Reconciling New Zealand Citizenship with Māori Nationalisms – Key Concepts

Abstract Overview

This set of notes distils every concept, argument, statistic and reference in Louise Humpage’s article on reconciling New Zealand citizenship with Māori nationalisms. The text tracks how the New Zealand state has tried – across four historic “citizenship regimes” – to absorb Māori into a single civic project while simultaneously offering only symbolic recognition of Māori nationhood. Each regime, spanning distinct historical periods, is presented with its specific ideological context, concrete policy mechanisms, diverse Māori responses (ranging from resistance to collaboration), perceived gains for both state and Māori, inherent limitations, and the enduring tension between state-centred nation-building and Indigenous self-determination.

Definitions, Core Ideas and Theoretical Foundations

Citizenship is framed as a set of judicial, political, economic, and cultural practices through which a person becomes a competent member of society and gains access to crucial resources and decision-making processes. It encompasses legal status (rights and duties), political participation (voting, public office), economic provision (welfare, employment), and cultural identification (belonging, identity). Nationalism, although distinct from the concept of citizenship solidarity that binds individuals to a state, is integral to modern citizenship because it supplies the foundational narrative of a united “nation” whose collective will is expressed through the state. Māori nationalisms—including localised tribal (hapū) movements, broader multi-tribal (iwi confederations) initiatives, and pan-Māori movements encompassing all Māori—constitute relational, layered assertions of autonomy (tino rangatiratanga). These assertions seldom seek full secession from the New Zealand state but routinely demand intra-state sovereignty, effectively seeking recognition as “nations within” the existing state structure, with distinct rights and self-governing capacities.

Citizenship, Nationalism and Indigenous Peoples

Liberal nation-states inherently conflate the concept of “nation” (a people with shared identity) and “state” (a political entity with defined territory), privileging a civic nationalism that tolerates pluralism only when it does not fundamentally undermine a singular national identity. This often leads to the suppression or absorption of sub-state nationalisms. Indigenous peoples, in contrast, often mobilise older, people-centred notions of nationhood, emphasising deep ancestral ties, unique cultural practices, and the inherent right to self-govern based on pre-colonial sovereignty. Because Māori, unlike many Indigenous groups globally, were never physically segregated onto reservations (though land was extensively alienated), their identities are highly hybridised, increasing the overlap of “ethnic” (Māori cultural markers) and “civic” (New Zealand citizen markers) attributes. This complicates the simplistic binary of state versus tribe or nation. Humpage adopts Anthony D. Smith’s broad definition of nationalism as movements for autonomy, unity, and identity, thereby justifying the term “Māori nationalism” even when explicit talk of “Māori nations” as self-contained polities is uncommon in everyday discourse in Aotearoa (New Zealand).

Four Citizenship Regimes in New Zealand

Political Citizenship Regime (1840 ext{–}1920 ext{s})

• Key legislation: Treaty of Waitangi (1840) established the basis of engagement; Constitution Act (1852) defined the new colonial governance structure; creation of four Māori parliamentary seats (1867) ostensibly granted political representation.

• Though Māori were granted British citizenship (Article Three of the Treaty, guaranteeing rights as British subjects), this was often in exchange for limited governance concessions (Article One, ceding sovereignty to the Crown) and vague promises of protection of property (Article Two, guaranteeing tino rangatiratanga over lands, forests, fisheries, and treasures). The Crown's interpretation of ceded sovereignty often overshadowed the guarantees of rangatiratanga.

• Māori institutions before colonisation: hapū (sub-tribes/clans) held effective authority over specific territories and resources; iwi (tribes) typically became broader external defence coalitions in times of war or large-scale resource management. The 1835 Declaration of Independence, signed by a confederation of northern chiefs, asserted the independence of united tribes, foreshadowing later multi-tribal nationalism and claims to self-determination.

• Examples of state tension management: Rūnanga councils (1858) and later the Land & Regional Māori Councils (1900) were established by the Crown. These councils symbolically recognised tribal authority and Māori social structures, yet practically served as mechanisms for colonial control, by devolving minor administrative tasks while undermining genuine self-governance.

