In 2016, American Special Forces commander Raymond Thomas identified small, armed drones used by the Islamic State (IS) as a significant problem for the US-led coalition in the battle for Mosul.
Thomas highlighted these key characteristics:
IS drones operated below the altitude of American air power, challenging air superiority.
IS adapted tactics, exploiting asymmetric strengths and forcing changes in American tactics.
IS possessed a large number of drones, flying as many as seventy in a twenty-four-hour period.
US and coalition forces lacked effective countermeasures, relying on small arms fire.
Since then, the use of drones by non-state actors has increased in scope and complexity.
Houthi rebels in Yemen have launched regular attacks, including one targeting the Yemeni army intelligence commander in January 2019.
In September 2019, Houthi drones (or those of allied groups in Iraq) struck an Aramco oil field in Saudi Arabia, temporarily suspending 6\% of the world’s oil production capacity.
Increasing drone activity in the Middle East has led to innovations in tactics, techniques, supply chains, and strategic objectives, as well as proliferation to new actors.
The report provides an empirically based overview of drone use and innovations through a comparative study of five violent non-state groups that have employed drones in the Middle East.
The project is funded by a grant from the Mobilizing Insights in National Defence and Security program from the Canadian Department of National Defence.
The project aims to address dynamics of innovation and learning among violent non-state groups, with a focus on drone program development.
The study concentrates on five groups with established drone programs: Islamic State (IS), Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthi Movement in Yemen, and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).
By focusing on established programs, the study uncovers how such groups use drones, how they learn and innovate, how drone use contributes to their objectives, and how drone use reflects geostrategic dynamics.
Research questions:
How do various non-state groups employ drones violently?
How do non-state groups develop drone technology programs?
What factors influence the decision by non-state groups to employ drones violently?
What new challenges does the proliferation of non-state violent drone programs present to military forces engaged in security operations?
These questions provide the foundation for an empirically based evaluation of non-state violent drone use which can offer guidance to the Canadian Armed Forces and other NATO militaries operating in these theaters.
Canada’s defense policy notes critical issues presented by global terrorism, weapons proliferation, the changing nature of peacekeeping operations, and growing complexity.
Innovation by non-state actors in the employment of armed drones presents pressing concerns relating to all these themes.
This report makes three substantial contributions to knowledge in this area.
It revises our understanding of the common uses of drones by armed non-state actors, and suggests a need to refocus planning against these threats.
Non-state drone programs do not present distinct threats merely due to the volume or style of their drone use, but rather through their capacity for innovation, adaptation, and development over time.
This report rejects the idea of a single pathway of development for drone programs, and calls for more granular, empirically based analysis of drone use and development. Not all drones are created equal, and non-state groups do not seek to follow a particular successful blueprint.
This report discusses techniques employed to counter the drone threats posed by the five groups under study, and, as such, provides a resource for states and militaries seeking to confront the threat of non-state drone activity.
However, the techniques discussed here are not exhaustive, and at present there is no dominant way to neutralize the threat of drone programs distinct from the conflicts in which they are embedded.
This report is based on the collection and systematic review of incidents of drone use by violent non-state actors in the Middle East.
Existing databases are incomplete and a large amount of data on terrorist drone use is not openly accessible and therefore impossible to validate.
The creation of a new dataset was necessary and in order to construct our database of violent non-state drone use in the Middle East, we used a formalized codebook.
Each incident of drone use by the five groups under study and taking place in the Middle East was coded, including the following elements:
Date and Location of the event
Incident summary
Make and model of the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
Incident type
Target
Experimental use (yes/no)
Impact
Information relevant to the internal decision-making process
Provenance of the UAV
Sub-group responsible
Additional relevant information
Systematic search of articles published in English, French, Arabic, Hebrew and Turkish language newspapers were conducted.
The report also made use of available primary information contained in newspapers, propaganda videos, training manuals, and social media posts produced by violent non-state actors.
Systematic thematic searches of the websites of government bodies, both those located in the Middle East and those with strong geopolitical interests in the region were also conducted.
The database was further informed by major academic and governmental reports, as well as reports from various conflicts and from armament watchdog associations (which monitor the proliferation of emerging technologies in conflict zones).
Data sources range from extremely credible – such as reports by UN Security Council-mandated Panels of Experts – to less inherently trustworthy sources, such as online reports from various media organizations.
The analysis does not depend on the credibility of any specific source or incident, but on the coherence of the dataset as a whole.
