Cosmological argument
Why is there something rather than nothing?
Inductive – an argument that draws a probabilistic conclusion from observation of the world
A posteriori – truth based on sense experience. Truth that is contingently true
The first three of Aquinas' Five Ways make up his Cosmological Argument
Aquinas' First Way: From motion
We can observe that things in the world are in a process of motion.
Everything that is in motion is in the process of changing from a potential state to an actual state.
The same thing cannot be at the same time potentially and actually the same thing.
For example, if something is actually hot, it cannot be potentially hot, but it can be potentially cold.
So, everything that is in a state of motion must be put into this state by another thing.
But the chain of movers cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover and, consequently, no other mover' (Aquinas, Summa Theologica)
Conclusion: it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.'
Second Way: From cause
Nothing is an efficient cause of itself
Efficient causes follow in order: a first cause causes a second, a second a third and so on.
It is not possible for efficient causes to go back infinitely, because if there is no efficient first cause, there will not be any following causes.
Conclusion: 'It is necessary to admit a first efficient cause to which everyone gives the name of God.'
Third Way: From contingency
Things which exist in nature at one time did not exist and in the future will not exist. These things at any time may or may not exist (i.e. contingent existence).
If everything at one time did not exist, there would have been nothing in existence.
If point 2 were true, then there would be nothing in existence, because there would be nothing to bring anything into existence.
Interim conclusion: 'There must exist something the existence of which is necessary'
But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another or not.
An infinite regression of necessary things is impossible as shown in Way 2.
Final conclusion: There exists 'some being having of itself of its own necessity.....causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.!’
Strengths
Aguinas did not intend his five ways to demonstrate a uniquely Christian God or to show that what we call 'God' is perfect. He intended them to show that there is something which causes things but is itself uncaused.
Inductive arguments (see p. 7 for definition) are based on probability rather than proof and show that the existence of God is likely, not certain. This might seem to be a weakness except that our observations of the world and universe seem to support Aquinas arguments. By not arguing for a specifically Christian God with set attributes, Aquinas makes the argument simpler and more straightforward to prove.
Cosmological arguments seem to be supported by inductive scientific arguments like the Big Bang theory, which backs up the idea that the universe had a beginning. Scientific arguments tend to be more persuasive as they use empirical evidence to support their conclusions.
If infinite regress of non-self-explanatory causes, movement and contingent beings was possible, we would still suppose that such a series would require an explanation outside of itself and it is much simpler to suppose that the universe depends for its existence on God - who is himself uncaused and depends on nothing outside of himself for his existence.
Weaknesses
Inductive arguments are only probable so do not provide the certainty of God's existence that religious faith looks for.
The idea of infinite regress is also a problem for the argument. There could be an endless series of causes: there doesn't have to be a first cause or prime mover the universe could be infinite.
If there is an infinite series of things or events which are contingent, each dependent for its occurrence or existence on some other contingent thing or event, then the series as a whole is contingent, i.e. it requires further explanation
This explanation can only be found outside the series in something that is self-explanatory, i.e. that requires no further explanation. Therefore it might be preferable to conclude, as Aguinas does, that God - the infinite and self-explanatory being - is the first cause of the universe. However, if we think about what God was doing before he created the universe we are again drawn into an infinite regress. If we work backwards from the beginning of our universe, we are left with an infinite regress of God actively choosing not to create the universe: an infinite amount of time existing before God actively chose to create the universe.
Hume and Kant on the cosmological argument
David Hume argues that we have no direct experience of the creation of the universe and therefore we cannot speak meaningfully about it. Hume does not believe that there is sufficient evidence to prove the cause of the universe or even that the universe was caused. Hume asks whether anything that existed from eternity could have a cause as that implies a priority in time (and this would undermine the idea of God as eternal or infinite). Even if the universe did begin, this does not mean that anything caused it to come into existence.
Hume criticises the principle of sufficient reason. Those seeking a complete explanation for the existence of the universe are looking for something which cannot be found and which we cannot expect to find. It is not a logical requirement to continue looking for an explanation, nor is it certain that there will be one.
