GPE 1700 - PODCASTT INTERVIEW (SEPT. 8)
Overview
Episode premise: Re-examine what a Cold War is by looking back at twentieth‑century history to understand international conflict during a Cold War. The speakers argue we are already in a Cold War with China and Russia, driven by U.S. imperial ambitions, and that current tensions could escalate toward a semi‑hot conflict.
Core claim: We are not merely entering a new Cold War; we are already in one. The United States has been stoking an unnecessary conflict with China, and the current level of hostility could push toward a semi‑hot war.
Purpose of analysis: Use a historical lens to understand what a Cold War actually is, differentiate official narratives from the material realities of imperial power, and assess how postwar geopolitics differ from today.
What is the Cold War? (Definition and scope)
The Cold War was a specific historical rivalry between The United States and The Soviet Union.
It was called a "Cold War" because it was contrasted with a hot war: no direct large‑scale fighting between the major powers, but intense antagonism, espionage, proxy conflicts, and political pressure.
Characteristics of a Cold War:
Decades‑long antagonism
Undermining each other without direct military confrontation
A spectrum of "shenanigans" short of bombing or full‑scale war
The left’s traditional framing (Leninist imperialism) had assumed an imperial conflict among capitalist states; however, the Cold War involved a capitalist US and a socialist USSR, making it an imperial rivalry of a different kind rather than a simple capitalist‑versus‑communist binary.
The Cold War was not globally uniform in scope; imperial dynamics varied by region and by the relative power of the two blocs.
Imperialism and empire in the Cold War
The Cold War was an imperial rivalry, but not in the classic sense of two modern colonial empires clashing in a race for direct sovereignty over other states.
Two key shifts in empire during this era:
The United States pursued a global empire with extensive influence, yet increasingly relied on local proxies rather than direct colonial governance.
The Soviet Union pursued a more limited, regional empire (e.g., Eastern Europe) and sought buffer zones rather than a global colony by direct rule.
What counts as an empire in this context:
A state that dominates or constrains other states, shaping outcomes to reflect its interests.
The US and USSR both fit this broad sense, but their mechanisms differed: the US used global political and economic influence via proxies; the USSR relied more on direct influence and military pressure in its spheres of control.
Important distinction: both empires existed in a global capitalist world, and both sought to expand influence, but the US aimed for global dominance while the USSR aimed to prevent American global hegemony and secure a buffer against Western power.
Asymmetry of the two empires and the global reach
The United States pursued global hegemony; the Soviet Union’s reach was regional and constrained by resources.
The Monroe Doctrine (early U.S. policy) asserted U.S. dominance in Latin America; after 1945, the U.S. expanded its zone of influence into regions formerly controlled by European powers (South and Southeast Asia, North Africa).
The USSR’s reach was strongest in Eastern Europe and to a lesser extent in places like Cuba; outside those areas, its influence was comparatively limited.
This created a fundamental asymmetry: a global dominant power (US) versus a regional challenger (USSR).
The mechanisms of imperial rule migrated from overt colonial governance to coordination with local elites and surrogate regimes.
How the United States pursued empire after 1945
There were two pillars to the U.S. postwar strategy, developed around 1943–1944 ext{-}1945, before the outcome of WWII was known:
Pillar 1 (dismantling colonial empires): Colonial empires (British, French) would have to be dismantled because they posed political and economic impediments to global capitalism and American interests.
Pillar 2 (open markets and American capital): American capital should have special access to all markets; the U.S. would act as a referee for open economic flows globally, enabling capitalist expansion.
The rationale for dismantling colonial barriers was to lessen economic rivalries that could trigger geopolitical conflict and to open global markets for American goods, investment, and financial dominance (e.g., the dollar as a global currency).
Why British and French empires mattered economically: they represented competing blocs of capital; opening markets would allow capital and labor to move more freely and reduce interstate tensions.
The postwar agenda was not primarily about spreading freedom or liberty; it was about restructuring the global political economy to facilitate open global capitalism and American leadership.
The United States anticipated that a globalized economy would reduce geopolitical rivalries by smoothing economic competition.
The U.S. saw itself as best positioned to supervise and stabilize a global capitalist order and to referee disputes among rising economies.
The Soviet Union after WWII: aims and constraints
The USSR faced devastating wartime losses and a ruined economy (e.g., about 30{,}000{,}000 deaths and massive physical destruction).
Moscow sought a buffer zone in Europe to prevent another invasion, leading to the establishment of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and influence over a few other areas (e.g., Cuba).
