Ch 4 - Extensions of Supply and Demand

Introduction

  • U.S. government sometimes imposes price ceilings on pharmaceutical drugs to curb price inflation.

    • Leads to shortages of the controlled drug (Medication A).

    • Patients shift to substitutes (Medication B).

    • Demand for substitutes rises, pushing their equilibrium price upward (see later discussion of Figure 4-6).

  • Chapter 4 extends basic demand–supply analysis to show how market interventions (price ceilings, floors, quotas) disturb equilibrium and trigger secondary effects.


4.1 The Price System and Markets

  • Price system / market system

    • Network of continuously changing relative prices that reflect current information about scarcity & abundance.

    • Prices act as signals and incentives for producers and consumers.

  • Voluntary exchange

    • Trade that both parties enter because they expect to be subjectively better off.

  • Transaction costs

    • All costs of arranging and carrying out exchange.

    • Information search (price, quality, service record, durability).

    • Drafting, monitoring, enforcing contracts.

  • AI/Big-data evidence on transaction costs & price stickiness

    • Alberto Cavallo (MIT) analyzed >60 million prices.

    • Typical U.S. firm changes list prices roughly every 9 months.

    • Interpretation: high transaction costs → sticky prices despite underlying supply–demand shifts.

  • Middlemen / intermediaries / brokers

    • Reduce transaction costs by matching buyers and sellers, supplying information, smoothing logistics.

  • Platform firms

    • Digital networks that link individuals or link buyers to sellers (e.g., Airbnb, eBay).

    • Act as large-scale, technologically enabled middlemen.


4.2 Changes in Demand and Supply

  • A shift in either curve → disequilibrium → price & quantity adjust until a new equilibrium is reached.

  • Single-curve shifts (determinant results)

    • Demand ↑ → P^ ↑ and Q^ ↑.

    • Demand ↓ → P^ ↓ and Q^ ↓.

    • Supply ↑ → P^ ↓ and Q^ ↑.

    • Supply ↓ → P^ ↑ and Q^ ↓.

  • Simultaneous shifts (indeterminate outcomes without size info)

    • Both D & S ↑: Q^ ↑ unambiguously; P^ ambiguous.

    • Both D & S ↓: Q^ ↓ unambiguously; P^ ambiguous.

    • S ↓ & D ↑: P^ ↑ unambiguously; Q^ ambiguous.

    • S ↑ & D ↓: P^ ↓ unambiguously; Q^ ambiguous.

  • Price flexibility varies across markets.

    • Adjustment may appear via hidden fees, quality changes, or slow posted-price movement.

  • Adjustment speed influenced by:

    • Market structure, expectations, shocks (energy, strikes, weather).

    • Markets can overshoot before settling at equilibrium.

  • Illustrative example: Vinyl records

    • Costly new pressing machines → S ↓.

    • Consumer nostalgia → D ↑.

    • Result: P{vinyl} ↑ (certain) & Q{vinyl} ↑ (net increase documented empirically).


4.3 The Rationing Function of Prices

  • Rationing function: market prices synchronise decisions of buyers & sellers so that quantity supplied = quantity demanded.

  • Non-price rationing methods (used when prices can’t freely adjust):

    1. Queues (waiting in line).

    2. Random assignment or coupons.

    3. Use of power, status, or political influence.

    4. Physical force.

  • International case – eWater in Gambia and Tanzania

    • Free community pumps broke down (≈ 33 % inoperable).

    • eWater installed metered pumps charging a fee; queues disappeared, spillage fell.

    • Households preferred price rationing over “first-come, first-served at zero price.”

  • Efficiency claim

    • Price rationing maximizes gains from trade; all mutually beneficial exchanges occur.


4.4 Price Ceilings

  • Price control = government-mandated maximum (ceiling) or minimum (floor) price.

  • Binding price ceiling

    • Set below equilibrium P^*.

    • Creates excess demand (shortage).

    • Spurs non-price rationing & black markets (illegal high-price resale).

    • Example figure: portable electric-generator market (Figure 4-3) shows shortage & implicit supply schedule in black market.

  • Rental-housing market

    • Functions of rental prices:

    1. Encourage maintenance & new construction.

    2. Allocate existing units among renters.

    3. Ration the intensity of use (household size, subletting).

    • Rent controls discourage new construction

    • Dallas (no controls, 16 % vacancy) built 11,000 new units.

    • San Francisco (1.6 % vacancy, with controls) built only 2,000.

