Why Iran Should Get the Bomb – Comprehensive Study Notes

Overview

• Context: The Iran nuclear standoff intensified in recent months with stronger sanctions by the United States and an EU oil embargo planned for July\ 1. Negotiations have resumed, but a sense of crisis persists. The central claim is counterintuitive: a nuclear-armed Iran could, in fact, restore stability to the Middle East.
• Core idea: ``Power begs to be balanced.'' A rising nuclear power alters the regional balance of power, and the emergence of a balancer can reduce overall instability.
• Objective of the article: Evaluate the three plausible outcomes of the standoff, assess the irrationality stereotype about Iran, and argue for a policy of accepting a nuclear Iran under proper deterrence rather than attempting to prevent it at all costs.

Three possible outcomes of the standoff

• Outcome 1: Diplomacy with serious sanctions persuades Iran to abandon its nuclear pursuit. Assessment: unlikely. Historical evidence shows a country bent on acquiring nuclear weapons is hard to deter via sanctions alone. Example cited: North Korea built weapons despite sanctions and UN resolutions. If Tehran believes its security depends on a bomb, escalating sanctions may backfire, increasing the perceived need for a nuclear shield.
• Outcome 2: Iran does not test a weapon but develops a breakout capability (the capacity to assemble a weapon quickly).
  • Definition: a sophisticated nuclear program that can produce a weapon on short notice without necessarily weaponizing immediately.
  • Rationale: domestic hard-liners gain security benefits by threatening to escalate into weaponization while avoiding the costs of actual detonation or international condemnation.
  • Potential problem: the breakout might not function as intended in practice. Western powers focus on weaponization; Israel views a substantial enrichment capability as an unacceptable threat and might push for tougher measures or sabotage.
• Outcome 3: Iran continues on its current course and publicly tests a weapon (goes nuclear).
  • Western officials deem this outcome unacceptable, labeling it an existential threat due to the terror of a nuclear Iran.
  • Counterpoint: historically, once new nuclear states join the club, other members often adjust and live with the new balance; new nuclear states frequently contribute to regional stability by reducing power imbalances, not increasing them.
  • The author’s thesis emphasizes that Israel’s long-standing nuclear monopoly has actually fueled instability in the region and that balance will emerge only when a balancer appears.

The balancing logic: why a nuclear Iran could increase stability

• The premise: reducing military imbalances among major powers tends to stabilize the region, not destabilize it.
• Israel’s role as a regional, unchecked nuclear power has contributed to ongoing tension; a counterbalancing state in the region could dampen incentives for covert actions.
• Historical pattern: stability often follows deterrence among nuclear states; the presence of a credible second power (and eventually a balancer) helps prevent large-scale conventional wars.
• Israel’s past actions illustrate the paradox: preemptive strikes against potential rivals (Iraq in 1981, Syria in 2007) have prolonged the very imbalance they aim to resolve, by provoking fears and prompting countermeasures.
• The claim is not that nuclear deterrence is perfect, but that, in the Middle East context, a balance of power achieved through the presence of a second nuclear actor could reduce incentives for extended conflict.

On rationality vs. irrationality of Iran’s leadership

• A common concern is that the Iranian regime is irrational and would provoke reckless escalation if it gains the bomb.
  • This view often rests on caricatures of “mad mullahs,” which the author disputes.
  • He argues that Iranian policy is driven by a rational desire to survive and secure the regime, not by irrational impulses.
• Evidence against irrationality:
  • Nuclear-armed states historically show increased caution and predictability in behavior after acquiring the bomb (Maoist China example cited as becoming less bellicose after nuclearization).
  • India and Pakistan have become more cautious since going nuclear.
  • Surveillance capabilities make a handoff to terrorists unlikely; source attribution and monitoring reduce the risk of uncontrolled transfers.
• Counterpoints to fears:
  • Some observers worry Iran would empower terrorism; the author contends these concerns contradict the track record of nuclear states and the rational security calculus of Iran, which seeks to preserve its own survival and regime security.
• Conclusion on rationality: there is little reason to believe Iran would abandon restraint once it possesses a nuclear capability; the regime would seek to maximize security rather than invite existential risk.

