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Untitled Flashcards Set

Reading #1 Danielle Thomsen and Aaron King (Why Women Representation Lags)

  • Thesis: Women do not have power in pipelines to house of representatives

    • Potential causes: ambition, election aversion, less likely to be encouraged, less likely to be recruited

  • This article focuses on three pools of candidates: those named in newspapers, lower level officeholders, lawyers who donated to political campaigns

    • Strengths of this method include traditional vs. non traditional entry and different propensities to run

  • 1st Pipeline State Legislatures

    • 75-80% male

    • Table 1 demonstrates rates of entry virtually the same, but initial total numbers skewed

  • 2nd Pipeline Law 

    • Men make up 64% of practicing lawyers

    • Men more likely to donate money

    • Lawyer donors signal candidate vitality

    • Table 1 shows women in the pool donate as much but their total numbers are lacking

  • 3rd Pipeline Newspaper speculation

    • Table 1 demonstrates Women almost equally speculated as a percent, but total number of women lacking

  • Key takeaway is that men dominate three main pools

  • Figure 1 demonstrates women must be 3 times as likely to run for victory

  • Table 2 demonstrates 3 different candidate pools 

  • Potential Solutions

    • Women’s groups focus on attracting women to law and/or related fields

    • Women should target legislatures with history of promoting female dominated fields

    • Candidate training programs

  • Table 3 demonstrates that avenues to house did not change after 2018

  • Figure 2 demonstrates as percent lawyers increase women representation goes down and vice versa for teachers (EXPLAIN)

  • Effects of having women in government

    • Policy: women prioritize bills that affect women

    • Quality: Women more effective at bringing resources to districts, sponsor more bills

      • Theory for this is women face more hurdles so only extra talented ones make it

    • Constituent Services: People talk to representatives with same demographics

  • Role Model’s Theory: Harris win makes it more viable for other women

  • Other barriers also exist, distance to capitals, recruitment, aversion to competition, and pipeline


Reading #2 Nicholas Carnes and Eric Hansen (Raising Salaries and Workers)

  • Central Question: Does increased salary attract working people to run for office

  • When politicians paid more they propose more legislation, miss less votes, and less often pursue outside employment (more effects also)

  • Having fewer working class people sidelines their minimum wage, taxes, and welfare priorities

  • Raising pay affects utility of both, so matter of which group gains more utility

  • Analyzes if working people are more likely to run, win, and run again

  • Figure 1 demonstrates that as pay increases workers’ representation decreases

    • One theory is more pay makes it more attractive to professionals

      • States that pay more have more professionals period though

    • Career politicians replace worker politicians

  • Percentage of career politicians significantly increases as salary increases 

  • Figure 4 demonstrates White collar candidates have less anxiety about losing their incomes

  • Study rules out workers being inexperienced and voters holding biases

  • Workers hold office more often in states with high rates of unionization

  • In CA aides paid more so it can become a profession compared to other states

Topic #5 Redistricting


Reading #1 Edward Tufte (Relationship Between Votes and Seats)

  • There are four main trends between votes and seats

    • As vote share increases so does seat share

    • The party that wins the most votes usually wins the seats

    • Winning a majority of votes translates to even more seats

    • Oftentimes parties earn fewer than 65% of votes but could win more seats

  • Percentage of Seats = b(percentage of votes)+c

    • b=swing ration

      • Ex. if swing ratio is 1.9% then increasing vote share by 1% increases seat share by 1.9%

    • c=party bias demonstrated by figure 2z

  • Table 1 demonstrates swing ratios in various localities

  • Cube law demonstrates relationships between seats and votes is nonlinear

    • Limitation #1 is that it assumes votes are distributed fairly

    • Limitation #2 bias is zero, essentially 50% votes = 50% seats

  • Many closely contested races leads to greater swing ratio

  • Table 3 explain

  • Biases emerge due to gerrymandering, differential turnout, and different population of districts

  • Oversized districts harder to finance giving swing ratio advantage to Democrats

  • Lower swing ratios make it so votes lead to less seat shifts

  • Higher swing ratios lead to more new members

  • Question: Effects of lower and higher swing ratios

  • Redistricting should yield electoral systems responsive to change and redistricting should be unbiased

  • Gerrymandering used for incumbent protection, party advantage, or minority advantage

  • Non Partisan considerations

    • Contiguous

    • Compact, ie Roch score 

      • Doesn't always show shared interest

  • Computer simulations

    • Chen and Roden model builds districts out precinct by precinct

      • Naturally favors republicans

    • Trump changed this by making rural more republican, cities more republican, and suburbs more liberal