Another problem is with the interpretation of causation. We think of causation temporally: the first cause sets off a chain of events in time and if we go back far enough in time we will encounter the first cause - God. The problem with this view is that it suggests that the first cause no longer exists, or at least that it exists within a time frame. Aquinas cannot accept this as God must still be present in order to act on the world. One answer to this is to argue that 'causation' can be interpreted as sustaining an event: not just causing it but also keeping it going, so the chain of causation is more hierarchical, with God an ongoing and sustaining cause of the universe.
In Dialogues IX Hume makes another attack on Aquinas called the fallacy of composition. Hume argues that it is a fallacy to think that because there is some property or attribute common to each part of a group then this property must apply to the group as a whole.
Immanuel Kant argues that because our knowledge of the world is limited to the phenomenal world of space and time it is not possible to speculate on what may or may not exist independently of space and time.
Kant and Hume argue that we cannot say about anything that exists that it is necessary, for example a necessary being. It is possible to say that something is necessary when its denial entails a contradiction. For example, 'All black cats are black' is a necessary proposition because to deny it creates a contradiction. But we cannot do this with propositions about things that exist. Even Aquinas accepts that 'God exists’ is not a self-evident proposition. If the concept of necessity cannot be applied to God, then Aquinas argument is undermined.
Further criticisms
Arguably, both first and second ways contain contradictions. Aquinas argues that everything has a cause but then concludes that God caused himself. In response, we could argue that that is what the reductio ad absurdum proves: that there has to be an exception to the rule, a 'prime mover' which must be a being unlike any other.
However, instead of God, we could make the universe itself the exception and say that the universe itself is the 'prime mover or the 'unmoved mover'. Everything in the universe might need a cause, but the universe itself doesn't. Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), in his 1948 debate with F. C. Copleston, expressed the view that the question of the cause of the universe is meaningless; the universe is a 'brute fact which does not require a complete explanation.
Copleston and Russel BBC radio debate
The Copleston Russell debate took place in 1948 on BBC Radio. It can be split into five distinct sections. The nature of the argument is discourse and so both parties should be explained in each area. We begin with Copleston's main argument from contingency.
Copleston's argument is based on Aquinas' third way for possibility and necessity and Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason. He asks us to view the world as objects which do not contain within themselves the answer for their own existence. He uses the example of depending on his own parents and now food and air etc. He states the universe is the real or imagined totality or aggregate of individual objects, none of which are capable of explaining themselves. The world isn't distinct from its objects any more than the human race is distinct from its members. Since no object contains the reason for its own existence there must be an external reason beyond the universe and this reason must be an existent being. This being is either the answer for its own existence or it is is not. But the chain of dependency cannot go on ad infinitum or else this would be absurd as we would have no explanation for the universe at all. So in order to explain existence we must come to a being whose existence is contained within it which is to say a being which cannot not exist (a necessary thing in Copleston’s terms). This is the essence of Copleston's argument from contingency.
Russell raises a number of issues with this. The argument continues down a discussion of the term necessity and the difference between a priori and a posterior. Russell suggests that the term"necessary being' has no meaning outside analytic propositions. In fact he argues that analytic propositions are somewhat logically late in the build-up of propositions. He states that he could only accept the term 'necessary being' if it could be demonstrated that this being was one whose existence it would be self-contradictory to deny. Russell believes that the term 'necessary' cannot be applied to things a posterior as well as the term 'contingent'. Copleston states that Russell is being over dogmatic on his insistence of adhering to what he terms 'modern logic' (Western analvtic philosophy). He suggests that once you know that a contingent being exists it follows of necessity that there is a necessary being. Russell insists that he isn't being dogmatic, just that certain things are meaningless outside of a priori analytic discussions, stating that this is essentially an ontological argument. Copleston asks whether the question "Does the cause of the world exist?" have any meaning, to which Russell replies, if you state that "God exists" this can never be analytic as the term can only have meaning a priori.
