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Monopoly & Market Structures – Comprehensive Bullet-Point Study Notes (copy)

Marginal Revenue vs. Marginal Cost

  • Core rule for all market structures (perfect competition, monopoly, monopolistic competition, oligopoly):
    • Produce the output level where MR = MC.
    • If MR > MC (marginal profit > 0): increase output until equality is restored.
    • If MR < MC (marginal profit < 0): reduce output.
  • Rationale: At equality, profit cannot be raised by altering Q; any change would lower total profit.
  • Micro‐foundations: profit \pi(Q) = TR(Q) - TC(Q). Maximization requires \frac{d\pi}{dQ} = 0 \Rightarrow \frac{dTR}{dQ} = \frac{dTC}{dQ} \Rightarrow MR = MC.
  • Applies even when firms behave strategically (e.g., oligopoly) or face a perfectly elastic demand (perfect competition, where P = MR).

Excess Capacity vs. Efficient Scale

  • Efficient Scale: Quantity where Average Total Cost is minimized ⇒ \min_{Q} ATC(Q).
  • Excess Capacity: Operating at a Q lower than efficient scale ⇒ under‐utilised plant/resources.
  • Common in monopolistic competition because the downward‐sloping firm demand curve meets ATC before its minimum.
    • Firms differentiate their products; each has some market power, allowing a price markup and smaller Q.
  • Implication: Society forgoes lowest‐possible cost; product variety is obtained at the expense of productive efficiency.

Natural Monopoly & Economies of Scale

  • Economies of scale: ATC falls as Q rises due to spreading fixed costs or increasing returns.
  • Natural monopoly exists when one firm can supply the market at a lower cost than any multi‐firm configuration (ATC declining over the entire relevant demand range).
    • Graph: downward‐sloping ATC intersects demand only once ⇒ single firm optimal.
    • Examples: water, electricity, gas distribution, rail track.
  • Regulatory implications: price regulation, public ownership, or franchise bidding to curb monopoly power while exploiting scale economies.

Price Discrimination & Elasticity

  • Definition: Selling the same or similar product at different prices to different buyers not justified by cost differences.
  • Feasibility conditions:
    1. Market power (downward‐sloping demand).
    2. Ability to segment markets (identify WTP‐differences).
    3. Prevention of resale or arbitrage.
  • Profit‐maximising strategy: charge higher price in less elastic segments, lower price in more elastic segments.
    • Elasticity rule: \frac{PH - MC}{PH} = \frac{1}{|\varepsilonH|} vs \frac{PL - MC}{PL} = \frac{1}{|\varepsilonL|} where |\varepsilonH| < |\varepsilonL|.
  • Welfare: can raise output and sometimes reduce deadweight loss (DWL) but redistributes surplus from consumers to producer.

Monopoly Pricing & Deadweight Loss

  • Monopoly chooses QM where MR = MC, charges PM on demand curve.
  • Results vs. perfect competition (where PC = MC at QC):
    • PM > MC, QM < Q_C.
    • DWL: triangle bounded by demand curve, MC, and vertical line at Q_M.
    • Consumer surplus ↓, producer surplus ↑ (relative to competition) but total surplus ↓.
  • Mathematical expression for DWL (linear demand & constant MC): DWL = \tfrac{1}{2}(PM - MC)(QC - Q_M).

Oligopoly & Marginal Analysis

  • Few firms, each large enough to influence price; strategic interdependence paramount.
  • Decision principle (still):
    • If MB > MC → expand.
    • If MC > MB → contract.
  • Game theory tools (Cournot, Bertrand, Stackelberg, prisoner's dilemma) model rival reactions.
  • Possibility of collusion (cartel) vs. competition; collusion is illegal but tempting because mimics monopoly outcome.

Cooperation & Welfare in Oligopoly

  • Cooperation (explicit or tacit) pushes price ↑ toward monopoly level:
    • Raises total (firm) surplus; lowers consumer surplus.
    • May improve productive efficiency but hurts allocative efficiency.
  • Game‐theoretic insight: each firm has incentive to undercut price slightly (cheat); hence collusive agreements unstable without enforcement.
  • Policy: antitrust laws to deter collusion, leniency programs, and merger review.

MR = MC (Universal Profit Maximisation Rule)

  • Reiterated principle (#8): regardless of structure/time horizon, the intersection of MR and MC supplies the optimal Q.
  • Provides a test question staple: "If MR > MC at current output, what should the firm do?" → increase output.