Reading #2 Vieth V. Jubelirer

  • Partisan gerrymandering requires a standard 

  • Based on PA partisan gerrymandering claim

    • Based upon Article 1 and the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment

  • Baker V. Carr establishes 6 points for why a political gerrymander is not justiciable

    • Absence of a  constitutional commitment

    • Absence of a judicial standard

    • Unclear

    • Breaking the separation of power

    • Unclear 

    • Embarrassment if they get it wrong

  • Davis V. Bandemer failed to establish standard, but promised they would

    • Requires that a group is deprived of opportunity not enough for a preferred candidate to lose

    • Basically must prove intent

  • Other alternative test to Bandemer is “Effects Prong” Test

    • Systematic “packing” and “cracking” of rivals

    • Court examines “totality of circumstances” to discern to confirm a majority of votes would not translate to a majority of seats

      • Court does not like this test since political affiliation can change, race does not

      • Also not justiciable since past election results not accurate for present

      • Even if a majority party identified under district scheme it will sometimes result in minority party winning

        • Basically “packing” and “cracking” will always happen a little

  • In responding to Kennedy, Scalia overturns Bandemer

  • Ginsburg and Souter establish five points needed for justiciability

    • Cohesive political group

    • No respect for contiguity, compactness, etc. 

    • Plaintiff would need to show the deviations between traditional districting practices

    • Draw a hypothetical district absent of such biases

    • Demonstrate intent for “packing” or “cracking”

  • Scalia argues latter four tests are too subjective

  • 2012 loss in house due to Democrats being too focused in cities, as redistricting only cost them 7 seats

  • Efficiency Gap emerged as best standard but not good enough to satisfy court


Reading #3 Rucho V. Common Cause

  • Compares MD and NC redistricting plans

    • Intent was completely clear in these cases

    • Case argued upon 1st Amendment, 14th Amendment, and Art. 1 Sec. 2 Election Clause

  • Robert disagrees

    • Gerrymandering was known to the founders

    • No straightforward standard

    • Definition of fairness is contested

    • No comparison to racial gerrymandering

      • Congress could always pass a law

    • Constitutional arguments are pretty weak

      • No clear relationship between harm on rights and gerrymandering

    • 14th Amendment provides no protections since it protects identity not party

    • Already being addressed in non partisan commissions

  • Kagan in dissent says gerrymandering inherently undemocratic

    • Existential threat to democracy

    • There have been technological changes since 2010

    • Courts already on the way to a standard

      • Intent

      • Effect

      • Casual relationship

    • Kagan’s anger may come from associating race with party

      • In south democrat used as synonym for black

  • Geography plays bigger role in voters, thus democrats must change policy

Topic #6 The Voting Rights Act and Racial Gerrymandering


Redistricting History

  • Whites in south after civil war tried to stop Blacks from voting

  • Used vote denial policies, violence, poll taxes, threats, literacy tests

    • Also grandfather clause, ie if your grandfather voted so could you

  • Gomillion V. Lightfoot got rid of unincorporated black neighborhoods (vote denial)

  • Section 2 of voting rights act anyone can bring a case if discriminated in “totality of circumstances”

    • Also political processes must be open and able to “elect representatives of choice”

      • Actual 1965 VRA had different language that required intent

  • Redsitricting and at large elections are both vote dilution


Reading #1 Thornburg V. Gingles

  • Centered around five multi member districts in NC which violated section 2

    • Based also on violations of 14th and 15th Amendments

  • Section 2 intent clause early repealed

    • Divisive

    • Too much burden of proof

    • Asks the wrong questions, right one is was opportunity deprived

  • Senate report says at large district not necessarily violations ie unequal access must be proved, dilutive electoral mechanism not enough, and results test not good enough

  • There exists a three prong test to see if minority group has VRA protections (Gingles Standard)

    • Sufficiently large and geographically cohesive

    • Politically cohesive

    • Must demonstrate white majority votes as a bloc against protected minority

  • Ruled it was a racial gerrymander

    • Proof of vote dilution can establish a Section 2 violation


Reading #2 Shelby County V. Holder

  • Section 5 only applied to south required preclearance

    • Applies to states were half do not vote and/or where a poll tax/literacy test was used

    • Places under preclearance need DOJ approval to change election law

      • The must PROVE changes do not make it harder to vote ie guilty until proven innocent

