trial or a grand jury hearing can be compelled to answer questions once he or she waives Fifth Amendment protection and begins to testify.

testimonial evidence

For Fifth Amendment purposes, “testimonial evidence” is loosely defined to include incriminating statements made at any point during the criminal justice process, whether or not the person making such statements is under oath.

physical evidence

The opposite of testimonial evidence. Physical evidence can include murder weapons, documents, and even results from police lineups.

Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966])

The Court announced the following important rule: “[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination (emphasis added). This wording clearly established that the Fifth Amendment should serve as the basis for determining the constitutionality of a confession.

Miranda warnings

While there are some variations, the Miranda warnings contain four elements: (1) You have the right to remain silent; (2) anything you say can be used against you in court; (3) you have the right to talk to an attorney and to have the attorney with you during questioning; and (4) if you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for you.

custody

Typically an arrest. Custody is important in the Miranda context because Miranda warnings do not need to be read if a person is not in custody.

Berkermer v. McCarty (468 U.S. 420 [1984])

In determining whether a person is in “custody,” the Supreme Court has held that “the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood his situation”.

California v. Beheler (463 U.S. 1121 [1983])

The Court offered some clarification concerning its decision in Mathiason. It pointed out that Miranda is not implicated “if the suspect is not placed under arrest, voluntarily comes to the police station, and is allowed to leave unhindered by the police after a brief interview.”

interrogation

Express questioning (e.g., Where were you on the night of the crime?) or the functional equivalent of a question (see definition). The definition of interrogation is important in the Miranda context because Miranda warnings do not need to be read if a person is not technically interrogated.

Rhode Island v. Innis (446 U.S. 291 [1980])

The Court noted that interrogation “must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself.” Thus, any questions that tend to incriminate—that is, those that are directed toward an individual about his or her suspected involvement in a crime—are considered interrogation.

functional equivalent of a question

“[A]ny words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect”.

California v. Prysock (453 U.S. 355 [1981])

A juvenile defendant was told, “You have the right to talk to a lawyer before you are questioned, have him present with you while you are being questioned, and all during the questioning.” The defendant was then told that he had the right to a court-appointed lawyer but not that one would be provided for him if he was indigent.

Michigan v. Mosley (423 U.S. 96 [1975])

Two hours after the defendant had stated that he did not want to talk, a different police officer confronted him in a different room about another crime and read him the Miranda rights for a second time.

Maryland v. Shatzer (559 U.S. 98 [2010])

A different officer resumed questioning about the same crime more than two weeks after the suspect was released following initial questioning.

New York v. Quarles (467 U.S. 649 [1984])

The public safety exception to Miranda was first established.

18 U.S.C. Section 3501

A federal statute enacted in the wake of the Miranda decision providing that any confession “shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given.” The statute was deemed unconstitutional in Dickerson v. United States (530 U.S. 428 [2000]).

Dickerson v. United States (530 U.S. 428 [2000])

In a 7 to 2 opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court:

We hold that Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress, and we decline to overrule Miranda ourselves. We therefore hold that Miranda and its progeny in this Court govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts.

Couch v. United States (409 U.S. 322 [1973])

Being advised of Miranda is considered a personal right. Thus, a person arguing for exclusion of an (unconstitutionally obtained) incriminating statement must have standing to challenge its use; otherwise, the statement and subsequent evidence will be deemed admissible.

Harris v. New York (401 U.S. 222 [1971])

The prosecution sought to introduce an out-of-court statement that was inconsistent with the defendant’s in-court testimony, even though the out-of-court statement was obtained in violation of Miranda.

United States v. Bayer (331 U.S. 532 [1947])

A case decided well before the Miranda decision was handed down. There, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine did not control the admissibility of improperly obtained confessions.

Chapter 9 Identification Procedures and the Role of Witnesses

lineup

An identification procedure in which the suspect is placed alongside several other people who resemble him or her. The intent of the procedure is to ensure that a witness or victim picks the suspect out of the lineup.

showup

An identification procedure in which the suspect is brought before the witness (or victim) alone, so the witness can be asked whether that person is the perpetrator.

photographic array

A procedure in which several photographs, including one of the suspect, are shown to a witness or victim, and he or she asked to pick out the perpetrator.

in-court showup

A procedure in which a witness identifies the perpetrator in court. This sometimes occurs when a prosecutor asks a testifying witness to point to the perpetrator.

Manson v. Braithwaite (432 U.S. 98 [1977])

The Court permitted an in-court identification based on an earlier identification from a single photograph because it was reliable based on the totality of circumstances.

double-blind lineup

A lineup procedure in which neither the witness nor the investigator staging the lineup knows who the suspect is.

credibility

A term concerned with whether the witness’s testimony should be believed.

competence

A term that refers to a witness’s ability to remember events, communicate effectively, and understand the importance of telling the truth, as well as the consequences of not doing so.

accrediting

It is the process by which the prosecution or defense attempts to support, bolster, or improve a witness’s credibility.

discrediting

When the prosecution or defense attempts to attack or challenge a witness’s credibility.

impeachment

The formal term for attacking a witness’s credibility (similar to discrediting).

rehabilitation

A goal of sentencing that consists of a planned intervention intended to change behavior (e.g., drug treatment); the process of restoring a witness’s credibility.

tainted identification

An identification that would not have taken place but for some earlier unconstitutional activity.

Chapter 10 The Pretrial Process

booking

The process by which an arrest is officially documented and the arrestee is placed into custody. During booking, the arrestee’s personal items will be inventoried and he or she will be fingerprinted and/or photographed.

initial appearance

The first appearance of an accused person before a judge. Trial may occur for misdemeanors.

Gerstein v. Pugh (420 U.S. 103 [1975])

The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment requires a probable cause hearing either before or promptly after arrest.

probable cause hearing

A hearing in which a judge decides whether there was probable cause to arrest. If the arrest was with a warrant, the probable cause hearing is not necessary. Also called a Gerstein hearing (for the Supreme Court’s decision in Gerstein v. Pugh).

