In-Depth Notes on the Mind/Body Problem

Philosophy of Mind

  • Fundamental questions about mental lives and existence as conscious beings.
  • Influenced by cognitive and brain sciences.
  • Conflicts with common beliefs, making it a challenging area of inquiry.

Main Questions in Mind/Body Problem

  • What is a mind?
  • What is the relationship between mind and body?
  • How does a mind function?
  • How does consciousness arise from neural activity?
  • Do non-human animals possess minds/consciousness/emotions/beliefs?
  • Are artificial/machine minds possible?

Nature of Mind

  • Focus on the fundamental nature of mental events, processes, or properties.
  • Questions whether we can provide a naturalistic account of the mind or whether it is supernatural.
  • Explores if explaining the mind surpasses human science.

The Mind/Body Problem

  • Interaction between body and mind:
    • Are they separate?
    • Or are they one?
  • Conflicts in observations:
    • Mental phenomena seem non-physical (beliefs, sensations).
    • Yet, physical causes exist for mental phenomena.

Theories on Mind/Body Relationship

  1. Substance Dualism
    • Distinct substances: Physical (body) and Non-physical (mind/soul).
  2. Property Dualism (Dual Aspect Theory)
  3. Physicalism
    • Includes:
      • Behaviourism
      • Identity Theory
      • Functionalism
      • Eliminative Materialism

Dualism Explained

  • Substance Dualism: Humans are hybrids of physical body and non-physical mind.
  • Historical perspectives:
    • Socratic/Platonic dualism by Socrates.
    • Descartes' view: body as a machine, mind/body interaction.

Arguments Supporting Substance Dualism

  1. Compatible with religious beliefs, especially concepts of the afterlife and free will.
  2. Bodies and minds possess fundamentally different attributes:
    • Indivisible mind vs body made of parts.
    • Knowledge: Mind known directly, body indirectly.

Leibniz’s Law

  • A is identical to B if they share all properties; if different, not identical.
  • Supports the argument for distinctness between mind and body.

Concerns and Criticisms of Dualism

  • Difficulty conceiving existence without a body.
  • Alternative explanations for consciousness that link to brain activity.
  • Challenges associated with mind-body interaction and adherence to conservation laws in physics.
  • Category Mistake: Misconceptions about the nature of the mind compared to the body.

Behaviourism

  • Understands mental states through observable behavior:
    • Methodological Behaviourism: Focus on observable actions only.
    • Logical Behaviourism: Reduces mental concepts to behavioral dispositions.

Mind-Brain Identity Theory

  • Asserts that mental events equate to brain processes (strict materialism).
  • Ockham’s Razor: Physical explanations are adequate, avoiding supernatural notions.

Type-Identity Theory

  • Example: Pain correlates with specific brain processes (e.g., c-fibres firing).
  • Presents challenges concerning consciousness and its qualitative nature.

Functionalism

  • Defines mental states by their functional role in behavior
  • Essential in addressing multi-realizability problems of Type-Identity theory.

Artificial Intelligence

  • Explores implications of machines demonstrating intelligence (e.g., passing the Turing Test).
  • Searle’s Chinese Room: Distinction between simulated and actual understanding.

Challenges to Functionalism

  • Lack of account for the qualitative aspects of mental states (qualia).
  • Concept of multiple realizability: Different entities can possess the same functional state without identical experiences.

Property Dualism and Epiphenomenalism

  • Accepts physicalist view while acknowledging non-physical properties of minds.
  • Mental properties cannot currently be fully explained by sciences.

Emergentism

  • Mind emerges from complex arrangements of non-conscious components.
  • Challenges remain in justifying the causal power of emergent properties.

Eliminative Materialism

  • Proposes that talk of mental states should be eliminated in favor of more precise neuro-physiological descriptions.
  • Rejects the identification of mental states with physical states yet to be discovered.