  • 14th/15th Amendment gave Congress the power to create this election law

    • Still conservatives on court uncomfortable with racialized voting

  • Shaw V Reno, NC 20% black with 12 districts

    • DOJ says must be a second district

    • Crazy district drawn and O’Connow doesn't like it, since it looks segregated

  • 2008 Election makes it seem like VRA Sec. 5 not needed anymore

    • Obama won white and black voters and won two confederate states

      • So question was should 1960s standards be used for 2010s

      • Contrary argument was Virginia improving was result of VRA

  • Shelby County V. Holder rules it violates “equal sovereignty of states”

    • Not in constitution but seems unfair

    • But congress can keep section 5 if they come up with an updates standard

  • After this the importance of section 2 grows (clarify)

    • Previously used for vote dilution cases

    • Used against voter ID laws


Bronovich V. DNC 

  • New Arizona law said voting at wrong precinct is illegal

    • Also said random carrier cannot deliver ballot

  • DNC argues this could have disproportionate effect on minorities

    • Has almost no effect

    • .15% of ballots discarded with mostly minorities

    • Scotus says Sec. 2 not built for such small cases with no intent

      • Small effects

      • Racial disparity small

      • Lots of different ways to vote

    • Sec. 5 plaintiffs have to prove it so they failed

    • Liberals say court lacks sensitivity to issues

  • Vote denial is process of voting

  • Vote dilution is like gerrymandering or at large


Reading #3 Sophie Schuit and Jon Rogowski

  • Members from pre clearance districts more positive on civil rights legislation

  • Black turnout surged after VRA enacted

  • Table 1 demonstrates the following

    • Over time civil rights records improved for democrats and worsened for republicans

    • Covered districts increased civil rights roll call votes

  • Table 2 demonstrates members from preclearance had civil rights scores 12 points higher than non preclearance

    • More democrat, more competitive, etc also more likely to support civil rights 

  • Table 3 expand sup[on groups more likely to support civil rights ie VRA coverage, competitiveness, democrat, and not republican 

  • Figure 2 demonstrates that as black population increases VRA districts record improves but non covered get worse

  •  


California Article and Race

  • Most cities had been using at large elections

  • Made it easier to sue cities to use districts

    • Did not have to show collective voting or compactness

    • Did not increase minority representation

  • In areas were latinos spread out ward system is worse for them

  • Parties realigned in 1900s

  • In 1930s Northern AA started associating with labor unions

  • 1930 80% in southern states, 1970 only 50%

    • AA begin to see northern democratic party as helpful

      • They begin to incorporate civil rights agenda

      • Southern democrats begin to become anti union

  • When Johnson ena ted Civil Rights support from AA became unanimous

  • “Linked fate” theory used to explain why regardless of income AA support democrats

    • See race as most important proxy for their value

  • Why so long for White Southerners to switch parties?

    • More partisan loyalty ie anti north (generational replacement)

    • There was not a two party system in the south only democrats

    • Democrats originally tried to make biracial coalition

      • Fielded white conservatives who played well in African American politics

  • Campaigns then became racialized

    • Republicans racialized everything to drive up white support

  • After 2012 loss Republicans wanted to outreach to latinos

    • Trump wanted to maximize white turnout

    • Ended up doing both

  • The more evenly racially divided a place is, the more racialized it is ex. MS

Topic #7 Incumbency, Coattails, and Term Limits and Ballot Counting and Election Certification


Reading #1 Robert Erickson (Coattails)

  • Coattail Effect is predicting house vote using presidential vote

  • Anticipation causes many to ticket split in presidential election

    • This is called “advanced balancing” and masks coattails that are later swept away

  • Meredith study demonstrates each gubernatorial vote equals 0.1/0.2 down ballot votes 

  • Vote for congress does not influence vote for president

  • Figure 1 demonstrates linear correlation between % Democratic presidential vote and betting odds for house

  • Table 1 demonstrates coattails (EXPLAIN)

  • Table 3

  • Both tables demonstrates strong ideological balancing and strong coattails

  • TABLE 4

  • Educated voters balance elections due to knowledge of election forecast and awareness of future policies contingencies

  • When betting markets show informed voters preferred choice winning they are more likely to split ticket

  • Table 5

  • NEED STILL READ DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

  • Ex. 1948 Advanced balancing Truman expected to lose so Democrats do well in house

  • Moderates, Independents, and Politically informed most likely to balance


Reading #2 John Carey (Compositional, Behavioral, Institutional)

  • Term limits have no effect on types of people elected

  • “Burkean Shift” measures how term limited politicians become beholden to other interests

