Contractualism, Utilitarianism, and Meta-Ethical Intuitionism
Utilitarianism and Meta-Ethical Limitations
First-Order vs. Second-Order Assessment:
On the first-order (normative) level, utilitarianism can lead to horrific consequences when applied strictly to concrete situations.
On the second-order (meta-ethical) level, utilitarianism appears highly attractive because it is centered on the promotion of individual welfare across the board.
The Explanatory Deficit of Utility Theory:
Although utilitarianism rightly recognizes individual welfare as central, it cannot explain why individual welfare is intrinsically important.
In utilitarian theory, the value of individual welfare cannot be derived or justified internal to the framework; it must simply be taken as an unproven baseline assumption.
Contractualist Account of Moral Duty and Individual Welfare
The Contractualist Model:
Contractualism conceptualizes morality through the metaphor of rational agents deliberating around a table to determine duties, individual rights, and principles of right and wrong.
Moral truths are established via mutual agreement under fair, unforced conditions.
Verbatim Definition of Wrong Action:
An act is wrong if its performance, under the circumstances, would be disallowed by any system of rules for regulation of behavior which no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement.
The core evaluative principle relies on whether a rule is one that no affected party could reasonably reject.
Justification of Individual Welfare:
Contractualism achieves a significant meta-ethical advantage over utilitarianism by successfully justifying the importance of individual welfare.
Rational agents coming together to establish governing moral rules would reasonably agree that individual welfare must be factored in as a fundamental concern.
This consensus process provides the necessary rational justification for individual welfare that utility theory lacks.
Critique of Intuitionism as a Meta-Ethical Theory
Objection 1: Non-Naturalism and Metaphysical Strangeness:
Meta-ethical intuitionism relies on a non-natural realm of moral properties, a position historically advocated by G. E. Moore and inherited by H. A. Prichard and W. D. Ross.
Humans lack empirical access to non-natural properties.
Positing non-natural moral entities introduces what J. L. Mackie describes as a "queer" (peculiar or strange) metaphysical realm, which lacks the concrete reality of sensory experiences such as pain and pleasure.
Objection 2: Epistemological Unverifiability:
Intuitionism posits that moral knowledge is acquired through a distinct cognitive faculty of intuition.
As A. J. Ayer argued, intuitions cannot be empirically verified, confirmed, or tested.
There exists no objective mechanism or faculty test to verify whether an individual has correctly intuited a genuine moral fact or is mistaken.
Objection 3: The Motivation Deficit:
Intuitionism fails to explain how non-natural moral facts could exert any motivational influence over human behavior.
Human actions are motivated by concrete psychological states—specifically pleasures, pains, and passions—rather than abstract, non-natural entities.
Separation of Meta-Ethical and First-Order Normative Positions
Independence of Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics:
Adopting a specific meta-ethical (second-order) stance does not dictate a single corresponding normative (first-order) commitment.
Being a meta-ethical intuitionist does not require an individual to be an intuitionist at the first-order normative level.
Case Study: G. E. Moore:
Meta-Ethical Level: G. E. Moore is an intuitionist because he regards fundamental moral properties (such as "good") as non-natural and unanalyzable.
Normative Level: On the first-order level, Moore is a utilitarian—specifically an "ideal utilitarian," as identified by W. D. Ross.
Definition of Right Action: Moore defines right action as that which maximizes the total amount of intrinsic good, combining a non-naturalist meta-ethics with a maximizing consequentialist normative framework.
Textual Source and Session Summary
Textual Source:
T. M. Scanlon's meta-ethical critique of intuitionism and development of contractualism are detailed on pages and of his work.
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