flashcards
FLASHCARDS FOR ALL READINGS
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UNIT 1 — IR THEORY
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Session 2: Classical Realism
Front:
1981 — Hedley Bull — “Hobbes and International Anarchy”
Back:
• International politics resembles Hobbes’s “state of nature.”
• No central authority; states live amid fear and uncertainty.
• Order emerges through shared norms, diplomacy, balance of power.
• Realism isn’t chaos; it’s patterned anarchy.
Front:
1651 — Thomas Hobbes — “The Natural Condition of Mankind” (Leviathan, Ch. 13)
Back:
• Humans are equal in vulnerability; equality breeds insecurity.
• Without a sovereign, life becomes competition, distrust, and preemptive violence.
• Foundation for realist arguments about war, fear, and self-help in IR.
Session 3: Neo-Realism
Front:
1979 — Kenneth Waltz — “The Anarchic Structure of World Politics”
Back:
• The international system’s structure pushes states to behave similarly.
• Anarchy compels self-help and security competition.
• Polarity (bi vs multi) shapes war likelihood more than human nature.
Front:
2001 — John Mearsheimer — “Anarchy and the Struggle for Power”
Back:
• Great powers are doomed to pursue power; survival requires aggression.
• States fear one another and seek regional hegemony.
• Offensive realism: conflict is built into the system.
Session 4: Liberalism
Front:
1978 — Robert Jervis — “Offense, Defense, and the Security Dilemma”
Back:
• Even defensive actions appear threatening under anarchy.
• Distinguishing offense vs. defense can reduce conflict.
• Technologies and geography can moderate security spirals.
Front:
1984 — Robert Keohane — After Hegemony, Ch. 4–5
Back:
• Cooperation persists even without hegemonic leadership.
• Institutions reduce uncertainty, create rules, and stabilize expectations.
• Repeated interactions encourage compliance and lower transaction costs.
Session 5: Constructivism
Front:
1992 — Alexander Wendt — “Anarchy Is What States Make of It”
Back:
• Anarchy has no intrinsic logic; states build meanings through interaction.
• Identities shape interests; enemies and friends are socially constructed.
• Change is possible because norms evolve.
Front:
1996 — Martha Finnemore — National Interests in International Society, Ch. 1
Back:
• States learn appropriate behavior from international norms.
• Interests are not fixed; society shapes what states value.
• Legitimacy and socialization guide state action.
Session 6: Democratic Peace Theory
Front:
2003 — Charles Lipson — Reliable Partners (Intro)
Back:
• Democracies form deep trust based on transparency and shared norms.
• Institutions reduce uncertainty and make deception costly.
• Explains why democracies rarely fight each other.
Front:
2003 — Sebastian Rosato — “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory”
Back:
• Challenges the causal mechanisms underpinning democratic peace.
• Democratic constraints don’t necessarily prevent war.
• Empirical evidence for democratic peace is weaker than claimed.
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UNIT 2 — SECURITY ISSUES
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Session 8: Causes of World War I
Front:
1984 — Glenn Snyder — “Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics”
Back:
• Alliances can create commitment and abandonment fears.
• States overreact to alliance signals, deepening insecurity.
• WWI alliances amplified misperceptions and rigid commitments.
Front:
1984 — Stephen Van Evera — “Cult of the Offensive”
Back:
• Military leaders exaggerated offensive advantages.
• Belief in fast wars encouraged preemption and mobilization races.
• Misperceived offense dominance helped trigger WWI.
Session 9: Peace Settlements
Front:
2001 — G. John Ikenberry — After Victory, Ch. 1 & 5
Back:
• Victors design postwar order through institutions that lock in restraint.
• Legitimacy and rules stabilize the system after major wars.
• US used institutions after 1945 to create durable liberal order.
Session 10: The Cold War
Front:
1947 — George Kennan — “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”
Back:
• Soviet behavior shaped by ideology and internal insecurity.
• Advocates containment: pressure without direct war.
• Predicts long-term competition ending with Soviet collapse.
Front:
1967 — Arthur Schlesinger Jr. — “The Origins of the Cold War”
Back:
• Argues Cold War resulted from Soviet expansion + Western responses.
• Emphasizes ideological and geopolitical rivalry.
• US policy partly reactive rather than aggressive.
Session 11: Nuclear Weapons
Front:
2003 — Sagan & Waltz — The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, Ch. 1–2
Back:
• Waltz: proliferation can stabilize via deterrence.
• Sagan: domestic politics and organizational biases make nukes dangerous.
• Debate frames risks vs. rationality in nuclear policy.
Session 12: Imperialism
Front:
1917 — V. I. Lenin — Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (Selections)
Back:
• Capitalism drives states to expand for resources and markets.
• Monopolies and finance capital push imperial competition.
• Imperialism is structural and inevitable under capitalism.
Front:
1991 — Jack Snyder — Myths of Empire, Ch. 1
Back:
• Domestic coalitions promote expansionist myths.
• Overexpansion is driven by bureaucratic and ideological biases.
• Expansion can undermine security instead of increasing it.
Session 13: American Hegemony
Front:
1999 — William Wohlforth — “The Stability of a Unipolar World”
Back:
• US unipolarity is stable; rivals lack capability to balance.
• Unipole’s dominance discourages great-power war.
• Peace stems from power concentration, not multipolarity.
Front:
2012 — Nuno Monteiro — “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful”
Back:
• Unipolarity sparks conflicts involving the hegemon.
• Unipoles fight to police order and prevent rising powers.