• Resistance & nationalism: Significant movements such as the Kīngitanga (Māori King Movement, active from 1854 onward, advocating for a pan-Māori sovereign), the Kauhanganui convention (1891), and the establishment of a parallel Māori parliament (Te Kotahitanga, also 1891) emerged. These movements sought to maintain Māori political autonomy and collective identity in the face of colonisation.

• Outcome: Incorporation into colonial electoral and judicial structures, such as the Native Land Court, systematically blurred traditional tribal boundaries and Māori land tenure, leading to land alienation. This process, however, also fostered new forms of pan-Māori activism (e.g., the Rātana–Labour alliance in the 1930s, uniting religious and political Māori leadership), but ultimately eroded autonomous Māori jurisdiction on the ground.

Social Citizenship Regime (1930 ext{s} ext{–}early ext{ }1980 ext{s})

• Ideological pivot: The rise of the welfare state, underpinned by universalist principles and an egalitarian nationalism that promoted New Zealand as a distinct, inclusive “people’s society” where all citizens would enjoy equal access to social provisions.

• Key policy: The Social Security Act (1938) promised equal entitlements to all New Zealanders; however, in practice, Māori often received lower payments due to discriminatory administrative practices and lack of access to information and services.

• The Department of Māori Affairs (DMA) expanded its role significantly to manage the dramatic urbanisation of Māori (Māori in cities rose from 20 ext{%}
ightarrow80 ext{%} between 1944 and 1970), as many Māori moved to urban centres for employment opportunities.

• Integration rhetoric (epitomised by the Hunn Report of 1961) replaced overt assimilation policies. The new approach sought to maintain a superficial notion of “Māori culture” (chiefly customs and language) within a dominant monocultural society, rather than completely eradicating it.

• Māori voluntary organisations like Tribal Committees and the Māori Women’s Welfare League partnered with the DMA. While the DMA sought to disseminate “desired behaviour” (e.g., European domestic practices, hygiene) and ease urban transition, these organizations simultaneously lobbied for resources for their communities and preserved cultural knowledge, demonstrating a complex relationship of complicity and resistance.

• Limits & discontent: While universalist programmes aimed for equality, they often ignored distinct Māori treaty rights and the structural inequalities faced by Māori. This neglect fuelled growing discontent, leading to significant land marches, occupations (such as Bastion Point in 1977), and the eventual creation of the Waitangi Tribunal (1975), a semi-judicial body tasked with investigating breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi.

• Solidarity narrative: The state actively linked social equality with a singular national identity, striving to foster a unified citizenry. However, Māori loyalty remained ambivalent, often prioritising tribal or pan-Māori affiliations, prompting continued and increasingly vocal pan-Māori political protest.

Contractual Citizenship Regime (late ext{ }1980 ext{s} ext{–}1990 ext{s})

• Context: This era was dominated by widespread neoliberal restructuring, high unemployment rates, and a severe fiscal crisis in New Zealand. Citizenship was explicitly reframed as a series of reciprocal contracts between the individual and the state, with social benefits becoming increasingly means- and work-tested, shifting from universal rights to conditional entitlements.

• Outcomes for Māori: The corporatisation and privatisation of state assets led to significant job losses, disproportionately affecting Māori communities. This increased reliance on welfare just as state entitlements shrank and became harder to access, exacerbating socio-economic disparities.

• “Devolution” was tested in Māori Affairs: Funding for social services and cultural initiatives increasingly shifted from direct state provision to iwi (tribal) providers. This process, framed under the banner of biculturalism and marketed as Māori self-determination, was often structured through principal–agent contracts. This meant iwi organisations became contractors delivering state services, rather than having genuine autonomy over their own resources and governance.

• Retribalisation: The Waitangi Tribunal’s land-focused claims settlement process, which often recognised iwi as the primary claimants, inadvertently encouraged an iwi-centred identity as the basis for receiving reparations. This led to a resurgence of iwi structures. However, urban Māori groups (e.g., Te Whānau o Waipareira, a prominent urban Māori authority in West Auckland) litigated for inclusion, arguing that the iwi-centric model breached Treaty guarantees for all Māori, regardless of tribal affiliation or location.