    • Across categories legislators close to end of tenure spend less time campaigning

    • Table 3 demonstrates less time to constituent outreach and less effort to attain government money

    • Less district oriented more state and conscience

  • Early analysis showed term limits lead to more women and minorities, but this is a misconception

  • Legislators in states with term limits have equal career ambitions

  • Term limits still allow lobbyists to target executive, agencies, staffers, etc in place of legislators

    • Legislature also loses power

    • Legislature also much weaker when bargaining with governor over budget

    • Loss of experience not a problem

    • More creativity in policies towards end of term

  • Four categories of term limits, NTLs, adopted TLs, Implemented TLs, and PostTLs

  • Different effects of term limits require different models

    • Analyzing composition of legislatures uses legislator specific models

  • Effects of Term Limits

    • Between NTL and TL no significant differences in terms of family income

    • No differences in religious affiliation

    • No difference in age

    • New comers more diverse and young

    • No difference in diversity

    • No differences in ideology

    • No effect on candidate pool

    • Table 1 demonstrates only observable differences is more women in TL states

    • Loss of institutional knowledge

    • Loss of long term relationships, ie Pelosi example

    • Behaviorally lawmakers shift from delegate to trustee model

    • Members don't show up as much once TL

  • Table 2 shows NCTLs most likely to have held office prior

  • Progressive ambition model remains unclear

  • Table 4 demonstrates TL affects power 

    • TL gives governors more power (.5 on the 7 point scale)

    • Majority leaders and committee chairs also weaker

    • Bureaucrats become more powerful

  • Constitution stipulates qualifications for congress, absence of term limits caused Court to say not allowed for congress


Incumbency

  • Incumbents keep winning

    • Legislative explanations (not true)

      • Redistricting

      • Seniority

      • Legislator blame attribution

      • Advertising

    • Non Legislative Explanations

      • Human capital, ie humans get better at jobs

      • Signaling ie if nothing bad has happened stick with the devil you know

      • Wait challengers do not run

      • Decline in party voting in favor of incumbent advantage

    • In actuality incumbent advantage has faded and now its much more party oriented 


Electoral College and Bush V. Gore

  • National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, PV winner gets all electoral votes

  • In Florida counties had different ballots

  • “Butterfly Ballot” determined election outcome as shown by graph

  • There were also chad ballots 

  • Types of ballot variation, optical scan, lever machines, and computer touchscreens

  • Residual vote is (total race vote)/(total vote) showed presence of uncounted hanging chads

  • Florida supreme court tried to fight legislature so went to scotus

    • Central question was due we care state legislatures have election authority

    • Later Moore V Harper ruled that state court actually can overturn election law

    • Scalia argued 14th Amendment to say recounts were not fair across counties

  • After 2016 some Democrats called fraud

    • Voter ID Laws

    • Cambridge analytica and facebook ads

    • Trump involved in Russian collusion

  • After 2020 some Republicans called fraud

    • Record number of votes with record low of counties

    • Biden lost bellwethers

    • Biden did better in counties with Dominion voting machines







Office Hour Questions


  • Question 2 lost points due to evaluating pros and cons or analyzing donations examples?

  • Question 3: Did cycling lose points due to poor examples?

  • Table 3 Tufte Reading

  • Table 3 and 4 Erikson Reading Regression

    • President’s party loses fewer seats than it gained in presidential years. Basically riding down steep curve 

  • Table 2 Percent black Rogowski Reading

    • White people in the areas of heavy black population had most conservative whites

    • Some of this happened after VRA too

  • Rucho Case

    • Fairness not the same as symmetry

      • Roberts argues 60% of votes and 45% of seats may not be fair but the fairness is not imbedded in constitution

      • Proportionality not in constitution

  • In CA for racial bloc voting then city can be forced to go to district elections rather than at large

    • Forced many cities to change

    • Expectation was for more minorities to win

    • However they were not geographically intact or sufficiently large

  • Vote dilution question

    • Vote denial is poll tax or literacy test

    • Vote dilution is racial gerrymandering

  • Ways of analyzing gerrymandering

    • Rock score - contested

    • Lack of proportionality - contested

    • Grouping like minded people - contested

  • Shaw V. reno

    • O’Connor thought too much emphasis on race

  • Midterm loss and Coattails

    • Midterm loss consistent

    • Unclear if midterm loss more powerful if coattails more prominent

    • If Harris does really well then down ballots could create coattails effect

  • Advanced balancing

    • More of a theory, only clear thing is midterm loss everything else from erikson is theory