The conversation shifts to the principle of sufficient reason. Copleston suggests that if anyone saw God, he would see that God must exist. God's essence and existence must be identical or we would need sufficient reason beyond God. However he states that this would only be known a posteriori and not a priori. Russell questions whether Copleston has explained the principle of sufficient reason, asking whether lighting a match by striking it against a box is a sufficient reason. Copleston suggests that it is only a partial explanation and a sufficient reason must be a total explanation to which nothing further can be added Russell claims that he is looking for something he cannot get and shouldn't expect to get. Copleston argues that to look and find nothing is one thing, but to say you shouldn't look is dogmatic. Russell insists that these ideas are effectively beyond our epistemological limits.
The debate continues into the meaning of the term 'universe' and the fallacy of composition. Russell believes the term 'universe' has no meaning. Copleston wants to know if he thinks the universe is unintelligible, he suggests that the universe is without explanation while Copleston states the universe is intrinsically unintelligible without God. After all an infinite number of chocolates are still not a sheep. Contingent objects cannot explain themselves without a necessary being. Copleston questions whether the world is gratuitous as Sartre suggests, to which Russel replies that "he universe is just there and that's all" indicating his belief that the universe is a brute fad. Copleston states that you cannot rule out the legitimacy of the questions of where the universe came from, to which Russell gives the fallacy of composition: just because every man has a mother it doesn't follow that the whole human race has a mother as that's a different logical sphere. Copleston disagrees as he states that this may be the case if looking for cause but he is looking for a transcendent one.
Finally the two move onto quantum physics and a discussion of whether things need to have a cause at all. Copleston suggests that scientists pre-suppose a cause as do metaphysicians, Russell states that it doesn't mean there are causes everywhere, using the example of a man looking for gold. He suggests ultimately that looking for an explanation for the world is a mistake. Copleston argues that scientists assume the universe is not discontinuous but ordered and intelligible. However Russell states that they don't assume that they will always find a cause just that it may be likely. Copleston says that they don't hope for more than probability but assume that the question of explanation has meaning. He asks whether it is an illegitimate question to ask the cause of the world and Russell states that this is his position. The discussion then moves on to a debate on religious experience as they agree to disagree.
Points of analysis from class discussion - A02!!
The success of the debate is greatly limited by Copleston and Russell disagreeing on the terms. They won't agree on the nature of a satisfactory argument for the existence of God (i.e. C says it should be inductive, a posteriori and R insists that the only way to prove God (if it were possible...) would be through analytic, a priori means - ie. more of an ontological argument) - Russell won't engage with Copleston's type of argument (who says 'I think we have to argue from the world of experience to God'), and perhaps for this he is at fault as it prevents them from getting very far at all.
Copleston relies on Leibniz's Principle of Sufficient Reason: everything must have an adequate explanation for its existence. Russell's response ('when is an explanation adequate?') is understandable. He thinks it is impossible to find the 'total explanation' that Copleston requires (you are looking for something which cannot be got)
However, Russell perhaps goes too far? He suggests the question of the origin of the universe is an 'illegitimate' one. This is problematic in any branch of enquiry. Can we really state that certain questions can never be asked? Theologian, Herbert McCabe, defends the legitimacy of the question. He says - there were people who said to Darwin: 'there are just dogs'. i.e. the universe may well have a full explanation we just haven't found it (yet).
Copleston thinks the universe if contingent - and says it is not distinct from its component parts. It is the aggregate of contingent things that it contains. Russell doesn't regard 'universe' as a meaningful concept. He says it is a 'handy word' but that there is no real meaning in it. Is he right that the universe is something separate from its parts (or a different category), or are you more persuaded by Copleston that it is the totality of its parts?
Russell accuses Copleston of committing the Fallacy of Composition ('1 can illustrate what seems to me your fallacy. Every man who exists has a mother, and it seems to me your argument is that therefore the human race must have am other, but obviously the human race hasn't a mother - that is a different logical sphere') - i.e. he says that Copleston has inferred something about the universe just from it being true of its parts. Arguably Copleston has done so... He does attempt to side step the problem by saying that the causes of the parts and the cause of the whole are of a different kind. The objects in the universe have phenomenal causes, while the universe itself has a transcendent cause. He is therefore denying the category problem, but does he do this persuasively?