Riverside County v. McLaughlin (500 U.S. 44 [1991])

The Court provided some clarification. In a 5 to 4 decision, the Court held that for a hearing to comply with the Fourth Amendment, it must take place within 48 hours of arrest.

pretrial release

One of several methods to release a defendant prior to his or her trial date.

bail

A process by which a defendant pays a certain amount of money in order to be released from jail prior to his or her trial date. Defendants who appear for trial receive their money back. Those who fail to appear for trial forfeit the bail amount.

Stack v. Boyle (342 U.S. 1 [1951])

The Court stated that as part of the bail determination, the judge should consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence against [the accused], [and] the financial ability of the defendant to give bail and the character of the defendant.”

bail bond agent

A professional who posts the defendant’s bail in exchange for a fee.

release on recognizance

The accused is released with the assumption that he or she will show up for scheduled court hearings.

preventive detention

The act of denying bail to certain defendants who are either dangerous or pose a high flight risk.

Schall v. Martin (467 U.S. 253 [1984])

The Supreme Court upheld a statute that provided for detention of a juvenile who posed serious risk of committing a crime while on release.

Schilb v. Kuebel (404 U.S. 357 [1971])

The Supreme Court took it upon itself to decide on the constitutionality of a state statute that provided that a criminal defendant who was not released on his or her own recognizance could (1) deposit 10 percent of the amount of set bail with that court, 10 percent of which would be forfeited to the court as bail bonds costs, or (2) pay the fulll amount of bail, all of which would be refunded if the accused showed up at court.

Bell v. Wolfish (441 U.S. 520 [1979])

The Court upheld several of the rules promulgated by New York City’s Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC), including rules prohibiting inmates from receiving books from entities other than publishers, bookstores, and book clubs, as well as outside packages.

preliminary hearing

A hearing that serves as a check on the prosecutor’s charging decision. The standard of proof is probable cause, and the main inquiry in the hearing is whether there is probable cause to take the case to trial. The preliminary hearing is to be distinguished from the initial appearance, the probable cause hearing, and the pretrial release hearing. It almost always takes place after one of these hearings as well as after that charging decision.

Lenn Woon v. Oregon (229 U.S. 586 [1913])

A preliminary hearing is not required by the Constitution.

arraignment

A hearing in which the defendant is formally notified of the charge lodged against him or her. The defendant also enters one of three pleas: (1) guilty, (2) not guilty, or (3) nolo contendere.

guilty

A plea in which the defendant claims responsibility for the crime with which he or she has been charged.

not guilty

A plea in which the defendant does not claim responsibility for the crime with which he or she has been charged. A not guilty plea is not the same as a plea of innocent. There is no plea of innocent.

nolo contendere

A plea similar to guilty with a literal meaning of “I do not desire to contest the action.” It resembles a guilty plea but is different in the sense that it may not be used against the defendant in any later civil litigation that arises from the acts that led to the criminal charge.

allocution

When the defendant explains to the judge exactly what he or she did and why. The defendant is usually required to allocute when he or she pleads guilty.

discovery

The process by which each party to a case learns of the evidence that the opposition will present.

Williams v. Florida (399 U.S. 78 [1970])

The Court considered Florida’s notice of alibi statute, which required the defendant, at the prosecution’s request, to disclose alibi defenses coupled with a list of witnesses who would support them.

United States v. Nobles (422 U.S. 225 [1975])

The defense attempted to call a private investigator to the stand whose testimony would have cast doubt on the prosecution’s case. The trial judge ruled that the investigator could not testify until the prosecution received portions of the investigator’s pretrial investigative report. The Supreme Court upheld this decision.

Wardius v. Oregon (412 U.S. 470 [1973])

The Court held that the prosecution must provide the defense with a list of witnesses who will testify in rebuttal to the defendant’s alibi or defense.

nonreciprocal discovery

Discovery that benefits one side in a criminal case, but not the other. For example, the prosecution is required to share exculpatory evidence with the defendant, but there is no such requirement for the defense.

Brady v. Maryland (373 U.S. 83 [1963])

The Supreme Court drastically altered its previous decisions concerning the prosecution’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence. The Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of good faith or bad faith of the prosecution” (emphasis added).

Arizona v. Youngblood (488 U.S. 51 [1988])

The Supreme Court clarified the third factor—the motivation of the prosecution. The Court stated that “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police [or prosecution], failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute due process of law.”

Chapter 11 Prosecutors, Grand Juries, and Defense Attorneys

prosecutorial discretion

A prosecutor’s authority to decide whether to proceed with criminal charges against a particular suspect.

information

The prosecutor’s formal charging document and the alternative to a grand jury indictment that informs the defendant of what crime he or she is charged with.

selective prosecution

When an individual is targeted for prosecution merely because he or she falls into a certain group (e.g., a minority group).

Oyler v. Boles (368 U.S. 448 [1962])

The Court held that the prosecution’s selection of cases violates the equal protection clause only when it is intentional and is intended to target “a certain class of cases…or specific persons.”

pretextual prosecution

When the prosecutor lacks the evidence to charge someone with a particular crime and so charges him or her with a lesser crime.

vindictive prosecution

Prosecution based on revenge.

Blackledge v. Perry (417 U.S. 21 [1974])

The defendant was convicted in a lower court for misdemeanor assault with deadly weapon. The defendant filed an appeal with the county superior court for a trial de novo (a new trial), which is sometimes permitted in misdemeanor cases.

trial de novo

A type of appeal in which an appellate court holds a new trial as if the prior trial never occurred.

joinder

When the prosecutor either (1) brings multiple charges against the same individual in the same trial or (2) brings charges against multiple individuals in the same trial.

severance

The opposite of joinder. For example, severance occurs when separate trials are held for different charges against the same defendant.

United States v. Lane (474 U.S. 438 [1968])

if this joinder has “a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict,” then new and separate trials must be held.

indictment

A formal, written accusation submitted to the court by a grand jury, alleging that a specified person(s) has committed a specified offense(s), usually a felony; also called true bill.

grand jury

A body of people selected to hear evidence against an accused person (or persons) and determine whether there is sufficient evidence to bring the case to trial.

Hurtado v. California (110 U.S. 516 [1884])

The Supreme Court stated that indictment by a grand jury is not a right guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

true bill

The grand jury’s endorsement that it found sufficient evidence to warrant a criminal charge.