Untitled Flashcards Set

Reading #1 Danielle Thomsen and Aaron King (Why Women Representation Lags)

  • Thesis: Women do not have power in pipelines to house of representatives

    • Potential causes: ambition, election aversion, less likely to be encouraged, less likely to be recruited

  • This article focuses on three pools of candidates: those named in newspapers, lower level officeholders, lawyers who donated to political campaigns

    • Strengths of this method include traditional vs. non traditional entry and different propensities to run

  • 1st Pipeline State Legislatures

    • 75-80% male

    • Table 1 demonstrates rates of entry virtually the same, but initial total numbers skewed

  • 2nd Pipeline Law 

    • Men make up 64% of practicing lawyers

    • Men more likely to donate money

    • Lawyer donors signal candidate vitality

    • Table 1 shows women in the pool donate as much but their total numbers are lacking

  • 3rd Pipeline Newspaper speculation

    • Table 1 demonstrates Women almost equally speculated as a percent, but total number of women lacking

  • Key takeaway is that men dominate three main pools

  • Figure 1 demonstrates women must be 3 times as likely to run for victory

  • Table 2 demonstrates 3 different candidate pools 

  • Potential Solutions

    • Women’s groups focus on attracting women to law and/or related fields

    • Women should target legislatures with history of promoting female dominated fields

    • Candidate training programs

  • Table 3 demonstrates that avenues to house did not change after 2018

  • Figure 2 demonstrates as percent lawyers increase women representation goes down and vice versa for teachers (EXPLAIN)

  • Effects of having women in government

    • Policy: women prioritize bills that affect women

    • Quality: Women more effective at bringing resources to districts, sponsor more bills

      • Theory for this is women face more hurdles so only extra talented ones make it

    • Constituent Services: People talk to representatives with same demographics

  • Role Model’s Theory: Harris win makes it more viable for other women

  • Other barriers also exist, distance to capitals, recruitment, aversion to competition, and pipeline


Reading #2 Nicholas Carnes and Eric Hansen (Raising Salaries and Workers)

  • Central Question: Does increased salary attract working people to run for office

  • When politicians paid more they propose more legislation, miss less votes, and less often pursue outside employment (more effects also)

  • Having fewer working class people sidelines their minimum wage, taxes, and welfare priorities

  • Raising pay affects utility of both, so matter of which group gains more utility

  • Analyzes if working people are more likely to run, win, and run again

  • Figure 1 demonstrates that as pay increases workers’ representation decreases

    • One theory is more pay makes it more attractive to professionals

      • States that pay more have more professionals period though

    • Career politicians replace worker politicians

  • Percentage of career politicians significantly increases as salary increases 

  • Figure 4 demonstrates White collar candidates have less anxiety about losing their incomes

  • Study rules out workers being inexperienced and voters holding biases

  • Workers hold office more often in states with high rates of unionization

  • In CA aides paid more so it can become a profession compared to other states

Topic #5 Redistricting


Reading #1 Edward Tufte (Relationship Between Votes and Seats)

  • There are four main trends between votes and seats

    • As vote share increases so does seat share

    • The party that wins the most votes usually wins the seats

    • Winning a majority of votes translates to even more seats

    • Oftentimes parties earn fewer than 65% of votes but could win more seats

  • Percentage of Seats = b(percentage of votes)+c

    • b=swing ration

      • Ex. if swing ratio is 1.9% then increasing vote share by 1% increases seat share by 1.9%

    • c=party bias demonstrated by figure 2z

  • Table 1 demonstrates swing ratios in various localities

  • Cube law demonstrates relationships between seats and votes is nonlinear

    • Limitation #1 is that it assumes votes are distributed fairly

    • Limitation #2 bias is zero, essentially 50% votes = 50% seats

  • Many closely contested races leads to greater swing ratio

  • Table 3 explain

  • Biases emerge due to gerrymandering, differential turnout, and different population of districts

  • Oversized districts harder to finance giving swing ratio advantage to Democrats

  • Lower swing ratios make it so votes lead to less seat shifts

  • Higher swing ratios lead to more new members

  • Question: Effects of lower and higher swing ratios

  • Redistricting should yield electoral systems responsive to change and redistricting should be unbiased

  • Gerrymandering used for incumbent protection, party advantage, or minority advantage

  • Non Partisan considerations

    • Contiguous

    • Compact, ie Roch score 

      • Doesn't always show shared interest

  • Computer simulations

    • Chen and Roden model builds districts out precinct by precinct

      • Naturally favors republicans

    • Trump changed this by making rural more republican, cities more republican, and suburbs more liberal


