11/26/2025 divorce!
measuring divorse rates
estimates
there are 5 states that do not participate in the federal goverment data collection
crude divorce rate
number of divorces per 1,000 people in the population
2021: 2.8 divorces per 1000 people in the country
major increase in rate to those marrying early before men went off to war and then divorcing after they came back or during the great depression divorces were less because people waited untill the economy got better before finalizing their divorce
the denominator also includes people who are also not able to divorce such as:
children
those under 18
marriage to divorce ratio
2021
2.3 marriages for every 1 divorce in the country
the mean number of marriages is increasing relative to the increase in divorces
Refined divorce rate:
number of divorces in a year for every 1000 married couple in the country
marriage to divorce rate scenario
if there is one mariage and a couple gets divorced the ration is 1:1
redefined divorce rate
1 per 1000 or .1%
Macro structural determinants
extra-familial institutions
pre industrialto industrial → extra familial institutions
these institutions provide extra resources and support or alternative sources of finantial security education religion healthcare and leisure
Thus family stability becomes less important because of these alternate options
no-fault divorse legislation
only certain types of serious marital misconduct such as adultery cruelty and desertion would allocate grounds for a divorse
in 1970 CA granted divorse options for irreconcible differences? look it up later
initial reaction from population
there was a surge in divorse rates after this came out however they eventially leveled out
the change in the law was a consequence of changing behavior in the population
increase in women’s employment
independance effect
more likely to leave if marriage is unhappy
need a mediator such as an unahppy marriage for increasing probability of divorse in dual income households
income effect
good for marriages because it decreases the financial deficit
the male or masculine partner may be hurt by the other partner having to work to help support the family unit
change in values
growth of individualism and expectation of personal fulfillment in marriage
redefined marriage rates mediators
individual risk factors
low income
low education
job loss especially the husbands or maculine coded partner
age at marriage
more likely to divorce if married young
maturity
more surface-level attractions than deep-level attractions such as ideals, morals, values ,behaviors,
parental divorce
second or higher marriage
repeated behavior
kevin hart talked about this in his comedy show
kids of other people
biases
could be looking for more surface level attractions
race and ethnicity
Some of these differences remain after accounting for spouses employment status income and education
stressers related to discriminations
less emphasis on marriage relative to extended family ties
Secondary stressors
Differences between children of divorce and other children
children in divorced families
lower academic acheivement
higher rate of emotional and behavioral problems
more problematic relationships with parents
adults who experience parental divorce as children
lower levels of psychological well being educational attainment job status standard of living and maritial satisfaction
higher rates of divorce
decline in parental time energy patience and supervision
less time and energy with parent
less supportive
fewer rules
harsher discipline
less supervision
engage in more conflict with their children
losing contact with one parent for a period of time
three studies that support
losing parent through death
another adult that is more fit to be a caregiver
close relationship with both parents
children who lose parent through divorce
economic decline
multiple transitions
40% divorced mothers move in first year → new school → new house → new enviroment
maritial conflict prior to divorce
not a mediator but part of the process
stressor
models fighting as a mode of problem solving
lowering incidence of divorce
restrictive laws
increasing proportion in seperated and high conflict families
enhance maritial happiness
tax code to benifit married parents
increases relative disadvantage of singleparent families
promote marriage prep and counseling
only minor benifits
increase incidence of joint physical custody
selection effect
higher education
higher income
less hostile fathers
child support reform
regular child support is associated with few behavior probs and higher test scores
probs:
not ethical for those of lower income as it might encourage them to partake in illegal mthods of obtaining finances
promote economic self sufficiency
govt subsidized job training and child care
DADS program
therapuetic interventions
child oriented
fewer maladaptive attitudes about divorse better classroom behavior less anxiety