Information contained in the dataset was triangulated by using multiple sources to create individual incident accounts to offset known or suspected biases.
It's important to note, not all drone observations are reported by media sources, and many instances of drone use which do not involve violence will go unobserved or unreported.
The absence of significant reports concerning non violent activities does not mean that the groups do not use drones for these purposes; rather, those limitations are inherent to the collection of data through reported sources.
This study compares and contrasts five violent non-state actor groups and the use of drones in their operations.
These five groups – all based in the broader Middle East region – have all employed drones to launch offensive operations; in addition, all demonstrate sustained engagement and innovation in drone use and significant technical and tactical innovation.
The five groups surveyed are the Islamic State (IS), Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthi Movement in Yemen, and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK) and its affiliated/ allied organizations.
The selection of groups are based on Don Rassler’s survey and typology of drone programs for West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center.
Rassler identified four groups which had drone programs (IS, Hezbollah, Hamas, and Jabhat al-Nusra), of which only IS had employed drones to kill.
The Houthi Movement and the PKK have also shown sustained drone use on a scale that justifies inclusion in the current report (since 2018 for the Houthis, 2019–2020 for the PKK).
Jabhat al-Nusra was excluded from the study, as there exists no evidence that the group has established a significant and sustained drone program.
The five groups under study here vary widely in their scope, strategic situation, timelines and activities, providing a well-rounded survey of potential drone capabilities.
The groups vary on several factors:
Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthi Movement enjoy various degrees of state support, while other do not.
Most employ drones against well-equipped and trained state militaries, while others have also employed drones against other non-state actors.
Some have seen drone capabilities build slowly over time, while others’ capabilities have surged very quickly.
One has almost exclusively used small, locally built drones, while others have employed larger equipment of a quasi-military standard.
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) – or drones – are employed in a variety of capacities and roles by military or violent actors.
the term “drone” designates any vehicle which is piloted remotely.
Distance from which drones can be piloted ranges from a few dozen metres to several thousand kilometres, either through direct telecommunication link or via satellite connection; in some cases, drones can also be preprogrammed to function without communication link.
While most drones are aerial vehicles, there exist some naval drones (and remote-controlled ground vehicles), and limited evidence suggests non-state actors have experimented with these types too.
Several typologies exist to account for the variety of drone types and capabilities, although all have limitations due to their focus on state drone perspectives.
CNAS typology of drone categories:
Stealth Combat
High-end Military
Mid-size Military & Commercial
Commercial
The top category of “stealth combat” is almost entirely future-oriented, with no such drones in operation.
The drones discussed in this report belong to the lower two categories.
This report introduce a new typology, focusing on how drones are employed rather than classifying them by size and provenance.
Drones warrant specific attention due to a number of characteristics which set them apart:
Air power has traditionally been associated with statehood and sovereignty; non-state drones therefore represent an incursion by non-state groups into the prerogative of sovereign states.
Drone programs require specific expertise, both technical and tactical; accordingly, countering drone threats likewise requires specific techniques and tactics on the part of state militaries.
allows for a nuanced appreciation of how different groups innovate in integrating these weapons into their arsenal, and how drones can shape strategic, political and tactical situations.
Amy Zegart presents an argument about the impact of cheap drones on states’ ability to engage in and prolong interstate crises by reducing the costs of involvement.
Don Rassler’s 2016 study dentifies a drone program as “a more structured, integrated and resourced capability” compared to occasional users or groups that experiment and then move on.
-Rassler further operationalizes his criteria through two additional variables: (1) significant frequency of drone use, and (2) the development of medium/long-term infrastructure.
The study adds a third criterion which demonstrates the significance of investment in drone development: namely, tactical and technical innovation.
Drone programs change and evolve over time, and violent non-state actors that develop drone programs seek to maintain the upper hand against well-resourced adversaries through technical novelty, expanded capabilities, and tactical surprise.
For Canadian security forces seeking to adapt to the “changing nature of peacekeeping operations” and the changing security environment, drone programs present a much greater potential threat than infrequent violent drone users.
A drone program, therefore, is helmed by an organization which displays:
A clear structure for drone activities
Integration between drone use and other operations
The availability of sufficient or significant resources devoted to these activities
The proliferation of terrorist UAVs is not geographically limited to the Middle East.
The common perception of the threat of drone attacks has tended to focus on three types of threats:27
(1) WMD attacks,
(2) domestic terror plots and unaffiliated terrorist attacks, and
(3) criminal actors.
