POL WEEK 7 Dominant Party Systems lecture 5
POL1005S 2025: Dominant Party Systems
Introduction to Party Systems
Previous lectures explored regime types: democratic, authoritarian, and hybrid regimes.
The concept of a "party system" is primarily derived from the study of democratic countries.
Multi-party systems can exist in electoral autocracies, but the incumbent party ensures its victory through various means.
Dominant party systems represent a special category that shares some similarities with hybrid regimes.
Types of Party Systems
One-party system: A single political party holds and controls all political power.
Dominant-party system (or One-Party Dominant System - OPD): A single party secures repeated electoral victories, often for two decades or more, and consistently dominates the political agenda. Definitions can vary, and such systems can still be democratic.
Two-party system: Two major political parties regularly rotate in office.
Multi-party system: Three or more major political parties are capable of winning office, either individually or as part of a coalition government.
Non-partisan system: Elections are not primarily determined by competition between distinct political parties.
Defining "Dominant Party System"
Characterized by the extended electoral dominance of a single party within a representative democracy or an electoral autocracy.
According to some definitions, it also implies:
The continuous capacity to attract significant support from substantial electorates over a prolonged period.
The presence of a unifying historical project that binds the party's supporters and ideology.
The ability to effectively dominate and set the policy agenda for the entire country.
Duverger ($1954$): Defined a dominant party as one 'identified with an epoch', whose ideas thoroughly dominate public debate, and whose pre-eminent position is acknowledged by both citizens and political elites alike ($1954: 308$-$9$).
Why Dominant Party Systems are Interesting: Overlap with Electoral Autocracy/Hybrid Regimes
Key features:
Elections are consistently held.
Repression, if present, is generally "soft," not overtly brutal.
There is typically no crude, outcome-changing electoral rigging or fraud.
Only a limited number of journalists may be killed or jailed, if any.
In some cases (e.g., Sweden, Japan, South Africa post-apartheid), voters may simply choose the same party democratically over extended periods.
Greene's ($2010$) perspective:
Argues that elections within these systems are still "meaningful."
Nonetheless, one party consistently wins elections for periods ranging from 2 to 6 decades.
Greene ($2010$) identified 17 such dominant party systems globally in his research.
The African National Congress (ANC) as a Dominant Party Example
In South Africa's democratic era, the ANC secured clear majorities in national elections in 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2019.
The ANC possesses a strong historical project, perceiving itself as a national liberation movement embodying a project that transcends traditional divisions of class, region, and race.
It articulates a strategic vision framed as a 'national democratic revolution'.
Comparative studies of party dominance can be fruitfully applied to understand political developments in South Africa.
Consequences of One-Party Dominance (OPD)
Influential Comparative Critique (Giliomee & Simkins, $1999$)
Hermann Giliomee and Charles Simkins edited The Awkward Embrace: One-Party Domination and Democracy in Industrialising Countries (London: Routledge, 1999$).
This work is not a rigid "theory" (a rigorous system based on general principles explaining outcomes) but rather acts as an analytical lens or framework.
It examines OPD through case studies of "semi-industrialised countries" with dominant parties, including Taiwan, Mexico, Singapore, Botswana, and Malaysia.
Key findings:
Dominant parties exhibit a strong tendency to conflate party interests with state apparatus.
There is a propensity to appoint party loyalists, even if inappropriate, to senior state positions.
The legitimacy of opposition parties is frequently undermined.
Reddy's ($2005$) Rejoinder: Not Uniformly Negative
Reddy ($2005$) expressed skepticism regarding the uniformly negative consequences often attributed to OPD.
Argued that parties and party systems in the studied contexts differ significantly from typical Western cases.
Challenged the case selection made by Giliomee and Simkins.
Conducted a comparative case study of the Indian National Congress and the African National Congress.
Proposed that electoral success for dominant parties can be significantly based on genuine legitimacy.
"The Congress System" (as understood by Reddy):
A dominant party characterized by mass-based legitimacy.
Features internal factional politics that aim for consensus-seeking.
Opposition parties often cooperate with these internal factions to influence the broader political agenda.
Reddy's analysis provides a fresh perspective on understanding OPD, particularly in South Africa.
Butler's ($2009$) Synthesis: Negative AND Positive Consequences
Negative Consequences:
Accrual of significant incumbency advantages.
Tendency to delegitimize or strategically co-opt opposition forces.
