Aggregate Demand: The total demand for goods and services within an economy at a given overall price level and in a given time period. Aggregate Supply: The total supply of goods and services that firms in an economy plan to sell at a given overall price level in a given time period.
Persistent external debtor (USA) vs. surplus holders (Germany, China) → sustainability question; amplified by crises/trade wars (e.g., U.S.–China tariffs 2018-19 & new 2025 executive order imposing ≥10 % tariffs; EU 20 %, CN 34 %, IN 26 %, BD 37 %)
Current-account data:
U.S. deficit ↑ (1996-2006 surge)
German surplus since early-2000s
Cumulated 1980-2017 balances mapped (Lane & Milesi-Ferretti IMF WP 17/115)
Key guiding questions: Why deficits/surpluses? Sustainability amid crises? Policy coordination?
Goods Markets – choice between domestic vs. foreign goods, trade barriers (tariffs/NTBs) ↓ via globalisation.
Financial Markets – portfolio choice across borders; capital controls ↓ → daily FX turnover ≈ 7.5\text{ trillion US$} (BIS 2022) ≈ 30× world GDP/day.
Factor Markets – FDI & labour mobility; dominated by MNEs; contentious re jobs/competitiveness.
German trade: exports & imports (levels + ratios), persistent surplus.
Export-ratio heterogeneity 2017 (World Bank): US 12.3 %, JP 16.1 %, DE 47.2 %, NL 86.4 %, CH 65 % …
Classroom teaser: “Can exports exceed GDP?” (yes, if high re-exports, small open economies, NL>100 %).
Quantity (direct) quote: E = \text{foreign currency per 1 domestic} – e.g. €1 = 1.09 US$ (Mar 19 2025).
Appreciation (€) ⇒ E\uparrow; depreciation ⇒ E\downarrow.
Price (indirect) quote: reciprocal.
Export price in domestic P, import price foreign P^*.
\epsilon = E \times \frac{P}{P^*} → relative price of domestic goods.
Real appreciation: \epsilon\uparrow (domestic dearer).
Absolute PPP (law of one price): \epsilon =1. Rare; impeded by trade costs & sticky prices.
Relative PPP: \frac{dE}{E}=\pi^* - \pi.
Big-Mac Index: compute E_{PPP}=\frac{P^*}{P} & gauge under/over-valuation.
Current Account (CA) = Trade balance + Net income.
US 2018: Ex 2 500, Im 3 122 → TB −622; Net income 133 → CA −489 bn US$.
Financial Account (FA) records net asset flows.
US 2018: FA +519; statistical disc. 30 bn US$ (“trade with Mars”).
Identity (ignoring errors): \text{CA}+\text{FA}=0.
GDP vs. GNP: \text{GNP}=\text{GDP}+NI (net foreign income).
Derivation (EU investor):
(1+it)=(1+it^)\,\frac{Et}{E{t+1}^e}
Approx.: it \approx it^ - \frac{E{t+1}^e - Et}{E_t} .
Implication: higher expected domestic appreciation (numerator ↓) allows lower i_t.
Z=C+I+G-\frac{IM}{\epsilon}+X
Imports IM=IM(Y,\epsilon):\;\partial IM/\partial Y>0,\;\partial IM/\partial \epsilon>0
Exports X=X(Y^,\epsilon):\;\partial X/\partial Y^>0,\;\partial X/\partial \epsilon<0
Y=C(Y-T)+I(Y,r)+G-\frac{IM(Y,\epsilon)}{\epsilon}+X(Y^*,\epsilon)
Trade balance point Y_{TB} where NX=0.
Fiscal expansion (\Delta G>0) → ZZ ↑, Y ↑, NX↓ (twin-deficit).
Foreign demand ↑ or real depreciation (Marshall-Lerner condition) → ZZ ↑, Y ↑, NX↑.
Policy mix to cut deficit without output loss: (depreciation + fiscal contraction).
CA = S + (T-G) - I; surplus = net lender, deficit = net borrower.
Goods-market IS (simplified, P/P^=1,\;r=i): Y=C(Y-T)+I(Y,i)+G+NX\Big(Y,Y^,E\Big).
UIP gives E=\frac{1+i}{1+i^*}E^e; substitute into IS.
LM: i=i_0 (policy rate).
Monetary tightening i\uparrow → E\uparrow (appreciation) ⇒ I↓, NX↓ → Y↓.
Fiscal expansion shifts IS → Y↑; if CB holds i fixed, E unchanged; if CB hikes i (inflation fears) partial crowd-out via appreciation.