Taylor v. Louisiana (419 U.S. 522 [1975])

The Court in that case held that “systematic exclusion” of a “large distinct group” from the pool from which the (petit) jury is chosen violates the Sixth Amendment.

Rose v. Mitchell (443 U.S. 545 [1979])

The Court held that the “right to equal protection of the was [is] denied when [the defendant] is indicted from a grand jury from which members of a racial group purposefully have been excluded.”

Butterworth v. Smith (494 U.S. 624 [1990])

The Supreme Court declared that the First Amendment may provide an exception to the grand jury secrecy requirement.

United States v. Mandujuano (425 U.S. 564 [1976])

Grand jury witnesses and the targets of grand jury investigations generally are not guaranteed a right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.

United States v. Calandra (414 U.S. 338 [1974])

A grand jury “may compel the production of evidence or the testimony of witnesses as it considers appropriate, and its operation generally is unrestrained by the technical procedural and evidentiary rules governing the conduct of criminal trials.”

subpoena ad testificandum

A subpoena that compels a witness to appear before the grand jury.

subpoena duces tecum

A subpoena that compels the production of tangible evidence (e.g., a suspected murder weapon).

Hale v. Henkel (201 U.S. 43 [1906])

Such a subpoena must comport with the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement.

contempt power

The grand jury’s authority to hold people in contempt of court for failing to appear before it. Civil and criminal sanctions can be imposed.

variance

When the prosecutor presents evidence at trial that departs significantly from that relied on by the grand jury for the purpose of issuing an indictment.

Powell v. Alabama (287 U.S. 45 [1932])

The constitutional right of an indigent defendant to be represented by counsel was first announced.

Gideon v. Wainwright (372 U.S. 335 [1963])

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel became incorporated. In that case, the Court recognized that “lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.”

Kirby v. Illinois (406 U.S. 682 [1972])

The Court became even more specific and held that the right to counsel applies not only in criminal prosecutions but also at the initiation of adversary proceedings.”

pro se defense

When a defendant waives his or her Sixth Amendment right to counsel and defends himself or herself.

Johnson v. Zerbst

The Supreme Court stated that a defendant may only waive counsel if the waiver is “competent and intelligent.”

effective assistance of counsel

The requirement that a defense attorney must effectively represent his or her client. In Strickland v. Washington (466 U.S. 668 [1994]), the Supreme Court held that a two-prong test must be applied in order to determine whether counsel is ineffective: “First, the defendant must show that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense” (p. 687).

Strickland v. Washington (466 U.S. 668 [1994])

The Supreme Court held that a two-prong test must be applied in order to determine whether counsel is ineffective:

First, the defendant must show that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is unreliable.

Chapter 12 Plea Bargaining and Guilty Pleas

plea bargaining

The defendant’s agreement to plead guilty to a criminal charge with the reasonable expectation of receiving some consideration from the state.

Alford plea

A guilty plea in which the defendant admits to the crime, but not necessarily all elements of it. An Alford plea does not require the defendant to allocute.

Brady v. United States (397 U.S. 742 [1970])

The Court stated, “Of course, that the prevalence of guilty pleas is explainable does not necessarily validate those pleas or the system which produces them. But we cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for the State to extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit to the State.”

prosecutorial inducements

Offers made by the prosecution to the defendant.

Bordenkircher v. Hayes (434 U.S. 357 [1978])

The defendant was indicted by a grand jury for forging a check for $88.30. The range of punishment was 2—10 years in prison. The prosecutor offered to recommend a five year sentence but threatened to seek an indictment under a habitual criminal statute if the defendant did not accept the offer.

United States v. Goodwin (457 U.S. 368 [1982])

In that case, the defendant was indicted on additional charges after plea negotiations broke down. The Court held that the prosecutor could file additional charges if an initial expectation that the defendant would plead guilty to a lesser charge proved unfounded. The Court refused to accept the defendants argument that the prosecution was vindictive and, once again, gave broad authority to prosecutors in the plea-bargaining process.

ad hoc plea bargaining

A term used to describe some of the strange concessions that defendants agree to make as part of prosecutors’ decisions to secure guilty pleas.

statutory inducements

Statutes that offer incentives for pleading guilty.

judicial inducements

When a judge offers something to the defendant in exchange for a guilty plea. Most judicial inducements are prohibited.

Corbitt v. New Jersey (439 U.S. 212 [1978])

The Court stated that it could not permit prosecutorial bargaining as in Bordenkircher “and yet hold that the legislature may not openly provide for the possibility of leniency in return for a plea.”

Henderson v. Morgan (426 U.S. 637 [1976])

The Supreme Court held that “since respondent did not receive adequate notice of the offense to which he pleaded guilty, his plea was involuntary and the judgment of conviction was entered without due process of law.” The element of intent (the mens era) in second-degree murder was viewed as critical, which meant it should have been explained to the defendant.

Boykin v. Alabama (395 U.S. 238 [1969])

According to the Supreme Court, there can be no presumption of “a waiver of these three important federal rights from a silent record.”

McCarthy v. United States (394 U.S. 459 [1969])

According to the Supreme Court:

Requiring this examination of the relation between the law and the acts the defendant admits having committed is designed to “protect a defendant who is in the position of pleading voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charge but without realizing that his conduct does not actually fall within the charge.”

Chapter 13 Rights at Trial

speedy trial

A trial that meets with the Sixth Amendment’s requirement for a speedy trial. A trial is no longer “speedy” when there is intentional delay that is prejudicial to the defendant’s case.

accusation rule

The requirement that a person must first be accused (i.e., charged) for the Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial provision to apply.

United States v. Marion (404 U.S. 307 [1971])

The Court held that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee to a speedy trial attaches only after the person (or persons) has been accused of a crime. The Court further stated that being accused of a crime did not necessarily mean that formal charges had to be filed.

United States v. Loud Hawk (474 U.S. 302 [1986])

Charges against the defendant were dismissed, but the prosecution appealed the dismissal. The defendant was granted unconstitutional release while the prosecution continue to mount its case. Nevertheless, the Court still held that the defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not implicated. Thus, if an individual is accused but then released to go about his or her business with no charges pending, any attempt to claim a violation of the Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial provision will likely fail. However, if a person is released while charges are pending, a speedy trial argument could be successfully raised.

