The collective securitization of terrorism in the EU

Introduction

1. Introduction: The EU's Role in Counter-Terrorism

• Objective: This chapter explores how terrorism became perceived as a significant security threat in Europe and how the European Union (EU) has responded with counter-terrorism measures.

• Key Focus: The chapter focuses on the development of EU counter-terrorism cooperation and securitization of terrorism within the EU framework.

2. Terrorism and EU Security Threat Perception

• Post-Brussels 2016 Attacks: After the March 2016 terrorist attacks in Brussels, discussions about the EU’s counter-terrorism strategies were intensified within European Parliament. Key figures such as Jean-Claude Juncker (European Commission President) and Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert (Dutch Minister of Defence) participated in these debates.

• Europol's Response: Shortly before these discussions, Europol launched the European Counter-Terrorism Centre (ECTC), aimed at becoming a hub of expertise and an operational center to enhance the EU's counter-terrorism efforts.

• Directive 2017/541: In 2017, the EU adopted Directive 2017/541 on combating terrorism, harmonizing definitions of terrorist offenses across member states, particularly focusing on foreign terrorist fighters and terrorist financing.

• Impact of Attacks: Each significant terrorist attack in Europe prompts discussions on the EU's failures and intensifies calls for stronger counter-terrorism cooperation among member states, showcasing the EU’s growing role in combating terrorism.

3. Historical Context: Early EU Responses to Terrorism

• Initial National Responses: In the early years, European countries like Spain, Italy, the UK, and West Germany dealt with their individual terrorist threats largely in isolation. Each country faced distinct terrorist groups:

  • Spain: ETA (Basque Fatherland and Liberty).

  • Italy: Red Brigades.

  • UK: Irish Republican Army (IRA).

  • Germany: Red Army Faction.

• Lack of Cooperation: During the 1970s and 1980s, cooperation between European states was minimal. For instance:

  • Spain and France had disputes regarding the safe haven that France offered to ETA militants in southern France, allowing them to train, plan operations, and regroup without facing legal consequences.

4. The Shift Toward EU-Wide Counter-Terrorism Cooperation

• Collective Securitization: The chapter explains the shift in counter-terrorism efforts in Europe through the framework of 'collective securitization'. The concept of collective securitization involves the social construction of a shared security threat, which prompts collective action at the EU level.

• Changing Perception: Over time, the perception of terrorism evolved from being seen as a national issue to a collective European threat, necessitating EU-wide policies and cooperation. This marks a shift from fragmented national responses to integrated EU action.

5. Five Stages of Collective Securitization

• Stage 1: Identification of the Threat: The EU and its member states began to recognize terrorism as a collective threat, rather than an issue solely affecting individual countries. This recognition was central to the move toward collective action.

• Stage 2: Politicization of Terrorism: Terrorism became a major political issue at the EU level, with discussions and actions aiming to address it. This politicization was crucial in prompting EU institutions to engage in counter-terrorism measures.

• Stage 3: Institutionalization of Security Policies: Over time, the EU developed formal frameworks and institutional responses to counter terrorism, such as the creation of the European Counter-Terrorism Centre (ECTC) by Europol and the adoption of specific directives.

• Stage 4: Development of EU Counter-Terrorism Instruments: The EU began to develop and harmonize counter-terrorism laws across member states, such as Directive 2017/541, which aligned the legal definition of terrorism and created consistent legal frameworks to combat terrorism throughout the EU.

• Stage 5: Global Role and Leadership: The EU's growing role in counter-terrorism cooperation not only strengthened internal security but also positioned the EU as an influential global actor in the fight against terrorism, contributing to global counter-terrorism initiatives.

6. The EU's Evolving Role in Global Counter-Terrorism

• International Influence: As the EU developed its internal counter-terrorism mechanisms, it also began to play a more significant role on the global stage by sharing best practices, offering support to third countries, and coordinating international counter-terrorism efforts.

• EU's Leadership in Policy Development: The EU's efforts to harmonize legal definitions of terrorism, combat terrorist financing, and respond to foreign terrorist fighters reflect its broader commitment to shaping global counter-terrorism policy.

7. Conclusion

• EU's Transformation: The shift from fragmented national responses to collective securitization of terrorism illustrates the EU's growing role in counter-terrorism efforts. From the early years of minimal cooperation to the formation of EU-wide counter-terrorism policies and institutions, the EU has increasingly unified its approach to tackling terrorism.