-Aum Shinrikyo, which conducted a deadly sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995, is also said have experimented with drones prior to the attack. This is often used to illustrate the longevity of the threat posed by violent non-state actors’ drone use and to raise the spectre of drones being used to disseminate chemical (or biological/radiological/nuclear) agents – often coupled with the narrative that the subway attack could have been much worse had Aum chosen a more efficient way of disseminating the nerve agent.
However, recent scholarship has cast doubt on the extent of Aum’s foray into drone use, pointing out that such accounts are largely based on circular citations and that there is a lack of information from primary sources to support them.
In 2003, Moazzam Begg, who was held in extrajudicial detention by the US government at Guantanamo Bay confessed to being part of a plot to spray the British Parliament with weapons-grade anthrax spores using a drone, in an attempt to kill British Prime Minister Tony Blair.
The credibility of the confession is further brought into question by allegations that Begg was threatened with death and torture during his over 300 interrogations.
Domestic attacks by small cells proliferated as Such fears were borne largely of the perception that anyone with access to a commercial drone could weaponize it relatively easily for violent attack.
intelligence reports indicated that, prior to the attack, al-Qaeda had considered using an explosive-laden drone to attack world leaders at the 2001 G8 summit in Genoa, Italy.
-In 2011, Rezwan Ferdaus, was arrested by the FBI for a plot to use remote-controlled model aircraft rigged with explosives and set on preprogrammed GPS routes to attack the Pentagon and the US Capitol building.
in Boston and was sentenced to seventeen years in prison. However, there is a major disconnect that existed between [Ferdaus’] grand vision for the operation and the project’s feasibility
Spanish and French authorities arrested two Chechen men and one Turkish man on terrorism charges claim to have found traces of explosives, three motorized paragliders, and an undated. In fact, nine months after their arrest, they were freed by Spain’s Supreme Court for lack of evidence, even though the men were still suspected of belonging to a terrorist organization.
Following a tip from a suspicious paragliding instructor who claimed that one of the men had asked him to fly over a shopping centre in Gibraltar - a similar and more significant plot emerged .
The JDL spent 370 on sophisticated electronic equipment to modify two remote-controlled model airplanes, to which they planned to attach twelve-and-a-half sticks of dynamite and detonating equipment. While the plot never came to fruition, JDL members went as far as conducting several test flights before deeming the idea impractical due to air currents and aerodynamics issues.
In 2003, the FBI arrested several individuals residing in Virginia on a number of terrorism-related offences related to providing material support to the Pakistani terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and attempting to join the Taliban. Among those arrested as part of the so-called “Virginia jihad network”, two US residents and an LeT operative based in the United Kingdom had collaborated to purchase sensitive technologies from LeT, including material to assist and enhance the performance of UAVs, notably preprogrammable GPS systems to guide drone flights.
There is extremely limited publicly available information about the case. Moreover, the plot against the summer camp was omitted from Haugstvedt’s survey of right-wing extremist drone plots.
Another example of right-wing extremist drone use comes from the 2017 Charlottesville Unite the Right protest, where the notorious night-time tiki torch parade into Lee Park was captured on camera by a drone and uploaded to the internet.
The most high- profile instance of drone use by right-wing extremists is that of Brenton Tarrant, who flew a small commercial drone over the Al Noor Mosque in Christchurch, New Zealand, “recording an aerial view of the masjid grounds and buildings” focusing on “entry and exit doors, as well as the alleyway where he parked” on the day of his attack.
In recent years the FARC, along with other narcotrafficking organizations, has embraced drones for a variety of purposes, including reconnaissance, surveillance of drug shipments, protection of said drug shipments with explosive-laden drones, and also as a means of smuggling narcotics.
In Nariño in September 2019, the Colombia military located two drones belonging to FOS laden with 300 grams of explosive. The drones were also equipped with various types of shrapnel, and are believed to have been destined to be deployed against public security forces.
In late 2021, a video went viral featuring a drone mounted with a handgun which could fire bullets while in the air, with the associated claim that the drone had been developed by the FARC. However, further investigation showed that the drone was actually made by an eighteen-year-old American student and posted to his YouTube channel in 2015.
WMD dispersal, small-cell terror attacks, or non-politically-motivated violence – have failed to translate into actual menaces then this report concentrates on the specific threats presented by organized drone programs, and does so through an empirical investigation of actual drone use.