Blurring of boundaries between the party and the state, often through practices like "deployment."
Interference with media independence.
Suppression of legitimate opposition voices and factions within the dominant party itself.
Positive Consequences:
Promotion of political stability.
Potential for internal pluralism/rotation of power and the externalization of factions that might otherwise destabilize the party.
Ability to curtail violent, racial, and ethnic politics by presenting an overarching national project.
Capacity to make "hard decisions" due to a strong mandate and reduced need for short-term electoral appeasement.
Summary of Consequences (Butler $2009$)
"Robust" opposition, while desirable, can be destabilizing if sound, legitimate, and trusted state institutions are not yet fully established.
Prolonged ANC dominance in South Africa has been identified as causing increasing harm, manifesting in intensified state-party integration, the prevalence of patronage politics, the delegitimation of opposition, and the systematic abuse of incumbency privileges.
The Inevitable End of OPD: Consequences and Outcomes
The dominance of any dominant party is ultimately inevitable.
Key questions arise: When will it end? How will it end? What will be the outcome?
The transition could serve as a 'bridge' either to a democratic two- or multi-party system or, conversely, to a one-party authoritarian regime (Du Toit 1999; Spiess 2002).
While the negative consequences of OPD may ease with its decline, the potential benefits associated with such systems will also likely be lost.
A comprehensive understanding requires a synthesis of arguments drawn primarily from comparative studies, but with significant weight given to domestic factors.
Causes of OPD (Greene $2010$)
"Hyper-incumbency advantages": A core theory explaining the perpetuation of OPD.
State resources for partisan advantage: The dominant party leverages state assets and functions for its own political gain.
"Pork-barrel" projects: Allocation of public funds or projects to specific areas to gain political support.
State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) budgets: Diverting SOE budgets to benefit party-owned businesses or party loyalists.
Public sector employment: Using civil service jobs as a means of patronage or to bolster party support.
Direct state resources: Utilizing government facilities, workers, and advertising for party campaigns.
Private funders: Employing a mix of incentives and threats to secure financial contributions from the private sector.
Public funding formula: Manipulating the formula for public funding of political parties to disproportionately benefit the dominant party.
Dominance undermining opposition: The very fact of dominance leads to ideological weakening of the opposition and makes successful coalition formation among opposition parties more difficult.
Greene's analysis originated from a case study of Mexico.
This led to the generation of the "resources theory" of OPD.
The theory has subsequently been tested across various countries to determine its general applicability.
Introduction to Party Systems
Previous lectures explored various regime types, including established democratic, authoritarian, and hybrid regimes. The analytical concept of a "party system" is primarily derived from and extensively studied within the context of democratic countries, where electoral competition is a defining feature.
While multi-party systems can technically exist in electoral autocracies, the incumbent or dominant party in such contexts typically employs a range of mechanisms, both overt and subtle, to ensure its continued victory and maintain control, thereby distorting genuine electoral competition.
Dominant party systems represent a particularly intricate and special category that often shares significant analytical overlaps and operational similarities with hybrid regimes, balancing elements of electoral competition with sustained, entrenched power.
Types of Party Systems
One-party system: In this highly centralized model, a single political party legally holds and exclusively controls all political power, often suppressing or outlawing alternative political formations. Elections, if held, are typically ceremonial or serve to legitimize the ruling party.
Dominant-party system (or One-Party Dominant System - OPD): Characterized by a single political party that secures repeated and overwhelming electoral victories over an extended period, frequently spanning two decades or more. This party consistently dominates the political agenda and public discourse. While definitions can vary regarding the degree of democratic health, such systems can still function within a democratic framework, particularly if elections are genuinely contested and the opposition is not systematically repressed.
Two-party system: This system involves two major political parties that regularly alternate in holding office. While other minor parties may exist, political power predominantly cycles between these two dominant forces, each capable of forming a government independently.
Multi-party system: In contrast, this system features three or more major political parties, all of which are capable of winning office, either by securing an outright majority or, more commonly, by forming coalition governments with other parties to achieve legislative control.
Non-partisan system: In this less common arrangement, elections are not primarily determined by competition between distinct political parties. Instead, candidates often run as individuals based on their merits or local affiliations, and party labels play a minimal or absent role in the electoral process.
Defining "Dominant Party System"
A dominant party system is fundamentally characterized by the extended electoral dominance of a single party within either a representative democracy or an electoral autocracy. This dominance is not simply about winning elections but about deeply embedding the party's influence throughout the political landscape.
