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Core Notes 8

What was the impact of the Treaty of Versailles?

Overview:

  • When harsh terms of treaty were revealed to German govt. in May 1918, ministers from all parties shared Chancellor Scheidemann’s view that accepting it would be incompatible with German honour.

  • H/e at this stage seemed possible to negotiate amendments to treaty.

  • In the event, the rejection of German requests for extensive changes + demand for acceptance of treaty within 7 days caused political crisis in Germany.

  • Scheidemann and some of this other ministers wanted to reject treaty whereas majority of cabinet + SPD members of Reichstag believed Germany had no choice but to sign treaty.

  • Scheidemann resigned + new coalition cabinet, led by Gustav Bauer, was formed.

Gustav Bauer (1870-1944):

  • Had been trade union official before entered Reichstag as SPD deputy in 1912

  • In political upheaval of 1918-19 he was appointed as Minister of Labour in cabinets of Prince Max, Ebert + Scheidemann.

  • After Scheidemann resigned in June 1919 Bauer became Chancellor but forced to resign in March 1920 after the Kapp Putsch.

  • He continued to serve as a minister and a Reichstag deputy for several more years.

Military Response to Treaty:

  • Some high-ranking officers in German Army with tacit support of Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, were discussing possibility or resisting the signing of the treaty through renewed military action.

  • President Ebert told General Groener that he would support rejection of the treaty of there was any chance that military action could be successful.

  • But Groener was a realist + informed Ebert that military resistance = futile + Germany had no alternative but to accept treaty.

  • Bauer cabinet bowed to inevitable and signed Treaty.

Reaction of pro-republican parties:

  • Divisions over signing of Versailles Treaty continued to dominate German political life throughout years of Weimar Republic.

  • SPD + allies in government in 1919 well aware signing would rebound upon them indeed, so concerned they asked main opponents in DNVP, DVP + DDP to state that those who voted for treaty weren’t being unpatriotic.

  • They also took the view that most sensible course of action in coming years = to outwardly comply with terms of treaty whilst negotiating modifications to it.

  • This became known as policy of fulfillment.

  • H/E even more importantly treaty turned some (even former supporters) against W.R  real damage was in alienating moderates who’d been happy to accept new constitution + promises of ‘better’ Germany but couldn’t stomach politicians who appeared to have betrayed unbeaten country.

  • Treaty caused political demoralization at v. centre of govt., associating W.R. once again with weakness + failure.

  • Politicians who agreed to it forced to become defensive

  • To public at large, gains of revo. Seemed unimpressive.

Reaction on the Right:

  • Right-wing treatment of the Republic intensified by signing of Versailles Treaty: German nationalists couldn’t accept fact of Germany’s military defeat, nor establishment of new republic.

  • Signing of peace settlement = final straw + led many to join groups committed to overthrowing Republic.

  • In eyes of extreme nationalists, politicians who now governed Germany lacked any legitimacy b/c they’d betrayed the ‘Fatherland’ several times – in dethroning the Kaiser, signing Armistice + acceptance of Versailles Treaty.

  • These politicians became labelled the ‘November criminals’ and their actions of ‘betrayal’ were referred to as ‘the stab in the back’.

  • German army bore no responsibility for defeat of 1918 fact that Ludendorff had advised Kaiser in late Sept. 1918 that army was on verge of defeat = conveniently forgotten.

  • Indeed, Ludendorff had advised the Kaiser to appoint a new civilian-led govt. in the hope that better peace terms would be secured + that the high command would avoid responsibility for defeat + signing of armistice.

  • Ludendorff + superior von Hindenburg actively promoted ‘stab in the back’ myth, the justification for continued nationalist attacks on the Republic, its political supporters and on the treaty.

  • Stab in the back myth particularly appealing to ex-soldiers who’d suffered in fighting for what they regarded as a noble cause + experienced insults + humiliation when they returned to Germany in throes of revolution.

Reactions of other soldiers:

  • Not all soldiers who returned to Germany in wake of defeat were hostile to new republic.

  • Many working-class soldiers, who’d previously been members of trade unions + supported SPD, supported new democratic system.

  • Others gravitated towards communists.

  • H/e many couldn’t adjust to civilian life, esp. as they had great difficulty in finding employment + yearned for comradeship + sense of purpose war years had given them.

  • These men gravitated towards the Freikorps + right-wing nationalist groups.

  • As a result, in the early years of the Weimar Republic, democratic politics was under continuous threat from violent nationalist groups.