Dodgett v. United States (505 U.S. 647 [1992]

The defendant was charged with a crime, but did not know that he had been charged and was not restrained in any way. Dodgett left the United States just prior to the government’s attempt to arrest him and, still unaware of the charges against him, returned over two years later. Dodgett was eventually found (although he never evaded authorities) and arrested over eight years after he was indicted.

United States v. Lovasco (431 U.S. 783 [1977])

There, the Supreme Court held that even when the statute of limitations period has not expired, the due process clause is violated if the delay exceeds “the community’s sense of fair play and decency.”

Barker v. Bingo (407 U.S. 514 [1972])

The defendant did not assert his Sixth Amendment right until after the prosecution had sought 16 continuances, which laster over five years. The Supreme Court announced a four-element test to determine when the right to a speedy trial is violated: (1) length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant.” According to the Court, none of these four criteria is, by itself, determinative. Instead, the courts must balance one against the others in deciding whether a Sixth Amendment violation has taken place.

Strunk v. United States (412 U.S. 434 [1973])

The defendant was found guilty of a crime in a federal district court after a 10-month delay between indictment and arraignment. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the defendant was denied a speedy trial, but only remanded the case for a reduction in the defendant’s sentence. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that dismissal is the only remedy. Thus, any time a defendant’s right to a speedy trial is denied, the charges against him or her will be dismissed altogether. This is in contrast to the plea-bargaining discussion in Chapter 12; in that context, if the prosecution fails to fulfill its end of a plea bargain, the accused does not necessarily go free.

impartial judge

A judge who is capable of basing his or her decisions on the law and who has no conflict of interest or pecuniary stake in the outcome of the case. There is no constitutional right to an impartial judge. This right is a Supreme Court creation.

Tumey v. Ohio (273 U.S. 510 [1927])

The judge of court that heard the defendant’s case was also the city mayor. In addition, he received fines and fees that levied against those convicted in his courtroom. The Supreme Court concluded that due process is violated when the judge “has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him his case.”

impartial jury

A jury that is capable of making a decision based solely on the facts of the case.

noncriminal proceeding rule

The rule that limits juries to criminal trials. The rule is a bit of a misnomer because civil trials are by jury. The noncriminal proceeding applies to steps of the criminal process that are not themselves considered “criminal.” Examples are juvenile adjuratory hearings and civil commitment hearings.

McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (403 U.S. 528 [1971])

The court held that juveniles charged with delinquent acts do not enjoy a right to a jury trial. Also, civil commitment hearings do not need to be conducted before a jury (see Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 [M.D. Ala. 1974]). In other words, both juvenile delinquency hearings and civil commitment hearings are noncriminal for Sixth Amendment purposes, even though they are still a part of the “criminal” process.

Baldwin v. New York (399 U.S. 66 [1970])

The Court explained its rationale for this exception, stating that the “disadvantages, onerous though they may,” of denying a jury trial for a petty crime are “outweighed by the benefits that result from speedy and inexpensive nonjury adjudication.”

six-month imprisonment rule

The rule that limits jury trials to cases where more than six-months’ incarceration in jail or prison is possible.

Johnson v. Louisiana (406 U.S. 356 [1972])

When a jury decides a case, a unanimous decision is required, but it was not always that way. In two companion cases, Johnson v. Louisiana (406 U.S. 356 [1972] and Apodaca v. Oregon (406 U.S. 404 [1972]), the Court upheld a Louisiana statute that permitted 9 to 3 jury verdicts as well as an Oregon statute permitting 10 to 2 decisions. According to the Court:

In our view, disagreement of three jurors does not alone establish reasonable doubt, particularly when such a heavy majority of the jury, after having considered the dissenters’ views, remained convinced of guilt…That want of jury unanimity is not to be equated with the existence of reasonable doubt emerges even more clearly from the fact that when a jury in a federal court, which operates under the unanimity rule and is instructed to acquit a defendant if it has a reasonable doubt,…cannot agree unanimously upon a verdict, the defendant is not acquitted, but is merely given a new trial.

jury list

The master list from which prospective jurors are subpoenaed. Examples include lists of those with drivers’ licenses or voter registration lists.

jury panel

The list of individuals drawn from the jury list. The jury panel consists of those individuals subpoenaed for jury service.

systematic exclusion

Exclusion of a distinctive group from jury service. Systematic exclusion is something more than just significant exclusion.

Duren v. Missouri (439 U.S. 357 [1979])

The Court clarified Taylor by requiring that the defendant prove three elements in a fair cross-section challenge:

1. that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community;

(2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. (emphasis added)

distinctive group

Historically protected groups that should not be excluded from jury service, namely women and minorities.

voir dire

The process of selecting jurors for service. Voir dire proceeds through three stages: questioning by the judge, challenges for cause, and peremptory challenges.

challenge for cause

A means of excluding prospective jurors who cannot be impartial. Prosecutors and defense attorneys have an unlimited number of challenges for cause in criminal cases.

Smith v. Phillips 455 U.S. 209 [1982])

The Court held once again that actual bias must be shown for a challenge for cause to succeed. In that case, the Court did not infer bias from the fact that a potential juror had been seeking employment from the prosecutor’s office. However, this decision and Leonard should not be construed to suggest that actual bias must always be shown rather than alleged bias. Alleged, or implied, bias may be sufficient in certain limited circumstances for exclusion of a potential juror based on a challenge for cause.

Witherspoon v. Illinois (391 U.S. 510 [1968])

The Court considered the constitutionality of a statute that provided for exclusion of all potential jurors who “expressed scruples” against the death penalty. The Court held that a death sentence returned from such a jury would be unconstitutional because the jury resulting from the statute would be “organized to return a verdict of death.” Importantly, in Witherspoon, it was only the defendant’s death sentence that was invalidated, not his conviction. Also, note that nothing prohibits a prosecutor from excluding a juror who would never return a verdict of death.

peremptory challenges

A means of excluding prospective jurors with no reason offered. Peremptory challenges are limited depending on the case type and the jurisdiction. Peremptory challenges cannot be used to excuse prospective jurors based on race.

