La Commande Publique et le Contrôle a Priori en RDC

Epigraph and Dedi cat ions

The s tu dy i s pre f ac ed by a qu ot a ti o n f ro m F l o ri a n L I N D I T C H h ig h l ig h t in g t h a t t h e n o m in a l r e s p e c t f o r l e g a l t e x t s o r g a n i z i n g c o m p e t i t i o n h a s n e v e r g u a r a n t e e d t h e i m p a r t i a l i t y o f t h e d e c i s i o n t o a w a r d a c o n t r a c t . T h e w o r k i s d e d i c a t e d t o t h e r e s e a r c h e r ' s p a r e n t s , K A S E N D E N G O Y A n d r é - P i e r r e a n d A T S H U N G A S H A N G O C o l e t t e , f o r t h e i r u n f a i l i n g s u p p o r t a n d g e n e r o u s a f f e c t i o n . R e c o g n i t i o n i s a l s o e x t e n d e d t o s i b l i n g s G a l v a P E D R O K A S E N D E , N T U M B A K A S E N D E D I N E C , a n d N G O M B A K A S E N D E J E A N C E L E . T h e a u t h o r e x p r e s s e s p r o f o u n d g r a t i t u d e t o P r o f e s s o r I N G A N G E W A I N G A N G E J e a n D é s i r é f o r h i s r e m a r k a b l e s c i e n t i f i c r i g o r , a n d t o a s s i s t a n t s M U K E W U T o m a n d L U K U K U L A N D U T h a d é e f o r t h e i r t e c h n i c a l s u p p o r t a n d r e l e v a n t a d v i c e .

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

The document utilizes numerous specialized abbreviations essential to the understanding of Congolese public administration. These include: A N C E (A u t o r i t e N a t i o n a l e d e C e r t i f i c a t i o n E l e c t r o n i q u e ), A N O (A v i s d e N o n - O b j e c t i o n ), A R M P (A u t o r i t e d e R e g u l a t i o n d e s M a r c h e s P u b l i c s ), B A D (B a n q u e A f r i c a i n e d e D e v e l o p p e m e n t ), B C E C O (B u r e a u C e n t r a l d e C o o r d i n a t i o n ), C C A G (C a h i e r d e s C l a u s e s A d m i n i s t r a t i v e s G e n e r a l e s ), C C A P (C a h i e r d e s C l a u s e s A d m i n i s t r a t i v e s P a r t i c u l i e r e s ), C C T G (C a h i e r d e s C l a u s e s T e c h n i c h e s G e n e r a l e s ), C C T P (C a h i e r d e s C l a u s e s T e c h n i c h e s P a r t i c u l i e r e s ), C E D I (C e n t r e d e D i f f u s i o n d e l ' I n f o r m a t i o n ), C G P M P (C e l l u l e d e G e s t i o n d e s P r o j e t s e t d e s M a r c h e s P u b l i c s ), C N S S A P (C a i s s e N a t i o n a l e d e S e c u r i t e S o c i a l e d e s A g e n t s P u b l i c s d e l ' E t a t ), C O R E F (C o m i t e d ' O r i e n t a t i o n d e l a R e f o r m e d e s F i n a n c e s P u b l i q u e s ), C P M (C o m m i s s i o n d e P a s s a t i o n d e s M a r c h e s ), C R D (C o m i t e d e R e g l e m e n t d e s D i f f e r e n d s ), D A O (D o s s i e r d ' A p p e l d ' O f f r e s ), D G C M P (D i r e c t i o n G e n e r a l e d u C o n t r o l e d e s M a r c h e s P u b l i c s ), E T D (E n t i t e s T e r r i t o r i a l e s D e c e n t r a l i s e e s ), I G F (I n s p e c t i o n G e n e r a l e d e s F i n a n c e s ), a n d S I G M A P (S y s t e m e I n t e g r e d e G e s t i o n d e s M a r c h e s P u b l i q u e s ).

