EU Integration Notes

The European Union and Integration

Guiding Questions

• How does the European Union project power?

• What is the “Brussels Effect”?

• How do British, French, and German foreign policies advance state security?

• How does the “Strategic Compass” seek to advance EU security?

• Will the EU “run the 21st century”?

Introduction

• European integration is often cited as an alternative vision of politics where soft power matters.

• It involves pooling sovereignty to achieve joint goals, such as economic stability and regional security, by surrendering some national powers to the EU level.

• The EU uses soft power and economic leverage, such as trade agreements and financial aid, to extend influence beyond its borders.

• It emphasizes multilateralism to solve common challenges, promoting cooperation among member states and with other international actors.

• The EU's alternative model to hard power politics is sometimes characterized as better suited for cooperation to face common challenges like climate change, pandemics, and economic crises.

• It is offered as a model for other regions facing conflict, demonstrating how integration can foster peace and stability among diverse nations.

• However, a more aggressive Russia and concerns over US commitment to NATO are leading to re-evaluation, prompting discussions about the need for a stronger EU security and defense policy.

Why Europe “Will Run the 21st Century” (Leonard 2005)

• The world is changing with power shifting, global ideals proliferating (i.e., the individual “matters”), and regional integration becoming common (e.g., ASEAN, MERCOSUR, etc.).

• The “European way of war” includes peacekeeping and peace enforcing and building state capacity in “war-torn states.”

• It augments soldiers with “an army of diplomats, police, election monitors and aid workers.”

• The goal is not to get in and out quickly but to bring about the long-term transformation of the country through institution-building and economic development.

• Use of force is counterproductive in the Post Cold War era.

• A soft power approach is well-suited to respond to common challenges.

• Foreign aid + SEM access can “transform international relations.”

• It can persuade without threatening others.

• The attractiveness of the European model + quality of life is drawing attention.

• Cooperation, not coercion, is the only way to resolve international challenges.

• Regional integration can be adapted to promote peace in other contexts.

• Europe will “run the 21st century because the ‘European way of doing things’ will have become the world’s [way of doing things].”

European Ascendancy? Not So Fast (Kagan 2003)

• European integration should be lauded for its role in promoting peace and cooperation on the continent.

• The possibility of war on the European continent is nil due to the deep economic and political ties fostered by integration.

• Integration made this possible.

• Integration is good for the EU AND FOR THE US.

• Europe emphasizes soft power, and the US emphasizes hard power, reflecting differing strategic cultures and threat perceptions.

• This is a function of European weakness, not strength; the emphasis on soft power is a result of limited military capabilities and a preference for diplomatic solutions.

• It is ONLY an option due to US hard power protections (i.e., NATO). Without the security umbrella provided by the US, the EU's soft power approach would be less viable.

• Integration is not the “wave of the future.”

Mars vs. Venus? (Kagan 2003)

• US and EU view threats in fundamentally different ways.

• The US is Mars, and the EU is Venus, symbolizing their contrasting approaches to foreign policy and security.

• The US embraces the use of force in an anarchic world (Hobbesian), viewing military power as essential for maintaining security and order.

• A technological gap in capabilities boosts willingness to fight.

• The US prefers to act with others but is not compelled to do so, willing to act unilaterally if necessary to protect its interests.

• It sees the world in black and white, with clear distinctions between allies and adversaries.

• Strength and perspective make it the primary target.

• It seeks to share the defense burden with the EU.

• The EU is unwilling/unable to significantly increase its military spending and capabilities.

• The EU is moving “away from power” towards international law (Kantian), prioritizing diplomacy, multilateralism, and the rule of law in international relations.

• UN Security Council legitimation of conflict is important.

• There is universal applicability of the ICC.

• The EU sees the world in shades of gray, recognizing the complexity of international issues and the need for nuanced responses.

• It privileges diplomacy over force.

• It is unclear if 9/11 targets them.

• Strategic dependence on US military is worrisome.

• Domestic politics prevents increases in defense spending.

• Military power is still critical in the post-Cold War era.

• The EU is not a superpower and not a new model for international politics.

• Economic power is not a superpower.

• It lacks military capabilities.

• The model is only possible given dependence on NATO military spending.

• It is unclear if soft power emphasis is workable without hard power.

• China and Russia will not respond to soft power.

• The Transatlantic relationship can be a force of good for the US, EU, and international community, but relations are strained due to differences in worldview + strategic culture.

Enter the “Brussels Effect” (Bradford 2020)

• Critiques of the EU’s lack of military power ignore how Europe wields international influence through the “Brussels Effect,” which is a form of regulatory power.

• This is the ability of the EU to unilaterally regulate global markets by setting standards that businesses worldwide must meet to access the EU market.

• The EU is able to parlay access to the Single European Market into expanding its regulatory power to shape how business is conducted globally.

• It sets global standards in competition policy.