Batson v. Kentucky (476 U.S. 79 [1986])

The Court decided that prosecutors can be called on to explain their use of peremptory challenges to exclude minorities, but only if the defense shows that the challenges were used for this purpose. This showing requires that the people excluded through the peremptory challenges constitute a distinct group, that these people were excluded by the prosecution through the use of peremptory challenges, and that “these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used [peremptories] to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race”

Gray v. Mississippi (481 U.S. 648 [1987])

Many Supreme Court cases concerning peremptory challenges by the defense have revolved around the question of how many, if any, peremptory challenges should be constitutionally permissible. The Court stated in Gray v. Mississippi (481 U.S. 648 [1987]) that peremptory challenges are not constitutionally guaranteed.

Chapter 14 More Rights at Trial

public trial

A trial that is open to the public and/or complies with the Sixth Amendment’s public trial provision. Courts can sometimes limit public access and the proceedings will still be considered public.

In re Oliver, (333 U.S. 257 [1948])

The Supreme Court elaborated on the purpose of a public trial–one that is open to the public. The Court stated, “The knowledge that every criminal that is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of powe…Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient; in comparison of publicity, all other checks are of small account.” Furthermore, “the presence of interested spectators may keep [the defendant’s] triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and to the importance of their functions.”

Waller v. Georgia, (467 U.S. 39 [1984])

Oliver dealt expressly with criminal trials, but the Supreme Court has held that openness also applies to other hearings. For example, suppression hearing should be open to the public (Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 [1984]), as should voir dire (Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209 [2010]). By extension, most other hearings (with the exception of grand jury proceedings, which are traditionally carried out in secret) should be considered public as well.

Sheppard v. Maxwell (384 U.S. 333 [1966])

Illustrates the negative effects that publicity may have at trial. In that case, the courtroom was packed with members of the public and media for all nine weeks of the trial. This made it difficult for people to hear one another. The press also handled and took pictures of evidentiary exhibits. The Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s conviction, citing the “carnival atmosphere” of the trial.

change of venue

A process by which a trial is heard in another jurisdiction, perhaps in another county in the state.

Rideau v. Louisiana (373 U.S. 723 [1963])

The Court overturned a defendant’s death sentence because the trial court refused to grant the defendant’s motion for a change of venue. In that case, Rideau’s confession had been broadcast all over local television. The Court stated that “due process of law in this case required a trial before a jury drawn from a community of people who had not seen and heard Rideau’s interview.”

jury sequestration

The process of confining jurors during a trial. Sequestered jurors usually spend nights in the same hotel together and have little to no access to press coverage of the case on which they are serving as jurors.

gag order

A judicial order limiting what the press and/or the parties to a particular case can divulge until the proceedings are completed.

Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart (427 U.S. 539 [1976])

The trial judge prohibited the media from reporting information regarding the defendant. While the Supreme Court disagreed in that case, it did indicate that a gag order would be permissible given “(a) the nature and extent of pretrial coverage; (b) whether other measures [such as changes of venue, continuances, voir dire, sequestration, or instructions to jury to ignore press coverage] would likely to mitigate the effects of unrestrained pretrial publicity; and (c) how effectively a restraining order would operate to prevent the threatened danger.”

confrontation

The defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to be present at his or her trial, hear live testimony of adverse witnesses, and challenge such witnesses’ statements in open court.

Illinois v. Allen (397 U.S. 337 [1970])

The Supreme Court expressly stated that “[o]ne of the most basic of rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused’s right to be present in the courtroom at every state of his trial.” The other two types of confrontation extended to the defendant are to require the live testimony of witnesses’ statements in open court.

physical presence

One of two confrontation requirements. In order to be “present at his/her trial,” the defendant must be physically present (as opposed, for example, to appearing via closed-circuit television).

Taylor v. Illinois (484 U.S. 400 [1988])

The defendant can waive his or her Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. Only the defendant can make this determination, though. In Taylor v. Illinois (484 U.S. 400 [1988]), the Court held that the defense attorney cannot waive the defendant’s right to be physically present without his or her consent.

mental competence

One of two confrontation requirements. In order to be”present at his/her trial,” the defendant must be not only physically present but also mentally competent. A defendant who is not mentally competent cannot adequately confront adverse witnesses.

Dusky v. United States (362 U.S. 402 [1960])

The Court set forth a test for determining whether a defendant is mentally competent to stand trial. The test assesses whether the defendant “has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding–and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” The burden of proving incompetence falls on the defendant (Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 [1992]).

live testimony

The confrontation requirement that adverse witnesses provide live testimony.

Mattox v. United States (156 U.S. 237 [1895])

Over a century ago, the Supreme Court stated in Mattox v. United States (156 U.S. 237 [1895]), that the defendant’s right to live testimony is “subject to exceptions, recognized long before the adoption of the Constitution.” The Court stated further:

Such exceptions were obviously intended to be respected. A technical adherence to the letter of a constitutional provision may occasionally be carried farther than the safety of the public will warrant. For instance, there could be nothing more directly contrary to the letter of the provision in question than the admission of dying declarations. They are rarely made in the presence of the accused; they are made without any opportunity for examination or cross-examination; nor is the witness brought face to face with the jury; yet from time immemorial they have been treated as competent testimony, and no one would have the hardihood at this day to question their admissibility. They are admitted not in conformity with any general rule regarding the admission of testimony, but as an exception to such rules, simply from the necessities of the case, and to prevent a manifest failure of justice.

unavailable witness

For purposes of confrontation, an unavailable witness is one who permanently moves to another country, cannot be located after a careful search by the prosecution, or suffers from a lapse in memory.

Motes v. United States (178 U.S. 458 [1900])

The Court stated that it would violate the Sixth Amendment “to permit the deposition or statement of an absent witness…to be read at the final trial when it does not appear that the witness was absent by the suggestion, connivance, or procurement of the accused, but does appear that this absence was due to the negligence of the prosecution. “In other words, if the prosecution fails to conduct a careful search for a certain witness and then claims that the witness is unavailable, then the defendant’s right to live testimony will be violated.

hearsay exceptions

Exceptions to the rule that hearsay is not permissible in a criminal trial. Hearsay is something that is “heard, then said.” It is considered unreliable because it is filtered through a second party. An example of hearsay would be this: A witness testifies that someone else told her the defendant committed the crime. Ideally, “someone else” would appear in court. Generally, hearsay statements such as this are not admissible. There are, however, several established exceptions to the hearsay rule.

