Political Science: Hobbes and Locke Flashcards
The State of Nature and Natural Laws
Conceptual Foundations of the State of Nature
The state of nature is not a specific historical era but a theoretical space in which humans encounter one another outside the framework of civil society.
In Hobbes's view, the state of nature is a condition of absolute equality in physical strength and intelligence among all people. Because there are no barriers to injustice and the only natural right is self-preservation, this state inevitably amounts to a "war of all against all."
Hobbes identifies the state of nature as a condition of "diffidence," or profound mistrust, where it is impossible for humans to collaborate. Consequently, life in this state is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."
In Locke's view, the state of nature is initially more relaxed and civil than in Hobbes's account. Humans, guided by the "light of reason," intuitively understand certain natural rights even without instructions or formal political declarations.
A natural right is an entitlement humans possess simply by virtue of existing. Locke and Hobbes use this term interchangeably with "natural law," representing what reason demands of any rational creature.
Locke's First Natural Law: Self-Preservation
Every human has the right to do "whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself and others too."
Unlike Hobbes, who views self-preservation as a "ghastly right" to do anything to anyone (a right to all things), Locke imposes restrictions.
Locke's Law of Self-Preservation holds that "no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions."
When one's own preservation is not in competition with another's, a person has a substantive commitment and raw obligation to "preserve the rest of mankind."
The Theological Argument for Preservation
Locke justifies moral obligations through the lens of divine property.
God is the creator, and therefore humans are the "workmanship" and "property" of God.
Because all humans are equal in their station as God's property, no subordination exists that would authorize humans to destroy one another at their own discretion.
The obligation to seek one's own well-being is a form of respect for God's workmanship; neglecting the self leads to slow destruction, which is a failure to respect God's property.
Locke's Second Natural Law: Punishment
Every individual in the state of nature possesses the right to punish "transgressors" of the first natural law.
Punishment is defined as violence enacted against another because it is perceived as an appropriate response to wrongdoing.
In the state of nature, there are no courts; therefore, this right is effectively the right to respond to violence with violence.
The degree of punishment must be sufficient to provide "reparation" to the victim and "restraint" for the offender. Locke argues this must be severe enough to make transgression an "ill bargain" and terrify others from committing similar acts.
The Case of the Thief as an Aggressor
Locke uses the example of a thief to illustrate the extremity of the right to punish.
If a thief, such as a hypothetical "Sam," steals firewood or a coat from an individual, such as "Petra," Petra has the lawful right to kill the thief.
The reasoning for this death penalty for theft is as follows:
In the state of nature, there is no common authority to appeal to for protection.
An aggressor who uses force to take away a small item (a horse or a coat) offers no reason to suppose they would not also take one's life once the victim is in their power.
Therefore, the act of theft places the thief into a "state of war" with the victim, authorizing the victim to "delete" or remove the aggressor to avoid all potential future hazards.
The Formation and Purpose of Civil Society
The Transition from Nature to Society
Civil society is established to resolve the instability of the state of nature. For Hobbes, the transition is a leap driven by the need for a "power able to overawe" people, compelling them to honor contracts.
For Locke, the transition is motivated exclusively by the need to protect private property. Civil society provides a "common judge with authority" to decide controversies and punish offenders.
Property as the End of Government
Locke emphasizes that "the preservation of property being the end of government," men enter into society for this specific purpose. "End" in this context signifies the point or purpose of the institution.
Locke defines the benefits of civil society not through human relationships, but through the "enjoyment of their properties in peace and safety."
While Locke occasionally mentions "peace, quiet, and unity" as goals of government, these are only valuable insofar as they contribute to the security of private property. "Quiet" in this context refers to a habitable and non-intimidating environment.
The Inconsistency in Locke’s State of Nature
Locke initially portrays the state of nature as a place where collaboration, industry, agriculture, and bridge-building are possible because humans are not inherently selfish.
However, to explain why anyone would ever leave such a "cool place," Locke is forced to "change his tune" and admit that the enjoyment of liberty in the state of nature is "very unsafe and very insecure."
He eventually concedes that the state of nature is plagued by the "invasion of others," bringing his view much closer to that of Hobbes.
Comparison: Humans vs. Bees (Hobbes's Perspective)
Hobbes uses the analogy of a bee colony to highlight why human civil society is "artificial" and difficult to maintain.
Competition: Bees do not compete; humans are in a "perpetual and restless desire of power after power" and competition for honor and dignity.
Common vs. Private Good: In a bee colony, the private interest of a bee naturally procures the common benefit. In humans, joy consists in comparing oneself to others and relishing what is "eminent" or superior.
Governance: Bees do not find fault with their administration. Humans believe they are wiser than those in charge and strive to reform or innovate, leading to distraction and civil war.
