Past Paper Questions

Although enforced by convention, individual ministerial responsibility has been somewhat effective historically, holding ministers to account for their behaviour

Sir Thomas Dugdale, resigned over the Crichel Down affair (despite it arguably being the responsibility of civil servants)

Amber Rudd resigned over misleading parliament

New Labour also started a convention of publishing a ministerial code, improving the extent of ministerial responsibility

BUT

The enforcement of IMR is limited and inconsistent, significantly undermining it as a convention

Michael Howard didn’t resign after Pankhurst jail breakouts, but instead sacked the general director of prison services

More significantly, IMR has limited effects long-term e.g. Priti Patel resigned in 2017 but became home secretary in 2019, and refused to resign over accusations of bullying civil servants

IMR is ultimately undermined as it isn’t consistently applied and relies excessively on the honour of ministers. It also lacks any actual long-term consequences, undermining its efficacy and thus it no longer adequately accounts for behaviour

‘Big beasts’ or people who simply refuse to resign can’t be held to the standard of individual ministerial responsibility

although Matt Hancock resigned for breaking his own covid laws in 2021, Sunak, Johnson nor 124 of the others involved in partygate immediately resigned

Norman Lamont didn’t resign after black Wednesday

BUT

when influential figures/prime ministers don’t resign it can have significant impacts on re-election chances

Major’s government were severely damaged by their failed economic incompetence and the actions of Lamont

Johnson eventually faced collapse of his government after Covid and partygate

Nevertheless, this is a pretty big contingency to rely on, still shows that IMR itself as a convention doesn’t work

CMR is the principle that governments should be united on decisions publicly, and that if a government loses a vote of no confidence everyone resigns

effective at ensuring public unity e.g. Sunak and Javid were divided over lateral flow tests but publicly agreed about the policy when it was decided

This is important because it makes the government a cohesive unity and allows for responsibility towards the public (if the government makes a mistake, people can’t just say it wasn’t their fault)

when CMR is ignored it can actually demonstrate the integrity of ministers, perhaps their valuing of the public/their electors as well e.g. Robin Cook resigning over Iraq war, Ian Duncan Smith resigning over cuts to disability tax

BUT

even if there is an appearance of CMR, this is largely undermined behind closed doors

ministers can brief media against each other e.g. Sunak and Johnson, Brown and Blair

especially an issue when the minister is a ‘big beast’ e.g. Johnson who wrote against May, briefed against her, caused problems when he resigned

even if CMR looks like its working it is often largely undermined and the public are aware of its limits, particularly a recent thing with increasing divides in parties, media influence and polarisation

20-25 people, acts as an extension, limits their power

Thatcher’s resignation prompted by her cabinet’s support for Heseltine and speech of Geoffrey Howe

Harold Wilson faced similar cabinet rebellions after limits on trade unions

Cabinet can have a strong influence on PM and even prompt them to resign (as seen with Thatcher and Blair)

Furthermore, evident in recent years

Johnson resigned as PM after series of high profile resignations

BUT

power of cabinet can be hugely limited, restricting their influence on the PM

this has arguable been a feature of more recent cabinets

pre-1960s, used to meet twice a week, now only one hour per week

can also be replaced e.g. increased use of sofa cabinet and spatial leadership

decreased involvement in PM action and decisions

reduced role has made PM more powerful but this depends on individual PMs and more significant factors such as their strength in parliament

Arguably much more consistent than the PM as a less directly appointed body

2021-2022 faced no defeats in Commons but 133 in Lords

can enforce successful amendments on prime minister’s policies e.g. EVEL, sunday trading, free school meals

BUT

as an unelected body their power is limited (democratically justified but in turn strengthens PM)

furthermore these limits have increased over time

amendments cannot be forced e.g. article 50 defeated twice, still pushed through

similar in regards to Rwanda policy → highlights limit of Lords and also received no other party’s support in Commons

essential reforms such as HoL acts and Salisbury convention: ensure democracy and representation of people but also mean PM’s power goes more unrestrained

Furthermore, certain PMs have influenced make-up of Lords, such as Cameron appointing 16 political allies and appointment of Crudas by Johnson

HoL is not very effective, especially recently, PM has too much power

May had 13 MPs rebel over no deal Brexit plans

Coalition vs Blair - 35% vs 28%

In the UK, the PM relies entirely on party support and if they lose this they lose all power (demonstrated in vote of no confidence resignations)

BUT

backbench rebellions are most common in weaker governments with smaller majorities (e.g. Major and May)

it is not recent PMs who have become too powerful but PMs with huge majorities

Exacerbated through FPTP and winner’s bonus

Tony Blair calling an early election to gain a 166-person majority - also one of the most notably powerful PMs in history

minority government like May faced far more rebellions, same applied to coalition (e.g. Cameron forced to make Nick Clegg deputy PM, suspension of collective ministerial responsibility)

how powerful a PM is depends on their majority