Four primary common-law argument types highlighted:
Arguments from precedent.
Arguments from public policy.
Arguments from rights / morality.
Arguments from administrability (a.k.a. institutional competence).
Two additional, frequently encountered patterns briefly noted: slippery-slope arguments (two sub-types).
Speaker stresses that categories routinely overlap; effective advocacy often weaves several strands together.
Core idea: look to earlier, factually similar cases to justify the same (or distinguish a different) outcome.
When a relevant precedent exists, lawyers frame the current dispute as “already decided.”
Absence of precedent triggers the other three categories more heavily.
Example implicitly referenced: if California already recognized stalking as a tort, plaintiff’s lawyer would rely on those cases—no need for moral or policy appeals.
Purpose: persuade the court by forecasting societal consequences of adopting or rejecting a rule.
Assess costs/benefits, deterrence, efficiency, fairness, administrative burden.
Speaker previously demonstrated with other examples (not repeated here) but notes they are common in philosophy, politics, everyday debate, and legal settings alike.
Used when neither precedent nor clear policy guidance exists.
Invoke widely shared moral intuitions or basic human rights to urge recognition of a new legal duty.
Hypothetical stalking scenario:
FACT PATTERN: Jurisdiction has no statute or case law treating stalking as tortious.
LAWYER’S MOVE: Argue victims possess a moral right “to be left alone” and free from creepy conduct.
Court could elevate this moral right into a legally cognizable duty despite lack of precedent.
Important caveat: not every moral wrong becomes a legal wrong; success is uncertain.
Technique in practice:
Combine moral appeal with analogies to existing torts (e.g., invasion of privacy, assault).
Demonstrates to judge that requested extension sits comfortably within established doctrinal neighborhood, easing concerns about judicial overreach.
Focus: “Who is the appropriate decision-maker?” rather than “What is the best rule?”
Courts may refuse to create or extend doctrines if legislatures/agencies are better suited.
Rationale considerations:
Democratic legitimacy & representativeness.
Fact-finding capacity, prospective rule-making ability.
Systemic impact on social practices.
Drunk-driver host liability example:
VICTIM sues dinner-party host who supplied alcohol to drunk driver.
DEFENSE argument:
Imposing host liability would radically transform ordinary social gatherings (dinner, Super Bowl parties).
Deciding whether society should bear that transformation is a legislative—not judicial—task.
Court should thus abstain from recognizing such liability.
Relationship to other categories:
Often intertwined with policy points (costs, societal disruption) but distinguished by its procedural focus on locus of authority.
General theme: today’s ruling will precipitate a chain of future outcomes or decisions—undesirable or logically compelled.
Two sub-types distinguished:
Predicts factual, real-world reactions.
Colorado skydiving-plane-crash case:
Plaintiff signed a liability waiver; question: should court enforce it?
ANTI-WAIVER argument: if court enforces here, other industries (ski resorts, bus companies, surgeons) will copy the waiver strategy.
End state: erosion or near-elimination of tort liability across society.
Emphasizes judicial rationality/consistency rather than external consequences.
Same waiver scenario reframed:
If court upholds skydiving waiver, it must later confront medical-malpractice waivers.
Judge risks either accepting them (perhaps unpalatable) or articulating a principled distinction.
If no coherent distinction exists, initial decision undermines integrity of legal reasoning.
Skilled litigators rarely rely on a single type; they layer:
Moral rhetoric to evoke sympathy and justice.
Precedential analogies to show doctrinal continuity.
Policy data to illustrate real-world stakes.
Administrability caution to direct certain questions to legislatures when beneficial.
Law-school pedagogy: teaches both the substantive outcome and the meta-question “WHO DECIDES?”—vital to mastering common-law reasoning.
Memorize four core categories and recognize hallmark signals in case opinions/exam hypotheticals.
Practice mapping any argument to at least one category; identify overlaps.
For each category, know:
Typical structure.
Common strengths/criticisms.
Canonical examples (stalking, host liability, waiver cases).
During analysis:
Ask: Is there precedent? If yes, lead with it.
If no precedent, consider rights and policy.
Always evaluate institutional competence—should court or legislature act?
Be ready to rebut or deploy slippery-slope claims (consequence vs. principle).
Remember: not every moral wrong = legal wrong; courts operate within institutional limits.