The Soviet Union’s economic capacity was far weaker than the United States; it could not sustain global expansion on the scale of the US. Its primary objective was strategic security rather than global economic dominance.
Soviet strategy involved subsidizing and supporting autocratic regimes on its western border to ensure geopolitical safety, not extracting wealth from those societies to the same extent as classic empires.
The Ukraine Russia dynamic today echoes this logic of fear of Western encroachment and the desire for buffer zones.
Containment versus expansion: rethinking the conventional view
The conventional description of the Cold War is containment: the U.S. sought to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence.
The speakers argue this is a misreading: from 1943 onward, the United States pursued a strategy of global expansion, using the Soviet threat to justify militarization, the Marshall Plan, and NATO, effectively expanding American capital and geopolitical reach.
The Soviet threat played a dual role: it provided a target to rally domestic support and Congress for military spending, and it created a counterbalance that justified U.S. global commitments.
The Cold War was thus a contest of expanding capitalist circuits under U.S. leadership, with the Soviet Union as a rival that never equaled the scale of American power.
The dynamic of empire in the Soviet bloc differed from classical colonial empires; it was more about protecting Western border security and maintaining a sphere of influence than about exploiting colonies for extractive wealth.
The role of proxies, class alliances, and diplomatic strategy
The new mode of imperial control relied on local elites who aligned with American corporate interests, creating unequal but cooperative power arrangements.
This is described as imperial rule through proxies rather than direct governors—e.g., Diem in Vietnam as a local leader aligned with U.S. interests.
The left in many postwar countries gained influence (e.g., welfare states in Europe and Japan), which made direct militarization less attractive and encouraged indirect control through economic and political partnerships.
In the global South, the U.S. tolerated import substitution policies that protected local industries but ensured they remained integrated into American economic hegemony via capital goods markets and the dollar system.
Why this mattered: America sought to cultivate a global capitalist class in other countries as a bulwark against communism, even if that required tolerating some tariff barriers and selective industrial policy domestically.
The state often insulated foreign policy from direct pressure by capitalists when necessary to pursue long‑term imperial goals; this is a counterpoint to the idea that the state is simply the “executive committee of the bourgeoisie.”
Europe and Japan after the war: welcome, not subjugation
Europe and Japan welcomed U.S. influence because of the welfare states they built and the burden of rebuilding after devastation.
The U.S. military and economic footprint helped offload responsibilities from European and Japanese states while enabling social programs and welfare spending at home and abroad.
This dynamic has been described as "empire by invitation": allied states accepted U.S. leadership and supported a global capitalist framework in exchange for security and economic stability.
This arrangement differed from the self‑ruled colonial empires of the 19th and early 20th centuries because control was exercised through geopolitical alignment and economic integration rather than direct colonial administration.
The global South and the limits of proxy empires
Newly independent countries in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Africa exhibited ambivalence toward American empire due to strong nationalist and leftist movements seeking land reform and nationalization.
The U.S. tolerated import substitution in these regions to foster a domestic capitalist class that would serve as a bulwark against communism, while resisting large‑scale nationalizations or strong communist parties.
In these regions, the relationship with the United States was more conflictual and militarized than in Europe/Japan, but still framed within the broader goal of expanding global capitalism and aligning states with U.S. interests.
The Soviets’ engagement with these regions was cautious and opportunistic, often limited by the need to prioritize European security and the realities of their smaller economy.
The Latin American front saw more explicit Soviet activity (e.g., Cuba, Chile) but Moscow did not seek to subjugate these countries to the same extent as the United States did in other regions; the goal was to gain legitimacy and influence without provoking a broader American backlash.
Vietnam, Cuba, Chile, and the regional dynamics of influence
In Vietnam, the Soviet Union and China offered support but often acted to avoid provoking a stronger U.S. response; their participation was meant to deter or complicate U.S. plans rather than to establish a durable global Soviet empire.
Latin America featured limited Soviet reach due to U.S. economic and political dominance, with the USSR attempting to demonstrate seriousness without triggering full U.S. mobilization in the region.
The overall pattern: even where the Soviet Union could offer support, it faced significant constraints due to relative economic size and the strategic focus on Europe and the Western border.
The present moment: is there a new Cold War? (China, Russia, and multipolarity)
The claim that we are in a Cold War today is contested; several factors distinguish the present from the postwar era:
Economic rivalry is not the same as a structural, system‑level clash. China’s growth is intertwined with the global capitalist system; China is capitalist in practice, even as it has a communist party leadership.