• Ongoing Challenges: Despite progress, the EU's counter-terrorism measures face challenges, such as balancing security with civil liberties, addressing emerging threats, and coordinating among diverse member states. These challenges highlight the complexity of maintaining a unified EU response to terrorism in an evolving global landscape.

Status Quo Security Discourse and Policies

1. Introduction: Early European Terrorism (1970s)

• Historical Context: Modern terrorism in Europe can largely be traced back to the 1970s, with various European countries experiencing terrorist attacks from both ethno-nationalist-separatist groups (e.g., ETA in Spain, IRA in the UK) and left-wing militant groups (e.g., Red Brigades in Italy, Red Army Faction in West Germany).

• Middle Eastern Influence: Middle Eastern groups like Black September also targeted Europe, aiming to influence the foreign policies of Western European countries.

• Despite these attacks, there was no collective securitization of terrorism within the European Economic Community (EEC) or the European Community (EC).

2. Absence of Collective Securitization in Early Years

• Lack of Shared Perception of Terrorism:

  • Different European states faced distinct threats from various terrorist organizations.

  • Countries like the UK were focused on the IRA, while Spain concentrated on ETA, and other countries faced left-wing groups like the Red Brigades.

  • This lack of commonality meant that terrorism was perceived as a domestic issue, and there was no perceived need for collective EU-level counter-terrorism cooperation.

• Sovereignty Concerns:

  • Each state had its own approach, often influenced by national sovereignty and differing political traditions.

  • For example, France was more open to negotiating with terrorists, while Britain maintained a firm stance against such negotiations.

  • These national differences hindered cooperation across Europe.

3. Initial Attempts at Cooperation (Post-1970s)

• Limited Cooperation Begins: The Munich Massacre of 1972 (during the Summer Olympics) marked a turning point, sparking some limited cooperation on counter-terrorism within Europe. This cooperation primarily occurred outside the EU framework since the EEC/EC lacked competence in security issues.

• Five Key Venues for Cooperation:

  1. Interpol:

     • European states began to coordinate counter-terrorism strategies through Interpol, an international policing organization.

     • Interpol developed a regional European infrastructure, including a European Regional Assembly, European Committee, and European Bureau to address European security concerns.

  2. Council of Europe:

     • The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (1978) aimed to facilitate extradition of terrorists by limiting the use of the 'political offense' exception (often used to avoid extradition).

     • The treaty's impact was limited by the fact that some key states (e.g., Belgium, France, Italy) delayed ratification.

  3. Trevi Group:

     • Established in the mid-1970s, the Trevi Group was an intergovernmental forum (independent of the EEC) that fostered cooperation on counter-terrorism.

     • Two operational working groups were created:

       • WG1 focused on information exchange and mutual assistance in countering terrorism.

       • WG2 emphasized training and scientific/technical information exchange.

     • Despite modest achievements, Trevi helped build trust among European police and intelligence agencies.

  4. Police Working Group on Terrorism (PWGOT):

     • A semi-permanent group that promoted closer working relationships among police officers across Europe, independent of Trevi (which was ministry-level).

  5. Schengen Cooperation:

     • While not explicitly focused on terrorism, the Schengen Area (which lifted internal border controls among EU countries) contributed to cross-border law enforcement and police cooperation in countering terrorism. The Schengen compensatory measures identified terrorism as a threat that required collaborative action.

4. Challenges to Progress in Counter-Terrorism Cooperation

• Main Explanations for Limited Cooperation:

  1. Intergovernmental Nature of Cooperation:

     • Cooperation remained intergovernmental rather than supranational, meaning member states retained sovereignty over counter-terrorism efforts.

     • This intergovernmental approach limited the effectiveness and scope of cooperation.

  2. Lack of Common Perception of Terrorism:

     • States did not share a unified understanding of terrorism or a collective approach to addressing it.

     • Without a shared definition or understanding of the threat, effective EU-wide counter-terrorism policies were difficult to develop.

  3. Haphazard Cooperation:

     • Cooperation occurred across multiple institutional venues (Interpol, Council of Europe, Trevi Group, Schengen) with varying levels of success.

     • The fragmented approach resulted in limited progress in forming a cohesive counter-terrorism strategy for the whole EU.