Reading #2 Vieth V. Jubelirer

  • Partisan gerrymandering requires a standard 

  • Based on PA partisan gerrymandering claim

    • Based upon Article 1 and the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment

  • Baker V. Carr establishes 6 points for why a political gerrymander is not justiciable

    • Absence of a  constitutional commitment

    • Absence of a judicial standard

    • Unclear

    • Breaking the separation of power

    • Unclear 

    • Embarrassment if they get it wrong

  • Davis V. Bandemer failed to establish standard, but promised they would

    • Requires that a group is deprived of opportunity not enough for a preferred candidate to lose

    • Basically must prove intent

  • Other alternative test to Bandemer is “Effects Prong” Test

    • Systematic “packing” and “cracking” of rivals

    • Court examines “totality of circumstances” to discern to confirm a majority of votes would not translate to a majority of seats

      • Court does not like this test since political affiliation can change, race does not

      • Also not justiciable since past election results not accurate for present

      • Even if a majority party identified under district scheme it will sometimes result in minority party winning

        • Basically “packing” and “cracking” will always happen a little

  • In responding to Kennedy, Scalia overturns Bandemer

  • Ginsburg and Souter establish five points needed for justiciability

    • Cohesive political group

    • No respect for contiguity, compactness, etc. 

    • Plaintiff would need to show the deviations between traditional districting practices

    • Draw a hypothetical district absent of such biases

    • Demonstrate intent for “packing” or “cracking”

  • Scalia argues latter four tests are too subjective

  • 2012 loss in house due to Democrats being too focused in cities, as redistricting only cost them 7 seats

  • Efficiency Gap emerged as best standard but not good enough to satisfy court


Reading #3 Rucho V. Common Cause

  • Compares MD and NC redistricting plans

    • Intent was completely clear in these cases

    • Case argued upon 1st Amendment, 14th Amendment, and Art. 1 Sec. 2 Election Clause

  • Robert disagrees

    • Gerrymandering was known to the founders

    • No straightforward standard

    • Definition of fairness is contested

    • No comparison to racial gerrymandering

      • Congress could always pass a law

    • Constitutional arguments are pretty weak

      • No clear relationship between harm on rights and gerrymandering

    • 14th Amendment provides no protections since it protects identity not party

    • Already being addressed in non partisan commissions

  • Kagan in dissent says gerrymandering inherently undemocratic

    • Existential threat to democracy

    • There have been technological changes since 2010

    • Courts already on the way to a standard

      • Intent

      • Effect

      • Casual relationship

    • Kagan’s anger may come from associating race with party

      • In south democrat used as synonym for black

  • Geography plays bigger role in voters, thus democrats must change policy

Topic #6 The Voting Rights Act and Racial Gerrymandering


Redistricting History

  • Whites in south after civil war tried to stop Blacks from voting

  • Used vote denial policies, violence, poll taxes, threats, literacy tests

    • Also grandfather clause, ie if your grandfather voted so could you

  • Gomillion V. Lightfoot got rid of unincorporated black neighborhoods (vote denial)

  • Section 2 of voting rights act anyone can bring a case if discriminated in “totality of circumstances”

    • Also political processes must be open and able to “elect representatives of choice”

      • Actual 1965 VRA had different language that required intent

  • Redsitricting and at large elections are both vote dilution


Reading #1 Thornburg V. Gingles

  • Centered around five multi member districts in NC which violated section 2

    • Based also on violations of 14th and 15th Amendments

  • Section 2 intent clause early repealed

    • Divisive

    • Too much burden of proof

    • Asks the wrong questions, right one is was opportunity deprived

  • Senate report says at large district not necessarily violations ie unequal access must be proved, dilutive electoral mechanism not enough, and results test not good enough

  • There exists a three prong test to see if minority group has VRA protections (Gingles Standard)

    • Sufficiently large and geographically cohesive

    • Politically cohesive

    • Must demonstrate white majority votes as a bloc against protected minority

  • Ruled it was a racial gerrymander

    • Proof of vote dilution can establish a Section 2 violation


Reading #2 Shelby County V. Holder

  • Section 5 only applied to south required preclearance

    • Applies to states were half do not vote and/or where a poll tax/literacy test was used

    • Places under preclearance need DOJ approval to change election law

      • The must PROVE changes do not make it harder to vote ie guilty until proven innocent

