13A

Stuart Britain and the Crisis of Monarchy, 1603-1702

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SECTION TWO Revolution, 1629-1649

Topic 13 The failure to secure a post-war settlement, 1648-49: divisions between the Army and Parliament and the Regicide

Key Question A: Why could a political settlement still not be agreed upon after the Second Civil War?

Post-war divisions between the Army and Parliament

The continued failure to reach a political settlement after the Second Civil War can be attributed to the actions of the following groups:

1. Charles I: The King, ensconced in Carisbrooke Castle on the Isle of Wight, remained intransigent, obstinately refusing to agree to any form of settlement in the hope of sowing division between his enemies.

2. Parliament: Parliament had emerged from the First Civil War as a divided body, with the Political Presbyterians pushing for a negotiated settlement with the King, and the Independents insisting that he must be irrevocably defeated on the battlefield. Then, during the course of the Second Civil War, support for the Independent party collapsed as a result of the pro-Royalist risings in the Puritan heartlands of Kent and Essex and the defection of several leading Parliamentarians to the Royalist cause. Most MPs now reached the conclusion that the Presbyterian party had been right all along – a settlement with the King had to be reached quickly to avert anarchy.

3. The New Model Army: The Army’s politicisation in 1647 led to increasingly radical attempts to force a settlement upon Charles, including the capture of the King by George Joyce, a hitherto unknown, low-ranking officer. The creation of the General Council of the Army, with adjutators (‘agitators’) representing the rank-and-file, fostered closer links between the ‘Grandees’ (leading officers) and those ordinary soldiers who were increasingly influenced by political and religious radicalism, especially within the Leveller movement.

4. The political and religious radical groups: By this time, the traditional ruling elite (both Royalists and supporters of Parliament) perceived the Army to be a dangerous hotbed of radical thought. It therefore came to represent the biggest threat to a post-war settlement, rather than a tool that could be usefully used to pressure the King into accepting a settlement. This shows the innate conservatism of the majority of the Political Nation – even among those who had fought against Charles in the Civil War.

The best example of the moderate nature of Parliament at this time is the motion passed in April 1648 by the House of Commons (by a vote of 165-99 in favour) that the “fundamental Government of the Kingdom, by Monarch, Lords and Commons” would not be altered after the result of the Second Civil War became known. In other words, the outcome of the fighting was an irrelevance: no matter what, Charles would remain at the centre of any settlement that was reached. This placed the political initiative firmly back in the hands of the King, while NMA soldiers had further reason to ask why they were risking their lives for a political class who clearly had no desire to redress any of their grievances. Sure enough, in August 1648, with the alliance between Royalists and Scots having been defeated at the Battle of Preston, Parliament voted to revoke The Vote of No Addresses and resume negotiations with the King.

The discussions over The Treaty of Newport were conducted between 15 September and 27 November 1648 on the Isle of Wight (where Charles remained in captivity), on the initial proviso that a settlement must be concluded within forty days. However, unbeknownst to Parliament, the King had secretly sent word to James Butler, Marquis of Ormond (now his leading military commander) that he should refuse to acknowledge the terms of any settlement that might be reached at Newport.

The Remonstrance of the Army

At the Windsor Prayer Meeting in April 1648, NMA soldiers had described Charles as “a man of blood” who must be brought to account for his crimes against the nation. Subsequent events seemed to give more credibility to such a view. Parliament’s decision to pursue The Treaty of Newport with the King left the General Council of the Army with stark choice: stand by and watch MPs betray the cause for which the soldiers had fought or take decisive action. On 16 November, Ireton persuaded the Council to issue an official document entitled The Remonstrance of the Army (that he himself had drafted) accusing the King of tyranny and calling for him to be held accountable for his actions by means of a public trial.

The Remonstrance of the Army was presented to Parliament on 20 November. MPs delayed discussion of it for a week, hoping that a last-ditch settlement with the King could be reached before the self-imposed forty-day deadline elapsed. When this passed with no deal having been struck, Parliament were forced to debate the Army’s point of view. Their decision was to vote 129-83 in favour of simply continuing negotiations with the King over The Treaty of Newport indefinitely. This was the final straw for the Army; the patience of the soldiers had finally run out. If Parliament refused to put Charles on trial, it would need to be purged of all those MPs who still supported him so the King could face the judgement he deserved.

Pride’s Purge

The day after Parliament had voted to continue with The Treaty of Newport, Ireton began preparations to take back the political initiative on behalf of the Army. Early in the morning of 06 December 1648, two regiments led by Colonel Thomas Pride moved into and occupied Palace Yard, Westminster Hall. When the units of the Trained Bands that usually guarded Parliament arrived to take up their stations, they were ordered to return home by the New Model officers. A confrontation between the Army and the Trained Bands was averted by Major-General Philip Skippon (a close ally of Ireton and Cromwell), who used his great personal popularity in the City of London to persuade the men of the Trained Bands to stand down.

Pride and his accomplices then proceeded to prevent around 180 of the most pro-Royalist MPs from entering the Houses of Parliament. 45 of those who had been the most outspoken sympathisers of the King were arrested. These politicians were badly treated by soldiers, who held them responsible for withholding Army pay. The MPs were held overnight in uncomfortable conditions in a nearby tavern (appropriately called ‘Hell’) but were transferred to more appropriate quarters in other local inns during the next few days. On 12 December, all leading Political Presbyterians (i.e., those most in favour of reaching a settlement with the King) were imprisoned at St James's Palace, accused of having plotted against the nation to facilitate the Scottish invasion of 1648. These men would be detained without trial for several years. The rest of the MPs arrested during the Purge were released early in 1649.

A number of explanations have been put forward to explain Pride’s Purge:

  • the Army’s victories in the Second Civil War were seen as a sign that God supported the Army cause (Providence);

  • any treaty that Parliament managed to agree with the King would have isolated the Army and made it vulnerable – it could continue fighting, but would have no political support;

  • there was an abundance of written justification for the Army to take decisive action, e.g., Ireton’s Remonstrance of the Army, the Leveller’s An Agreement of the People, even Old Testament stories of Kings who had been overthrown for angering God were referenced in Army discussions;

  • if Parliament made peace with the King on the basis of The Treaty of Newport, the Army’s sacrifices in the Civil Wars (and their victories) would have been for nothing;

  • the collapse of the Independent party meant that the Army’s interests were no longer being protected in Parliament;

  • discontent among the Army rank-and-file soldiers was still high due to their continued lack of pay, to the extent that the Grandees feared that another mutiny was imminent;

  • at this point, the Levellers were continuing to press for a radical settlement – the second draft of An Agreement of the People was about to be published just as Pride’s Purge took place.

The Purge had been carried out on the orders of Henry Ireton. Fairfax (the military leader of the New Model Army) apparently had no knowledge of it, even though all NMA actions were carried out under his name. He was said to be furious when he heard what had happened but did nothing about it. Perhaps rather too conveniently, Cromwell returned to London from the siege of Pontefract (the final military action of the Second Civil War) the day after the Purge. Upon his arrival, he made the somewhat expedient decision to announce his approval of the proceedings, although the nature of his true feelings is very much a matter of debate.

Before the Purge took place, there had been 471 active members of the House of Commons. After Pride’s action, just over 200 members remained, of whom a further 80 or so would absent themselves voluntarily over the coming months. Ultimately, the removal of the MPs who still favoured a negotiated settlement with Charles cleared the way for the trial of the King to take place several weeks later. This ‘remnant’ of the Long Parliament, which became known as the ‘Rump Parliament’, now set to work on making the necessary preparations to bring Charles to justice.