5. Key Takeaways

• Fragmented Responses: Despite several terrorist incidents across Europe, terrorism was largely treated as a domestic issue by each state, with little collective action at the EU level until the late 20th century.

• Gradual Cooperation: From the 1970s onward, European states began to develop bilateral and multilateral cooperation in counter-terrorism, though it was still fragmented and limited by national sovereignty concerns.

• Challenges to EU-Wide Cooperation:

  • Early cooperation efforts (such as those within Interpol, Trevi, and Schengen) laid the groundwork for later developments but were hindered by national differences, the lack of a common understanding of terrorism, and an overall lack of EU competence in security matters at the time.

• Ongoing Obstacles: Even in the 1970s and 1980s, terrorism was not collectively securitized, and efforts to address it were often ad hoc and uncoordinated, underscoring the challenges of European-wide counter-terrorism cooperation.

6. Conclusion

• The 1970s and 1980s marked a period of initial attempts at cooperation but limited progress in collective EU-level counter-terrorism strategies.

• The lack of a shared perception of terrorism, differences in national policies, and limited institutional frameworks significantly delayed the development of an integrated and cohesive EU counter-terrorism approach.

• Future development of counter-terrorism policy in Europe would eventually address these challenges, as the need for collective securitization became more apparent, especially in the face of increasingly sophisticated and cross-border terrorist threats.

Precipitating Event – The 9/11 Attacks and the Collective Securitization of Terrorism in the EU

1. The 9/11 Attacks as a Precipitating Event

• Date: 11 September 2001 (9/11)

• Key Event:

  • Four airplanes were hijacked by 19 terrorists linked to al-Qaeda.

  • Two planes were flown into the World Trade Center in New York City, causing both towers to collapse.

  • A third plane crashed into the Pentagon (U.S. Department of Defense headquarters) in Washington, D.C.

  • The fourth plane, United Airlines Flight 93, crashed in a field in Pennsylvania after passengers attempted to retake control.

• Casualties: Nearly 3,000 people died in these attacks, marking them as one of the deadliest terrorist attacks in history.

2. The Significance of 9/11 in the Context of Collective Securitization

• The 9/11 attacks were a game-changer in the global counter-terrorism landscape and disrupted the status quo in the European Union (EU) and worldwide.

• Unique Characteristics of the Attacks:

  • The scale of the attacks (thousands killed), the novelty of the modus operandi (hijacking planes and using them as weapons), and the global media coverage made 9/11 an event of unparalleled significance.

  • The live broadcast of the planes crashing into the towers, followed by the collapse of the buildings, was watched by millions worldwide.

• These attacks made clear that terrorism had evolved in nature and magnitude, confirming what experts had warned about for years.

3. Changing Nature of Terrorism: From Traditional to Catastrophic

• Prior to 9/11, terrorism in Europe was largely linked to ethno-nationalist (e.g., ETA in Spain, IRA in the UK) or left-wing groups (e.g., Red Brigades in Italy).

• 1999 (Laqueur’s Analysis): In his book "The New Terrorism", Laqueur argued that terrorism was shifting from political violence for strategic goals to fanaticism and catastrophic violence, signaling a move towards more destructive and indiscriminate terrorism.

• Emergence of ‘Super-Terrorism’: Experts predicted that the future of terrorism would involve more lethal, unpredictable, and catastrophic attacks, coining terms like:

  • Super-terrorism

  • Mega-terrorism

  • Hyper-terrorism

• The 9/11 attacks epitomized this new wave of terrorism: not only did it cause significant casualties, but the method of attack (hijacking planes and using them as missiles) was unprecedented in its scale and scope.

4. Islamist Terrorism as a New Threat

• Shift in Terrorism’s Focus: The 9/11 attacks marked a shift in the perception of terrorism, especially in Western countries:

  • Islamist terrorism was now viewed as a major and growing threat, eclipsing other forms of terrorism like left-wing or ethno-nationalist terrorism in terms of severity.

  • Islamist extremism was perceived as more dangerous due to:

    • Global reach (al-Qaeda and its affiliates operating internationally)

    • Fanatical commitment to a radical ideology

    • The potential for catastrophic violence, as demonstrated by the 9/11 attacks.

5. Impact on EU Counter-Terrorism Policy

• Collective Securitization: In the aftermath of 9/11, the EU began to view terrorism as a collective security threat, prompting a reorientation of its counter-terrorism policies.