  • 14th/15th Amendment gave Congress the power to create this election law

    • Still conservatives on court uncomfortable with racialized voting

  • Shaw V Reno, NC 20% black with 12 districts

    • DOJ says must be a second district

    • Crazy district drawn and O’Connow doesn't like it, since it looks segregated

  • 2008 Election makes it seem like VRA Sec. 5 not needed anymore

    • Obama won white and black voters and won two confederate states

      • So question was should 1960s standards be used for 2010s

      • Contrary argument was Virginia improving was result of VRA

  • Shelby County V. Holder rules it violates “equal sovereignty of states”

    • Not in constitution but seems unfair

    • But congress can keep section 5 if they come up with an updates standard

  • After this the importance of section 2 grows (clarify)

    • Previously used for vote dilution cases

    • Used against voter ID laws


Bronovich V. DNC 

  • New Arizona law said voting at wrong precinct is illegal

    • Also said random carrier cannot deliver ballot

  • DNC argues this could have disproportionate effect on minorities

    • Has almost no effect

    • .15% of ballots discarded with mostly minorities

    • Scotus says Sec. 2 not built for such small cases with no intent

      • Small effects

      • Racial disparity small

      • Lots of different ways to vote

    • Sec. 5 plaintiffs have to prove it so they failed

    • Liberals say court lacks sensitivity to issues

  • Vote denial is process of voting

  • Vote dilution is like gerrymandering or at large


Reading #3 Sophie Schuit and Jon Rogowski

  • Members from pre clearance districts more positive on civil rights legislation

  • Black turnout surged after VRA enacted

  • Table 1 demonstrates the following

    • Over time civil rights records improved for democrats and worsened for republicans

    • Covered districts increased civil rights roll call votes

  • Table 2 demonstrates members from preclearance had civil rights scores 12 points higher than non preclearance

    • More democrat, more competitive, etc also more likely to support civil rights 

  • Table 3 expand sup[on groups more likely to support civil rights ie VRA coverage, competitiveness, democrat, and not republican 

  • Figure 2 demonstrates that as black population increases VRA districts record improves but non covered get worse

  •  


California Article and Race

  • Most cities had been using at large elections

  • Made it easier to sue cities to use districts

    • Did not have to show collective voting or compactness

    • Did not increase minority representation

  • In areas were latinos spread out ward system is worse for them

  • Parties realigned in 1900s

  • In 1930s Northern AA started associating with labor unions

  • 1930 80% in southern states, 1970 only 50%

    • AA begin to see northern democratic party as helpful

      • They begin to incorporate civil rights agenda

      • Southern democrats begin to become anti union

  • When Johnson ena ted Civil Rights support from AA became unanimous

  • “Linked fate” theory used to explain why regardless of income AA support democrats

    • See race as most important proxy for their value

  • Why so long for White Southerners to switch parties?

    • More partisan loyalty ie anti north (generational replacement)

    • There was not a two party system in the south only democrats

    • Democrats originally tried to make biracial coalition

      • Fielded white conservatives who played well in African American politics

  • Campaigns then became racialized

    • Republicans racialized everything to drive up white support

  • After 2012 loss Republicans wanted to outreach to latinos

    • Trump wanted to maximize white turnout

    • Ended up doing both

  • The more evenly racially divided a place is, the more racialized it is ex. MS

Topic #7 Incumbency, Coattails, and Term Limits and Ballot Counting and Election Certification


Reading #1 Robert Erickson (Coattails)

  • Coattail Effect is predicting house vote using presidential vote

  • Anticipation causes many to ticket split in presidential election

    • This is called “advanced balancing” and masks coattails that are later swept away

  • Meredith study demonstrates each gubernatorial vote equals 0.1/0.2 down ballot votes 

  • Vote for congress does not influence vote for president

  • Figure 1 demonstrates linear correlation between % Democratic presidential vote and betting odds for house

  • Table 1 demonstrates coattails (EXPLAIN)

  • Table 3

  • Both tables demonstrates strong ideological balancing and strong coattails

  • TABLE 4

  • Educated voters balance elections due to knowledge of election forecast and awareness of future policies contingencies

  • When betting markets show informed voters preferred choice winning they are more likely to split ticket

  • Table 5

  • NEED STILL READ DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

  • Ex. 1948 Advanced balancing Truman expected to lose so Democrats do well in house

  • Moderates, Independents, and Politically informed most likely to balance


Reading #2 John Carey (Compositional, Behavioral, Institutional)

  • Term limits have no effect on types of people elected

  • “Burkean Shift” measures how term limited politicians become beholden to other interests