• It impacts environmental and food safety protections.

• It shapes privacy policy and regulation of hate speech on social media.

• Extension of EU influence is done voluntarily and not coercively; countries and companies adopt EU standards to gain access to the EU market.

• External actors choose to abide by EU standards.

• In a world where regulatory power “matters”, the EU is a superpower.

De Jure vs. De Facto Brussels Effect (Bradford 2020)

• The “Brussels Effect” exists in two forms:

  • de facto: MNCs accept EU regulations + adapt behavior to EU. Business incentives explain application to global operations. No foreign governmental regulatory response is needed.

  • de jure: foreign governments adopt EU regulations/standards. MNCs have already adopted EU standards and lobby home governments to do likewise. State officials CHOOSE to adopt EU standards under the auspices that they are the “best practices.”

Brussels Effect and Influence (Bradford 2020)

• The “Brussels Effect” is limited to circumstances where:

  • “Market size” can be leveraged, i.e., the market must be attractive to business.

  • States possess “regulatory capacity,” i.e., they are willing to craft regulations + create institutions to enforce.

  • Targets are “inelastic,” i.e., they are tied to a specific jurisdiction + business unable to “venue shop.”

  • Corporation activity is “non-divisible,” i.e., the benefit of adopting one set of standards outweighs the benefit of adopting several.

• Under these circumstances, the MOST “stringent regulations” gain influence, which tends to favor the European Union.

Internal Basis for the “Brussels Effect” (Bradford 2020)

• The Single European Market is a “regulatory state” advancing “mutual recognition.”

• This boosts the size/effectiveness of the SEM AND projects EU values.

• The question then arises: why adopt the “most stringent standard”?

• It signals that integration will not occur at the expense of health and safety.

• European citizens are more comfortable with public health regulations.

• It boosts legitimacy by tying integration to “non-economic” values.

• It pushes back against efforts to tie integration to neoliberalism.

• It is easier to convince states with weaker standards to “boost up.”

• EU standards are the most stringent of the ones that markets respond to.

International Impact of “Brussels Effect” (Bradford 2020)

• The EU can use regulatory impact to ACTIVELY set domestic AND global norms.

• This shapes “external action” and “external effects of internal policies” facets.

• EU regulations are critical for aid conditionality, trade, and SEM access.

• International negotiations are used to adopt EU standards.

• The extension of EU standards makes EU exports more competitive.

• Global extension of EU standards undercuts efforts to challenge in WTO.

• If other states adopt EU standards, they cannot be “discriminatory.”

• It boosts the EU “soft power superpower” + undermines the argument that the EU is “irrelevant.”

• The Commission shapes GLOBAL markets via INTERNAL regulation of the SEM.

• The Commission projects influence via trade agreements and aid conditionality.

Is Economic Power Enough? (Keukeleire and Delreux 2022)

• Western dominance of the post-Cold War global order is being challenged by the rise of new powers and increasing geopolitical instability.

• The rise of China, Russian aggression, and weakening relations with Turkey raise questions about the future role of the EU in any new global order.

• The Russian invasion of Ukraine is particularly relevant, highlighting the limits of economic power in the face of military aggression.

• War on the European continent is no longer unthinkable.

• This creates new concerns over EU security.

• Concerns over security are forcing reflection on NATO dependence.

• The reliability of the United States as an alliance partner is no longer assured, especially given shifts in US foreign policy priorities.

• Members are having to make decisions regarding their security.

• Should they emphasize relations with the EU? NATO? Both?

Structural Factors Shaping British Foreign Policy (White 2012)

• Power: Middle power; Post Suez crisis à focus on a “hug them [US] close” strategy.

• Institutions:

  • Globalization constrains autonomy given the role of the financial services industry.

  • EU membership is seen as too restrictive despite trade benefits of membership.

  • Economically, Brexit has come at a cost in terms of economic well-being.

• Ideas:

  • Concept of insularity

  • Atlanticism (Special Relationship)

  • Common language, heritage, etc., but view politics and society very differently.

  • A “bridge-building” approach seeks to connect the US and EU.

  • Brexit weakens this option.

Political Factors Shaping British Foreign Policy (White 2012)

• PM/Government are key actors.

• Blair’s Iraq vote in Parliament was precedent-setting.

• Increased role of Parliament.

• The opposition historically sides with the Government on national security.

• Support for Atlanticism is solid across parties.

• Support for the EU WAS NOT solid across parties.

• Public opinion:

  • Supports Atlanticism; Dislikes the perception of the UK as a “junior partner.”

  • NOTE: post Brexit, emphasis is still on maintaining ties with the US BUT working with European NATO partners on national security.

Structural Factors Shaping French Foreign Policy (Treacher 2012)

• Power: middle power

• Post-Suez crisis à actively reduce dependence on US

• Interdependence

• Boost EU to project French influence and reduce dependence on US

• Ideas-

  • Maintain or boost French status.