Why is there something rather than nothing?
Inductive – an argument that draws a probabilistic conclusion from observation of the world
A posteriori – truth based on sense experience. Truth that is contingently true
The first three of Aquinas' Five Ways make up his Cosmological Argument
Aquinas' First Way: From motion
We can observe that things in the world are in a process of motion.
Everything that is in motion is in the process of changing from a potential state to an actual state.
The same thing cannot be at the same time potentially and actually the same thing.
For example, if something is actually hot, it cannot be potentially hot, but it can be potentially cold.
So, everything that is in a state of motion must be put into this state by another thing.
But the chain of movers cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover and, consequently, no other mover' (Aquinas, Summa Theologica)
Conclusion: it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.'
Second Way: From cause
Nothing is an efficient cause of itself
Efficient causes follow in order: a first cause causes a second, a second a third and so on.
It is not possible for efficient causes to go back infinitely, because if there is no efficient first cause, there will not be any following causes.
Conclusion: 'It is necessary to admit a first efficient cause to which everyone gives the name of God.'
Third Way: From contingency
Things which exist in nature at one time did not exist and in the future will not exist. These things at any time may or may not exist (i.e. contingent existence).
If everything at one time did not exist, there would have been nothing in existence.
If point 2 were true, then there would be nothing in existence, because there would be nothing to bring anything into existence.
Interim conclusion: 'There must exist something the existence of which is necessary'
But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another or not.
An infinite regression of necessary things is impossible as shown in Way 2.
Final conclusion: There exists 'some being having of itself of its own necessity.....causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.!’
Strengths
Aguinas did not intend his five ways to demonstrate a uniquely Christian God or to show that what we call 'God' is perfect. He intended them to show that there is something which causes things but is itself uncaused.
Inductive arguments (see p. 7 for definition) are based on probability rather than proof and show that the existence of God is likely, not certain. This might seem to be a weakness except that our observations of the world and universe seem to support Aquinas arguments. By not arguing for a specifically Christian God with set attributes, Aquinas makes the argument simpler and more straightforward to prove.
Cosmological arguments seem to be supported by inductive scientific arguments like the Big Bang theory, which backs up the idea that the universe had a beginning. Scientific arguments tend to be more persuasive as they use empirical evidence to support their conclusions.
If infinite regress of non-self-explanatory causes, movement and contingent beings was possible, we would still suppose that such a series would require an explanation outside of itself and it is much simpler to suppose that the universe depends for its existence on God - who is himself uncaused and depends on nothing outside of himself for his existence.
Weaknesses
Inductive arguments are only probable so do not provide the certainty of God's existence that religious faith looks for.
The idea of infinite regress is also a problem for the argument. There could be an endless series of causes: there doesn't have to be a first cause or prime mover the universe could be infinite.
If there is an infinite series of things or events which are contingent, each dependent for its occurrence or existence on some other contingent thing or event, then the series as a whole is contingent, i.e. it requires further explanation
This explanation can only be found outside the series in something that is self-explanatory, i.e. that requires no further explanation. Therefore it might be preferable to conclude, as Aguinas does, that God - the infinite and self-explanatory being - is the first cause of the universe. However, if we think about what God was doing before he created the universe we are again drawn into an infinite regress. If we work backwards from the beginning of our universe, we are left with an infinite regress of God actively choosing not to create the universe: an infinite amount of time existing before God actively chose to create the universe.
Hume and Kant on the cosmological argument
David Hume argues that we have no direct experience of the creation of the universe and therefore we cannot speak meaningfully about it. Hume does not believe that there is sufficient evidence to prove the cause of the universe or even that the universe was caused. Hume asks whether anything that existed from eternity could have a cause as that implies a priority in time (and this would undermine the idea of God as eternal or infinite). Even if the universe did begin, this does not mean that anything caused it to come into existence.
Hume criticises the principle of sufficient reason. Those seeking a complete explanation for the existence of the universe are looking for something which cannot be found and which we cannot expect to find. It is not a logical requirement to continue looking for an explanation, nor is it certain that there will be one.
