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Major Milestones in U.S.–Latin American Policy (January 2017 – January 2021)

• January 2017: Executive Withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)

  • During his first week in office, U.S. President Donald Trump executed an executive order withdrawing the United States from the $12\text{-nation}$ TPP trade agreement.

  • The decision directly impacted Latin American signatories Mexico, Peru, and Chile, signaling an immediate pivot away from Obama-era Asia-Pacific multilateralism toward nationalist trade strategy.

• February 2017: Targeted Sanctions Against the Venezuelan Regime

  • The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) implemented targeted financial sanctions against top Venezuelan officials.

  • Designated Vice President Tareck El Aissami under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act for facilitating international narcotics trafficking, freezing foreign assets and prohibiting U.S. entities from conducting business with designated individuals.

• June 2017: Rollback of Obama-Era Diplomatic and Commercial Opening to Cuba

  • Delivering an address in Miami's Little Havana, President Trump announced a executive directive reinstating commercial and travel restrictions on Cuba.

  • Prohibited direct financial transactions with entities controlled by the Cuban military holding company GAESA (Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A.) and eliminated individual "people-to-people" educational travel.

• May – October 2018: Zero-Tolerance Border Strategy and Regional Tariff Pressure

  • The U.S. Department of Justice instituted a zero-tolerance immigration policy, directing federal prosecutors to pursue criminal charges against all unauthorized border entries, resulting in the separation of over $2{,}800$ migrant children from parents.

  • Under executive threats to levy escalating tariffs ($5\%$ scaling up to $25\%$) on all Mexican exports, Mexico agreed to deploy $15{,}000$ National Guard troops to tighten internal border enforcement and increase migrant detentions.

  • In January 2021, the U.S. State Department placed Cuba back on the official list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, reversing Obama's 2015 removal.

• June 2018: IMF Emergency Stabilization Bailout for Argentina

  • Supported by the U.S. Treasury, Argentine President Mauricio Macri secured a record $57\,\text{billion USD}$ standby arrangement from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to stabilize the Argentine peso.

  • The package marked the largest loan in IMF history, cementing Argentina as the fund's largest debtor nation.

• November 2018: Renegotiation and Signing of the USMCA

  • Following tariff threats against Canada and Mexico, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) was signed to replace the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

  • The agreement increased regional automotive content requirements from $62.5\%$ to $75\%$, mandated that $40\text{--}45\%$ of auto content be produced by workers earning at least $\\text{16 USD/hour}$, introduced stricter intellectual property protections, and established a $16\text{-year}$ sunset clause.

• January 2019: Diplomatic Recognition of Juan Guaidó in Venezuela

  • The U.S., Canada, multiple European Union states, and members of the regional Lima Group officially recognized National Assembly President Juan Guaidó as the legitimate interim president of Venezuela under Article 233 of the Venezuelan Constitution.

• January – February 2019: Partial Federal Shutdown and "Remain in Mexico" Launch

  • Executive insistence on securing $\\text{5.7 billion USD}$ for southern border wall construction caused a $35\text{-day}$ partial U.S. government shutdown, the longest in U.S. history.

  • Concurrently, the Department of Homeland Security launched the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), forcing over $60{,}000$ non-Mexican asylum seekers to await U.S. immigration court hearings in border towns in Northern Mexico.

• July 2019: Bilateral Safe Third Country / Asylum Cooperative Agreements

  • The U.S. executed bilateral Asylum Cooperative Agreements (ACAs) with Northern Triangle countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras).

  • The agreements required transit migrants crossing through those territories to apply for asylum locally before establishing eligibility at the U.S. border.

• September 2019: Termination of CICIG in Guatemala

  • Guatemalan President Jimmy Morales ended the mandate of the UN-backed International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG).

  • The White House offered no public opposition following diplomatic concessions secured under the bilateral migration agreements.

Academic Analysis: "The Trump Administration in Latin America: Continuity and Change"

• Publication Details and Authorship

  • Authors: Carlos Oliva Campos (University of Havana, Cuba) and Gary Prevost (College of Saint Benedict / Saint John's University, USA).

  • Journal: International Journal of Cuban Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1, Summer 2019, pp. 15–18.

• Core Theoretical Framework & Neoconservative Influence

  • The administration assumed office in 2017 lacking a cohesive regional framework, relying heavily on the neoconservative wing of the Republican Party.

  • Policy direction was steered by National Security Adviser John Bolton (author of Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad), who explicitly declared the revival of the Monroe Doctrine.

  • Neoconservatism rejects multipolarity, viewing post-Cold War dynamics as an arena for unilateral U.S. political, economic, and military dominance.

  • Unlike Obama-era frameworks treating China as a potential partner in global governance, neoconservative doctrine designates Beijing as an adversary and targets anti-American regimes (Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua) for active pressure.

• Economic Nationalism and Asymmetric Bilateralism

  • Policy was shaped alongside economic nationalism advocated by Steve Bannon and Peter Navarro.

  • The ideology distrusts multilateral institutions (UN, WTO, World Bank) and favors direct bilateral negotiations, enabling the U.S. to leverage economic asymmetries to extract concessions from smaller partner states.

  • Demonstrated during USMCA negotiations by pressuring Mexico independently before forcing Canada into acceptance under threats of exclusion.

• Alignment with the Regional Conservative Wave

  • U.S. policy coincided with a regional shift away from the early 21st-century "pink tide" toward conservative governments across Latin America:

  • Brazil: Election of Jair Bolsonaro in October 2018.

  • Argentina: Mauricio Macri's center-right coalition (2015–2019).

  • Chile: Presidency of Sebastián Piñera.

  • Colombia: Government of Iván Duque.

Regional Case Studies & Policy Implementations

• U.S. Border Security and Migration Dynamics

  • Shift in Migration Flows: Economic shifts post-2007 reduced traditional Mexican economic migration; violence from transnational gangs (MS-13, Barrio 18) in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras drove family units and unaccompanied minors seeking asylum.

  • Deterrence Framework: Ending "catch and release" procedures, 2018 zero-tolerance policies utilized systematic prosecution and family separation as explicit deterrence mechanisms.

  • Troop Deployments: In October 2018, a Central American migrant caravan was classified as a national security threat, prompting the deployment of over $5{,}000$ active-duty troops to the southern border ahead of midterm elections.

• Cuba Policy Reversals

  • In June 2017, President Trump announced the reversal of the 2014 diplomatic normalization.

  • Consular Reduction: Citing unexplained health occurrences ("Havana Syndrome") among embassy personnel, the State Department reduced staffing by over $60\%$, forcing Cubans seeking visas to travel to third countries like Guyana.

  • Helms-Burton Enforcement: Enacted Title III and Title IV of the 1996 Helms-Burton Act, permitting Cuban Americans to file lawsuits in U.S. courts against foreign companies operating on expropriated property.

  • Cuban Restricted List: The State Department banned transactions with over $200$ state-linked entities, specifically military-owned hotels and tour operators.

• **Venezuela and Nicaragua (