Korean War Readings

Quiz Answers

• According to the lecture, what cause of bargaining failure was central to explaining the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950?

  • Information problem about US resolve

• In early September 1950, the United States increased its war aims. According to Reiter, what led to this increase?

  • credible commitment concerns

• According to Reiter, what issue caused the Korean War to continue from 1951 until 1953

  • Voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war

• According to the Reiter reading, how did the united states address its concerns about a credible commitment from north korea?

  • Stationing of American troops in South Korea

• According to the Stanley reading, what was central to ending the Korean war?

  • shifts in ruling coalitions

Reiter

• korean war “monument to inefficeinecy of war”

• wae aims and war termination behavuor of belligerents in war shaped by information and commitment dynamics

  • together they provide account for evolution of war ending behavior

• usa estavlished high war aims to destroy communist regime in the beginning and kept it during combat setbacks

  • decision defies theory that belligerents (usa) should reduce war aims in reaction to combat setbacks

  • instead, usa establishes high war aims bc it feared any settlement that left north korea standing would be unstable and lead to future north korean attack (a communist north korea cannot credibly commit, war can only end if ccp is solved) —>

  • what usa govt wanted: end to north korea and a unified non communist korea

• and then china gets involved

  • this is when the united nations reduces its war aims to protect status quo rather than unified korea, even tho the nk credible commitment problem was not solved

  • why?

    • shifts in information enviornment

    • usa updates assessment of likelihood of victory + cost of victory (since now usa would have to strike china, and then the soviet union would get involved and then everybody dead) given chinese intervention

• tldr why the usa reduced war aims of total victory?

  • rise in cost of solving the commitment problem (which the solution was a non communist unified korea that wont strike)

• what does the third phase in this war show us?

  • tldr: inneficiency of combat as a source of information, and commitment problem solve was more important at ending the war through negotiation

Stanley; Role of Domestic Coalition Shifts in Overcoming Obstacles to Peace

• shifts in gov coalitions affect ending of wars

• war can only end once all belligerents develop similar expectations of war (bargaining model theory)

  • stanley theory vs everyone else

    • stanley: change comes from change in foreign policy leadership

      • preferences during war shift due to sunk cost and info gained from fighting/negotiating

      • new leaders (not just incumbents) come in with diff preferences and goals

• domestic level is important in intl bargains

• “domestic coalition shift”: change in identity of decision maker or change in type of government

obstacles to face when enidng a war

• preference obstacle: leaders in domestic coalition may not want to end the war because

  • personal stakes may be high

  • fighting war may help leaders stay in power

  • leaders may perceive cost of military inaction higher than costs of fighting

  • continuing war may help leaders in broader conflict by providing info abt adversary

• info obstacle

  • leaders may not know they should end the war

    • coalition members may receieve incomplete/bias/incorrect info abt the war

    • different coalition members may be exposed to different info, and then try to manipulate others

    • diff coalition members may use diff indicators to assess war, and reach diff conclusions

    • coalition members may have different biases yjay prevent them from processing war info

• entrapment obsctacle

  • leaders in domestic coalition may want to end war but cant

    • happens when hawkish constituents want to continue war and leader aquieses to retain power

overcoming obstacles to peace

• polciies that a state enacted to better wage the war become”sticky” and will involve coalition shift to get them “unstuck”

korean war specifically

• preference obstacle: soviet union under stalin

  • stalin dies during korean war and he didnt want to end it bc he did not go thru costs , and then the pows are exchanged

• info obstacle

  • decision to adopt voluntary repatriation is evidence of info obstacle

    • state department officials who bucked colleagues support for voluntary repatriation

      • did not know full size of pow problem

      • did not consider impact of additional casualties on allied and domestic opinion

      • could not tell which pows would want to be returned

      • had refused to consider whether communists would seek retaliation aainst us pows if usa did not return communist pows

    • when it came ot approve decision, they all ignored evidence that it would probably prolong the war

Powerpoint Gaps to Fill/ Things to note

Reiter’s Argument

• Korean war is monument to inefficeiency of war

• war aims and war termination behavior of the belligerents in war shaped by commitment and information dynamics

Bargaining

• Why does war occur?

  • Bargaining Failure

    • example given: information or credible commitment problem

• why does war end?

  • information and credible commitment problems are alleviated

Information proposition and war ending

• if war starts because of an information problem, when does war end?

  • when this information problem is alleviated

• how does this happen?

  • actors update their beliefs about resolve or capabilities

    • usuallt, unexpected outcomes

    • possible third party intervention

• for war to end, actors must believe continuining war is more expensive than peace

credible commitment proposition

• more likely belligerent fears its adverdary will violate war ending commitments, more likely that belligerent will be to pursue absolute victory

solutions to the credible commitment problem

• absolute war

• postwar peacekeeping

• capture strategic territory

absolute war

• absolute war ends states sovereignty

  • versions of absolute war

    • annihilation

    • annexation

    • regime change

What is the problem with absolute war?

• believe absolute war outcome is not possible

• costs of absolute war outcome are too high

  • possible postwar insurgency

  • need for postwar peacekeeping

  • need to seize strategic territory

Postwar peacekeeping

• international institutions

  • 3rd party monitors

  • demilitarized zones

  • arms agreements

• pre deploy troops near possible conflict zone

  • reduces fear of first strike

  • reduces fears of commitment violation

Sizie strategic territory

• territory that enhances defensive position, contains important natural resources

Postwar insurgency

• absolute war faces challenge of postwar insurgency

• actor that starts insurgency is not necessarily the actor that enters into war

• more likely when

  • mountainous terrain

  • large urban population

  • limited centeral govt control

when does postwar peace breakdown

• change in balance of power

• first striek advantage occurs

• change in leadership

KOREAN WAR

• June 1950: NK invades South Korea

  • why did this war occur?

    • to unify the korean penisula under a singular communist govt after it was divided, but the usa did not want that

  • why did bargaining fail?

• September: US initial war aim: restore sk independence

  • US increases war aim to include unifying korea

    • why did the us increase war aim?

• September: Inchon Landing

  • reiter’s answer on increading war aim?

Credible Commitment Concerns in September 1950

• losing nuclear monopoly

• expected costs of fighting were lower than expected costs of peace, in september 1950

Back to Korean War

• november 1950: china enters war

• june 1951: us reduces its war aim. why?

  • did credible commitment concerns go away?

• commitment concerns still present, but

  • cost of continued war increased

  • post agreement defection viewed as not catastrophic

  • alternative solution to the ccp: long term military deployment

Korean War

• why did the war not end june 1951? it lasted two more years

  • Prisoner of War

  • China demanded an all-for-all exchange; the un/us wanted voluntary reptration

    • reiter suggests this is a credible commitment problem

  • precise line of separation

    • kansas line

  • ended in 1953 bc communists yielded on credible commitment problem: prisoner of war repatriation and demarcation line

Alternative Explainations

• military industrial complex

• domestic politics

• casualty hypothesis

  • reiters understanding

• other points

  • death of stalin

  • increase in us nuclear arsenal and communication of this to china/ussr