(Mod 12) After Iraq (Goldberg)

1. The Middle East’s Borders Are Artificial and Fragile

  • Britain and France invented the modern Middle East after WWI, drawing borders that ignored ethnic and sectarian realities.

  • These borders created states like Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and split Palestine in contradictory ways.

  • The region became unstable because colonial powers never built durable political systems.

2. U.S. Actions After 9/11 Exposed the Fragility of the Region

  • The Iraq War revealed how tenuous and artificial Middle Eastern borders are.

  • The Bush administration hoped to transform the region through democracy, but instead triggered unintended, destabilizing consequences.

  • Experts describe the region undergoing “wholesale change” — but not the change the U.S. intended.

3. The Rise of Sectarian Conflict

  • A major consequence of the Iraq invasion is the potential for a Sunni–Shia regional war.

  • Could involve Saudi Arabia vs. Iran, directly or through proxies in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province.

  • Jordan’s King Abdullah warned of a growing “Shiite Crescent.”

4. Possible Breakup of Multiple States

  • Iraq may split into three parts (Kurdish, Sunni Arab, Shiite Arab).

  • Other states could fracture:

    • Lebanon partly absorbed by Syria

    • Khuzestan breaking from Iran

    • Bahrain annexed by Iran

    • Yemen expanding into Saudi Arabia

    • New Palestinian states

    • Pakistan threatened by ethnic divisions (Baluch, Pashtuns)

Core idea: The entire Middle East state system is an open question.

5. The Kurdish Question

  • Kurds suffered genocide under Saddam and have long sought independence.

  • Kurdistan is already functionally independent: own army, taxes, oil deals, banned Iraqi flag.

  • Kurdish independence was even part of Wilson’s Fourteen Points.

  • Turkey opposes Kurdish independence, but Kurds remain America’s most reliable allies in Iraq.

6. Competing U.S. Foreign‑Policy Philosophies

Neoconservatives

  • Believed democracy would spread rapidly after Saddam fell.

  • Expected authoritarian regimes to collapse and al‑Qaeda to lose appeal.

  • Reality: democracy did not take root, instability increased.

Realists

  • Prioritize stability over democracy.

  • Argue U.S. support for dictators (Egypt, Saudi Arabia) kept peace — but also fueled anti‑American extremism.

Goldberg’s Argument

  • The U.S. needs a hybrid approach:

    • Neocon belief in democracy

    • Realist caution about unintended consequences

7. Iraq’s Future: Uncertain and Long‑Term

  • The surge reduced violence, but:

    • Sunnis and Shias may simply be repositioning for future conflict.

    • Power‑sharing remains unlikely.

  • Experts predict 10+ years before sectarian conflict burns out.

8. Democracy Must Be a Slow, Generational Project

  • Real change requires:

    • Strong universities

    • Independent courts

    • Support for journalists

    • Careful, non‑discrediting support for activists

  • Democracy in the Middle East is a 50‑year project, not a 5‑year one.

9. America’s Limits

  • The U.S. cannot re‑engineer the Middle East, just as Britain failed before it.

  • Edward Luttwak: “In the Middle East, it doesn’t help to be nice to them, or to bomb them.”

  • U.S. moral credibility has been damaged by torture and the Iraq War.

10. Kirkuk as the Symbol of the Next Phase

  • Kirkuk = “the Kurds’ Jerusalem.”

  • Saddam expelled Kurds and replaced them with Arabs; the government is slowly reversing this.

  • Kurdish leaders emphasize justice without revenge and quietly expect a “new, different situation” (independence).

  • The governor: “We won’t go back to the way it was before.”