Reactions from Abroad: Britain

  • When Prime Minister Lloyd George returned to London after signing of treaty, he was given rapturous reception from large crowd.

  • On the whole, British public opinion was satisfied that Germany had lost its overseas empire, along with its large fleet, and would be unable to threaten European peace for a generation.

  • H/e privately Lloyd George believed Germany shouldn’t be so weak it would be unable to resist expansion of USSR westwards + wanted Germany to become strong trading partner with Britain again.

  • Many in Britain saw the French as being greedy + vindictive + there was growing feeling in Britain that Germany had been unfairly treated at Versailles.

  • One influential view was put forward by economist, John Maynard Keynes, who argued level of reparations was too high  believed level of reparations ‘was one of the most serious acts of political unwisdom for which our statesmen have ever been responsible’.

Reactions from Abroad: France

  • French felt they had suffered most of all the combatant nations + were determined to seek revenge at Versailles.

  • Recovery of Alsace-Lorraine, demilitarization of Rhineland and payment of reparations = key French demands which had been met.

  • Despite this, there were many in France who regarded treaty as too lenient on Germany + President Clemenceau who was blamed for making too many concessions was defeated at next election in 1920.

  • Marshal Foch, the wartime military commander, expressed a widely held view in France when he said ‘This is not peace. It is an armistice for twenty years’.

Reactions from Abroad: The USA

  • Reactions to treaty in America were generally negative.

  • There was a widespread opinion that the treaty had been unfair on Germany + that Britain and France had used treaty to enrich themselves at Germany’s expense.

  • Republicans in American Congress opposed the treaty + Wilson failed to win Congressional vote to ratify the treaty, leaving the USA to make a separate peace with Germany in 1921.

  • USA refused to join League of Nations and in 1920s retreated from involvement in European affairs.

Economic Significance of Treaty of Versailles:

  • Did Treaty of Versailles act as serious handicap to establishment of long-term political stability in Germany?

  • Economic consequences of reparations undoubtedly a genuine concern  English economist John Maynard Keynes feared in 1919 that reparations would fundamentally weaken economy of Germany with consequences for whole of Europe.

  • However Germany’s economic potential remained considerable  it had potentially by far the strongest economy in Europe + still had extensive industry + resources so republic’s economic problems can’t be blamed on burden of reparations alone.

  • It should be remembered that by 1932 b/c reparations had been scaled back Germany actually received more in loans under the Dawes Plan than it paid in reparations.

Political Significance of Treaty of Versailles:

  • Cannot maintain that treaty had weakened Germany politically  in some respects, Germany in 1919 was in stronger position than in 1914: the great empires of Russia, Austria-Hungary + Turkey had gone, creating power vacuum in central and eastern Europe that couldn’t be filled, at least in short term, by weak and isolated Soviet Russia or any other state.

  • In such a situation, cautious diplomacy might have led to establishment of German power and influence at heart of Europe.

  • H/e on another level the treaty might be considered more to blame b/c in the minds of many Germans it was regarded as real cause of country’s problems + really believed it was totally unfair.

  • In the war German public opinion strongly shaped by nationalist propaganda, so deeply shocked by defeat.

  • Both Armistice + Versailles closely linked to ‘stab in the back’ myth that German army had not really lost WW1 in 1918  maybe myth, but v. powerful.

  • As a result, new democracy of Weimar forced to take responsibility and blame for outcome of WW1. Weimar deeply weakened by Versailles, fueling propaganda of republic’s opponents over years.

  • Even for sympathetic democrats like Hugo Preuss, Versailles served to disillusion many into thinking that gains of revolution undone.

  • For these reasons Treaty of Versailles contributed to internal political + economic difficulties that emerged in Germany after 1919.

Summary:

  • Treaty of Versailles stripped Germany of land, people, resources and military power.

  • Although Germany might have suffered even greater losses if demands of French P.M. Clemenceau had been accepted by other Allies, German people viewed treaty in wholly negative terms.

  • Signing by Bauer’s socialist led govt. in June 1919 viewed by many as act of national betrayal.

  • Circumstances in which new republic founded in November 1918 prompted many Germans to reject its legitimacy, despite the democratic process that later led to the drawing up of the Weimar constitution.

  • For German nationalists the new republic, and in particular, the socialist politicians who’d taken the lead in its foundation, was permanently tainted by its association with betrayal + humiliation of unjust + dictated peace.