• 9/11 as the Catalyst:

  • The scale and uniqueness of the 9/11 attacks were the precipitating event that triggered the collective securitization of terrorism within the EU.

  • The EU response to these events marked the beginning of a shift toward coordinated, EU-wide counter-terrorism efforts.

6. Subsequent Islamist Terrorist Attacks in Europe

• While the attacks in Madrid (2004), London (2005), Paris (2015), Brussels (2016), and Nice (2016) further highlighted the growing threat of Islamist terrorism in Europe, these events are part of the routinization phase in the collective securitization framework.

• Routinization refers to the stage where counter-terrorism policies become institutionalized and the threat of terrorism is continuously managed. These later attacks were not as much a catalyst as 9/11, but they reinforced the perception of Islamist terrorism as a persistent, ongoing threat that required a long-term, coordinated EU response.

7. Conclusion

• The 9/11 attacks acted as the defining precipitating event that disrupted the previous status quo regarding terrorism in Europe.

• The scale, novelty, and media impact of the 9/11 attacks confirmed the growing perception that the world was facing a new kind of terrorist threat—one that was more deadly, more global, and rooted in Islamist extremism.

• As a result, EU counter-terrorism policy underwent significant transformation, with a focus on collective securitization that would shape EU policies for the years that followed.

• 9/11 marked the beginning of a new era in European security discourse, one in which Islamist terrorism became the central concern for counter-terrorism efforts, leading to enhanced cooperation and the development of EU-wide counter-terrorism strategies.

8. Key Takeaways

• 9/11 was a pivotal moment in the collective securitization of terrorism in the EU.

• It demonstrated the shift in the nature of terrorism, moving from domestic, ideologically motivated groups to more global, fanatical, and catastrophic threats (i.e., Islamist terrorism).

• The EU response to 9/11 set the stage for long-term changes in its counter-terrorism policies.

• Later terrorist attacks in Europe, while important, are part of the routinization phase rather than the initial securitization process initiated by 9/11.

The Securitizing Moves and the Response of the Audience

1. Introduction to Securitization in the Aftermath of 9/11

• The 9/11 terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 were pivotal in triggering a significant shift in international security policies. These attacks were recognized as acts of war rather than traditional terrorist actions.

• The process of securitization refers to the framing of a particular issue as an existential threat that requires extraordinary measures. This was the case with terrorism after 9/11, as political leaders and institutions framed it as a global crisis demanding urgent, collective action.

2. President George W. Bush’s Securitizing Speech

• Key Speech: President Bush’s address after the 9/11 attacks was referred to as the "act of war" speech.

• Message: Bush framed the attacks as acts of war, not just terrorism, and called for a global war on terrorism:

  • He described the attacks as targeting not only American citizens but also all freedom-loving people.

  • Bush presented the conflict as a monumental struggle of good versus evil, with the implication that joining the fight against terrorism was a moral obligation: “Good will prevail”.

• Norm Emergence: Bush’s rhetoric established a new norm, urging the world to join the war on terrorism. His framing of the issue as one of “good vs. evil” created moral pressure on countries to align with the U.S. and combat terrorism in any form.

• Divisive Dichotomy: The statement “you are either for us or against us” reinforced this binary division between good and evil, leaving no room for neutrality. Countries not supporting the U.S. could be seen as supporting terrorism, thus facing international backlash.

• NATO’s Response: For the first time in its history, NATO invoked its mutual defense clause (Article 5), signaling the alliance’s collective support for U.S. military actions. However, NATO was largely sidelined during the actual military campaign in Afghanistan.

3. Global Response and Securitization

• The global response to 9/11 was rapid and overwhelming. Within a day, much of the world expressed solidarity with the United States. The 9/11 attacks were viewed not only as an attack on the U.S. but also as an attack on the "civilized world".

• UN’s Position: Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, called the attacks "a kind of terrorism one hardly dared imagine" and asserted that all nations must unite against terrorism. His statements framed the attacks as a universal threat that necessitated international action. He highlighted the need to combat not only the terrorists but also those who harbored or supported them.

• This rhetorical shift framed terrorism as a threat to global security, and it was morally incumbent upon all nations to join the “war on terror”.

4. European Reactions to the 9/11 Attacks

• European leaders quickly aligned with the U.S., extending condolences and supporting the framing of terrorism as an existential threat. They also engaged in their own securitization of terrorism, presenting it as an act of war:

  • German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder called the attacks “a declaration of war against the entire civilized world”, reinforcing the framing of terrorism as a global issue requiring urgent action.