Agreement: Agreements among bees are natural; human agreements are reached only by "covenant," which requires an enforcement mechanism.
The Nature of the Sovereign and Absolute Power
Hobbes's Sovereign (The Great Leviathan)
The sovereign is a "mortal god" established when a multitude of people confer all their power and strength upon one man or one assembly.
The strength of the sovereign is not external; it is the combined strength of the population who have promised to obey and carry out the sovereign's wishes as their own.
The sovereign makes no covenant with the subjects. While subjects' hands are tied (they cannot harm one another), the sovereign’s hands are not. The sovereign remains in a state of nature relative to the subjects to maintain the power of "terror" necessary for enforcement.
Concentration of Power in Hobbes's Commonwealth
Hobbes argues that sovereign power must be absolute and undivided. To divide the power of a commonwealth is to dissolve it, as "powers divided mutually destroy each other."
This concentration is necessary to secure peace. If power is distributed, it creates potential for internal conflict, which Hobbes equates with the "greatest evil"—civil war and a return to the state of nature.
The Rejection of Personal Judgment and Conscience (Hobbes)
Hobbes classifies the view that "every private man is judge of good and evil actions" as a "seditious doctrine" and "poison."
In a commonwealth, the "measure of good and evil actions is the civil law." Individual conscience must be replaced by the "public conscience" established by the sovereign.
Allowing private judgment leads citizens to pick and choose which laws to obey, weakening the state.
Locke’s Rejection of Absolute Power
Locke argues that the legislative branch is "supreme" only in the sense that it is the most important office; it cannot possess "absolute, arbitrary" power.
Arbitrary power means doing "whatever you want" without predictability.
Argument Against Absolute Legislative Power:
The purpose of government is to protect property.
Humans are frail and self-interested.
An absolute legislature would design laws to promote its own riches and power.
This would involve depriving citizens of property, which is contrary to the purpose of government.
Therefore, the legislature must never be granted absolute power.
Institutional Structures: Separation and Monarchy
Locke's Division of Powers
Locke argues for the separation of the Legislative Power (law-making) and the Executive Power (law-enforcing).
The legislative function is not permanent; it can make laws in a "little time" and then dissolve, leaving the members as ordinary citizens subject to the laws they created.
The executive power must be permanent to ensure the constant enforcement of the laws.
The "Frail Human" Argument: If the same people make and enforce the laws, they will exempt themselves from obedience and develop a "distinct interest" from the community.
Hobbes's Preference for Monarchy
Hobbes identifies three forms of commonwealth: Monarchy (one person), Democracy (assembly of all), and Aristocracy (assembly of a part).
He argues Monarchy is the most effective form for ensuring peace for four reasons:
Alignment of Interests: A monarch's private riches and glory arise only from the strength and reputation of his subjects. In assemblies, corrupt individuals may benefit from civil war or treachery.
Consistency: A monarch is subject only to the inconstancy of human nature. An assembly suffers from "institutional inconstancy," where shifting attendance and voting majorities (often decided by a single person in the "bathroom") can undo yesterday's work today.
Security of Advice: A monarch can receive secret advice; an assembly must deliberate in groups, which allows for the "evil counsel" of orators and flatterers.
Internal Harmony: A monarch cannot disagree with himself out of envy, but an assembly can fragment into factions, leading to civil war.
Locke's Rejection of Monarchy
Locke argues that monarchy is "inconsistent with civil society" and is actually a primitive political form that has not left the state of nature.
In a monarchy, there is no common judge to which one can appeal against the monarch's opinion. This places the subjects in a "losing battle against the king."
Locke views monarchy as a state where citizens are effectively "slaves of an absolute prince."
Societal Obligations and Policies
Property and Taxation in Locke's System
Locke's "Fundamental Law of Property" holds that the government should not interfere with the enjoyment of private property.
However, Locke is a "realist" and grants that government should extract taxes. Everyone who enjoys the protection of the government must pay a "proportion" for its maintenance.
Taxes are necessary to pay administrators and ensure the government functions to protect the remaining property.
Education as a Tool of Obedience (Hobbes)
Hobbes views education not as a means of personal growth, but as "propaganda" to secure obedience.
Understanding is not the goal; he points out that people believe in "absurd" doctrines like the Holy Trinity without understanding them.
Citizens must be taught:
Not to admire neighbor nations' governments or desire change.
Not to admire fellow subjects more than the sovereign.
Not to speak evil of the sovereign, as this "slacks" obedience.
Care for the Disabled vs. Forced Labor (Hobbes)
Hobbes argues that the state should provide for those who become unable to maintain themselves through "inevitable accident" (the disabled/infirm).
