McDonald, Purse Strings copy

Introduction

The collaboration of the Midwest Political Science Association and Wiley with JSTOR aims to provide a reliable digital archive for journals like the American Journal of Political Science. The article "The Purse Strings of Peace" by Patrick J. McDonald examines how domestic economic structures influence the likelihood of military conflict between states, diverging from traditional views on commercial peace that focus primarily on international trade.

Main Argument

• This study argues that substantial public property within a state's economy fosters fiscal autonomy for governments and may lead to more aggressive foreign policies by enabling states to allocate resources without the constraints typically imposed by domestic interests.

• The presence of state-owned enterprises allows bureaucratic officials to influence economic decisions based on political expediency rather than profit.

• Statistical analyses confirm that states with significant public assets are more likely to engage in military conflict, while more privatized economies correlate with peaceful foreign relations.

Background and Theoretical Framework

• The classical liberal theory posits that globalization and economic interdependence create incentives for political disputes to be resolved peacefully.

• Historical perspectives from thinkers like Kant and Schumpeter support the idea that capitalism encourages peace by altering domestic power balances, favoring business interests that oppose costly military engagements.

• The article draws from selectorate theory, which examines how the allocation of public and private goods influences government decision-making.

Structure of the Article

1. Review of Commercial Peace Literature

   • Analysis of how domestic institutions moderate the influences of international commerce on foreign policy.

   • Critique of traditional commercial peace literature for neglecting domestic dynamics.

2. Public Finance and State-Society Relations

   • Examines how fiscal structures affect state behavior and policy decisions, linking wealth generation to state authority.

   • Suggests a model where high public property levels weaken societal constraints on state actions, creating greater policy discretion.

3. Statistical Results

   • Presents empirical evidence showing the relationship between public asset levels and military conflict propensity.

   • Reiterates the idea that larger public property holdings lead to more aggressive international postures.

Key Findings

• Public Property's Role: High levels of public ownership create fiscal autonomy, allowing states to engage in military actions without immediate economic repercussions.

• Selectorate Model Application: Politicians who leverage a significant pool of public goods are less accountable to the electorate and are thus incentivized to pursue militaristic agendas.

• Implications for Economic Structure: The analysis contradicts the assumption that capitalism uniformly promotes peace; rather, it suggests that the degree of public versus private ownership critically shapes state behavior.

Conclusion

• The findings indicate that substantial state control over economic assets correlates with increased military conflict likelihood, challenging assumptions about capitalism’s inherently pacifying effects. Governments holding significant public property do not face the same checks and balances as those with privatized economies, leading to a higher propensity for conflict. Thus, fostering greater private property and reducing state-held assets may contribute to international peace.