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Study Guide on Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes

Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes

Introduction

  • Author: Stephen John Stedman, Senior Research Scholar at Stanford University.

  • Published in International Security, Fall 1997, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 5-53.

  • Central Thesis: The wars of the 1990s confirm the finding that "peacemaking is a risky business," primarily due to the phenomenon of spoilers—individuals or groups who use violence to undermine peace processes due to perceived threats to their power or interests.

Risks of Peacemaking

  • Spoilers: Leaders or factions that feel threatened by peace and resort to violence to sabotage it.

  • Consequences of Failed Peace Agreements:

    • History shows catastrophic results from the success of spoilers, leading to greater casualties than war itself.

    • Examples:

    • Angola (1992): Jonas Savimbi's refusal to accept election results resulted in approximately 300,000 deaths.

    • Rwanda (1994): Hutu extremists rejected the Arusha Accords, leading to a genocide with over 1 million deaths in three months.

Theories of Spoiler Management

  • Research Aims:

    1. Develop a typology of spoilers.

    2. Describe strategies for managing spoilers.

    3. Propose effective strategies for different spoiler types.

    4. Raise awareness of complexities in diagnosing spoilers.

    5. Analyze cases of successful and failed spoiler management.

Definition and Causality of Spoilers

  • Spoilers only exist in the context of a peace process.

  • Peace processes create inherent risks because not all parties perceive peace as beneficial.

  • Types of Spoilers:

    • Inside Spoilers: Have signed peace agreements but fail to implement them (e.g., Habyarimana in Rwanda).

    • Outside Spoilers: Excluded from the peace process and use violence (e.g., CDR in Rwanda).

Characteristics of Spoilers

  • Spoilers differ by goals, commitment, and perspectives on cost and risks.

  • Types of Goals:

    • Limited Goals: Seek recognition or redress but can accept compromises.

    • Total Goals: Seek total power and are less willing to compromise.

    • Greedy Goals: Goals that can expand or contract based on circumstances (savvy to costs and benefits).

Locus of the Spoiler Problem

  • The source of spoiler behavior can be either leaders or followers.

  • Change in leadership can impact spoiler types and behavior.

Strategies of Spoiler Management

  • Custodians of Peace: International actors overseeing peace processes.

  • Three main strategies for managing spoilers:

    1. Inducement: Engaging with spoilers by meeting some of their demands (e.g., protection, fairness).

    2. Socialization: Encouraging spoilers to adhere to norms of acceptable behavior.

    3. Coercion: Using threats and punishments to alter or deter unacceptable behavior.

Specific Strategies Analyzed

  • Inducement: Can include meeting grievances, such as legitimizing a party’s position or ensuring protection from threats.

  • Socialization: More normative, aiming to change spoilers' behavior through established norms.

  • Coercion: Used infrequently; but effective when paired with a consensus about legitimacy among the custodians.

Case Studies of Spoiler Management

  • Analyze multiple case studies ranging from Rwanda, Cambodia, Angola, to Mozambique that demonstrate the complex dynamics in peace processes due to spoilers.

1. Rwanda: Threatened Withdrawal
  • Arusha Peace Accords: Signed in 1993, sought to end conflict.

  • Spoiler Analysis: Misdiagnosis of Habyarimana’s (limited spoiler) role and lack of understanding of the CDR (total spoiler).

  • Outcome: International response led to escalation of violence and eventual genocide.

2. Cambodia: Departure of the Khmer Rouge
  • Paris Peace Accords: Involving multiple factions, including the Khmer Rouge (KR).

  • Management Strategy: The departing train strategy—continuing the peace process without the KR, as long as it is perceived as illegitimate.

  • Outcome: Led to successful elections while marginalizing the KR, ultimately diminishing its power.

3. Angola: The Failure of Inducement
  • Bicesse Agreement: Peace agreement lacked provisions for power-sharing.

  • Failure Causes: Miscalculations of Savimbi’s ambitions led to ineffective inducement strategies, culminating in the return to violence.

4. Mozambique: The Success of Inducement
  • Peace Agreement: Signed in 1992 with RENAMO.

  • Strategies Used: Combination of inducements and socialization, acknowledging Dhlakama’s need for legitimacy.

  • Outcome: Successful peace implementation but awareness needed to prevent obstruction.

Lessons Learned

  • Acknowledge diversity among spoilers to tailor strategies effectively.

  • Successful spoiler management requires a nuanced understanding of local dynamics, international consensus, and organizational adaptability.

  • Importance of recognizing the legitimate grievances of parties in peace processes to ensure enduring peace.

Conclusion

  • Peacemaking in civil wars presents inherent challenges.

  • Successful strategies require recognition of spoilers’ motivations and adaptation to changing dynamics within peace negotiations. The international community must be decisive and united in addressing spoiler behavior to maintain peace processes.