U.S. government sometimes imposes price ceilings on pharmaceutical drugs to curb price inflation.
Leads to shortages of the controlled drug (Medication A).
Patients shift to substitutes (Medication B).
Demand for substitutes rises, pushing their equilibrium price upward (see later discussion of Figure 4-6).
Chapter 4 extends basic demand–supply analysis to show how market interventions (price ceilings, floors, quotas) disturb equilibrium and trigger secondary effects.
Price system / market system
Network of continuously changing relative prices that reflect current information about scarcity & abundance.
Prices act as signals and incentives for producers and consumers.
Voluntary exchange
Trade that both parties enter because they expect to be subjectively better off.
Transaction costs
All costs of arranging and carrying out exchange.
Information search (price, quality, service record, durability).
Drafting, monitoring, enforcing contracts.
AI/Big-data evidence on transaction costs & price stickiness
Alberto Cavallo (MIT) analyzed >60 million prices.
Typical U.S. firm changes list prices roughly every 9 months.
Interpretation: high transaction costs → sticky prices despite underlying supply–demand shifts.
Middlemen / intermediaries / brokers
Reduce transaction costs by matching buyers and sellers, supplying information, smoothing logistics.
Platform firms
Digital networks that link individuals or link buyers to sellers (e.g., Airbnb, eBay).
Act as large-scale, technologically enabled middlemen.
A shift in either curve → disequilibrium → price & quantity adjust until a new equilibrium is reached.
Single-curve shifts (determinant results)
Demand ↑ → P^ ↑ and Q^ ↑.
Demand ↓ → P^ ↓ and Q^ ↓.
Supply ↑ → P^ ↓ and Q^ ↑.
Supply ↓ → P^ ↑ and Q^ ↓.
Simultaneous shifts (indeterminate outcomes without size info)
Both D & S ↑: Q^ ↑ unambiguously; P^ ambiguous.
Both D & S ↓: Q^ ↓ unambiguously; P^ ambiguous.
S ↓ & D ↑: P^ ↑ unambiguously; Q^ ambiguous.
S ↑ & D ↓: P^ ↓ unambiguously; Q^ ambiguous.
Price flexibility varies across markets.
Adjustment may appear via hidden fees, quality changes, or slow posted-price movement.
Adjustment speed influenced by:
Market structure, expectations, shocks (energy, strikes, weather).
Markets can overshoot before settling at equilibrium.
Illustrative example: Vinyl records
Costly new pressing machines → S ↓.
Consumer nostalgia → D ↑.
Result: P{vinyl} ↑ (certain) & Q{vinyl} ↑ (net increase documented empirically).
Rationing function: market prices synchronise decisions of buyers & sellers so that quantity supplied = quantity demanded.
Non-price rationing methods (used when prices can’t freely adjust):
Queues (waiting in line).
Random assignment or coupons.
Use of power, status, or political influence.
Physical force.
International case – eWater in Gambia and Tanzania
Free community pumps broke down (≈ 33 % inoperable).
eWater installed metered pumps charging a fee; queues disappeared, spillage fell.
Households preferred price rationing over “first-come, first-served at zero price.”
Efficiency claim
Price rationing maximizes gains from trade; all mutually beneficial exchanges occur.
Price control = government-mandated maximum (ceiling) or minimum (floor) price.
Binding price ceiling
Set below equilibrium P^*.
Creates excess demand (shortage).
Spurs non-price rationing & black markets (illegal high-price resale).
Example figure: portable electric-generator market (Figure 4-3) shows shortage & implicit supply schedule in black market.
Rental-housing market
Functions of rental prices:
Encourage maintenance & new construction.
Allocate existing units among renters.
Ration the intensity of use (household size, subletting).
Rent controls discourage new construction
Dallas (no controls, 16 % vacancy) built 11,000 new units.
San Francisco (1.6 % vacancy, with controls) built only 2,000.
