personal identity

-        Problem of personality

o   Key questions

§  Do we always remain one and the same person; not matter how much we change?

§  What kind of change can bring our existence to an end?

§  Is our physical death necessarily the end of us

§  What happens to our self if we have Alzheimer’s and we lose our memories?

·        Are we the still around or have we gone out of existence with the last passing memory?

o   Problem of personal identity

§  What are the values that are most important to us?

§  How unified ourselves really are. Are we each one singular being or is it more than one person in me?

§  What accounts of for the fact that I the person who exists right now – am identical to a person in the past or in the future?

o   Questions about personal identity

§  Who am I? what values are really important to me?

§  How unified am I? Am I a singular being or is it possible that there is more than one person in me?

§  Do I persist through time? In virtue of what am I identical to a person in the past or in the future?

o   Qualitative Identical – two things are qualitatively identical if they look the same, that is, if they have the same properties

o   Numerical Identical – something is numerical identical with something else only are both in the same thing

o   Persistence questions deal exclusively with numerical identity: Do we persist throughout time?

§  Illusion theory

§  Self as substance

·        Body theory

·        Soul theory

§  Self as psychic continuity

·        Memory theory

·        Narrative identity

o   Illusion theory – there is no self that persists through time, we change from one moment to the next and turn constantly into a new person to think that we persist through time is an illusion

o   Body theory – we persist through time as long as we have the same numerical body. The principle is same body same person

o   Soul theory – we persist through time as long as we continue to have the same soul. The principle is same soul same person

o   Memory theory – we persist through time as long as we can remember at least some events from our past life stages the principle is as long as we have overlapping memories the same the numerical person continues to exist

o   Narrative identity – according to the narrative identity view different life stages are attributable to one person if they are incorporated into one story (narrative) of a self

o   The case of illusion theory

§  Observation that we all undergo continuous qualitative change

§  If we all are good empiricist and trust our senses we can observe only change but not a permanent self

·        Heraclitus – its not possible to step twice into the same river

·        James observations that our consciousness undergoes permanent changes appears credible

·        Objections to the identity theory rest on pragmatic concerns: they show that we live our lives in firm belief that we’re going to be around in the future and also that is just to punish people for what they did in the past

o   The case for body theory

§  According to this theory we are identical to our biological bodies and we persist through time as long as our bodies retain functional organization

§  Animalism – the identity conditions for humans are in principle the same as for all other animals that is we are around as long as our biological living bodies are around

§  Sameness here we mean numerical sameness

·        Such change doesn’t mean that we would have become a different person since we are numerically still dealing with same physical body

§  Strongest argument in defense of the body theory is connect with situations in which people fall in to a vegetative state

·        If you think your uncle is stull around even though he has fallen into a permeant vegetative state then you have reason to subscribe to body theory

o   Uncle Steve is around as long as his body is alive

o   The problems for body theory

§  Story of uncle Steve can also be used as a reason to criticize the body theory

·        It is wrong to think that Uncle Steve (the person) has survived the brain damage because a person must be able to think and reason

§  Prospect of life and death – even if life after death isn’t believed to be possible that we continue to exist after our physical bodies stop functioning

·        Body theory runs into problems when it comes to explaining possibility

·        Body theory isn’t compatible with life after death even if god will recreate the same physical body as right before death

§  John locke pointed out that it seems logically possible for two different persons to switch their bodies

·        Ie freaky Friday

§  Body theory of personal identity body switches should be logically impossible – not very convincing

§  Final problem has to do with cases of total amnesia

·        Seems responsible to say that individuals who suffer from complete amnesia have lost their sense of self and are no longer amnesia is still the same person as long as he our she has the numerically somebody

o   The case for soul theory

§  Centered on the idea of a nonphysical soul

§  Principle = same soul same body

§  It can easily explain how life after death is logically possible

o   Problems for soul theory

§  Runs into difficulties when it comes to offering explanations for our beliefs and our judgement about personal identity

§  Leads to a form of skepticism; we can never be sure whether we are dealing with same person because we have no means of checking whether the person continues to have the same soul

·        If you want to avoid this pervasive skepticism about personal identity you need an alternative theory  

§  Locke points out that if our identity consists in having the same soul then its entirely possible that people living today are identical to people in the past

·        Paradoxical consequence of soul theory: Soul today previously attached to julias ceasar that we are the same person

o   Memory theory of personal identity

§  John locke was the first to explore the memory theory of personal identity in greater detail

§  Basic idea: I am identical to a person who existed in the past as long as I can remember at least some events that were experienced by that person