    • Effects on existing stock

    • Owners cannot fully recover maintenance & improvement costs → deterioration.

    • Reduced mobility (“housing gridlock” in NYC).

    • Evasion tactics

    • Landlords force tenants out (to reset rent).

    • Tenants sublet at higher rates.

    • Proliferation of housing courts.

    • Winners vs. losers

    • Losers: property owners; low-income households who cannot find units.

    • Winners: Upper-income professionals who secure controlled apartments.

  • Black-market cigarettes in NYC

    • U.S. average price ≈ \$7/pack.

    • NYC policies raise legal minimum to \$13.

    • Result: >50 % of cigarettes consumed in NYC purchased illegally.


4.5 Price Floors and Quantity Restrictions

  • Support price / price floor: legal minimum enforced by government.

    • Binding if set above equilibrium P^* → surplus.

    • Common in agriculture (e.g., peanuts, Figure 4-4).

  • Policy tools to maintain floor

    1. Government purchase & storage.

    2. Destruction of excess (plow-downs, dumping).

    3. Production quotas or acreage allotments.

  • Incidence / beneficiaries of supports

    • Farmers receiving higher prices.

    • Political constituencies in rural areas.

  • Minimum wage – a labor-market price floor

    • Definition: legal lower bound on hourly wage.

    • Predicted effects (Figure 4-5):

    • Wage rises from We to Wm.

    • Quantity of labor demanded falls from Qe to Qd (job loss).

    • Quantity supplied rises to Q_s (excess labor = unemployment).

  • Real-world illustrations

    • Los Angeles 99-seat theaters: $15 minimum led to closures, volunteer labor, non-union casting.

    • Baltimore mayor Catherine Pugh reversed support for $15 plan after firms vowed to cut hiring.

    • Experimental online-labor-market study: minimum wage reduced hiring & hours.

  • Quantity restrictions / bans / licenses

    • Prohibited goods: human organs, certain drugs.

    • Licensing: physicians, taxis, hospital beds.

    • Import quota: cap on quantity of a foreign good; acts like vertical supply limit, raising domestic price.


Applications & Case Studies

  • Pharmaceutical shortages & substitute price hikes (Issues & Applications)

    • Price ceiling on Medication A → manufacturer cuts production → shortage.

    • Doctors prescribe substitute Medication B → D_B shifts right.

    • Equilibrium P_B rises (Figure 4-6).

  • City apartment shortages (Did-You-Know box)

    • Net loss of middle-price units due to demolition > construction.

    • Where rents free to rise, shortages decline; where ceilings remain, shortages persist.


Appendix B – Consumer Surplus, Producer Surplus & Gains from Trade

  • Consumer surplus (CS)

    • CS = \text{Willingness to pay} - \text{Amount actually paid}.

    • Graphically: area below demand curve and above market price up to Q^* (Figure B-1).

    • Formal integral: CS = \int{0}^{Q^} \big( PD(q) - P^ \big)\,dq.

  • Producer surplus (PS)

    • PS = \text{Amount received} - \text{Minimum acceptable}.

    • Graphically: area above supply curve & below price up to Q^* (Figure B-2).

    • Formal integral: PS = \int{0}^{Q^} \big( P^ - PS(q) \big)\,dq.

  • Gains from trade (GFT)

    • GFT = CS + PS (Figure B-3).

  • Effect of price controls

    • Both CS & PS fall; deadweight loss emerges; total gains shrink.


Review of Learning Objectives

  • LO 4.1 Essential features of price system: flexible relative prices, middlemen lowering transaction costs.

  • LO 4.2 Effects of demand/supply shifts: direction of P^ and Q^ changes summarised above; simultaneous shifts often indeterminate.

  • LO 4.3 Rationing function: prices versus queues, coupons, force, or power; efficiency of price rationing.

  • LO 4.4 Price ceilings: if below P^* → shortage, non-price rationing, black markets; rent control specifics.

  • LO 4.5 Price floors & quantity restrictions: if above P^* → surplus; examples include agricultural supports, minimum wage, quotas, bans, licences.


Numerical & Statistical References (all from transcript)

  • Cavallo price-change frequency: ≈ 9 months in U.S. retail.

  • MIT database size: 60 million prices.

  • Dallas vs. San Francisco apartment construction: 11,000 vs. 2,000 units; vacancy rates 16 % vs. 1.6 %.

  • NYC cigarette legal minimum: \$13 vs. U.S. average \$7.

  • Vinyl record case: qualitative but notes cost up for pressing machines & demand surge.