Introduction and Literature Review

Public procurement plays a cardinal role in administrative action, serving as a tool to meet community needs through economic operators while ensuring efficient use of public funds. According to Professor L . Y u m a B i a b a , it represents a privileged field of general administrative law, connecting the general interest with the economic sphere. F . V u n d u a w e t e P e m a k o and J . - M . M b o k o D j ’ a n d i m a state that administrative contracts are major tools for public action, mobilizing private sector expertise for the benefit of all. In the Democratic Republic of Congo ( R D C ), the regime is governed by Law $n^{\circ} 10 / 010$ of $27$ April $2010$ and Decree $n^{\circ} 23 / 12$ of $3$ March $2023$, based on principles of freedom of access, equal treatment, transparency, and national preference. Article $5$ of the law defines a public market as a written contract where an entrepreneur, supplier, or service provider commits to a contracting authority for a determined price.

Although competitive bidding is the rule, exceptions exist, specifically "gré à gré" (direct agreement). Article $41$ of Law $n^{\circ} 10 / 010$ describes it as a negotiated market concluded without a call for tenders, requiring approval from the a priori control service and validation by the competent body. Article $42$ specifies triggers such as extreme urgency, exclusive patents, or technical impossibility. Scholars including J e a n - L o u i s E s a m b o K a n g a s h e , N . M w i l a n y a W i l o n d j a , and G . K a b e y a M u a n a K a l a l a emphasize that while gré à gré meets concrete necessities, it remains an exceptional procedure that must be strictly monitored to prevent the circumvention of transparency and access principles.

Problem Statement and Hypotheses

The primary question of this study is whether the a priori control of gré à gré markets constitutes a sufficient safeguard against abuse. The researcher observes that in practice, gré à gré tends to become the norm rather than the exception in certain sectors, raising concerns about corruption and favoritism. The central hypothesis is that while a priori control serves as a legal "lock," it is not a totally effective rampart against abuse due to a gap between the rigor of texts and administrative reality. This inefficiency stems from overly formal controls, ambiguous exception criteria (especially regarding "urgency"), and the fragile independence of controllers. To improve this, the study suggests clarifying thresholds and requiring rigorous justification for derogations.

Methodology and Scope of Study

The research utilizes a multidimensional methodological approach. The exegetical method is used to analyze Law $n^{\circ} 10 / 010$ of $27$ April $2010$, while the empirical method confronts legal rules with administrative realities. Documentary techniques involved exploring the J o u r n a l O f f i c i e l and works of eminent Congolese jurists. Observation techniques focused on the functioning of the D G C M P and interactions between contracting authorities and regulatory bodies. The study is spatially limited to the R D C , temporally focused on the period from the $2010$ reform to the present, and materially centered on the pre-contractual phase of gré à gré markets and the effectiveness of their a priori control.

Conceptual Aspects of Public Markets

Chapter I establishes the theoretical and conceptual markers of Congolese procurement. Public procurement is a motor for administrative action, favoring job creation and inclusive growth. Law $n^{\circ} 10 / 010$ defines the public market as a written contract where a provider engages with a contracting authority for works, goods, or intellectual services for an agreed price. This contract is fundamentally administrative, implying it is subject to a specific regime distinct from common law, characterized by "clauses exorbitantes" (extraordinary clauses) that grant the administration powers of direction, control, modification, or unilateral termination. Such powers are justified by the pursuit of the general interest.

Procurement is classified into four material categories: $1 .$ Markets of works (construction of buildings, roads, bridges, etc.); $2 .$ Markets of supplies (acquisition, leasing, or lease-purchase of tangible mobile goods); $3 .$ Markets of services (material or physical services like transport, maintenance, or gardening); $4 .$ Markets of intellectual services (intangible missions like feasibility studies, technical assistance, or master of works). Procedurally, the study distinguishes between the Call for Tenders (A p p e l d ' o f f r e s ), which is the common law rule, and Special Markets (M a r c h é s s p é c i a u x ) related to national defense, security, and strategic state interests which fall under an autonomous legal regime.

Preparation, Implementation, and Regulation

Preparation involves a strict project management approach. It begins with identifying public initiatives, studying opportunities (regie vs. outsourcing), and defining technical specifications. Financial estimation is crucial, and in the RDC, selection is based on the "economically most advantageous offer" rather than just the lowest price, considering technical value, execution time, and environmental impact. The P l a n d e P a s s a t i o n d e s M a r c h é s (P P M ) is the annual technical instrument for planning. Its absence leads to the nullity of resulting contracts. Contracting authorities must ensure the availability of reserved credits before launching a market to prevent insolvency.