White v. Illinois (502 U.S. 346 [1992])

Which dealt with the admissibility of out -of-court statements made by a four-year-old girl. The prosecution argued that the statements should be admissible because two exceptions to the hearsay rule applied to her testimony. The first exception, for “spontaneous declarations” allows hearsay statements that are made in the “heat of the moment.” The second exception allows hearsay statements that are made while an individual is seeking medical treatment from a doctor. The Court held that the Confrontation Clause was not violated in this instance:

A statement that has been offered in a moment of excitement–without the opportunity to reflect on the consequences of one’s exclamation–may justifiably carry more weight with a trier of fact than a similar statement made in the course of procuring medical services, where the declarant knows that a false statement may cause misdiagnosis or mistreatment, carried special guarantees of credibility that a trier of fact may not think replicated by courtroom testimony.

Coy v. Iowa (487 U.S. 1012 [1988])

The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a state law that permitted the placement of a large opaque screen between the defendant and two young girls who testified that he had sexually assaulted them. The Court declared that the statute was unconstitutional because “the Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact.”

Chambers v. Mississippi (410 U.S. 284 [1973])

The Court considered the constitutionality of a state statute that barred any cross-examination by the defense. In that case, the defendant sought to cross-examine a witness who, on three previous occasions, had confessed to the murder with which the defendant was charged. The state did not call the witness, so the defense was forced to. However, the judge prohibited cross-examination based on the voucher rule, which provides that the party calling the witness vouches for (attests to) his or her credibility. According to this rule, cross-examination would be pointless because that is not typically the job of the party calling the witness. But since this case placed something of a unique twist on the voucher rule, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the defendant’s conviction. According to the Court, “The availability of the right to confront and cross-examine those who give damaging testimony against the accused has never been held to depend on whether the witness was initially put on the stand by the accused or by the state.”

compulsory process

The Sixth Amendment requirement that criminal defendants enjoy the right to compel the production of witnesses and evidence. This is often accomplished via subpoena.

Washington v. Texas (388 U.S. 14 [1967])

The right to compulsory process was incorporated to the states in Washington v. Texas (388 U.S. 14 [1967]), in which the Supreme Court stated that compulsory process protects “[t]he right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance.” Further, the Court stated:

We hold that the petitioner in this case was denied his right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor because the State arbitrarily denied him the right to put on the stand a witness who was physically and mentally capable of testifying to events that he had personally observed, and whose testimony would have been relevant and material to the defense. The Framers of the Constitution did not intend to commit the futile act of giving the defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose testimony he had no right to use. The judgment of conviction must be reversed.

Crane v. Kentucky (476 U.S. 683 [1986])

Another related case, the defendant sought to present evidence that his confession was unreliable because it had been obtained when he was young and uneducated and had been interrogated at great length. The trial court excluded this evidence and the defendant was convicted. The Supreme Court reversed that decision, however, declaring that a state may not exclude “competent, reliable evidence bearing on the credibility of a confession when such evidence is central to the defendant’s claim of innocence” because “[w]hether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause…or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clause…the Constitution guarantees criminal defendant a ‘meaningful opportunity’ to present a complete defense.”

United States v. Scheffer (523 U.S. 303 [1998])

On a few occasions, the Court has sanctioned exclusion of certain defense evidence based on the right to compulsory process. For example, in United States v. Scheffer (523 U.S. 303 [1998]), the Court upheld a trial court’s decision to exclude polygraph evidence presented by the defense. The Court stated, “There is simply no consensus that polygraph evidence is reliable. To this day, the scientific community remains extremely polarized about the reliability of polygraph evidence.” Thus, the defense’s ability to present its case can be restricted if the evidence it seeks to present cannot be considered reliable (see also United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317 [1992]).

double jeopardy

The fifth Amendment requirement that a person cannot be reprosecuted after acquittal, reprosecuted after conviction, or subjected to separate punishments for the same offense.

Benton v. Maryland (395 U.S. 784 (1969)

Today, double-jeopardy protection is applied in every state because the Supreme Court decided, in Benton v. Maryland (395 U.S. 784 (1969), that the Fifth Amendment’s protection against double jeopardy is a fundamental right:

The fundamental nature of the guarantee against double jeopardy can hardly be doubted. Its origins can be traced to Greek and Roman times, and it became established in the common law of England long before this Nation’s independence…As with many other elements of the common law, it was carried into the jurisprudence of this Country through the medium of Blackstone, who codified the doctrine in his Commentaries. “The plea of autrefoits acquit, or a former acquittal,” he wrote, “is grounded on this universal maxim of the common law of England, that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offense.”…Today, every State incorporates some form of the prohibition in its constitution or common law. As this Court put it in Green v. United States (355 U.S. 184, 187-188 [1957]), “the underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.” This underlying notion has from the very beginning been part of our constitutional tradition. Like the right to trial by jury, it is clearly “fundamental to the American scheme of justice.