However, those with "strong bodies" who refuse to work get "no handout." They are to be forced to work or shipped to colonies in "countries not sufficiently inhabited" to serve as indentured servants and extract resources.
Resistance and the State of War
Locke's Right of Resistance
Citizens give consent to be ruled, but this consent can be withdrawn if the government violates the fundamental law of property.
Tyranny is defined by Locke as any government—be it a prince or an assembly—that acts "without authority" by interfering with property.
Violating this law constitutes a "state of war" against the citizens, effectively dissolving the government's authority.
Locke likens an unjust government to a "thief in the state of nature"; both use force without right and may be opposed with violence.
Constraints on the Right of Resistance
Resistance is only lawful where there is "no remedy" or "appeal" to a judge. If a mistake (like a wrong speeding ticket) can be rectified through a support ticket or paperwork, violence is not permitted.
When the government and the people disagree on whether the rule is just, Locke's answer is "Heaven help us." This results in a state of war where everyone must judge for themselves how to survive.
Locke is cynical about the effectiveness of this right, noting that people are "hardly to be prevailed with to amend acknowledged faults" and are often too "morally frail" or "ignorant" to actually revolt.
Hobbes's Rejection of Resistance
Hobbes maintains that one must never rebel, as the alternative is always the state of nature, which is worse than any possible sovereign injustice.
Inconveniences in society (like having trash picked up on Sundays instead of Mondays) are like "blisters" from splitting wood—they are unfortunate but necessary side effects of the labor required to survive the "winter" of the state of nature.
International Relations (Hobbes)
The relationship between separate commonwealths is a "state of nature."
Every sovereign has the same right to procure the safety of the commonwealth that an individual has in the state of nature.
International relations are in a permanent "state of war," characterized by mutual suspicion and distrust, though not always open combat.
Hobbes sees no possibility for a covenant between nations or an international body (like the UN) because there is no "terrifying power" over the commonwealths to enforce such an agreement.
Questions & Discussion
Question: What if the right of resistance leads to political chaos?
Locke's Response: People are naturally "moody and irritable," but they are also weak and accustomed to their old forms. They will not exercise the right of resistance easily, even when they know the government is unjust.
Question: How can we justify killing a thief for a coat in the state of nature?
Locke's Response: Theft is an act of aggression that signals a readiness to take one's life. Without a common judge, the victim must respond to the threat as total to ensure survival.
Question: Does Hobbes care if education creates bad people if it creates obedient ones?
Hobbes's Response: The only metric is the stability and prosperity of the commonwealth. If propaganda ensures the state does not return to the state of nature, it is a tool and a success.
I. John Locke — Two Treatises of Government
(Selections from pp. 69–83, 101–124)
A. Meaning of “Commonwealth” (§133)
Locke clarifies that “common-wealth” does not mean democracy specifically, but any independent political community.
Quote: Locke defines it as “any independent community, which the Latines signified by the word civitas” .
B. Chapter XI — The Extent of Legislative Power (§134–142)
1. Purpose of entering society (§134)
People join society to secure their property, peace, and safety.
The first positive law is establishing the legislative power.
The first natural law governing even the legislature is preservation of society.
2. Legislative supremacy — but not absolute (§134–135)
Legislative power is “sacred and unalterable” once placed by the community.
No other body’s edicts count as law without legislative sanction.
However, legislative power cannot be arbitrary:
Individuals cannot give more power than they possess in the state of nature.
No one has the right to destroy themselves or others; therefore the legislature cannot have such power.
3. Limits on legislative power (§135–137)
Legislative power is limited to the public good.
It cannot destroy, enslave, or impoverish the people.
Laws must conform to natural law, which remains binding in society.
Quote: “The fundamental law of nature being the preservation of mankind, no human sanction can be good or valid against it.”
4. Requirement of standing, known laws (§136–137)
Legislatures cannot rule by arbitrary decrees.
They must govern through promulgated, standing laws and authorized judges.
Arbitrary rule would place people in a worse condition than the state of nature.
5. Protection of property (§138–140)
Government exists to preserve property, so it cannot take property without consent.
Quote: “I have truly no property in that, which another can by right take from me, when he pleases, against my consent.”
Taxation requires consent of the people or their representatives.
6. Non-transferability of legislative power (§141–142)
Legislative power is delegated by the people and cannot be transferred to any other body.
The legislature cannot appoint new legislators unless authorized by the people.
C. Chapter XII — Legislative, Executive, and Federative Power (§143–148)
1. Legislative power (§143)
Directs how the force of the commonwealth is used for preservation.
Should not be always in session to avoid temptation to abuse power.
2. Executive power (§144)
Must always be active to enforce laws.
Separation from legislative power prevents self-exemption from laws.