  • EU External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten described 9/11 as “an act of war by madmen”, aligning with the rhetoric that terrorism was a universal threat to peace and security.

• Call for EU Cooperation: Schröder emphasized the need for EU cooperation in countering terrorism, arguing that only by pooling common policing and judicial resources could the EU effectively fight global terrorism.

• Schröder’s statement also indicated that the EU should aim to become a global player, suggesting that the EU’s international influence would need to be strengthened to address the growing global terrorism threat.

5. The Role of the "Civilized World" as a Referent Object

• In the discourse surrounding 9/11, the referent object of securitization was not just Europe or the EU, but a broader concept of “the civilized world”—an alliance of nations united against the threat of terrorism.

• This broad framing was used to emphasize that the terrorist attacks on 9/11 were not solely an American tragedy, but an assault on freedom and civilization itself. Thus, the referent object extended beyond national borders, incorporating the U.S. and Europe into a unified global struggle against terrorism.

6. Agenda-Setting and Norm-Forming in the Aftermath of 9/11

• The securitization of terrorism in Europe and beyond had significant agenda-setting effects, shaping the priorities of both national governments and international organizations.

• Jacques Chirac, the French President, during his meeting with President Bush, reaffirmed the urgency of the fight against terrorism, calling it an “absolute priority” in the world’s response to global threats.

• European Integration in Counter-Terrorism: European leaders, while expressing solidarity with the U.S., recognized the need for strengthened cooperation within the EU framework. This led to the adoption of counter-terrorism measures at the EU level, such as:

  • Joint counter-terrorism operations

  • Enhanced information-sharing mechanisms

  • Harmonized legal frameworks for the prosecution of terrorists

7. Moral and Political Pressure for Global Cooperation

• The framing of the 9/11 attacks as acts of war and “good versus evil” generated moral pressure on states and leaders worldwide to support the U.S. in its war on terrorism.

• The international community was largely united in condemning the attacks and expressing a moral obligation to fight terrorism, with few nations daring to oppose or take a neutral stance.

• This broad-based international consensus legitimized U.S. actions and set a precedent for global cooperation against terrorism, including military interventions (e.g., in Afghanistan) and broader international security policies.

8. Conclusion: The Securitization Process Post-9/11

• Securitization of terrorism post-9/11 involved political leaders framing terrorism as an existential threat, necessitating extraordinary measures and collective action.

• The responses from the U.S., European leaders, and the international community were characterized by a rapid moral consensus on the need to combat terrorism as a global priority.

• The emerging norm of joining the “war on terrorism” was underscored by Bush’s rhetoric of “good vs. evil” and the widespread perception that terrorism was a threat to the civilized world.

• In the EU, the securitization of terrorism led to greater cooperation and a reimagining of the EU’s role as a global actor in counter-terrorism, marking the beginning of a more integrated and proactive European counter-terrorism policy.

9. Key Takeaways

• The 9/11 attacks marked the global securitization of terrorism, with widespread adoption of the “war on terrorism” narrative.

• The securitizing speech by President Bush framed the attacks as acts of war, encouraging global support for the U.S. and placing moral pressure on countries to choose sides.

• European leaders, including Chancellor Schröder and Commissioner Patten, also securitized terrorism by presenting it as a global act of war and rallying behind the U.S. to combat the growing threat.

• This shift in rhetoric and action led to enhanced EU cooperation in counter-terrorism, emphasizing the “civilized world” as the core referent object, and set the stage for an integrated global response to terrorism.

Formulation and Execution of Policies

Contextual Background

• Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the European Union (EU) quickly moved from expressing solidarity with the United States to formulating a comprehensive counter-terrorism policy.

• The EU's response aimed at strengthening cooperation with the US and other international partners in combating terrorism on a global scale.

Initial Steps (Post-9/11 Actions)

• September 12, 2001: The EU Council requested a report on measures to combat international terrorism and increase EU capacity for joint action with the US.

• September 14, 2001: The EU issued a Joint Declaration emphasizing two key policy objectives:

  1. Strengthening intelligence efforts against terrorism.

  2. Accelerating the creation of a European judicial area, including measures like a European arrest warrant and mutual recognition of legal decisions.