  • Nuclear force + ”understanding” of key regionsà key role for France

  • (Pre-Sarkozy) Multipolar world with a European pillar

  • (Post-Sarkozy) Use international setting to achieve common goals

Political Factors Shaping French Foreign Policy (Treacher 2012)

• The President is critical…

• The ability of the President to deliver is constrained

• Return to Atlanticism (and NATO command structure) post Chirac

• Elite consensus on foreign policy goals.

• More opposed to globalization

• See climate change and protecting human rights as critical security goals

• Focus on maintaining strong ties with Germany to boost French ideals within the EU

• BUT French EU influence waning as EU increasingly resembling German ideals

• NOTE: Emphasis on a common European force seen as critical to ensure security

• ‘Strategic autonomy” + “principled pragmatism” critical

Structural Factors Shaping German Foreign Policy (Harnisch 2012)

• Power: Middle power, but too big to ignore

• Unification = Cold War goal

• Interdependence

• Strong commitment to alliances

• Motor of the EU: accepted EMU for unification.

• Ideas-

  • Committed to preservation of human rights and democracy.

  • Collective/cooperative action.

  • Germany as a “civilian power”

  • Used to achieve civilian and national ends

Political Factors Shaping German Foreign Policy (Harnisch 2012)

• Chancellor and cabinet are critical

• Big decisions usually made by unanimity

• Historically Atlanticist, but the incoming chancellor skeptical of Trump

• “My absolute priority will be to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible so that, step by step, we can really achieve independence from the USA”

• “I never thought I would have to say something like this… but after Donald Trump's statements last week at the latest, it is clear that the Americans, at least this part of the Americans, this administration, are largely indifferent to the fate of Europe.”

• Basic Law prohibits the mobilization of army outside of regional, collective security purposes

• Federal Constitutional Court critical regarding intervention.

• Peace keeping/peace enforcing OK and the region is “the world”

• Public opinion: pacifism, humanitarianism, opposition to nuclear weapons exert a large influence

• NOTE: Post Ukraine invasion, struggling with balancing EU/NATO commitments in a context where it is being asked to assist with MILITARY rather than just ECONOMIC support

Re-Evaluating the Security Strategy (EEAS 2016; EEAS 2022)

• The changing international context requires a “re-think” of EU security strategy.

• Globally:

  • Increasing competition between global actors, i.e., “power has returned.”

  • Climate change is promoting competition over scarce resources, subsequently, it is a security issue.

  • The Post-WW2 international order is questioned.

• Regionally:

  • War on the European continent.

  • External interference from state/non-state actors.

  • State fragility within the European neighborhood.

• Within the European Union

  • External use of disruptive technologies and misinformation.

  • Instrumentalization of irregular migration.

  • Terrorism

Responding to New International Challenges (EEAS 2022)

• The EU MUST ACT “more quickly and decisively” in the face of a crisis.

  • Re-assess the need for unanimity in CFSP/CSDP.

  • Reinforce “constructive abstention.”

  • Create a EU Rapid Deployment Capacity using EU Battlegroups and member state resources.

• EU MUST SECURE “citizens against fast-changing threats.”

  • Enhance intelligence gathering abilities.

  • Create an EU Hybrid Toolbox to battle against misinformation and election interference.

  • Expand resources to counter cyberattacks + strengthen air, sea, and space protections.

• EU MUST INVEST in “capabilities and technologies” that are necessary.

  • Spend more on military capabilities.

  • Upgrade existing resources to meet future challenges.

  • Create a Defense Integration Hub to coordinate resources across member states.

• EU MUST PARTNER “with others to achieve common goals.”

  • Continue to maintain/improve relationships with NATO/UN.

  • Boost bilateral relationships with partners sharing values (e.g., US, Japan, UK, Norway, etc.).

• The EU should continue to focus on ideals while recognizing the shifting context.

  • “Principled pragmatism” + “strategic autonomy.”

Conclusions

• If this is a “hard power” world…

  • The EU is further integrating NATO into the foreign policy architecture.

  • It is increasingly speaking with one voice.

  • It is increasingly viewing threats similarly as the US/NATO.

  • The EU is seeking to boost/invest in common military capabilities but still lacks a solid unified force.

  • NATO membership creates challenges relationally.

  • Unanimity on CSDP creates challenges procedurally.

  • BUT, if a superpower needs BOTH economic + military strength, the EU doesn’t have it…(yet?)

• If this is a “soft power” world…

  • The Single European Market gives it a great deal of leverage via the “Brussels Effect.”

  • The EU is adept at using persuasion to extend its influence through aid conditionality and state-building.

  • It has experience bringing various states together.

  • It is critical for resolving common challenges.

  • It can be considered a “soft power superpower”…

  • But is it enough in the current context?