• National politics: The introduction of Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP) representation in 1996 expanded the number of Māori seats from four to six (later seven). In 1996, the New Zealand First party, led by Winston Peters (a prominent Māori politician), captured all six Māori seats. However, strict party discipline often truncated the real influence Māori representatives could exert on policy within the broader party agenda.

• Result: This regime resulted in administrative authority and responsibility being devolved to Māori providers without genuine sovereignty. It was seen by many critics as “corporate governance” of social services rather than a pathway to true Māori nationhood or self-determination.

Active Citizenship Regime (1999 ext{–}present, still evolving)

• Third Way inspiration: Drawing from “Third Way” political philosophy popular in the late 1990s, this regime acknowledged that the market alone could not meet all social needs. The state consequently invested in “social development” initiatives aimed at enhancing social inclusion, but paid work remained primary responsibility for citizens.

• Flagship initiative: “Closing the Gaps” (2000) was a cornerstone policy under the Labour government, designed to address disparities between Māori and non-Māori. It funded two main areas: (1) improving government performance to better serve Māori needs, and (2) providing Māori capacity-building grants to support Māori communities and organisations. However, critics, notably the opposition National Party, labelled it “social apartheid” for its targeted nature, prompting re-branding under the more universalist banner of “social inclusion” in 2004.

• Foreshore & Seabed crisis (2003 ext{–}2004): This was a major flashpoint. The Court of Appeal affirmed in 2003 that iwi could potentially test customary title to the foreshore and seabed in court. In response, the Labour government legislated against this ruling through the Foreshore and Seabed Act (2004), asserting public domain and Crown ownership “for all New Zealanders.” This move sparked widespread Māori protest and was internationally condemned by human rights bodies, notably the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in 2005 and the UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples in 2006, for potentially violating Māori customary rights.

• Political fallout: Tariana Turia, a Labour MP, quit the party in protest over the Foreshore and Seabed Act and co-founded the Māori Party in 2004 with Pita Sharples. The party successfully won 4 of the 7 Māori seats in the 2005 general election, signalling a significant revival of pan-Māori political mobilisation and representation. Simultaneously, talks emerged for a pan-tribal forum under the Kīngitanga (Māori King) after the death of Queen Te Atairangikaahu in 2006, illustrating a parallel push for unity outside mainstream politics.

• Continuing contradiction: Labour consistently framed Māori as one disadvantaged group within the broader New Zealand nation, thus justifying social inclusion policies. However, it steadfastly denied treaty-based distinctiveness or collective rights when these claims threatened state prerogatives or perceived national unity, demonstrating the enduring tension between universalism and Indigenous nationhood.

Persistent Tension: Symbolic Recognition versus Real Power

State actions have repeatedly followed a pattern of extending individual rights to Māori while staunchly resisting the recognition or establishment of collective Māori authority and sovereignty. Symbolic gestures, such as separate Māori parliamentary seats (from 1867), the establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal (1975), the creation of Rūnanga councils, and later, devolution contracts to Māori providers, have served to pacify protest and create an appearance of progress. However, these measures have largely left the fundamental issue of Māori sovereignty and collective self-determination untouched. Governments consistently fear that acknowledging Māori nationalism will fracture civic unity, often conflating social cohesion with a monocultural nation-state where only one national identity is legitimate. The result is a cyclical pattern: limited concession is made → Māori protest subsides temporarily → but the underlying structural tension between state sovereignty and Indigenous self-determination inevitably resurfaces, leading to renewed calls for change.

Revisioning Citizenship and Solidarity

International scholarship proposes freeing citizenship from its historical ties to nation-state exclusivity, offering models that accommodate multiple loyalties and overlapping jurisdictions. These include “differentiated citizenship” (where specific groups hold distinct rights), “multicultural citizenship” (recognising diverse cultural groups within a single state), “nested citizenship” (layered identities within local, regional, and national polities), “multinational citizenship” (where two or more nations coexist within one state), or “post-sovereign” models (rethinking traditional state sovereignty). For New Zealand, meaningful, structural change would involve:

1. Constitutional reform recognising Māori not merely as a minority group, but as treaty partners and an autonomous “founding nation” alongside the settler population. This would reshape the fundamental legal and political framework of the country.