The EU’s Coordinated Response

• September 20, 2001: The EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council met and agreed on a set of measures to combat terrorism. These measures were endorsed by an extraordinary European Council meeting the following day (September 21, 2001).

  • The EU launched the "Action Plan to Combat Terrorism", which called for:

    • Close cooperation between Member States.

    • A coordinated, interdisciplinary approach involving various EU policies.

    • A comprehensive strategy that included legislative, operational, repressive, preventive, internal, and external measures.

Key Challenges and Actions in the Early EU Counter-Terrorism Efforts

• Antonio Vitorino’s Statement (September 2001): The EU Commissioner highlighted the importance of legal harmonization to tackle terrorism, emphasizing the challenge posed by international groups exploiting legal loopholes across different countries.

• European Arrest Warrant (EAW):

  • A significant policy achievement was the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), which abolished extradition procedures among EU Member States.

  • Prior to the EAW, extradition was governed by a patchwork of intergovernmental legal agreements. The EAW created a transnational EU law that streamlined the process.

  • The EAW replaced the term "extradition" with "surrender" and applied to 32 specific categories of crimes.

  • It also abolished the principle of double criminality for serious offenses (the requirement that the crime must be illegal in both the requesting and the requested state).

• Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (June 2002):

  • A crucial legislative development for EU counter-terrorism was the Framework Decision of June 2002, which provided the EU's first common definition of terrorism.

  • The decision outlined:

    1. The context of an action.

    2. The aim of the action (e.g., intimidating populations, coercing governments, destabilizing structures).

    3. A list of specific acts that qualify as terrorism.

  • Member States were required to penalize terrorist offenses more severely than ordinary crimes.

  • It established legal responsibility for terrorist acts committed on national territory or against nationals, facilitating EU-US cooperation.

The EU’s Role in the ‘War on Terror’

• The European Commission emerged as a key player in shaping the EU’s response, acting as a strategic “first mover” in counter-terrorism.

  • It allied with the US, pressuring reluctant Member States to take swift action and adopt necessary legal frameworks.

  • Despite differences, the EU sought to harmonize laws across Member States and quickly move negotiations to a successful conclusion (e.g., the EAW and Framework Decision).

Challenges in Implementation

• Despite significant policy developments, implementation at the domestic level was slow and faced resistance in several EU Member States.

  • Post-9/11 Policy Adoption: In March 2004, the European Council adopted a Declaration on Combating Terrorism, calling for the effective implementation of counter-terrorism measures across the EU.

  • By December 2004, some Member States had not fully implemented:

    • The Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism.

    • Legislation on joint investigation teams.

    • In Italy, parliamentary ratification of the European Arrest Warrant was still pending.

  • Implementation Gap: These delays highlighted the gap between political agreement at the EU level and actual execution in individual Member States.

Summary of Key EU Policy Developments

1. The European Arrest Warrant (EAW):

   • Abolished extradition between EU Member States, allowing for faster surrender of suspects.

   • Established a new system of mutual recognition of judicial decisions.

2. The Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (2002):

   • Defined terrorism at the EU level and established common punishments for terrorism-related offenses.

   • Enabled EU-US cooperation, as both sides now recognized terrorism as a serious criminal offense.

3. EU-US Cooperation:

   • The EU aligned with the US in the "war on terror" but used a "carrot and stick" approach to secure agreements and foster collaboration.

4. Implementation Challenges:

   • Although ambitious policies were adopted, implementation at the national level lagged, with some Member States facing difficulties in aligning their legal frameworks with EU measures.

Concluding Thoughts

• The EU's response to the 9/11 attacks marked a transformational shift in how it approached security and counter-terrorism.

• Key policies like the EAW and Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism represented significant legal integration and coordination across the EU.

• However, the implementation gap and reluctance from some Member States showed the challenges of translating EU-wide policies into national actions.

the Routinization of EU Counter-Terrorism Cooperation and the Emergence of a New Status Quo

Introduction to Routinization in EU Counter-Terrorism

After the immediate, intense phase of EU counter-terrorism policy development in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, a period of relative inertia followed. This cyclical pattern—where new terrorist attacks spark a surge in policy initiatives, followed by a period of deceleration—has been consistent over time. In the aftermath of each major attack, the EU revisits its counter-terrorism policies, sheds light on unresolved issues, and introduces new measures. However, the implementation of these measures often lags behind real-time events, creating a gap between policy adoption and on-the-ground action. Despite this, EU counter-terrorism efforts have progressively strengthened over the years, largely through institutional innovations and the growing role of key EU bodies.