Russia seeks to regain influence and security, but it is not a multinational global empire on par with the United States in economic or geopolitical scale.
The idea of a structural, permanent Cold War is rejected; rather, current tensions are seen as the outcome of U.S. choices to preserve dominance in a multipolar world.
China’s rise is not viewed as an existential threat in the same sense as the USSR was framed; rather, China is a major trading partner and a competitor in specific sectors, not a rival with an automatic, global anti‑capitalist project.
Russia, since 2000, has sought greater inclusion in global governance (e.g., NATO dialogue), not outright exclusion; its goal has been to share in the spoils of global empire rather than to overturn it.
The contemporary narrative of a binary global struggle resembles a political tool to mobilize support for aggression and militarization—this narrative is used by the U.S. to justify increased defense spending and interventionism.
The argument is that there is no natural law forcing rising powers to become permanent geopolitical rivals; rivalry is a product of policy choices by the ruling classes.
If the United States shifts toward a more democratic, populist governance structure, it could ease tensions and wind down imperial competition.
The case for multipolarity and implications for the future
The current trajectory is toward multipolarity: multiple imperial powers with regional spheres of influence plus growing global actors.
This multipolar order could reduce the likelihood of large‑scale global conflict, but it will still involve competition, instability, and coercive actions by powerful states over subordinate regions.
All empires in a multipolar world are likely to employ more subtle mechanisms of dominance (economic leverage, political influence, regional alignments) rather than overt invasions.
The long‑term outlook is uncertain; the balance of power could shift toward more cooperative multipolar arrangements, or it could see renewed great‑power competition depending on policy choices and domestic political dynamics in leading states.
Presenters’ reflections on the nature of power and history
The postwar period had a unique configuration: a vastly dominant United States backed by European and Japanese allies, with a devastated Europe and Asia that allowed U.S. leadership to shape global capitalism.
The expansion of global capitalism reduced the likelihood of direct military confrontation between the U.S. and the USSR, but created new forms of economic and political pressure that maintained the Cold War dynamic.
Realist assumptions about inevitability of rivalry among rising powers are questioned: economic growth does not automatically translate into geopolitics of permanent antagonism; policy choices determine outcomes.
The analysis emphasizes the role of the American state in shaping global capitalism, sometimes at odds with the interests of domestic capitalists, and the ability of the presidency to act with a degree of unilateral power in foreign policy.
Key numerical references and concepts (with LaTeX)
Years and sequences central to the postwar planning: 1943, 1944, 1945
Pillars of plan (two pillars): 2 pillars
Pillar 1: Dismantle colonial empires
Pillar 2: Open access for American capital to all markets
Economic scale indicators:
In 1950, the United States accounted for about 0.25 of global GDP. (approx. one quarter of global economic output)
The U.S. economy was roughly rac{1}{4} the size of the global economy at that time in terms of share of global GDP
Peak human and material costs cited for the USSR during WWII: approximately 30{,}000{,}000 deaths, with extensive destruction of infrastructure
Connections to broader themes and implications
Ethical and practical implications:
The militarization of foreign policy often relies on creating existential threats to justify expansion and intervention.
Economic policy is used to stabilize political power at home while expanding capitalist markets abroad, sometimes at the expense of democratic movements or social welfare domestically and abroad.
Philosophical implications:
The relationship between state power, capitalism, and imperial project shows how ideology (democracy vs. communism) can be deployed to legitimate geopolitical strategies that primarily advance elite interests.
Real-world relevance:
Contemporary debates about China, Russia, NATO, and global trade reflect remnants of Cold War logic, but the current structure is realist and contingent rather than deterministically dictated by a binary system.
The shift toward multipolarity suggests a need to rethink strategies for conflict prevention, economic coordination, and global governance that do not rely on binary antagonisms.
Concluding reflections and credits
The discussion frames the Cold War as an imperial competition driven by U.S. expansion and political economy, with the USSR acting as a counterbalance rather than a symmetric rival.
The presenters argue that current tensions with China and Russia are not an inevitable return to a new Cold War; rather, they reflect contingent choices by the U.S. ruling class in a world where subordinate states have greater capacities to resist.
The speakers advocate for acknowledging imperial dynamics and the constraints of global capitalism to better navigate contemporary geopolitics, potentially reducing large‑scale conflict through more democratic and populist governance.
Production credits: Confronting Capitalism is produced by Catalyst, a journal of theory and strategy; music by Zonky; editing and production credits as listed in the transcript.