§  My self therefore extends back as far as I can remember past experiences. Thus we are connected with the past as long as we the past is somehow present with in us and we’ll be connected with our present in the future as long as we are able to remember this present

o   Case for memory theory

§  First its logically possible to survive one’s death ex. If after my death a person in heaven can remember what I did on this earth is plausible to conclude that this is the same person as me

§  As long as my memories are around I myself am around

§  Can explain how we can know that the person we see today is the same person we knew in the past

§  Gottfried Leibniz suggested the following thought experiment your offerent to be queen if you undergo a brain washing that will destroy every memory you have

§  Our sense of self seems essentially connected with our ability to rember our past. A person who doesn’t know any of my experiences doesn’t seem to be me even if the person has the same body I currently have

o   Problems for memory theory

§  Compatible with common sense and is able to sole many of the difficulties that plagued body and soul theory

§  Thomas reid pointed out that the memory theory can leas to potential inconsistencies

·        Kid, adult and old versions of the same person

§  Small moderating fixes this indirect and direct memories; the distinction between direct and indirect memories position to solve difficulty raised by Thomas ried

·        Indirect memories – are those that I cant recall directly but a former version of my self was able to recall directly

·        Direct memories – is one that can be recalled consciously right at this very moment

o   Problem of false memories – I am clearly not justified to claim on the basis of these memories that I am identical to napoleon unless I can be sure that these memories are genuine and true

o   Genuine memory - a memory of an experience that in fact happened to me

§  Creates a logical problem as its circular argument

o   Quasi – memory – allows us to state the memory theory of personal identity without presupposing that we already understand the concept of self

o   Reduplication or branching cases – derek parfit points out that in reduplication cases it doesn’t seem to matter with whom were identical

o   Advantages of narrative view

§  This conception connects the metaphysical question of how person persist through time to the ethical questions of what really matters to us

·        Explains our practical concerns for our futures selves much better than any competing conception

·        Cant answer question of how we persist through time without clarifying why certain beliefs values and experiences fit into a coherent story that reaches out into past and future

§  False memories might lead to a false sense of self

·        Marya schechtman suggested in this context that personal narratives must be subject to a reality constraint that’s the self narrative must cohere with basic observational fact about the world and must exhibit a fundamental grap of what the world is like

§  The narrative account of personal identity can also explain the possibility of how we might survive the death of our physical bodies

·        Can accommodate the possibility that ourselves remain the same in a possible after life

o   Problems of narrative view

§  We have seen that the narrative conception defines our identity in terms of a life story that connects our life experiences desiers and actions overtime

·        Hypothetical life story – this means that we do not have to have a story available in our minds but that if we were asked appropriate questions we would be able to respond by producing a story

o   The claim then is that all of us carry with us like a hypothetical life story and that such a hypothetical life story that provides the foundation for our personal identity across time

·        Galen strawson has called people who don’t experiences their inner selves in a diachronic and narrative way as episodic

o   Epidsodics are people who don’t have a strong sense that their present self was present in the distant past or will be present in the future

o   This show that its mistaken to make a narrative self a necessary condition for having a self at all

o   The problem of personal identity

§  We think ourselves as persons and (probably) that we are the same person throughout our lives

§  But we also think that we change as we grow

§  How can this be

o   Three broad and connected issues

§  Who am I?

·        The issue of how you see yourself

§  What am I?

·        The issue of personhood

·        Am I more than one thing

§  What makes me the same person? (Person)

·        Issue of persistence through time?

o   Who am I?

§  Identify set of characteristics and values that makes up who you are?

·        How you see yourself – as an individual, socially in various other roles etc

·        List of descriptors – what happens if those change

o   What am I?

§  An obvious answer is that you are a person

§  But what makes someone or thing a person?

·        The set of necessary and sufficient conditions for personhood

o   Possible criteria for person hood

§  Human being – member of homosapiens

§  Bearer of a soul/psyche

§  Consciousness/sentience

§  Reasoning/ problem solving

§  Self-directed behaviour

§  Communicate/ social visibility or awareness

§  Concept of “self”/ self-awareness

§  Concern for future wellbeing

§  Moral agency/entitled to moral/ legal rights

·        Am I collection of selves/parts of a unified whole

o   Work/school version

o   At home with family

o   On your own

o   With friends

o   Rational vs emotional self

o   “animal” nature

o   Reflective vs non reflective

o   What makes someone the same person throughout life

§  How can a person change overtime yet remain the same person

§  The persistence issue (for persons) is our focus

o   Distinction is sameness

§  When two things are the same properties they’re said to be qualitatively identical

§  When two referring terms pick out one and the same thing we have numerical identical

·        One in the same thing

o   Transitivity of identical (important idea)

§  If a is b and b is c than a is c

§  Acorn to sapling to oak tree (one in the same thing)

o   Initial question

§  What joins your past, present and future self?