Monopolistic Competition – Long Run

  • Free entry/exit drives economic profit to zero.
  • Long‐run equilibrium: demand curve tangent to ATC at Q_{LR} (not at its minimum).
    • Price P_{MC} > MC (allocative inefficiency).
    • Q{LR} < Q{efficient\ scale} (excess capacity, productive inefficiency).
  • Consumers gain variety; firms operate like mini‐monopolies over differentiated niches.

Market Structure Comparison (Key Attributes)

  • Perfect Competition: many sellers, identical product, no barriers, price = MC, zero LR profit.
  • Monopoly: one seller, unique product, high barriers, price maker, possible LR profit, DWL.
  • Monopolistic Competition: many sellers, differentiated, low barriers, some price setting, zero LR profit, excess capacity.
  • Oligopoly: few sellers, product may differ, high barriers, mutual interdependence, LR profit depends on rivalry.

Monopoly Graph – Reading Profits

  • Steps:
    1. MR = MC → Q_M.
    2. Up to demand curve → P_M.
    3. Up to ATC curve → ATC_M.
    4. Profit per unit: \piu = PM - ATC_M.
    5. Total profit: \Pi = \piu \times QM (area of rectangle between P and ATC at Q).

Perfect Competition vs. Monopoly – Efficiency Contrast

  • Perfect Competition: P = MC, maximises total surplus, no DWL.
  • Monopoly: P > MC, generates DWL & redistributes surplus to producer.
  • Policy tools: price caps, output regulation, or promote competition.

Long‐Run Monopolistic Competition – Graphical Highlights

  • Demand tangency point = break‐even.
  • Still positive markup: P - MC = \text{Markup} > 0.
  • Not efficient (same arguments as earlier). Variety considered a countervailing benefit.

Losses & Shutdown Decision

  • Short run: fixed costs sunk.
    • Continue producing if P \ge AVC (covers variable costs); loss < fixed cost.
    • Shutdown if P < AVC (minimise loss to fixed cost).
  • Long run: all costs variable → exit if P < ATC and no expectation of improvement.
  • Graphical: supply curve for competitive firm is MC curve above AVC.

Elasticity & Monopoly Pricing Strategy

  • Monopoly will never operate where demand is inelastic (|ε| < 1): there MR < 0; reducing Q ↑ TR & ↓ TC.
  • Operates only on elastic portion (|ε| > 1) where MR > 0.
  • Total revenue test: lowering price in elastic range → TR rises.

Deadweight Loss – Visualising Welfare Loss

  • Efficient output: intersection of demand (MB) and MC (social MC).
  • Monopoly output lower; DWL triangle bounded by demand curve, MC curve, and vertical lines at QM & QE.
  • Represents lost mutually beneficial trades.

Types of Price Discrimination

  • First‐degree (perfect): each consumer pays their exact WTP; CS ≈ 0, output efficient, monopoly captures all surplus.
  • Second‐degree: self‐selection by quantity/quality (block pricing, two‐part tariffs, bundling). Larger buyers get lower per‐unit price.
  • Third‐degree: segmentation by observable characteristic (age, location, time). Each segment faces its own elasticities.
  • Welfare effects:
    • May expand output compared to single‐price monopoly → DWL ↓.
    • Consumer surplus redistributed; some groups may pay less, others more.
    • Regulatory scrutiny when considered unfair or anti‐competitive.

Cross‐Connections & Broader Context

  • MR = MC anchors every topic: from shutdown rule to price discrimination formulas.
  • Excess capacity in monopolistic competition parallels underproduction in monopoly → both stem from downward‐sloping demand.
  • Game‐theoretic problems of oligopoly (cheating in cartels) echo inability to sustain first‐degree price discrimination without perfect info.
  • Regulatory interventions differ:
    • Antitrust (Sherman Act) targets collusion/mergers (oligopoly).
    • Price caps or marginal‐cost pricing for natural monopolies.
    • Consumer protection laws for discriminatory pricing.
  • Real‐world examples: airline dynamic pricing (2nd & 3rd degree), Amazon web services natural monopoly debate, OPEC cartel as oligopoly.

Key Equations & Reminders

  • Profit: \pi = TR - TC.
  • Marginal values: MR = \frac{dTR}{dQ},\; MC = \frac{dTC}{dQ}.
  • Elasticity relation (monopoly): MR = P \left(1 - \frac{1}{|\varepsilon|}\right).
  • Shutdown: produce if P \ge AVC (short run).
  • DWL (linear): \text{Area} = \frac{1}{2}(PM - MC)(QE - Q_M).

Use these notes to replicate diagrams, solve numerical questions, and explain policy debates on market power and efficiency.