Contractualism, Utilitarianism, and Meta-Ethical Intuitionism

Utilitarianism and Meta-Ethical Limitations

  • First-Order vs. Second-Order Assessment:

    • On the first-order (normative) level, utilitarianism can lead to horrific consequences when applied strictly to concrete situations.

    • On the second-order (meta-ethical) level, utilitarianism appears highly attractive because it is centered on the promotion of individual welfare across the board.

  • The Explanatory Deficit of Utility Theory:

    • Although utilitarianism rightly recognizes individual welfare as central, it cannot explain why individual welfare is intrinsically important.

    • In utilitarian theory, the value of individual welfare cannot be derived or justified internal to the framework; it must simply be taken as an unproven baseline assumption.

Contractualist Account of Moral Duty and Individual Welfare

  • The Contractualist Model:

    • Contractualism conceptualizes morality through the metaphor of rational agents deliberating around a table to determine duties, individual rights, and principles of right and wrong.

    • Moral truths are established via mutual agreement under fair, unforced conditions.

  • Verbatim Definition of Wrong Action:

    • An act is wrong if its performance, under the circumstances, would be disallowed by any system of rules for regulation of behavior which no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement.

    • The core evaluative principle relies on whether a rule is one that no affected party could reasonably reject.

  • Justification of Individual Welfare:

    • Contractualism achieves a significant meta-ethical advantage over utilitarianism by successfully justifying the importance of individual welfare.

    • Rational agents coming together to establish governing moral rules would reasonably agree that individual welfare must be factored in as a fundamental concern.

    • This consensus process provides the necessary rational justification for individual welfare that utility theory lacks.

Critique of Intuitionism as a Meta-Ethical Theory

  • Objection 1: Non-Naturalism and Metaphysical Strangeness:

    • Meta-ethical intuitionism relies on a non-natural realm of moral properties, a position historically advocated by G. E. Moore and inherited by H. A. Prichard and W. D. Ross.

    • Humans lack empirical access to non-natural properties.

    • Positing non-natural moral entities introduces what J. L. Mackie describes as a "queer" (peculiar or strange) metaphysical realm, which lacks the concrete reality of sensory experiences such as pain and pleasure.

  • Objection 2: Epistemological Unverifiability:

    • Intuitionism posits that moral knowledge is acquired through a distinct cognitive faculty of intuition.

    • As A. J. Ayer argued, intuitions cannot be empirically verified, confirmed, or tested.

    • There exists no objective mechanism or faculty test to verify whether an individual has correctly intuited a genuine moral fact or is mistaken.

  • Objection 3: The Motivation Deficit:

    • Intuitionism fails to explain how non-natural moral facts could exert any motivational influence over human behavior.

    • Human actions are motivated by concrete psychological states—specifically pleasures, pains, and passions—rather than abstract, non-natural entities.

Separation of Meta-Ethical and First-Order Normative Positions

  • Independence of Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics:

    • Adopting a specific meta-ethical (second-order) stance does not dictate a single corresponding normative (first-order) commitment.

    • Being a meta-ethical intuitionist does not require an individual to be an intuitionist at the first-order normative level.

  • Case Study: G. E. Moore:

    • Meta-Ethical Level: G. E. Moore is an intuitionist because he regards fundamental moral properties (such as "good") as non-natural and unanalyzable.

    • Normative Level: On the first-order level, Moore is a utilitarian—specifically an "ideal utilitarian," as identified by W. D. Ross.

    • Definition of Right Action: Moore defines right action as that which maximizes the total amount of intrinsic good, combining a non-naturalist meta-ethics with a maximizing consequentialist normative framework.

Textual Source and Session Summary

  • Textual Source:

    • T. M. Scanlon's meta-ethical critique of intuitionism and development of contractualism are detailed on pages 108108 and 109109 of his work.

  • Questions & Discussion:

    • No questions were raised by attendees at the conclusion of the session.

    • Attendance was recorded via an automated printout roster.

    • The next scheduled session occurs on Friday.