According to some widely accepted definitions, it also implies:
The continuous capacity to attract and sustain significant support from substantial segments of the electorate over an extended and prolonged period, often due to a strong historical legacy or perceived competence.
The presence of a unifying historical project or overarching narrative that effectively binds the party's diverse supporters and its core ideology, providing a sense of shared purpose and identity.
The unchallenged ability to effectively dominate and set the policy agenda for the entire country, influencing national discourse and guiding governmental priorities without significant challenge from opposition forces or other state actors.
Duverger ($1954$): Famously defined a dominant party as one 'identified with an epoch', suggesting that its influence is so profound that it shapes the very character and direction of an era. He argued that such a party's ideas thoroughly dominate public debate, setting the terms of political discussion, and that its pre-eminent position is widely acknowledged and accepted by both ordinary citizens and the political elites alike ($1954: 308$-$9$).
Why Dominant Party Systems are Interesting: Overlap with Electoral Autocracy/Hybrid Regimes
Dominant party systems offer a fascinating case study precisely because they often blur the lines between democratic and authoritarian practices, leading to an overlap with electoral autocracies or hybrid regimes.
Key features that highlight this overlap:
Elections are consistently held, providing a veneer of democratic legitimacy, even if the playing field is heavily skewed.
Repression, if and when present, is generally "soft," meaning it is not overtly brutal or large-scale. This might involve subtle intimidation, selective legal action, or control over media, rather than widespread violence or mass incarcerations.
There is typically no crude, overt, or outcome-changing electoral rigging or fraud that would immediately invalidate the election results in the eyes of international observers. Instead, advantages are built through institutional control and resource manipulation.
Only a limited number of journalists or political activists may be killed or jailed, if any, which distinguishes them from harsher authoritarian regimes and maintains a perception of relative openness.
In some cases (e.g., Sweden with the Social Democrats, Japan with the Liberal Democratic Party, or South Africa post-apartheid with the ANC), voters may simply choose the same party democratically over extended periods due to genuine electoral support, strong historical legitimacy, or perceived successes, rather than coercion.
Greene's ($2010$) perspective:
Argues that elections within these systems, despite the dominant party's entrenched power, are still considered "meaningful." This implies that the outcomes are not entirely predetermined and that there is still some degree of voter agency and consequence, even if limited.
Nonetheless, a defining characteristic is that one party consistently wins elections for remarkably long periods, often ranging from 2 to 6 decades, establishing a very stable, albeit often imbalanced, political landscape.
Greene ($2010$) identified a significant number—17 such dominant party systems globally—in his comprehensive research, underscoring their prevalence and importance in comparative politics.
The African National Congress (ANC) as a Dominant Party Example
In South Africa's democratic era, which commenced in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) has secured clear and commanding majorities in all national elections to date: in 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2019. This consistent performance firmly places it within the dominant party framework.
The ANC possesses a particularly strong and compelling historical project, perceiving itself not merely as a political party but as a national liberation movement. This identity embodies a project that aims to transcend traditional societal divisions of class, region, and race, seeking to unite the nation under a common vision of transformation and reconciliation following apartheid.
Furthermore, the ANC actively articulates a strategic vision framed as a 'national democratic revolution'. This ideological construct guides its policy-making and its narrative, suggesting a continuous process of social, economic, and political transformation aimed at achieving a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic, and prosperous society.
As such, comparative studies of party dominance, particularly those analyzing its causes and consequences, can be fruitfully applied to significantly enhance our understanding of contemporary political developments and challenges in South Africa.
Consequences of One-Party Dominance (OPD)
Influential Comparative Critique (Giliomee & Simkins, $1999$)
Hermann Giliomee and Charles Simkins, prominent scholars, edited The Awkward Embrace: One-Party Domination and Democracy in Industrialising Countries (London: Routledge, 1999$). This seminal work provided a critical examination of OPD.
This work is not presented as a rigid "theory"—a rigorous system based on general principles explaining outcomes—but rather acts as an analytical lens or comprehensive framework. It offers a structured way to understand the dynamics and implications of single-party dominance.
It extensively examines OPD through detailed case studies primarily focusing on "semi-industrialised countries" with entrenched dominant parties, including prominent examples such as Taiwan (KMT), Mexico (PRI), Singapore (PAP), Botswana (BDP), and Malaysia (UMNO).
