Metaethics: Objectivism, Relativism, and Emotivism

Objectivism

  • Moral judgments reflect objective facts, akin to empirical or scientific observations.
  • Objectivist View: Moral judgments are true or false, objectively true, similar to empirical judgments in science.

Objection to Objectivism

  • Challenge: Disanalogy exists between moral and empirical judgments. Empirical disagreements can be verified through observation, but moral disagreements lack a clear verification method.
  • It's difficult to determine how to resolve disagreements on issues like genocide or polygamy, as moral facts aren't observable.
  • Disanalogy: Empirical judgments can be verified through observation while moral judgments can not.

Possible Responses to Objectivism

  • Objectivists might argue that empirical observation can sometimes inform moral judgments, e.g., assessing policies based on whether they maximize overall happiness which, they say, can be observed.
  • Alternatively, they could assert that moral truths are accessible through rational reflection or intuition, akin to how we understand mathematical truths.

Relativism

  • Moral judgments are true or false relative to a culture or individual feelings.
  • Moral Relativist View: Moral judgments are true relative to culture/personal feelings but possibly false relative to other cultures/feelings.

Objection to Relativism

  • Challenge: Relativism struggles to account for moral progress. If morality is relative, past views (e.g., accepting slavery) could be true relative to their time, making it difficult to claim we've improved.

Possible Responses to Relativism

  • Relativists might argue that cultures overlap, allowing for cross-cultural moral disagreements and the recognition of progress. For example, we can see slavery in 18th-century America as part of our cultural heritage now, creating disagreement due to cultural overlap.

Emotivism

  • Moral judgments express emotions, approval, or disapproval rather than beliefs about objective or relative facts.
  • Emotivist View: Moral judgments are expressions of emotion, such as "boo for polygamy" or "hooray for charity."

Objection to Emotivism

  • Challenge: Emotivism struggles to explain moral reasoning.
  • If moral opinions are mere emotive reactions, it's difficult to account for how we reason our way to moral conclusions.
  • For example, considering whether Oedipus' actions were morally bad involves reasoning about his knowledge and culpability.

Possible Responses to Emotivism

  • Emotivists can propose that some evaluative reactions are subject to reason. For example, they could say that if you prefer A to B and B to C, but you prefer C to A, that there is something wrong with you preferences and are irrational.
  • An emotivist could argue that our moral judgments are expressions of certain kinds of moral preferences rather than just emotive reactions.

Metaethics and Contemporary Theories

  • These three views (objectivism, relativism, and emotivism) form the foundation of metaethics.
  • Contemporary theories often incorporate strands from one or more of these approaches.
  • Instead of trying to decide which theory is the right one, we can consider the best objection, and see if it is possible to overcome that objection.
  • The goal is to refine these views by considering objections and determining if they're viable starting points.

Universal Moral Principles

  • Some argue for universal moral principles with varying applications across contexts, questioning the objectivism-relativism distinction.
  • Examples include cultural norms (headscarves) that, from an objectivist perspective, adhere to a universal principle like "when in Rome, do as the Romans do".
  • Even with near-universal moral judgments (e.g., kicking dogs is bad), disagreements may arise about why it's wrong (pain vs. disrespect).

Objective: Independent vs. Universal

  • Distinction between two senses of "objective":
    • Independent of us (like scientific facts).
    • Universal (applies to all people).
  • Relativists primarily deny universality, not necessarily independence.

Nature of Morality

  • Morality may be disunified, with objectivism, relativism, and emotivism each applying to different moral principles.
  • Moral judgments stem from different considerations:
    • Societal organization (best for most people).
    • Personal conscience.
    • Religious beliefs.

Unifying Factors in Morality

  • Despite diverse origins, morality may be unified by:
    • Agent neutrality: Moral reasons apply equally to anyone in similar circumstances.
    • Overriding nature: Moral reasons take precedence over other considerations.
  • If morality exhibits these features, a unified explanation is more likely, potentially favoring one theory over a fragmented approach.