·        When did you begin?

·        When will you end?

·        What is essential to you being you?

§  How is it that something can change yet remain the same?

·        Compatibility thesis: a thing can continue as the same thing through changes

·        Incompatibility thesis – a thing cannot be both

§  General issue of identity across time

·        The ship of Theseus example

o   The ship changes parts throughout a voyage

o   Parts change during repairs

o   Is it the same ship

o   Three possible positions

§  Identity is incompatible with change

·        Bodies change but people don’t

·        We are something independent of our bodies

§  Identify incompatible with change

·        Persons are changing bodies only so no identity

§  Alternatives – identity is compatible with change

·        Persons can persist through time yet change while persisting

o   Two main theories for compatibility between

§  Substance theories

§  Psychological theories

o   Self as substance

§  The substance of material body established identity across time

§  Substance of the immaterial soul established identity

·        Animalism (body theory)

o   The physical body is what persists through time

§  Sameness of physical substance

o   We identify people by certain physical and biological features like face, fingerprints, DNA, retinas etc

o   Seems to be consistent with many of our beliefs about ourselves

§  People persist so long as their bodies remain alive

·        Problems for body theory

o   The material atoms of the body changes – 98% replaced every year

o   Some tissues seems not to be replaced eg neurons though they do die off eye lenses and tooth enamel

§  But we don’t identify ourselves with specific tissue

§  Possible responses

·        Identify through continuous casual history

o   Like thesus’s ship

o   Not clear that continuity is enough for identity

o   And substance changes over time

·        The “form”” of the body creates identity

o   Not the material stuff that makes the body up but the essential design or blueprint

o   But then not reall the body as substance

o   And what of identical twins

·        The body theory seems to be in conflict with outher intuitions or beliefs may have

o   Bodies can remai “alive” but the person no longer exists

o   Persons contunye to exist without bodies

o   A total retrograde amnesiac being a different person

o   Body swapping scenarios and stories

o   Though questions over how much we should rely on intuitions

§  The soul theory (self as substance)

·        We are to be identified with a nonphysical substance the soul

o   Allows for certain common traditions intuitions or beliefs especially ones that caused trouble for the body theory

o   Often talk of the body as if its merely something we possess

·        Problems for the soul theory

o   No clear evidence that we have a soul

§  Many related serious problems in the philosophy of the mind

o   Not at all clear that we ever in fact identify people by their soul

§  How would you do that?

§  How coul you ever be sure that someone was the same person as before?

§  Seems to lead to a strong skepticism about personal identity

§  Even skepticism about judgments of our own identity

§  What of the self as substance?

·        not clear that there is some essence – as a substance – that makes you the same person throughout your life

o   lockes psychological view/ memory theory

§  identity established through memories of ones consciousness

§  psychological continuity = sameness of “person” across time

·        not sameness of human being (body)

§  Human being vs persons

·        Human being = just the animal body

·        Person = a thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking

§  Identity of person

·        Consciousness is what makes everyone to be what locke class self thereby distinguishes himself from other thinking things in this alone consist personal identity ie the samness of a rational being and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought so far reaches the ifentity of that person it is the same now it was then

§  Thomas reids problem: what if memories are lost?

·        By lockes theory the older version of the person isn’t identical to the younger version of the same person

·        But id identity is transitive memory theory seems to lead to inconsistencies

·        Reid thinks the inconsistency cant be solved and proposes an alternative view of identity

o   The self is indivisible so it cannot change

o   Things that change but are continuous eg our bodies retain only imperfect identity

o   A self must be something that’s independent of bodily and psychological changes

o   Seems like a reversion to the old soul theory (plato) with all of its problems

o   New possible solution: Direct vs indirect memories

§  Helps with understanding cases of memory loss ie amnesia, alzheimers  

·        We say someone that has lost their memory

·        Not that theres now a new or different person

§  Not clear how memory theory handles false memories

·        What if someone has memories of certain events but these aren’t true or were really events of someone else

o   The person has conused memories of reading a biography say with real memories?

o   Perhaps memories have to be genuine

§  Distinguishes between false and genuine memories

·        Genuine memory – are memories that happened from me

§  Only genuine memories count for identity

§  But this leads to a circularity

o   Quasi-memories (Sydney shoemaker)

§  An experience that;

·        We seem to remember

·        Somebody actually had

·        And is caused by an actual experience

o   Reminder of possible problems for memory theory

§  Thomas rieds problem of lost memories of younger self

§  How to deal with false memories

§  Problem cases: reduplication or branching

·        What if we took a copy of all of you memories and downloaded them into someone else whose memories had been removed

o   Who are you?