    • Across categories legislators close to end of tenure spend less time campaigning

    • Table 3 demonstrates less time to constituent outreach and less effort to attain government money

    • Less district oriented more state and conscience

  • Early analysis showed term limits lead to more women and minorities, but this is a misconception

  • Legislators in states with term limits have equal career ambitions

  • Term limits still allow lobbyists to target executive, agencies, staffers, etc in place of legislators

    • Legislature also loses power

    • Legislature also much weaker when bargaining with governor over budget

    • Loss of experience not a problem

    • More creativity in policies towards end of term

  • Four categories of term limits, NTLs, adopted TLs, Implemented TLs, and PostTLs

  • Different effects of term limits require different models

    • Analyzing composition of legislatures uses legislator specific models

  • Effects of Term Limits

    • Between NTL and TL no significant differences in terms of family income

    • No differences in religious affiliation

    • No difference in age

    • New comers more diverse and young

    • No difference in diversity

    • No differences in ideology

    • No effect on candidate pool

    • Table 1 demonstrates only observable differences is more women in TL states

    • Loss of institutional knowledge

    • Loss of long term relationships, ie Pelosi example

    • Behaviorally lawmakers shift from delegate to trustee model

    • Members don't show up as much once TL

  • Table 2 shows NCTLs most likely to have held office prior

  • Progressive ambition model remains unclear

  • Table 4 demonstrates TL affects power 

    • TL gives governors more power (.5 on the 7 point scale)

    • Majority leaders and committee chairs also weaker

    • Bureaucrats become more powerful

  • Constitution stipulates qualifications for congress, absence of term limits caused Court to say not allowed for congress


Incumbency

  • Incumbents keep winning

    • Legislative explanations (not true)

      • Redistricting

      • Seniority

      • Legislator blame attribution

      • Advertising

    • Non Legislative Explanations

      • Human capital, ie humans get better at jobs

      • Signaling ie if nothing bad has happened stick with the devil you know

      • Wait challengers do not run

      • Decline in party voting in favor of incumbent advantage

    • In actuality incumbent advantage has faded and now its much more party oriented 


Electoral College and Bush V. Gore

  • National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, PV winner gets all electoral votes

  • In Florida counties had different ballots

  • “Butterfly Ballot” determined election outcome as shown by graph

  • There were also chad ballots 

  • Types of ballot variation, optical scan, lever machines, and computer touchscreens

  • Residual vote is (total race vote)/(total vote) showed presence of uncounted hanging chads

  • Florida supreme court tried to fight legislature so went to scotus

    • Central question was due we care state legislatures have election authority

    • Later Moore V Harper ruled that state court actually can overturn election law

    • Scalia argued 14th Amendment to say recounts were not fair across counties

  • After 2016 some Democrats called fraud

    • Voter ID Laws

    • Cambridge analytica and facebook ads

    • Trump involved in Russian collusion

  • After 2020 some Republicans called fraud

    • Record number of votes with record low of counties

    • Biden lost bellwethers

    • Biden did better in counties with Dominion voting machines







Office Hour Questions


  • Question 2 lost points due to evaluating pros and cons or analyzing donations examples?

  • Question 3: Did cycling lose points due to poor examples?

  • Table 3 Tufte Reading

  • Table 3 and 4 Erikson Reading Regression

    • President’s party loses fewer seats than it gained in presidential years. Basically riding down steep curve 

  • Table 2 Percent black Rogowski Reading

    • White people in the areas of heavy black population had most conservative whites

    • Some of this happened after VRA too

  • Rucho Case

    • Fairness not the same as symmetry

      • Roberts argues 60% of votes and 45% of seats may not be fair but the fairness is not imbedded in constitution

      • Proportionality not in constitution

  • In CA for racial bloc voting then city can be forced to go to district elections rather than at large

    • Forced many cities to change

    • Expectation was for more minorities to win

    • However they were not geographically intact or sufficiently large

  • Vote dilution question

    • Vote denial is poll tax or literacy test

    • Vote dilution is racial gerrymandering

  • Ways of analyzing gerrymandering

    • Rock score - contested

    • Lack of proportionality - contested

    • Grouping like minded people - contested

  • Shaw V. reno

    • O’Connor thought too much emphasis on race

  • Midterm loss and Coattails

    • Midterm loss consistent

    • Unclear if midterm loss more powerful if coattails more prominent

    • If Harris does really well then down ballots could create coattails effect

  • Advanced balancing

    • More of a theory, only clear thing is midterm loss everything else from erikson is theory

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