Kansas v. Hendricks (521 U.S. 346 [1997])

The Fifth Amendment suggests that double jeopardy occurs when a person’s “life or limb” is threatened. This language has been taken to mean that double jeopardy applies in all criminal proceedings. Determining whether a proceeding is criminal, however, is not as clear as it seems. Courts will often look to the legislature’s intent in writing the statute that is the basis for prosecution. For example, in Kansas v. Hendricks (521U.S. 346 [1997), the Supreme Court found that a statute providing for a “sexual predator” proceeding, in addition to a criminal proceeding, did not place the defendant in double jeopardy because it provided for civil confinement. The Court stated:

Because we have determined that the Kansas Act is civil in nature, initiation of its commitment proceedings does not constitute a second prosecution. Cf. Jones v. United States (463 U.S. 354, 77 L. Ed. 2d 694, 103 S. Ct. 3043 [1984]) (permitting involuntary civil commitment after verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity). Moreover as commitment under the Act is not tantamount to “punishment,” Hendricks’ involuntary detention does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, even though that confinement may follow a prison term. Indeed, in Baxtrom v. Herold (383 U.S. 107, 15 L. Ed. 2d 620, 86 S. Ct. 760 [1966]), we expressly recognized that civil commitment could follow the expiration of a prison term without offending double jeopardy principles. We reasoned that “there is no conceivable basis for distinguishing the commitment of a person who is nearing the end of a penal term from all other civil commitments.” Id., at 111-112. If an individual otherwise meets the requirements for involuntary civil commitment, the State is under no obligation to release that individual simply because the detention would follow a period of incarceration.

same offense

For double-jeopardy purposes, the same offense is one that has the same elements as another offense. For example, first- and second- degree murders are considered the “same offense” for double-jeopardy purposes. First-degree murder is defined as the premeditated deliberate killing of another person. Second-degree murder is the same offense, less the premeditation requirement. A person cannot be convicted of both offenses, otherwise a double-jeopardy violation occurs.

Blockburger v. United States (284 U.S. 299 [1932])

The Supreme Court stated that “[w]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.”

Blockburger rule

A rue stemming from Blockburger v. United States (284 U.S. 299 [1932]) that helps courts determine what constitutes the “same offense” for double-jeopardy purposes: “[w]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not” (p. 304).

entrapment defense

A criminal defense based on the belief that someone should not be convicted of a crime that the government instigated. It is a defense in the criminal law sense, but it is one of the only defenses that calls into question law enforcement’s role in the instigation of a crime. This is why entrapment is important in criminal procedure.

Sorrells v. United States (287 U.S. 435 [1932])

The first Supreme Court case recognizing the entrapment defense was Sorrells v. United States (287 U.S 435 [1932]). Chief Justice Hughes stated, “We are unable to conclude that…[the]…processes of detection or enforcement should be abused by the instigation by government officials of an act on the part of persons otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its commission and to punish them.” This reasoning underlies the treatment of the entrapment defense in U.S. courts to this day. The Court further stated:

The appropriate object of this permitted activity, frequently essential to the enforcement of the law, is to reveal the criminal design; to expose the illicit traffic, the prohibited publication, the fraudulent use of the mails, the illegal conspiracy, or other offenses, and thus to disclose the would-be violators of the law. A different question is presented when the criminal design originates with the officials of the Government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order that they may prosecute.

Sherman v. United States (356 U.S. 369 [1958])

The Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion but still adhered to the predisposition test. In that case, a government informant met the defendant at a doctor’s office, where both were being treated for narcotics addiction. After repeated requests by the informant, the defendant provided him with illegal narcotics. The Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s conviction, noting that entrapment was “patently clear” as a matter of law. Even so, the Court also pointed out that it is difficult to judge the conduct of an informant without knowing how predisposed the offender was to act before the crime was committed.

United States v. Russell (411 U.S. 423 [1973])

The Court continued to focus on the defendant’s predisposition. In Russell, a narcotics agent posed as a narcotics manufacturer and offered the defendant a difficult-to-obtain ingredient used to manufacture a drug. The defendant accepted and was convicted. Justice Rehnquist, the author of the majority opinion, observed that there was sufficient predisposition on the part of the defendant, so the entrapment defense did not apply.

Hampton v. United States (425 U.S. 484 [1976])

The Supreme Court once again focused on the defendant’s predisposition. In that case, the defendant was convicted of distributing heroin supplied to the defendant by a government informant. The Court stated that “[i]f the police engage in illegal activity in concert with a defendant beyond the scope of their duties the remedy lies, not in freeing the equally culpable defendant, but in prosecuting the police under the applicable provisions of state or federal

law.” In other words, it is the defendant’s predisposition that matters in the context of the entrapment defense, not the government’s conduct.

Chapter 15 Sentencing, Appeals, and Habeas Corpus

indeterminate sentencing

A sentencing strategy that gives the judge the authority to set the sentence.

determinate sentencing

A sentencing strategy that permits the judge to set the sentence, and the sentence cannot later be altered by a parole board.

mandatory sentencing

A sentencing strategy that takes discretion away from judges. The law, not the judge, sets the sentence.

sentencing guidelines

State and federal rules used to set sentences based on offense severity and the offender’s prior record. Sentencing guidelines achieve a balance between determinate and indeterminate sentencing.

Roberts v. United States (445 U.S. 552 [1980])

Sentencing can also be influenced by the defendant’s degree of cooperation with the police. In Roberts v. United States (445 U.S. 552 [1980]), the Court held that the sentencing judge was permitted to consider the defendant’s refusal to cooperate with the police in investigating his crime. Still other factors, such as the offender’s mental status, can be considered. In fact, it has been held that a mentally ill individual can be held in custody, such as in a mental institution, for a loner terms than would otherwise be imposed for the crime charged. (see Jones v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 3043 [1983]). This often happens following an insanity plea.

Furman v. Georgia (408 U.S. 238 [1972])

The Court held that the death penalty was carried out in the United States in a way that amounted to cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Gregg v. Georgia (428 U.S. 153 [1976])

In 1976, the Court reinstated the death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia (428 U.S. 153 [1976]), holding that death is an acceptable sentence, provided the sentencing process is reasonable.

bifurcated trial

Holding two separate proceedings in the death penalty context, one for determining guilt and another for determining the appropriate sentence (e.g., death or life in prison).

United States v. Tucker (404 U.S. 443 [1972])

The Supreme Court invalidated an individual’s 25-year sentence because the sentencing judge arrived at the sentence by considering the defendant’s past convictions, for which he was not afforded counsel.

appeal

The practice of asking an appellate court to examine a lower court’s decision in order to determine whether the proper procedure was followed or the correct law was applied.

direct appeal

An appeal that is authorized by law.

discretionary appeal

An appeal that will be heard only if the reviewing court agrees to do so.

Griffin v. Illinois (351 U.S. 12 [1956])

The Supreme Court reviewed an Illinois appellate procedure that required the defendant to produce transcripts of the trial—even if he or she could not afford to do so. The Court struck down this requirement, holding that the government cannot impose a restriction on the right to appeal “in a way that discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their poverty.”