N

Core Notes 8

What was the impact of the Treaty of Versailles?

Overview:

  • When harsh terms of treaty were revealed to German govt. in May 1918, ministers from all parties shared Chancellor Scheidemann’s view that accepting it would be incompatible with German honour.

  • H/e at this stage seemed possible to negotiate amendments to treaty.

  • In the event, the rejection of German requests for extensive changes + demand for acceptance of treaty within 7 days caused political crisis in Germany.

  • Scheidemann and some of this other ministers wanted to reject treaty whereas majority of cabinet + SPD members of Reichstag believed Germany had no choice but to sign treaty.

  • Scheidemann resigned + new coalition cabinet, led by Gustav Bauer, was formed.

Gustav Bauer (1870-1944):

  • Had been trade union official before entered Reichstag as SPD deputy in 1912

  • In political upheaval of 1918-19 he was appointed as Minister of Labour in cabinets of Prince Max, Ebert + Scheidemann.

  • After Scheidemann resigned in June 1919 Bauer became Chancellor but forced to resign in March 1920 after the Kapp Putsch.

  • He continued to serve as a minister and a Reichstag deputy for several more years.

Military Response to Treaty:

  • Some high-ranking officers in German Army with tacit support of Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, were discussing possibility or resisting the signing of the treaty through renewed military action.

  • President Ebert told General Groener that he would support rejection of the treaty of there was any chance that military action could be successful.

  • But Groener was a realist + informed Ebert that military resistance = futile + Germany had no alternative but to accept treaty.

  • Bauer cabinet bowed to inevitable and signed Treaty.

Reaction of pro-republican parties:

  • Divisions over signing of Versailles Treaty continued to dominate German political life throughout years of Weimar Republic.

  • SPD + allies in government in 1919 well aware signing would rebound upon them indeed, so concerned they asked main opponents in DNVP, DVP + DDP to state that those who voted for treaty weren’t being unpatriotic.

  • They also took the view that most sensible course of action in coming years = to outwardly comply with terms of treaty whilst negotiating modifications to it.

  • This became known as policy of fulfillment.

  • H/E even more importantly treaty turned some (even former supporters) against W.R  real damage was in alienating moderates who’d been happy to accept new constitution + promises of ‘better’ Germany but couldn’t stomach politicians who appeared to have betrayed unbeaten country.

  • Treaty caused political demoralization at v. centre of govt., associating W.R. once again with weakness + failure.

  • Politicians who agreed to it forced to become defensive

  • To public at large, gains of revo. Seemed unimpressive.

Reaction on the Right:

  • Right-wing treatment of the Republic intensified by signing of Versailles Treaty: German nationalists couldn’t accept fact of Germany’s military defeat, nor establishment of new republic.

  • Signing of peace settlement = final straw + led many to join groups committed to overthrowing Republic.

  • In eyes of extreme nationalists, politicians who now governed Germany lacked any legitimacy b/c they’d betrayed the ‘Fatherland’ several times – in dethroning the Kaiser, signing Armistice + acceptance of Versailles Treaty.

  • These politicians became labelled the ‘November criminals’ and their actions of ‘betrayal’ were referred to as ‘the stab in the back’.

  • German army bore no responsibility for defeat of 1918 fact that Ludendorff had advised Kaiser in late Sept. 1918 that army was on verge of defeat = conveniently forgotten.

  • Indeed, Ludendorff had advised the Kaiser to appoint a new civilian-led govt. in the hope that better peace terms would be secured + that the high command would avoid responsibility for defeat + signing of armistice.

  • Ludendorff + superior von Hindenburg actively promoted ‘stab in the back’ myth, the justification for continued nationalist attacks on the Republic, its political supporters and on the treaty.

  • Stab in the back myth particularly appealing to ex-soldiers who’d suffered in fighting for what they regarded as a noble cause + experienced insults + humiliation when they returned to Germany in throes of revolution.

Reactions of other soldiers:

  • Not all soldiers who returned to Germany in wake of defeat were hostile to new republic.

  • Many working-class soldiers, who’d previously been members of trade unions + supported SPD, supported new democratic system.

  • Others gravitated towards communists.

  • H/e many couldn’t adjust to civilian life, esp. as they had great difficulty in finding employment + yearned for comradeship + sense of purpose war years had given them.

  • These men gravitated towards the Freikorps + right-wing nationalist groups.

  • As a result, in the early years of the Weimar Republic, democratic politics was under continuous threat from violent nationalist groups.