Institutional regulation is divided to avoid conflicts of interest: $1 .$ A u t o r i t e d e R e g u l a t i o n d e s M a r c h e s P u b l i c s (A R M P ): Reports to the Prime Minister, provides strategic oversight, conducts audits, and includes the C o m i t e d e R e g l e m e n t d e s D i f f e r e n d s (C R D ) for disputes. $2 .$ D i r e c t i o n G e n e r a l e d u C o n t r o l e d e s M a r c h e s P u b l i c s (D G C M P ): Under the Ministry of Budget, it performs a priori control of regularity and issues the A v i s d e N o n - O b j e c t i o n (A N O ). $3 .$ A p p r o v i n g A u t h o r i t y : The Prime Minister, Budget Minister, or tutelage minister who gives final legal effect to the contract. $4 .$ C e l l u l e d e G e s t i o n d e s P r o j e t s e t d e s M a r c h e s P u b l i c s (C G P M P ): Internal unit within each contracting authority responsible for planning and technical preparation.

Legal Framework and Modalities of A Priori Control

A priori control consists of verification before the administrative act carries legal effect. Systematic control for average/large markets is triggered by specific financial thresholds: $300 \, 000 \, 000$ Congolese francs for works, $200 \, 000 \, 000$ for supplies/services, and $100 \, 000 \, 000$ for intellectual services. A "second degree" control (revue préalable) increases scrutiny at higher levels ($500 \, 000 \, 000$ for works). The D G C M P issues the A N O at key steps: before the launch to check for discriminatory specifications, and before award to ensure evaluation followed announced criteria. For gré à gré, no negotiation can begin without a specific "prior and special written authorization" from the D G C M P . The provider in such cases is subject to a specific control of cost prices to compensate for the lack of competition.

Analysis of Obstacles and Weaknesses

Chapter II explores concrete realities and weaknesses. The researcher notes an abuse of the "urgency" motif. While Law $n^{\circ} 10 / 010$ limits this to unpredictable cases or force majeure, administrative practice often uses it to cover for delays or poor planning. The P E F A $2018$ report revealed that approximately $98.4 \%$ of public expenditures followed urgency procedures. This "fabricated urgency" leads to what E s a m b o calls "triangular complicity" between buyers, managers, and entrepreneurs. Recent cases highlight these issues, such as the suspension of a $39.8 \, \text{million} \, \text{USD}$ contract to Z I O N and $4 \, \text{million} \, \text{USD}$ to C N S S A P by Prime Minister J u d i t h S u m i n w a in May $2025$ because the companies lacked the required technical capacity.

Political interference remains a major hurdle. The "tiroir-caisse" (cash drawer) system of budget management allows a small circle (Presidency, Primature, Finance, Budget) to dictate priorities regardless of the voted Finance Law, pressuring the D G C M P to issue A N O s against legal requirements. The B u k a n g a L o n z o case involving former Prime Minister A u g u s t i n M a t a t a P o n y o highlighted how political decisions can supplant legal procedures. Similarly, the Constant M u t a m b a / Z i o n C o n s t r u c t i o n case ($2025$) involved an illegal transfer of $19 \, 900 \, 000 \, \text{USD}$ without an A N O and with advance payments exceeding the legal cap of $30 \%$.

Perspectives for Optimization

To remediate these issues, the study proposes structural corrections: $1 .$ D i g i t a l i z a t i o n : Implementing S I G M A P according to Decree $n^{\circ} 24 / 13$ of $14$ October $2024$. This platform aims to automate procedures, time-stamp bids, and reduce human intervention, thereby limiting corruption risks. It requires qualified electronic signatures from A N C E . $2 .$ T r a n s p a r e n c y : Systematically publishing award notices online, as current audits show only $14 \%$ of final awards are published. $3 .$ P r o f e s s i o n a l i z a t i o n : Moving from "administrative agents" to "certified procurement professionals" within C G P M P s to handle the increasing technical complexity. $4 .$ I n d e p e n d e n c e : Strengthening the financial and technical autonomy of A R M P and D G C M P , ensuring they have the institutional courage to refuse compliant A N O s. The F i n a l C o n c l u s i o n asserts that procurement integrity is a matter of both advanced technology and shared ethical management toward the general interest.