Key findings from their comparative analysis included:
Conflation of party interests with state apparatus: Dominant parties exhibit a strong and pervasive tendency to blur the distinction between their organizational interests and the functions/resources of the state. This can manifest through the partisan use of state resources, institutions, and personnel for party political ends.
Propensity to appoint party loyalists: There is a common inclination to appoint party loyalists, regardless of whether they possess the most appropriate skills or qualifications, to senior state positions, state-owned enterprises, and the civil service. This practice ensures ideological alignment and solidifies party control over governmental machinery, often leading to patronage networks.
Undermining the legitimacy of opposition parties: The dominant party frequently engages in rhetoric and actions designed to delegitimize opposition parties, portraying them as unpatriotic, divisive, or incapable of governing. This weakens the opposition's public standing and makes it harder for them to attract support or form effective challenges.
Reddy's ($2005$) Rejoinder: Not Uniformly Negative
Rajani Reddy ($2005$) expressed significant skepticism regarding the uniformly negative consequences often attributed to OPD by scholars like Giliomee and Simkins.
He argued that parties and party systems in the studied contexts, particularly in post-colonial or developing nations, differ significantly from the typical Western cases used as benchmarks, making direct comparisons problematic.
Reddy specifically challenged the case selection made by Giliomee and Simkins, suggesting it might have led to a biased conclusion by focusing on cases where negative aspects were more pronounced.
He conducted a nuanced comparative case study, examining the Indian National Congress and the African National Congress, highlighting how these parties achieved and maintained dominance through distinct mechanisms that often involved broad public support.
Reddy proposed that electoral success and prolonged dominance for these parties can be significantly based on genuine legitimacy, derived from historical struggles (e.g., independence, anti-apartheid) and their ability to represent diverse societal interests, rather than purely coercive or manipulative means.
"The Congress System" (as understood by Reddy/Kothari):
A unique model of a dominant party characterized by mass-based legitimacy, stemming from its role as an umbrella movement that incorporated broad societal aspirations.
Features robust internal factional politics that, paradoxically, aim for consensus-seeking. Different ideological groups and regional interests are accommodated within the party, preventing splintering and acting as a microcosm of the political system itself.
Opposition parties, rather than being entirely marginalized, often find avenues to cooperate with these powerful internal factions to influence the broader political agenda, effectively operating within the orbit of the dominant party rather than purely in opposition to it.
Reddy's analysis provides a fresh and more complex perspective on understanding OPD, particularly in contexts like South Africa and India, by emphasizing the possibility of legitimate and stable dominance.
Butler's ($2009$) Synthesis: Negative AND Positive Consequences
Anthony Butler ($2009$) offered a balanced synthesis, acknowledging that dominant party systems entail both significant negative and, surprisingly, some positive consequences for democracy and governance.
Negative Consequences:
Accrual of significant incumbency advantages: The prolonged period in power allows the dominant party to systematically build and exploit various advantages, such as name recognition, control over public resources, and established networks, making it exceedingly difficult for any challenger to compete effectively.
Tendency to delegitimize or strategically co-opt opposition forces: The dominant party often not only dismisses opposition as irrelevant or unpatriotic but may also strategically absorb popular opposition figures or policies into its own ranks or agenda, thereby deflating potential challenges.
Blurring of boundaries between the party and the state (e.g., "deployment"): Practices like "deployment" (appointing party cadres to key state positions) intentionally merge the party's institutional interests with the government's functions, leading to reduced state impartiality and responsiveness to non-party citizens.
Interference with media independence: Dominant parties can exert pressure on media outlets through various means, including funding control, selective access, or subtle intimidation, leading to self-censorship and a less critical public discourse.
Suppression of legitimate opposition voices and factions within the dominant party itself: While internal factionalism can exist, critical voices or potential challengers within the party may face marginalization, disciplinary action, or resource deprivation, limiting internal pluralism.
Positive Consequences:
Promotion of political stability: A dominant party, with its strong mandate and long-term vision, can provide a high degree of political stability, particularly in new or fragile democracies, by preventing frequent government collapses or policy reversals.
Potential for internal pluralism/rotation of power within the party: A strong dominant party can sometimes accommodate diverse viewpoints and even allow for internal leadership rotations or policy shifts, preventing the need for external, potentially destabilizing, opposition.
