Plato, Meno

Dialogue theme: What is virtue, and can it be taught or learned?
Socrates and Meno explore whether virtue is a single, unified quality or many different virtues with no common essence.

Meno’s initial stance: virtue varies by role (man, woman, child) and by situation; there are many virtues.
Socrates pushes for a single underlying notion of virtue that unites all its forms.
Question arises: is virtue the same in all people, or are there many distinct virtues that share a common nature?

Socrates uses the analogy of figure and colour to seek a common definition that applies to all virtues.
He demonstrates that terms like “figure” can be defined by a common quality (the limit of a solid), not by listing different kinds of figures.
Aim: find the common nature that makes all virtues what they are, beyond their particular instances (courage, temperance, wisdom, etc.).

Meno’s tentative definition: virtue is the power to govern, including ruling well and avoiding harm; justice and temperance are implied as necessary for governance.
Socrates counters: even if we describe virtue as governance, it must apply to all; does governance require temperance and justice for both sexes and all ages?
Result: virtue seems to require temperance and justice for all, suggesting a common moral core.

Meno proposes: virtue could be a kind of knowledge or wisdom.
Socrates says: if virtue is knowledge, it should be teachable; but there are no reliable teachers of virtue, and many who claim to teach virtue are untrustworthy (Sophists).
The discussion transitions to whether virtue is knowledge, right opinion, or something else.

Socrates distinguishes between true opinion (which guides action effectively) and knowledge (which is tied to justification and permanence).
Example: someone may have a right opinion about how to get to a place and act correctly, but without knowledge, their guidance might fail in the long run.
He uses the analogy of a guide: true opinion can be as useful as knowledge if bound to the cause or justified by reasons.
Conclusion: virtue might be linked to wisdom or prudent skill, but true opinion can sometimes serve as well as knowledge; the binding tie (justification) matters for lasting virtue.

Socrates asks a slave-boy questions about geometry to show the boy can arrive at knowledge through recollection rather than teaching.
The boy initially answers confidently, then recognizes gaps, illustrating recollection: knowledge already present in the soul and awakened by questioning.
Implication: learning may be a process of recollection, not mere instruction; the soul is immortal and has within it the knowledge of universal forms (at least in some sense).
This supports the claim that virtue (and other knowledge) could be learned by recollection rather than by being taught de novo.

If virtue were knowledge, there would be teachers; but there appear to be no reliable, definitive teachers of virtue.
Socrates and Meno scrutinize who truly teaches virtue: Sophists (e.g., Gorgias, Protagoras) are criticized as corrupters, not true teachers of virtue.
Anytus reinforces the worry that public figures who claim to teach virtue may be corrupting rather than virtuous.
The dialogue suggests that true virtue cannot be taught in the conventional sense; if it is teachable, it would require genuine mastery and a trustworthy teacher, which they do not identify.

After exploring several possibilities, the dialogue settles on a non-natural, non-teachable account: virtue is not given by nature or acquired by teaching; it is a divine gift to the virtuous.
Socrates and Meno propose that virtuous character may be inspired or guided by an almost divine spark, possibly requiring a teacher who is a kind of divine guide.
The conclusion emphasizes inquiry into the nature of virtue first; the practical question of teachability is left to those who claim expertise (and is skeptical of such claims).

Virtue as unity: there is a single form or idea of virtue underlying particular virtues, though its full nature remains elusive.
Knowledge vs right opinion: both can guide action, but knowledge (when justified) is superior; right opinion becomes knowledge when it is tied to explanation and justification.
Recollection as mechanism: learning is a process of recollection, implying the soul’s pre-existing knowledge and immortality.
Teachability challenge: lack of reliable teachers casts doubt on virtue as a teachable craft; the Sophists are seen as corrupting influences rather than true educators.
Final stance: virtue comes as a divine gift to the virtuous, though the exact nature of this gift requires further examination of what virtue itself is.

The central question: What is virtue, and can it be taught?
Core tension: unity of virtue vs plurality of virtuous qualities.
Method: elenchus (refutation by questioning) to force agreement on a common essence.
Recollection argument provides a metaphysical backbone (immortal soul; knowledge as recollection).
Practical conclusion: virtue is not simply teachable like a craft; it may be divinely inspired, while true inquiry remains essential to approach any understanding of virtue.