• Unipolarity creates frequent but limited wars.
Session 14: Rise of China
Front:
2008 — G. John Ikenberry — “The Rise of China and the Future of the West”
Back:
• China can rise peacefully inside the liberal order.
• US-led institutions constrain and socialize rising powers.
• Order survives if it stays open and rules-based.
Front:
2014 — John Mearsheimer — The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Ch. 10
Back:
• China’s rise will be conflictual.
• Great powers compete for regional hegemony.
• US will try to contain China; rivalry is inevitable.
Session 16: Intervention & Peacekeeping
Front:
1977 — Michael Walzer — “Intervention”
Back:
• Just wars allow intervention under strict moral criteria.
• Self-defense, aiding victims of aggression, and preventing massacre matter.
• Sovereignty isn't absolute; humanitarian need can override.
Front:
1995 — Daniel Philpott — “Sovereignty: An Introduction and Brief History”
Back:
• Sovereignty evolved from Westphalia to modern era.
• Authority, autonomy, and legitimacy define state sovereignty.
• Norms continually reshape the meaning of sovereignty.
Session 17: Terrorism
Front:
2003 — Robert Pape — “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism”
Back:
• Suicide attacks are rational strategies to coerce democracies.
• Aim is to compel withdrawal from occupied territories.
• Not primarily driven by religion; driven by political goals.
Front:
2006 — John Mueller — “Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?”
Back:
• Terrorism threat is exaggerated by politics and media.
• Overreaction can cost more than terrorism itself.
• Calls for measured, evidence-based counterterrorism.
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UNIT 3 — POLITICAL ECONOMY
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Session 19: Trade
Front:
2003 — Grieco & Ikenberry — State Power and World Markets, Ch. 2
Back:
• Basics of trade theory: comparative advantage.
• Trade creates winners and losers inside states.
• Domestic politics shapes trade policy.
Front:
1989 — Ronald Rogowski — “Commerce and Coalitions”
Back:
• Trade exposure restructures domestic political alliances.
• Factor endowments determine who wins or loses.
• Winners push for liberalization; losers resist.
Session 20: Money
Front:
1996 — Barry Eichengreen — “Hegemonic Stability Theories of the Monetary System”
Back:
• International money works best with a hegemon providing stability.
• Gold standard and Bretton Woods relied on UK/US leadership.
• Hegemons supply liquidity, rules, and enforcement.
Front:
1984 — Peter Gourevitch — “Breaking with Orthodoxy”
Back:
• States choose economic policies based on domestic coalitions.
• Depression-era choices varied by political structure and interests.
• Domestic institutions mediate global shocks.
Front:
1994 — Jeffry Frieden — “Exchange Rate Politics”
Back:
• Exchange rate preferences reflect economic interests.
• Fixed vs. floating systems create winners and losers.
• Sectoral coalitions fight for their ideal regime.
Session 21: Labor Unions & Trade Policy
Front:
2015 — Adam Dean — “Power Over Profits”
Back:
• Strong unions support protection to secure wages.
• Firms prefer liberalization; labor prefers shields.
• Worker power shapes national trade policy.
Front:
2015 — Adam Dean — “The Gilded Wage”
Back:
• Profit-sharing reduces labor opposition to trade.
• Firms can align worker incentives with globalization.
• Institutions moderate class conflict over trade.
Session 22: Labor Unions & Free Trade
Front:
2005 — Milner & Kubota — “Why the Move to Free Trade?”
Back:
• Democracies liberalize because voters benefit from lower prices.
• Leaders respond to broad electoral pressures.
• Globalization encourages policy convergence.
Front:
2022 — Adam Dean — Opening Up by Cracking Down, Ch. 1
Back:
• States repress labor to attract foreign investment.
• Political control enables economic openness.
• Explores the link between authoritarianism and liberalization.
Session 23: Migration
Front:
2003 — Kapur & McHale — “Migration’s New Payoff”
Back:
• Migration creates global gains via remittances and skills flows.
• Developing states benefit from diaspora networks.
• Brain drain can be offset by long-run development.
Front:
1988 — Susan Strange — “States, Firms and Diplomacy”
Back:
• Power shifts between states and multinational firms.
• Firms shape diplomacy and global governance.
• State authority is shared with non-state actors.
Session 24: Labor & Globalization
Front:
1997 — Paul Krugman — “In Praise of Cheap Labor”
Back:
• Sweatshops provide vital development opportunities.
• Bad jobs in poor countries are better than no jobs.
• Globalization can lift living standards over time.
Front:
1998 — Jeffrey Williamson — “Globalization and Inequality”
Back:
• Past globalization waves increased inequality.
• Trade and migration reshape wage structures.
• Historic patterns mirror current globalization pressures.
Session 25: World Trade Organization
Front:
2006 — Barton et al. — Evolution of the Trade Regime, Ch. 1
Back:
• GATT–WTO system blends law, politics, and economics.
• Rules prevent trade wars and stabilize cooperation.
• Developing states increasingly shape negotiations.
Session 26: Compensating Trade Losers & Populism
Front:
2017 — Colgan & Keohane — “The Liberal Order Is Rigged”
Back:
• Globalization benefits elites more than workers.
• Political backlash stems from unequal distribution.
• Liberal order must be reformed to survive.
Front:
2017 — Dani Rodrik — “Too Late to Compensate Free Trade’s Losers”
Back:
• Compensation programs have failed politically.
• Economic shocks concentrate harm in specific regions.
• Real fix requires rethinking globalization’s structure.