Post-Madrid Terrorist Attacks: March 2004

1. Immediate Response to Madrid Attacks:

   • The 11 March 2004 Madrid bombings, which killed almost 200 people, triggered an immediate response from the EU.

   • The European Council issued a Solidarity Declaration on 29 March 2004, emphasizing measures to:

     • Reduce terrorist access to financial and economic resources.

     • Address the root causes of terrorism, such as social and political factors.

   • International Cooperation:

     • Counter-terrorism clauses were included in agreements with third countries, laying the groundwork for external diplomatic and operational engagement.

     • EU–US collaborations, such as the Container Security Initiative (CSI) (2004), were expanded to protect global transport routes from terrorism.

2. Increased Role of the European Commission:

   • The Commission’s involvement in counter-terrorism measures grew, especially after the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), which gave the Commission greater powers to negotiate agreements with third countries.

   • Significant agreements in the post-Lisbon era include PNR agreements with the USA (2012), Australia (2012), and Canada (2014), aimed at tracking terrorist movements through air travel data.

EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (CTC)

1. Creation and Role of the CTC:

   • In response to the Madrid attacks, the EU established the position of EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (CTC) in 2004, with Gijs de Vries as the first appointee.

   • The role of the CTC was to:

     • Coordinate the implementation of the EU Counter-Terrorism Action Plan.

     • Report on the progress of EU counter-terrorism initiatives.

     • Promote collaboration among EU institutions and member states.

2. Challenges with the CTC:

   • The position of the CTC was fraught with challenges due to its vague mandate, lack of formal powers, and limited resources.

   • Gilles de Kerchove took over as CTC in 2007, during a period of uncertainty. Despite its limitations, de Kerchove effectively promoted EU–US counter-terrorism cooperation and encouraged EU member states to adhere to agreed-upon measures.

   • However, the CTC’s formal lack of authority meant it could not directly enforce compliance among member states.

3. Implementation and Oversight:

   • The CTC also published regular reports evaluating the progress of counter-terrorism policies, though these reports often highlighted deficiencies in implementation and cooperation.

   • Coordination with EU bodies:

     • The CTC encouraged closer ties between the European Commission, the Council (where ministers meet), and other EU agencies, though formal powers to coordinate these bodies were limited.

Europol and the ECTC: Strengthening EU Counter-Terrorism Efforts

1. Europol’s Evolving Role:

   • Europol’s role in counter-terrorism significantly strengthened post-9/11, focusing on Islamist terrorism and other related threats.

   • Key functions of Europol’s counter-terrorism efforts include:

     • Strategic analysis of terrorism-related information.

     • Operational support to member states in investigations.

     • Threat and risk assessments, informing policy decisions.

     • Collaboration in areas such as arms trafficking, nuclear material smuggling, and preventing weapons of mass destruction.

2. European Counter-Terrorism Centre (ECTC):

   • In January 2016, the EU established the European Counter-Terrorism Centre (ECTC) within Europol to enhance its operational capabilities.

   • The ECTC focuses on:

     • Combating foreign fighters: Tracking the movement of individuals linked to terrorist groups.

     • Countering terrorist financing: Sharing intelligence on terrorist financing across EU member states.

     • Preventing online extremism: Combatting the spread of terrorist propaganda online through the EU Internet Referral Unit.

     • Supporting international cooperation: Engaging with global partners to strengthen global counter-terrorism measures.

3. Institutionalization of Counter-Terrorism:

   • Europol and the ECTC have become central to EU counter-terrorism efforts, reinforcing the institutionalization and routinization of EU counter-terrorism practices.

   • The creation of these bodies illustrates the EU’s commitment to maintaining a structured, ongoing approach to counter-terrorism.

Key Features of EU Counter-Terrorism Policy

1. International and Domestic Dimensions:

   • EU counter-terrorism policy emphasizes both internal and external measures, recognizing the importance of international cooperation while strengthening domestic measures within the EU.

   • This includes data-sharing agreements and joint operations with third countries (e.g., the US, Canada, Australia).

2. Long-Term Strategy:

   • While the EU’s response to terrorism is often reactive, it has increasingly focused on long-term strategies to address the root causes of terrorism, such as socio-economic factors and extremist ideologies.