3. Federative power (§145–147)
Handles war, peace, alliances, and foreign relations.
Represents the community as a single body relative to outsiders.
Less capable of being governed by standing laws; requires prudence.
4. Union of executive and federative powers (§148)
Though distinct, they are usually united because both require command of the commonwealth’s force.
D. Chapter XIII — Subordination of Powers (§149–153)
1. People retain ultimate supremacy (§149)
Legislature is supreme while government exists, but the people retain a “supreme power to remove or alter the legislative” if it violates trust.
Quote: “Whenever that end is manifestly neglected…the power devolve[s] into the hands of those that gave it.”
2. Legislative supremacy (§150–152)
Legislature is supreme because it makes laws for all.
Executive power is subordinate unless the executive also shares in legislative power.
3. Necessity of constant executive power (§153)
Legislative need not be constant; executive must be.
Legislature can resume executive power if misused.
II. John Locke — Two Treatises, Book II (pp. 7–30, 42–51, 65–68)
A. Rejection of Filmer’s Patriarchal Theory (§1)
Locke refutes the idea that political authority descends from Adam’s paternal dominion.
B. Definition of political power (§2–3)
Political power = right to make laws with penalties (including death) for regulating property and defending the commonwealth.
C. State of Nature (§4–15)
1. Characteristics (§4–6)
Perfect freedom and equality.
Governed by natural law, discoverable by reason.
No one may harm another’s life, liberty, or property.
2. Execution of natural law (§7–12)
Every person has the right to punish violations.
Punishment aims at reparation and restraint.
Quote: “Every man hath a right to punish the offender, and be executioner of the law of nature.”
3. Problems of the state of nature (§13–15)
People are biased judges in their own cases.
Leads to insecurity → reason to form civil society.
D. State of War (§16–21)
1. Definition (§16–19)
A state of war arises when someone declares a settled intention to violate another’s rights.
Attempting to enslave someone constitutes a declaration of war.
2. Distinction from state of nature (§19–20)
State of nature = peace unless violated.
State of war = force without right.
3. Appeal to law or heaven (§20–21)
In society, appeal to civil law ends state of war.
Without a judge, people may appeal to heaven.
E. Slavery (§22–24)
1. Natural liberty (§22)
Freedom = living under laws one consents to.
Not freedom to do anything, but freedom from arbitrary power.
2. No one can consent to absolute slavery (§23)
Cannot give another power over one’s life.
Slavery only legitimate as continuation of state of war (lawful conqueror vs. captive).
III. Thomas Hobbes — Leviathan, Part II (pp. 363–394; 223–261)
A. Causes of Dissolution of Commonwealths (Chap. 29)
1. Imperfect institution
Commonwealths fail when rulers accept less power than necessary for peace.
Leads to rebellion when power must later be reclaimed.
2. Poison of seditious doctrines
False doctrines weaken the state:
Private judgment of good/evil.
Claim that conscience overrides civil law.
Belief in supernatural inspiration over reason.
Idea that sovereign is subject to civil law.
Claim of absolute private property excluding sovereign rights.
3. Division of sovereign power
Dividing sovereignty destroys the commonwealth.
Quote: “Powers divided mutually destroy each other.”
4. Imitation of other governments
Citizens destabilize their own state by copying foreign models (e.g., Athens, Rome).
5. Popularity of powerful subjects
Ambitious individuals can sway the masses → rebellion.
6. Structural weaknesses
Oversized cities, too many corporations, excessive liberty to dispute sovereign power.
7. Final dissolution
Occurs when the sovereign can no longer protect subjects; people revert to natural liberty.
B. Office of the Sovereign (Chap. 30)
1. Purpose
Sovereign’s duty: procuration of the safety of the people.
Safety includes preservation and “contentments of life.”
2. Essential rights must remain intact
Sovereign must not relinquish:
Power of judicature
Power of war/peace
Power of taxation
Power of doctrine
Power of appointing officers
3. People must be taught the grounds of sovereignty
Ignorance leads to sedition.
C. Generation & Definition of Commonwealth (Chap. 17–18)
1. Reason for forming commonwealth (§17)
Escape the state of war caused by natural passions.
Laws of nature insufficient without enforcement.
2. Creation of the sovereign (§17)
Individuals covenant to give up their right of self-governance to a single person or assembly.
Quote: “Covenants, without the sword, are but words.”
3. Definition of commonwealth (§17)
“One person, of whose acts a great multitude…have made themselves every one the author.”
4. Rights of sovereign by institution (§18)
Subjects cannot:
Change the form of government
Accuse the sovereign of injustice
Punish the sovereign
Sovereign determines:
Doctrine
Law
Judicature
War/peace
Rewards/punishments
Honor and social order