The table below, the five full-width rows represent the five aims of drone use, and each of these is broken down into multiple methods used to accomplish these aims. The examples which follow are meant as illustrations; in principle, any of these could be adopted by non-state groups that have drone programs, though some are far more common than others.
Surveillance: Military UAVs were largely developed and produced for both spying and reconnaissance purposes; as such it is unsurprising that commercial drones provide can provide non-state actors with an excellent infrastructure to conduct surveillance operations without being detected. Drones can be also be used to carry conventional spying devices.
Reconnaissance: Drones can be used by violent non-state actors to capture live footage. There is some compelling evidence that IS used hobbyist drones to gain situation awareness on the battlefield as early as 2014. In August of that year, the group released a 14-minute video showing aerial views of the Tabqa air base prior to its campaign to capture the military installation.
Electronic Collection Several studies have demonstrated that a drone equipped with a radio transceiver can be used to extract unencrypted information from Wi-Fi and Bluetooth devices. This can include the setup of a fake mobile Wi-Fi network or a rogue access point, enabling the interception of smartphone traffic by luring users to connect to a nearby “free Wi-Fi” point, which in turn captures the users’ sensitive information such as passwords or credit card credentials.
Operational Support Drones can be used for command-and-control purposes, allowing groups to direct attacks, monitor progress, and supervise operations. IS has been known to use drones to direct vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attacks in urban settings by using drones to map out routes and guide attackers.
Messaging Drones can be used to convey messages, by broadcasting audio, by dropping leaflets or other media, or simply through their presence. In 2018, authorities in the US announced that a Sacramento resident had been charged in connection with violating Temporary Flight Restriction areas during two separate National Football League matches where he used a drone to drop leaflets featuring swastikas and anti-media sentiments into the crowd.
Propaganda Production In recent years, several terrorist organizations have begun using drones to film their attacks, training and other activities, and disseminating this imagery online. This has been employed extensively by IS, and by right-wing extremist groups in the US.7
Access to Protected Facilities As airborne devices, drones can access facilities which may be difficult to reach on the ground, and thus present a challenge for defending secure locations. In 2014, France’s state-run power firm Électricité de France (EDF) announced that unidentified drones had flown over seven nuclear power plants during the course of a month. A more routine manifestation of this use of drones relates to the smuggling of drugs, phones and even weapons to prisoners within high security prisons.
Logistics and Supply Drones may allow for the delivery of supplies where other means of transport are difficult. Due to the payload limitations of drones, such supplies are necessarily limited. However, the prospect of drone trans-portation has been raised in other contexts, notably that of humanitarian relief missions with hard-to-reach populations.
Harassment Non-violent drone flights can be used to draw attention to political viewpoints or disrupt specific events to convey a message. In 2013, the Pirate Party, a German political party, flew a small drone close to Chancellor Angela Merkel during an outdoor campaign event in Dresden.
Fake Threats Drone presence – real or suspected – can force interruptions in activi-ties due to the potential menace that drones (and their possible weapon-ization) can present. In 2019, climate activists Extinction Rebellion threatened to fly drones over Heathrow Airport to force shutdowns.
Vandalism Drones can be used to deface property for political messaging, either by damaging buildings or structures or by soiling them with paint or other substances. In 2015, a well-known graffiti artist used a commercial drone to paint a giant red scribble across Kendall Jenner’s face on one of New York City’s largest and most viewed billboardsIn 2018, Greenpeace used a drone to enter the restricted airspace surrounding the EDF nuclear plant in Bugey, and deliberately crashed it into the wall of the plant’s spent-fuel pool building to highlight “the extreme vulnera- bility of this type of buildings, which contain the highest amount of ra-dioactivity in nuclear plants.”
Interference The mere presence of unknown drones can disrupt activities, force shutdowns, or otherwise hamper normal functioning. Between 19 and 21 December 2018, authorities at Gatwick Airport suspended over 1,000 inbound and outbound flights from the airport after receiving reports of two drones flying near the airfield.
pilot-to-target attacks or explosive delivery.
In 2018, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro addressed a military parade in Caracas, at least two drones armed with explosives denotated near the president in an apparent targeted assassination attempt.
In 2021, Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi sur-vived a similar assassination attempt after drones laden with explosives targeted his residence.
weapon mount there exist many videos made by hobbyists about the possibility of equipping drones with rifles or flamethrowers, though without any evi-dence of use for offensive purposes.