UIP ⇒ i=i^* (monetary policy lost).
Fiscal policy still effective, but trade-off w/ external balance; CB cannot use i.
Monetary trilemma: can choose 2 of 3 – (Exchange-rate stability, Capital mobility, Independent MP).
Bretton Woods (1944-73): dollar-gold peg 35\,/oz; capital-controls; collapse via imbalances.
Crawling pegs, central-parity bands (EMS → Euro).
Crisis mechanics: expectation of devaluation ⇒ E{t+1}^et ⇒ i\uparrow.
CB options: communicate, intervene (reserve loss), or hike i (recession risk).
Optimal currency area (Mundell): symmetric shocks, price/wage flexibility, factor mobility.
Hard pegs / currency boards (e.g., Argentina 1991-2001) – credibility vs. policy strait-jacket; crisis 2001 shows dangers.
Post-1950 rich-country growth ≈ 2 – 3 % p.a.; convergence: poorer OECD members grew faster (Figure 10-2).
Need PPP adjustment for cross-country welfare measurement (Penn World Tables).
Debates on GDP ↔ happiness (Easterlin paradox revisions).
Production per worker y=f(k) with k=K/N; CRS, diminishing returns.
Capital accumulation:
\Delta k = s f(k) - \delta k.
Steady state k^: s f(k^) = \delta k^*; growth of $y$ = 0.
Higher s ⇒ higher k^,y^ but not higher long-run growth.
Golden Rule: maximise $c=f(k)-\delta k$ ⇒ f'(kG)=\delta ⇒ saving sG.
Effective labour A N grows at gA+gN.
Redefine variables per effective worker \tilde{k}=K/(AN), \tilde{y}=Y/(AN).
Accumulation: \Delta \tilde{k} = s f(\tilde{k}) - (\delta+gA+gN)\tilde{k}.
Steady state: \tilde{k}^* constant → balanced-growth: gY = gK = gA + gN.
Permanent growth driven solely by g_A (tech progress).
↑ saving rate ⇒ transitory higher growth, higher long-run level of \tilde{y}.
R&D intensity (2-3 % GDP in rich economies).
Fertility of research (basic ↔ applied, human capital, FDI, global diffusion).
Appropriability: patent laws, IP protection vs. open knowledge; institutions matter (high correlation between property-rights index & GDP/capita).
For 1985-2018, TFP contributes bulk of rich-country per-hour growth (≈ 1-1.4 pp of 1.5-2 %).
China 1996-2008: high TFP (5.6 %) + capital deepening (8.6 %) → super-growth; slowdown post-2008 as TFP ↓ to 2.3 %.
Historical fears (Keynes 1930 “technological unemployment”, Leontief 1952).
Robotisation study (Acemoglu & Restrepo 2020): +1 robot ⇒ −6 jobs, wage pressure in exposed U.S. commuting zones.
Mixed evidence: productivity effect vs. displacement; net outcome ambiguous across periods.
Skill-biased tech change → rising college wage premium; routine-task offshoring amplifies.
Top-1 % income share ↑ markedly in US since 1980.
Cross-OECD variation: policy-driven redistribution (market vs. disposable Gini).
Two effects of Northern automation on Southern exporters (Baur et al. 2023):
Replacement (same industry) negative.
Productivity spillover (other industries) positive.
Policy implication: position in GVCs matters.
Trade-offs under openness: fiscal policy spill-overs → need for coordination (e.g., G20 2009 stimulus).
Exchange-rate regime choice: flexible favoured unless OCA criteria met or credibility crisis (hyper-inflation) warrants hard peg.
Growth vs. well-being: GDP gains may coexist with distributional tensions; policy must balance innovation incentives with social safety nets.
Long-run sustainability: debt-financed external deficits, environmental constraints, climate-policy-induced structural change remain central.
Real exchange rate: \epsilon = E \frac{P}{P^*}
Relative PPP: \frac{\dot{E}}{E}=\pi^*-\pi
Current-account identity: CA = S + (T-G) - I
UIP exact: (1+i)=(1+i^)\frac{E}{E^e{+1}}; approx.: i \approx i^ - \frac{E^e{+1}-E}{E}
Open-economy IS: Y=C(Y-T)+I(Y,i)+G+NX\big(Y,Y^*,E\big)
Capital dynamics (no tech): \Delta k = s f(k) - \delta k
Golden Rule: f'(k_G)=\delta
Capital dynamics (with tech): \Delta \tilde{k} = s f(\tilde{k}) - (\delta+gA+gN)\tilde{k}
End of consolidated study notes – replace original 284-slide deck for exam prep.