2. Multilevel solidarity (as proposed by Craig Calhoun): Recognising interwoven loyalties within communities (e.g., whānau and hapū), broader categories (e.g., Māori nation and ethnic New Zealanders), and overarching publics (the overall New Zealand polity). This allows for solidarity at different scales without requiring a singular, monolithic identity.

3. Iris Marion Young’s “differentiated solidarity”: This concept emphasises mutual respect and shared obligations to minimise domination, acknowledging interdependence between groups rather than absolute non-interference. It moves beyond mere tolerance to active engagement in addressing historical injustices.

4. Reframing Māori claims from adversarial independence to relational autonomy within jointly governed institutions. This would involve co-designing governance structures that allow Māori to exercise self-determination while remaining part of the broader New Zealand state.

Key Reports, Legislation, Movements & Scholars

• Reports: Hunn Report (1961), which outlined the policy of integration for Māori; Royal Commission on Social Policy (1988), a significant review of New Zealand's welfare state in the context of neoliberal reforms.

• Legislation: Treaty of Waitangi (1840) as the foundational document; Social Security Act (1938), establishing the welfare state; Treaty of Waitangi Act (1975), establishing the Waitangi Tribunal; Foreshore & Seabed Act (2004), asserting Crown ownership of the coastal area.

• Movements: Kīngitanga (Māori King Movement), a pan-Māori political and spiritual movement; Rātana, a Māori political-religious movement; Biculturalism policy, a state-led attempt to formally recognise Māori culture; Māori Party, a contemporary Indigenous political party.

• Key academics cited: Kymlicka (on multicultural citizenship), Tully (on constitutionalism and Indigenous rights), Young (on differentiated solidarity), Castles & Davidson (on citizenship and migration), Jenson (on social policy and citizenship), Calhoun (on nationalism and solidarity).

Statistical & Quantitative References

• Māori proportion of the population: Approximately 15 ext{%} (MSD 2005 estimate).

• Urbanisation shift: Rural Māori dropped from approximately 75 ext{%} (in 1945) to urban Māori comprising 80 ext{%} (within 25 years by 1970), indicating a rapid demographic and social change.

• Parliamentary seats: Separate Māori seats initially established at 4 (from 1867), expanded to 6 (1996) with the introduction of MMP, and then to 7 (2002) reflecting demographic shifts.

• Māori Party success: Won 4 of the 7 Māori seats in the 2005 general election, demonstrating significant political mobilisation.

• Time frames for regimes: Political (1840 ext{–}1920s); Social (1930s ext{–}early ext{ }1980s); Contractual (late ext{ }1980s ext{–}1990s); Active (1999 ext{–}present).

Ethical, Philosophical & Practical Implications

Acknowledging Māori nationhood would necessitate the settler state to genuinely share power and authority, directly challenging entrenched liberal assumptions that presuppose “one territory equals one sovereign.” Ethically, differentiated citizenship aligns with principles of justice by affirming Indigenous peoples’ prior occupancy and inherent relational autonomy, moving beyond mere procedural equality to substantive equity. Practically, it suggests the need for significant redesign of governance structures, such as introducing bicameralism (a two-chamber parliament, potentially with a dedicated Māori house), establishing a distinct Māori parliament, or implementing co-management of resources and environmental domains. These reforms would aim to devolve real power while maintaining overall state integrity and shared national interests. Philosophically, it reframes solidarity from a state-imposed uniformity to a dynamic, negotiated interdependence among distinct peoples, effectively countering fears of social fragmentation by highlighting that true national cohesion arises from the pursuit of justice and mutual respect, not from imposed uniformity or the suppression of difference.

Concluding Synthesis

Across four distinct citizenship regimes, Māori have consistently been granted ever-expanding individual rights as citizens yet have been systematically denied collective sovereignty and recognition as a distinct nation. Each state strategy—whether the universalism of the welfare state, the individualised contractualism of neoliberalism, or the inclusion narrative of the Third Way—has sought to achieve social cohesion through assimilation or integration but has ultimately reproduced the root problem: the state’s conflation of “nation” with “state,” resisting any form of plural nationhood. The article ultimately calls for a new, differentiated citizenship decoupled from a