Douglas v. California (372 U.S. 353 [1963])

There, the Court concluded that the government must provide an indigent defendant with counsel to assist in his or her appeals of right. The Court stated that “where the merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without benefit of counsel…an unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich and poor.” The Court has also held that the Constitution requires effective counsel for a nonindigent defendant in his or her appeals of right.

North Carolina v. Pearce (395 U.S. 711 [1969])

In several cases, the Supreme Court has dealt with retaliation by the prosecution for a successful defense appeal. The first noteworthy case in this regard was North Carolina v. Pearce (395 U.S. 711 [1969]). The defendant was reconvicted after a successful appeal and was actually punished more harshly the second time around. The Court concluded that due process required that the “defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge.”

final judgment rule

The requirement that interlocutory appeals dealing with questions of the defendant’s guilt (rather than questions of a constitutional nature) cannot be heard until after final adjudication.

interlocutory appeal

An appeal filed prior to adjudication.

Carroll v. United States (354 U.S. 394 [1957])

The decision in Abney can be compared to Carroll v. United States (354 U.S. 394 [1957]), in which an interlocutory appeal was not allowed. The Court held that a defendant cannot appeal a decision on a search-and-seizure motion until after final adjudication has taken place. In other words, the Court felt that an appeal of a decision addressing evidence critical to the defendant’s case is not sufficiently independent of the trial.

Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. (337 U.S. 541 [1949])

is perhaps the first noteworthy case in which the Supreme Court recognized certain interlocutory appeals, which it defined as:

a small class [of pre adjudication decisions] which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.

Cobbledick v. United States (309 U.S. 323 [1940])

The Supreme Court held that a person can appeal a court order, such as a subpoena, but only if he or she has been found in contempt of court for failing to abide by that order. The Court said that a decision to the contrary “would forever preclude review of the witness’ claim, for his alternatives are to abandon the claim or languish in jail.”

harmless error

A mistake at the trial level that has little practical consequence in terms of deciding whether the defendant is guilty or innocent.

Kotteakos v. United States (328 U.S. 750 [1946])

The Court set the test for deciding what constitutes a non constitutional harmless error.

Chapman v. California (386 U.S. 18 [1967])

The Court set the test for a constitutional harmless error.

retroactivity

The extent to which appellate court decisions should apply only to the appellant or to other similarly situated individuals.

habeas corpus

A means of challenging the constitutionality of one’s confinement, best viewed as an alternative to appealing. Habeas corpus is a constitutional right (Article I, Section 9, Clause 2).

Sanders v. United States (373 U.S. 1 [1963])

Although it is difficult for a petition of habeas corpus to succeed before the Supreme Court, the Court has emphasized the importance of the writ. For example, in Sanders v. United States (373 U.S. 1 [1963]), the Court emphasized that “[c]onventional notions of finality of litigation have no place where life or liberty is at stake and infringement of constitutional rights is alleged.” Similarly, in Kaufman v. United States (394 U.S. 217 [1969]), the Court held that the writ is necessary to provide “adequate protection of constitutional rights.”

Stone v. Powell (428 U.S. 465 [1976])

In later years, however, the Court intimated that a habeas corpus review should be qualified. In particular, it has held that writs should not be liberally issued for claims arising from state courts. As the Court stated in Stone v. Powell (428 U.S. 465 [1976]), “Despite differences in institutional environment and the unsympathetic attitude to federal constitutional claims of some state judges in years past, we are unwilling to assume that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts of the several States.”

Teague v. Lane (489 U.S. 288 [1989])

The Court held that, unless a claim is dictated by precedent, it cannot be heard on habeas review. In other words, if habeas review would result in a new rule, then review is impermissible. Only claims based on existing case law should be granted review. The Court did announce two exceptions to this rule, however. If the claim questions the jurisdiction of the trial court or is central to the accused’s guilt or innocence, then it can be granted review in federal court.

Herrera v. Collins (506 U.S. 390 [1993])

Third, habeas review will only be granted if it raises a federal constitutional question. In Herrera v. Collins (506 U.S. 390 [1993]), the petitioner claimed that his death sentence should be vacated because new evidence pointed to his innocence. The Court held that the claim could not be heard on habeas review because it did not raise a constitutional question. The Court explained that “[i]n light of the historical availability of new trials…and the contemporary practice in the States, we cannot say that Texas’ refusal to entertain petitioner’s newly discovered evidence eight years after his convictions transgresses a principle of fundamental fairness.”

Hill v. United States (368 U.S. 424 [1962])

Fourth, a non constitutional claim that does not allege that a fundamental defect took place at trial will not succeed (Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 [1962]). The ruling is the reason why nonconstitutional claims rarely succeed. The ones that do succeed must argue that a serious miscarriage of justice took place at trial.

Kuhlmann v. Wilson (477 U.S. 436 [1986])

The current standard for determining whether habeas review should be granted is known as the actual innocence standard. The Court described this standard in Kuhlmann v. Wilson (477 U.S. 436 [1986]): “[T]he prisoner must show a fair probability that, in light of all the evidence, including that alleged to have been illegally admitted (but with due regard to any unreliability of it) and evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have become available only after the trial, the trier of the facts would have entertained a reasonable doubt of his guilt.” In other words, when a prisoner has failed to file a habeas petition in a timely manner, he or she may still succeed in doing so provided that the petition sets forth sufficient facts as to his or her actual innocence.

Fay v. Noia (372 U.S. 391 [1963])

First, what is the meaning of “available state corrective process”? The Court answered this question in Fay v. Noia (372 U.S. 391 [1963]), in which it held that prisoners must pursue appeals through all state-level appellate courts. Further, it held that prisoners do not necessarily have to appeal all the way to a state Supreme Court to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. In other words, a prisoner can be said to have exhausted state-level remedies even if he or she does not appeal all the way to the state Supreme Court. However, the Supreme Court has held that a prisoner must pursue direct as well as discretionary appeals (see previous discussion on direct versus discretionary appeals) (O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S 838 [1999]).

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

Federal legislation enacted in the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing in 1996. The legislation places significant restrictions on habeas corpus.