The risk of a handoff to terrorists and proliferation dynamics

• Nuclear weapon possession by Iran would still be under strong state control, given the high costs and the risk of exposure.
• Even if Iran sponsors terrorist groups, the spread of nuclear technology through such channels is highly constrained by detection, security, and the risk of attribution.
• The broader point: a nuclear Iran could stabilize the region by reducing the incentives for direct conflict with Israel, provided there is credible deterrence and reliable protection of the arsenal from theft or miscalculation.

Proliferation concerns: historical patterns and the Middle East

• Common worry: Iran’s bomb would spark a regional arms race.
  • The article notes that the nuclear age is nearing seven decades old, and thus far, proliferation has not proceeded as quickly or uncontrollably as feared.
  • Since 1970, there has been a slowdown in the emergence of new nuclear states, suggesting that fear of a cascade may be overstated in today’s context.
• If Iran becomes the second Middle Eastern nuclear power since 1945, it would not necessarily trigger a landslide toward regional nuclearization.
• Israel’s existing nuclear capability historically had posed a larger threat to the Arab world than Iran’s program does today; if Iran goes nuclear, deterrence would likely prevent large-scale conflict between Israel and Iran.
• The implication: the odds of a general regional arms race are overstated; instead, a stable deterrence relationship could emerge between rival nuclear actors.

Israel’s nuclear monopoly and the longer-term balance

• Israel’s long-standing nuclear monopoly has temporarily prevented a full-scale regional arms race but has created chronic instability due to the perceived imbalance.
• The final stage of the Middle East nuclear crisis, Waltz argues, is reached only when a balance of power is restored—i.e., when a credible balancer (a second regional nuclear state) emerges.
• Israel’s strategy of maintaining its edge has involved repeated military actions (Iraq 1981, Syria 2007, potential actions against Iran), which undermine long-term stability by provoking counter-moves and increasing regional insecurity.

Policy implications for the United States and its allies

• If Iran goes nuclear, the recommendation is to accept deterrence rather than attempt to prevent the bomb at all costs.
• Diplomacy should continue, but sanctions should be reconsidered because they primarily harm ordinary Iranians and have limited strategic effect on the nuclear calculus.
• Open lines of communication with Iran and major powers can reassure Western actors and help manage a nuclear Iran without waiting for an effective regime change.
• The broader regional audience (Arab states, Europe, Israel, and the United States) should take comfort from the historical pattern that where nuclear capabilities emerge, stability tends to increase, not decrease.
• Final sentiment: when it comes to nuclear weapons, the maxim remains that sometimes, more may be better for stability, not worse for security."

Key dates, examples, and data references (for quick recall)

• Sanctions and policy context: July\ 1 oil embargo planned by the EU; continued U.S. sanctions tightening.
• Historical benchmarks and comparisons:
  • North Korea: pursued nuclear weapons despite sanctions and UN resolutions.
  • Japan: maintains a vast civilian nuclear infrastructure; discussed in the breakout-capability context.
  • Israel’s preemptive strikes: Iraq (1981), Syria (2007).
  • India-Pakistan treaty: 1991 agreement not to target each other’s facilities; subsequent peace and stability in spite of tensions.
• Proliferation context:
  • Since 1970, slowdown in emergence of new nuclear states.
  • Israel acquired the bomb in the 1960s; this event shaped regional dynamics but did not necessarily trigger a widespread arms race when compared to later hypothetical Iranian acquisition.
• Final assertion: "When it comes to nuclear weapons, now as ever, more may be better."

// End of notes on the transmission of Kenneth N. Waltz's argument in the provided Foreign Affairs excerpt.