Ability to curtail violent, racial, and ethnic politics: By presenting an overarching national project that transcends narrow identity politics, a dominant party can often unify diverse groups and reduce the salience of potentially inflammatory racial or ethnic divisions, acting as a unifying force.
Capacity to make "hard decisions": Due to a strong electoral mandate and reduced immediate pressure for short-term electoral appeasement (as reelection is often assumed), a dominant party may have the political capital and space to implement necessary but unpopular long-term policy reforms.
Summary of Consequences (Butler $2009$)
Butler's synthesis suggests that while a "robust" opposition is generally desirable for democratic health and accountability, it can ironically be destabilizing if sound, legitimate, and trusted state institutions are not yet fully established. In such contexts, a strong dominant party might initially offer a necessary period of stability.
However, prolonged ANC dominance in South Africa has been increasingly identified as causing accumulating harm to democratic institutions and governance. This manifests in intensified state-party integration, leading to a blurred line between party and state; the pervasive prevalence of patronage politics, where state resources are distributed for political loyalty; the systematic delegitimation of opposition, undermining their role; and the widespread abuse of incumbency privileges, distorting fair competition.
The Inevitable End of OPD: Consequences and Outcomes
The dominance of any dominant party is ultimately not perpetual; its end is inevitable, though the timing and manner remain critical questions for political analysis.
Key questions thus arise: When will this dominance end? How will it end—through internal collapse, electoral defeat, or a more gradual decline? And what will be the ultimate outcome for the political system?
The transition away from OPD could serve as a 'bridge' either towards the consolidation of a democratic two- or multi-party system, indicating a healthy evolution of competitive politics, or, conversely, towards a more repressive one-party authoritarian regime (Du Toit 1999; Spiess 2002). The path taken depends on many institutional and political factors.
While the negative consequences often associated with OPD (such as corruption, lack of accountability, and state-party conflation) may ease with its decline, it is crucial to recognize that the potential benefits sometimes associated with such systems (like stability or the ability to make hard decisions) will also likely be lost, potentially creating new challenges.
A comprehensive understanding of the dynamics and future trajectories of dominant party systems therefore requires a nuanced synthesis of arguments drawn primarily from comparative studies across various global contexts, but with significant weight always given to unique domestic factors, historical legacies, and specific political actors.
Causes of OPD (Greene $2010$)
Greene ($2010$) identifies "hyper-incumbency advantages" as a core theoretical construct explaining the persistent perpetuation of dominant party systems. These are a set of formidable advantages accumulated and exploited by the ruling party, making it exceptionally difficult to dislodge from power.
Specific mechanisms through which a dominant party leverages state resources for partisan advantage include:
"Pork-barrel" projects: The strategic allocation of public funds or government projects to specific geographic areas or demographic groups primarily to gain political support and secure votes, rather than purely on the basis of economic need or efficiency.
State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) budgets: Diverting significant portions of SOE budgets or revenues to benefit party-owned businesses, reward party loyalists with contracts, or directly fund party activities, effectively privatizing public assets for partisan gain.
Public sector employment: Utilizing civil service jobs and positions within state bureaucracy as a means of patronage, offering secure employment in exchange for political loyalty or bolstering the party's support base by ensuring a loyal cadre within state institutions.
Direct state resources: The overt utilization of government facilities, vehicles, administrative staff, and public advertising campaigns for party political purposes, blurring the lines between government functions and party campaigning.
Private funders: Employing a mix of incentives (e.g., favorable contracts, regulatory exemptions) and subtle threats (e.g., increased scrutiny, bureaucratic hurdles) to secure significant financial contributions from the private sector for party coffers.
Public funding formula: Manipulating or designing the formula for public funding of political parties in a way that disproportionately benefits the dominant party, providing it with a significant financial advantage over competitors.
Dominance undermining opposition: The very fact of the dominant party's long-standing power leads to an ideological weakening and demoralization of the opposition. This makes successful coalition formation among disparate opposition parties more difficult, as they struggle to present a unified and credible alternative, often fragmented by internal disputes and resource scarcity.
Greene's rigorous analysis of these mechanisms originally stemmed from a detailed case study of Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which ruled for over 7 decades.
This research led to the generation of the comprehensive "resources theory" of OPD, positing that control and manipulation of state resources are central to maintaining dominance.
The theory has subsequently been extensively tested across various countries and contexts to determine its general applicability and explanatory power beyond the Mexican case, proving its utility in understanding dominant party phenomena globally.