Another problem is with the interpretation of causation. We think of causation temporally: the first cause sets off a chain of events in time and if we go back far enough in time we will encounter the first cause - God. The problem with this view is that it suggests that the first cause no longer exists, or at least that it exists within a time frame. Aquinas cannot accept this as God must still be present in order to act on the world. One answer to this is to argue that 'causation' can be interpreted as sustaining an event: not just causing it but also keeping it going, so the chain of causation is more hierarchical, with God an ongoing and sustaining cause of the universe.
In Dialogues IX Hume makes another attack on Aquinas called the fallacy of composition. Hume argues that it is a fallacy to think that because there is some property or attribute common to each part of a group then this property must apply to the group as a whole.
Immanuel Kant argues that because our knowledge of the world is limited to the phenomenal world of space and time it is not possible to speculate on what may or may not exist independently of space and time.
Kant and Hume argue that we cannot say about anything that exists that it is necessary, for example a necessary being. It is possible to say that something is necessary when its denial entails a contradiction. For example, 'All black cats are black' is a necessary proposition because to deny it creates a contradiction. But we cannot do this with propositions about things that exist. Even Aquinas accepts that 'God exists’ is not a self-evident proposition. If the concept of necessity cannot be applied to God, then Aquinas argument is undermined.
Further criticisms
Arguably, both first and second ways contain contradictions. Aquinas argues that everything has a cause but then concludes that God caused himself. In response, we could argue that that is what the reductio ad absurdum proves: that there has to be an exception to the rule, a 'prime mover' which must be a being unlike any other.
However, instead of God, we could make the universe itself the exception and say that the universe itself is the 'prime mover or the 'unmoved mover'. Everything in the universe might need a cause, but the universe itself doesn't. Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), in his 1948 debate with F. C. Copleston, expressed the view that the question of the cause of the universe is meaningless; the universe is a 'brute fact which does not require a complete explanation.
Copleston and Russel BBC radio debate
The Copleston Russell debate took place in 1948 on BBC Radio. It can be split into five distinct sections. The nature of the argument is discourse and so both parties should be explained in each area. We begin with Copleston's main argument from contingency.
Copleston's argument is based on Aquinas' third way for possibility and necessity and Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason. He asks us to view the world as objects which do not contain within themselves the answer for their own existence. He uses the example of depending on his own parents and now food and air etc. He states the universe is the real or imagined totality or aggregate of individual objects, none of which are capable of explaining themselves. The world isn't distinct from its objects any more than the human race is distinct from its members. Since no object contains the reason for its own existence there must be an external reason beyond the universe and this reason must be an existent being. This being is either the answer for its own existence or it is is not. But the chain of dependency cannot go on ad infinitum or else this would be absurd as we would have no explanation for the universe at all. So in order to explain existence we must come to a being whose existence is contained within it which is to say a being which cannot not exist (a necessary thing in Copleston’s terms). This is the essence of Copleston's argument from contingency.
Russell raises a number of issues with this. The argument continues down a discussion of the term necessity and the difference between a priori and a posterior. Russell suggests that the term"necessary being' has no meaning outside analytic propositions. In fact he argues that analytic propositions are somewhat logically late in the build-up of propositions. He states that he could only accept the term 'necessary being' if it could be demonstrated that this being was one whose existence it would be self-contradictory to deny. Russell believes that the term 'necessary' cannot be applied to things a posterior as well as the term 'contingent'. Copleston states that Russell is being over dogmatic on his insistence of adhering to what he terms 'modern logic' (Western analvtic philosophy). He suggests that once you know that a contingent being exists it follows of necessity that there is a necessary being. Russell insists that he isn't being dogmatic, just that certain things are meaningless outside of a priori analytic discussions, stating that this is essentially an ontological argument. Copleston asks whether the question "Does the cause of the world exist?" have any meaning, to which Russell replies, if you state that "God exists" this can never be analytic as the term can only have meaning a priori.