o   Are you both people?

o   Narrative conception of personal identity

§  We all construct a narrative of our lives and this establishes our identity

·        Not just a sequence of event and experiences but what links them in some overall story that we use to make sense of our lives

·        Reconstructed past/present/projected future

§  Seems to have both pragmatic and moral implications

·        Our identities made by what matters to us

o   Desires achieved goals etc

·        And what fits with various intuitions

·        Though the story must be real genuine

§  problems for the narrative conception

·        we don’t all create such a narrative

o   though we presumably could if asked

§  though presumably could if asked

·        perhaps some have a much more disjointed sense of their past

o   have no overarching narrative

·        if there is a self then it seems to be independent of a narrative

o   personal identity

§  where are we now with respect to the persistence issue of identity

·        that we’re nummericall the same person throughout our lives

§  conclusion and issues

·        no clear answer to the persistence problem

·        each theory seems to accord with some intuitions but conflict with others

§  some anciet scholars rejected the idea of self

·        herclitus, Daoist, Buddhists

§  because everything is in a constant state of change there is no permanent self

o   humes illusion theory

§  nothing establishes identity

§  our send of self or personal identity is an illusion

§  start with an empiricist epistemology

·        if all we know are our empirical observations then all we have is knowledge of is the observable changes that occur

·        thus is there no knowledge of any permanence ie we see no permanent self that establishes identity through bodily change

§  hume on the self as a substance

·        we habe no experience of the self as a thing

o   we have no experience of the self as a thing       

§  we have no experience of the self as a thing

§  all we know is the sequence of conscious experiences and the ideas that pass before the mind or presented in the mind = bundle theory

·        the mind is a theatre where different perceptions appear interact and change constantly. Theres no true simplicity or constant identity in the mind. Our perspection come from or what theyre made of

§  the illusion

·        our idea then of there being a thing that is the permanent self is an illusion

o   not only us ut that our bodies are in a perpetal state of change so too are our minds

o   there is nothing left over from the changing body and changing consciousness

§  priblems for the illusion theory

·        serious pragmatic ussues

o   what would your life be like if this were true

o   how would you govern your life if it were truw that yours and others perceived identity was really and illusion?

§  Saving for retirement? Punish people for crimes committed in the past?

·        Reid – we have a natural conviction or invincible belief in our continue existence

o   Reids view that we establish our continued existence through re-identifying ourselves as a misunderstanding of how we use “I”

§  We can have successive in instances of I am here now without there being anything for their linking them

·        Hume says that we are naturally inclined to confuse

o   The presence of a succession of things self identifiers

o   With the idea that here is something persisting through the succession

o   We have repeated experiences of awareness of our own consciousness

o   No experience if anything that persists through these

·        Metaphysical distinction to help us

o   Realism – certain entities are real and not reducible

§  Pairs of socks are real

o   Reductionism – certain entities aren’t real but are reducible to other things

§  Pairs of socks don’t exist because its just a set of two socks

o   eliminativism – certain entities aren’t real nor reducible they don’t exist and were just confused into thinking that they do exist

§  no such thing as a pair of socks just two separate socks exist. Stop saying pair.

o   Science is largely deductive

§  Most science understanding aims to explain more obvious things in terms of something simpler or more fundamental

§  Which then too can be reduced to something even more fundamental

o   Three metaphysical characteristic about self

§  Realism – the self is a real (enduring) entity (plato/reid)

§  Reductionism – the self is reducible to various (psychological) parts

§  Eliminativism – no such thing as the self (hume)

·        The self refers to nothing at all

o   Hume seems to have a mixed response

§  Mixed between reductionism and eliminativism

·        But thinks that there is no fact of the matter on this issue

·        Its more like a verbal dispute

·        And he sees no reason to think that the identity of persons is special

o   Brain fission/ reduplication cases (perek parfit)

§  We cannot decide on what establishes identity

§  Three possibilities

·        Original person doesn’t survive

·        Person survives as both (dual person)

·        Person survives as just one of the new two versions

§  Parfit argues that all are implausible so we need to re-think the whole idea of personal identity

·        Identity more like Wittgenstein twist fibre thread

o   Life is like little bits or rope winded together to make one thick rope so no experience stays with  you forever

·        Ther is both physical and psychological continuity

·        But continuity might be disrupted in some cases

§  Result of parfits considerations

·        I am continuous with my younger sef but not necessarily identical with my younger self

o   There isn’t always a decisive answer to questions of numerical identity

·        But what matter is survival not identity

o   Our identity is more like that of a sports team or nation overtime

o