Effects on existing stock
Owners cannot fully recover maintenance & improvement costs → deterioration.
Reduced mobility (“housing gridlock” in NYC).
Evasion tactics
Landlords force tenants out (to reset rent).
Tenants sublet at higher rates.
Proliferation of housing courts.
Winners vs. losers
Losers: property owners; low-income households who cannot find units.
Winners: Upper-income professionals who secure controlled apartments.
Black-market cigarettes in NYC
U.S. average price ≈ \$7/pack.
NYC policies raise legal minimum to \$13.
Result: >50 % of cigarettes consumed in NYC purchased illegally.
Support price / price floor: legal minimum enforced by government.
Binding if set above equilibrium P^* → surplus.
Common in agriculture (e.g., peanuts, Figure 4-4).
Policy tools to maintain floor
Government purchase & storage.
Destruction of excess (plow-downs, dumping).
Production quotas or acreage allotments.
Incidence / beneficiaries of supports
Farmers receiving higher prices.
Political constituencies in rural areas.
Minimum wage – a labor-market price floor
Definition: legal lower bound on hourly wage.
Predicted effects (Figure 4-5):
Wage rises from We to Wm.
Quantity of labor demanded falls from Qe to Qd (job loss).
Quantity supplied rises to Q_s (excess labor = unemployment).
Real-world illustrations
Los Angeles 99-seat theaters: $15 minimum led to closures, volunteer labor, non-union casting.
Baltimore mayor Catherine Pugh reversed support for $15 plan after firms vowed to cut hiring.
Experimental online-labor-market study: minimum wage reduced hiring & hours.
Quantity restrictions / bans / licenses
Prohibited goods: human organs, certain drugs.
Licensing: physicians, taxis, hospital beds.
Import quota: cap on quantity of a foreign good; acts like vertical supply limit, raising domestic price.
Pharmaceutical shortages & substitute price hikes (Issues & Applications)
Price ceiling on Medication A → manufacturer cuts production → shortage.
Doctors prescribe substitute Medication B → D_B shifts right.
Equilibrium P_B rises (Figure 4-6).
City apartment shortages (Did-You-Know box)
Net loss of middle-price units due to demolition > construction.
Where rents free to rise, shortages decline; where ceilings remain, shortages persist.
Consumer surplus (CS)
CS = \text{Willingness to pay} - \text{Amount actually paid}.
Graphically: area below demand curve and above market price up to Q^* (Figure B-1).
Formal integral: CS = \int{0}^{Q^} \big( PD(q) - P^ \big)\,dq.
Producer surplus (PS)
PS = \text{Amount received} - \text{Minimum acceptable}.
Graphically: area above supply curve & below price up to Q^* (Figure B-2).
Formal integral: PS = \int{0}^{Q^} \big( P^ - PS(q) \big)\,dq.
Gains from trade (GFT)
GFT = CS + PS (Figure B-3).
Effect of price controls
Both CS & PS fall; deadweight loss emerges; total gains shrink.
LO 4.1 Essential features of price system: flexible relative prices, middlemen lowering transaction costs.
LO 4.2 Effects of demand/supply shifts: direction of P^ and Q^ changes summarised above; simultaneous shifts often indeterminate.
LO 4.3 Rationing function: prices versus queues, coupons, force, or power; efficiency of price rationing.
LO 4.4 Price ceilings: if below P^* → shortage, non-price rationing, black markets; rent control specifics.
LO 4.5 Price floors & quantity restrictions: if above P^* → surplus; examples include agricultural supports, minimum wage, quotas, bans, licences.
Cavallo price-change frequency: ≈ 9 months in U.S. retail.
MIT database size: 60 million prices.
Dallas vs. San Francisco apartment construction: 11,000 vs. 2,000 units; vacancy rates 16 % vs. 1.6 %.
NYC cigarette legal minimum: \$13 vs. U.S. average \$7.
Vinyl record case: qualitative but notes cost up for pressing machines & demand surge.