The conversation shifts to the principle of sufficient reason. Copleston suggests that if anyone saw God, he would see that God must exist. God's essence and existence must be identical or we would need sufficient reason beyond God. However he states that this would only be known a posteriori and not a priori. Russell questions whether Copleston has explained the principle of sufficient reason, asking whether lighting a match by striking it against a box is a sufficient reason. Copleston suggests that it is only a partial explanation and a sufficient reason must be a total explanation to which nothing further can be added Russell claims that he is looking for something he cannot get and shouldn't expect to get. Copleston argues that to look and find nothing is one thing, but to say you shouldn't look is dogmatic. Russell insists that these ideas are effectively beyond our epistemological limits.
The debate continues into the meaning of the term 'universe' and the fallacy of composition. Russell believes the term 'universe' has no meaning. Copleston wants to know if he thinks the universe is unintelligible, he suggests that the universe is without explanation while Copleston states the universe is intrinsically unintelligible without God. After all an infinite number of chocolates are still not a sheep. Contingent objects cannot explain themselves without a necessary being. Copleston questions whether the world is gratuitous as Sartre suggests, to which Russel replies that "he universe is just there and that's all" indicating his belief that the universe is a brute fad. Copleston states that you cannot rule out the legitimacy of the questions of where the universe came from, to which Russell gives the fallacy of composition: just because every man has a mother it doesn't follow that the whole human race has a mother as that's a different logical sphere. Copleston disagrees as he states that this may be the case if looking for cause but he is looking for a transcendent one.
Finally the two move onto quantum physics and a discussion of whether things need to have a cause at all. Copleston suggests that scientists pre-suppose a cause as do metaphysicians, Russell states that it doesn't mean there are causes everywhere, using the example of a man looking for gold. He suggests ultimately that looking for an explanation for the world is a mistake. Copleston argues that scientists assume the universe is not discontinuous but ordered and intelligible. However Russell states that they don't assume that they will always find a cause just that it may be likely. Copleston says that they don't hope for more than probability but assume that the question of explanation has meaning. He asks whether it is an illegitimate question to ask the cause of the world and Russell states that this is his position. The discussion then moves on to a debate on religious experience as they agree to disagree.
Points of analysis from class discussion - A02!!
The success of the debate is greatly limited by Copleston and Russell disagreeing on the terms. They won't agree on the nature of a satisfactory argument for the existence of God (i.e. C says it should be inductive, a posteriori and R insists that the only way to prove God (if it were possible...) would be through analytic, a priori means - ie. more of an ontological argument) - Russell won't engage with Copleston's type of argument (who says 'I think we have to argue from the world of experience to God'), and perhaps for this he is at fault as it prevents them from getting very far at all.
Copleston relies on Leibniz's Principle of Sufficient Reason: everything must have an adequate explanation for its existence. Russell's response ('when is an explanation adequate?') is understandable. He thinks it is impossible to find the 'total explanation' that Copleston requires (you are looking for something which cannot be got)
However, Russell perhaps goes too far? He suggests the question of the origin of the universe is an 'illegitimate' one. This is problematic in any branch of enquiry. Can we really state that certain questions can never be asked? Theologian, Herbert McCabe, defends the legitimacy of the question. He says - there were people who said to Darwin: 'there are just dogs'. i.e. the universe may well have a full explanation we just haven't found it (yet).
Copleston thinks the universe if contingent - and says it is not distinct from its component parts. It is the aggregate of contingent things that it contains. Russell doesn't regard 'universe' as a meaningful concept. He says it is a 'handy word' but that there is no real meaning in it. Is he right that the universe is something separate from its parts (or a different category), or are you more persuaded by Copleston that it is the totality of its parts?
Russell accuses Copleston of committing the Fallacy of Composition ('1 can illustrate what seems to me your fallacy. Every man who exists has a mother, and it seems to me your argument is that therefore the human race must have am other, but obviously the human race hasn't a mother - that is a different logical sphere') - i.e. he says that Copleston has inferred something about the universe just from it being true of its parts. Arguably Copleston has done so... He does attempt to side step the problem by saying that the causes of the parts and the cause of the whole are of a different kind. The objects in the universe have phenomenal causes, while the universe itself has a transcendent cause. He is therefore denying the category problem, but does he do this persuasively?