Reactions from Abroad: Britain

  • When Prime Minister Lloyd George returned to London after signing of treaty, he was given rapturous reception from large crowd.

  • On the whole, British public opinion was satisfied that Germany had lost its overseas empire, along with its large fleet, and would be unable to threaten European peace for a generation.

  • H/e privately Lloyd George believed Germany shouldn’t be so weak it would be unable to resist expansion of USSR westwards + wanted Germany to become strong trading partner with Britain again.

  • Many in Britain saw the French as being greedy + vindictive + there was growing feeling in Britain that Germany had been unfairly treated at Versailles.

  • One influential view was put forward by economist, John Maynard Keynes, who argued level of reparations was too high  believed level of reparations ‘was one of the most serious acts of political unwisdom for which our statesmen have ever been responsible’.

Reactions from Abroad: France

  • French felt they had suffered most of all the combatant nations + were determined to seek revenge at Versailles.

  • Recovery of Alsace-Lorraine, demilitarization of Rhineland and payment of reparations = key French demands which had been met.

  • Despite this, there were many in France who regarded treaty as too lenient on Germany + President Clemenceau who was blamed for making too many concessions was defeated at next election in 1920.

  • Marshal Foch, the wartime military commander, expressed a widely held view in France when he said ‘This is not peace. It is an armistice for twenty years’.

Reactions from Abroad: The USA

  • Reactions to treaty in America were generally negative.

  • There was a widespread opinion that the treaty had been unfair on Germany + that Britain and France had used treaty to enrich themselves at Germany’s expense.

  • Republicans in American Congress opposed the treaty + Wilson failed to win Congressional vote to ratify the treaty, leaving the USA to make a separate peace with Germany in 1921.

  • USA refused to join League of Nations and in 1920s retreated from involvement in European affairs.

Economic Significance of Treaty of Versailles:

  • Did Treaty of Versailles act as serious handicap to establishment of long-term political stability in Germany?

  • Economic consequences of reparations undoubtedly a genuine concern  English economist John Maynard Keynes feared in 1919 that reparations would fundamentally weaken economy of Germany with consequences for whole of Europe.

  • However Germany’s economic potential remained considerable  it had potentially by far the strongest economy in Europe + still had extensive industry + resources so republic’s economic problems can’t be blamed on burden of reparations alone.

  • It should be remembered that by 1932 b/c reparations had been scaled back Germany actually received more in loans under the Dawes Plan than it paid in reparations.

Political Significance of Treaty of Versailles:

  • Cannot maintain that treaty had weakened Germany politically  in some respects, Germany in 1919 was in stronger position than in 1914: the great empires of Russia, Austria-Hungary + Turkey had gone, creating power vacuum in central and eastern Europe that couldn’t be filled, at least in short term, by weak and isolated Soviet Russia or any other state.

  • In such a situation, cautious diplomacy might have led to establishment of German power and influence at heart of Europe.

  • H/e on another level the treaty might be considered more to blame b/c in the minds of many Germans it was regarded as real cause of country’s problems + really believed it was totally unfair.

  • In the war German public opinion strongly shaped by nationalist propaganda, so deeply shocked by defeat.

  • Both Armistice + Versailles closely linked to ‘stab in the back’ myth that German army had not really lost WW1 in 1918  maybe myth, but v. powerful.

  • As a result, new democracy of Weimar forced to take responsibility and blame for outcome of WW1. Weimar deeply weakened by Versailles, fueling propaganda of republic’s opponents over years.

  • Even for sympathetic democrats like Hugo Preuss, Versailles served to disillusion many into thinking that gains of revolution undone.

  • For these reasons Treaty of Versailles contributed to internal political + economic difficulties that emerged in Germany after 1919.

Summary:

  • Treaty of Versailles stripped Germany of land, people, resources and military power.

  • Although Germany might have suffered even greater losses if demands of French P.M. Clemenceau had been accepted by other Allies, German people viewed treaty in wholly negative terms.

  • Signing by Bauer’s socialist led govt. in June 1919 viewed by many as act of national betrayal.

  • Circumstances in which new republic founded in November 1918 prompted many Germans to reject its legitimacy, despite the democratic process that later led to the drawing up of the Weimar constitution.

  • For German nationalists the new republic, and in particular, the socialist politicians who’d taken the lead in its foundation, was permanently tainted by its association with betrayal + humiliation of unjust + dictated peace.