   • Over time, the EU has developed a more integrated, institutionalized approach to counter-terrorism, aligning policies across member states and engaging in wider international diplomacy.

3. Slow but Steady Institutionalization:

   • The process of routinization has been gradual, with EU institutions (like Europol, the European Commission, and the CTC) taking increasingly significant roles in shaping the EU’s counter-terrorism response.

   • Institutional frameworks have provided continuity and coordination, facilitating more effective implementation of policies at both the national and EU levels.

Conclusion

The routinization of EU counter-terrorism cooperation reflects a growing institutionalized and coordinated approach to combating terrorism. Despite challenges such as slow implementation and competing national interests, the EU’s counter-terrorism efforts have become more structured and comprehensive over time. The EU CTC, Europol, and the ECTC exemplify the increasingly important roles that EU institutions play in shaping and executing counter-terrorism strategies across Europe. As terrorist threats evolve, these institutional structures will likely continue to adapt, further solidifying the EU’s role in global counter-terrorism governance.

Key Points of the Chapter's Conclusion

1. Growth in EU Counter-Terrorism Cooperation:

   • The chapter explored the significant growth in EU cooperation on counter-terrorism.

   • This growth is marked by the development of important legislative instruments that have had a major impact on EU member states' policies and practices.

2. The Role of 9/11:

   • 9/11 was a precipitating event that catalyzed EU cooperation on counter-terrorism.

   • After 9/11, EU leaders recognized the need to create a unified counter-terrorism policy.

   • This led to an increase in counter-terrorism cooperation with the USA and the adoption of new legislative measures.

3. Collective Securitization:

   • The concept of ‘collective securitization’ (discussed in Chapter 1) played a key role.

   • Al-Qaeda, as a collective terrorist threat, replaced the previous idea that European countries each faced distinct threats (e.g., ethnonationalist-separatist terrorism).

   • The 9/11 attacks shifted the focus to the idea that all EU member states faced a common terrorism threat, which united their efforts against terrorism.

4. Impact on National Counter-Terrorism Policies:

   • Various EU counter-terrorism legislative instruments defined terrorist acts and had a significant impact on national policies of EU member states.

   • Collective security became a unifying principle, enabling member states to work together, even though they had previously faced different, region-specific threats.

5. Institutionalization of EU Counter-Terrorism Cooperation:

   • The establishment of the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (CTC) and the creation of the European Counter-Terrorism Centre (ECTC) within Europol have been key steps in institutionalizing EU counter-terrorism cooperation.

   • This process has routinized counter-terrorism practices, making cooperation more structured and formalized.

6. Limitations of the EU’s Role:

   • Despite these advancements, the chapter acknowledges some limitations in the analysis:

     • National vs. EU roles: While the EU has pushed for stronger cooperation and adopted common measures, counter-terrorism remains primarily a national responsibility, especially in areas like policing and intelligence.

     • The EU’s role is mostly to add value to the national efforts rather than replace or control them.

7. Ongoing National Sovereignty:

   • Counter-terrorism is still largely the preserve of individual member states.

   • The EU’s involvement tends to complement national measures, particularly in areas where transnational cooperation is needed (e.g., intelligence sharing, international coordination).

8. Consolidation of EU’s Role in Counter-Terrorism:

   • More than 20 years after 9/11, the EU’s role in combating terrorism is well-established.

   • While member states maintain primary control over national counter-terrorism efforts, the idea that the EU plays a significant role alongside its member states is no longer contested.

Summary of Key Insights:

• 9/11 was a transformative event that unified EU counter-terrorism efforts.

• The concept of collective securitization helped align member states to tackle a common terrorist threat.

• The EU has increasingly institutionalized counter-terrorism cooperation, exemplified by the CTC and ECTC within Europol.

• While the EU has played a critical role in legislative coordination and international cooperation, the national sovereignty of member states over counter-terrorism remains intact.

• EU’s contribution is complementary, aiming to enhance and coordinate national measures rather than replace them.

Conclusion:

The EU’s role in counter-terrorism has evolved into a more coordinated, institutionalized effort. However, counter-terrorism largely remains under the purview of individual EU member states, with the EU playing a supportive and facilitative role in enhancing national efforts. Despite the complexity of EU–member state relationships, the idea of EU cooperation in counter-terrorism is firmly established.