Notes on 3.2 Institutional Tort Liability: Overview, Negligence, Educational Malpractice, and Defamation

3.2.1 Overview

  • Purpose: Several common law doctrines provide remedies to individuals injured by the action or inaction of others; colleges/universities face common law liability as well as statutory liability.

  • Who can be sued:

    • The college/university is usually the defendant, but claims may also be brought against faculty and staff in their personal capacities.

  • Primary tort focus in higher education:

    • Tort law requires a college or its agents to refrain from injuring someone to whom the college owes a duty.

    • Common torts include negligence and defamation; contract law increasingly used by employees, students, and others.

  • What is a tort in this context:

    • A civil wrong (not a breach of contract) for which a remedy is provided by the courts.

    • A plaintiff must show: the institution/its agents owed a duty to behave according to a defined standard of care, the duty was breached, and the breach caused injury.

  • Typical tort theories in the college setting:

    • Negligence and defamation are the two classic torts; other theories such as common law fraud appear in lawsuits (briefly noted).

  • When a college is liable:

    • Generally liable for torts committed within the scope of an actor’s employment or otherwise authorized by the institution or subject to its control, absent immunity or other defenses.

    • Example scope issue: a student, employee, or invitee injured due to a college employee’s careless/wrongful act can give rise to liability, similar to a landlord or business owner in comparable circumstances.

  • Premises and activity scope examples:

    • Duty to keep premises safe may apply in classroom, residence hall, athletics, etc.; off-campus or abroad activities may also trigger liability.

  • Notable cases and analyses summarized:

    • Mazart v. State (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1981): analyzed two possible theories for institutional liability for student organization torts:
      1) Agency theory (respondeat superior): organization acts as an agent of the institution; institution liable for its agents.
      2) Duty-to-supervise theory: institution has a duty to supervise the organization because it provided the environment for operation.

    • Court held the university did not exercise sufficient control over the student newspaper to establish an agency relationship and had no legal duty to supervise the newspaper’s editorial process.

    • Contemporary references following Mazart: McEvaddy v. City University of New York (1995); Lewis v. St. Cloud State University (2005).

    • Doria v. University of Vermont (Vt. 1991): Supreme Court rejected the institution’s purported “duty to control” over student/faculty activities to preserve a fair election; deferential to academic environment and faculty/students’ activities.

  • Immunity defenses (availability varies by state):

    • Sovereign immunity: protects the state and its agencies from certain claims; depends on whether the institution is an arm of the state and whether the state has taken actions to divest immunity (e.g., tort claims acts).

    • Tort claims acts (statutory exceptions) define permissible lawsuits and procedures (e.g., Florida’s Tort Claims Act, Fla. Stat. § 768.28 (2011)).

    • Case example illustrating robust public-university protection under a state tort claims act (Texas): Prairie View A&M University v. Mitchell, 27 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. App., 1st Dist. 2000) (university immune from a degree-verification tort claim; registrar sued personally).

    • Governmental function test: some courts hold security provision as governmental function (e.g., Rashed v. State of New York, 648 N.Y.S.2d 131 (Sup. Ct., App. Div. 1996)); otherwise, governmental immunity may not apply.

    • Brown v. Florida State Board of Regents (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987): if the activity is not governmental, sovereign immunity may not apply—e.g., operating a lake or facility can impose common law duty of care.

    • New York example: security at a state university concert can be treated as governmental function; liability may be barred absent a special duty.

  • Charitable immunity (for nonprofit educational institutions):

    • Availability varies by state; some states recognize it for activities that serve charitable purposes, others have limitations or reject it in certain circumstances.

    • Georgetown College v. Hughes (D.C. Cir. 1942): federal appellate court criticized charitable immunity in a hospital-related tort claim; Mullins v. Pine Manor College (Mass. 1983) rejected charitable immunity when activity is commercial; Massachusetts later recognized caps and commercial considerations in charitable immunity cases.

    • In Massachusetts: charitable-immunity can cap damages (e.g., $20,000) if the tort occurred in an activity that furthers charitable purposes and is not commercial; Goldberg v. Northeastern University (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) involved a health-center patient death; court found health center operation not negligent and applied charitable-immunity cap.

    • New Jersey: charitable immunity recognized for nonprofit colleges; O’Connell v. State of New Jersey, 795 A.2d 857 (N.J. 2002) upheld immunity under the Charitable Immunity Act for a campus fall injury; later cases extended or clarified application (e.g., Gilbert v. Seton Hall University; Orzech v. Fairleigh Dickinson University; Green v. Monmouth University).

    • Willful, wanton, or grossly negligent acts, or intentional acts, may defeat charitable immunity.

    • Example distinction: in Pennsylvania State University context (Sandusky case), a federal court held university not vicariously liable for abuse by an employee for acts outside the scope of employment; examines scope of employment.

  • Other liability defenses and limits mentioned:

    • Public vs. private status affects immunity; charitable-immunity defenses may apply to public as well as private nonprofits in some states.

    • Some exceptions apply where the activity is inherently commercial or involves willful misconduct.

    • The overall landscape is state-specific and fact-sensitive.

  • Outcome: The remaining sections discuss the most common tort subjects faced by colleges and universities: negligence (most frequent), defamation, and educational malpractice; plus special topics like off-campus courses, cocurricular and social activities, student-suicide cases, and more.

3.2.2 Negligence

  • Overview: Colleges face growing negligence lawsuits related to on-campus injuries, off-campus functions, and hazards associated with campus life.

  • Special relationship doctrine: Courts reject a broad “special relationship” with students in most tort claims but have imposed duties to protect from foreseeable harm (e.g., hazing, dangerous persons on campus).

  • How negligence liability is determined:

    • A plaintiff must show: a duty existed, the institution breached the duty by failing to exercise due care, and the breach proximately caused the injury.

    • Duty is a matter of state common law (e.g., Feliccia v. Lackawanna College, 175 A.3d 221 (Pa. 2017) – issue of fact over whether medical personnel at athletic events were required to satisfy a duty of care).

  • Typical defenses:

    • No duty (foreseeability not present); plaintiff’s own negligence (comparative fault) may bar or limit recovery; assumption of risk.

  • Common negligence targets for colleges:

    • Premises liability: defective buildings/grounds; on/off campus instructional or cocurricular activities; or claims of educational malpractice.

    • Computer security: negligent loss/disclosure of records; negligent supervision of employees using electronic information; negligent network security; negligent transmission of data harming privacy interests.

  • Historical duty standards and shifts:

    • Early 20th century: in loco parentis shielded colleges from liability; later courts treated colleges as bystanders for adult students (Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979)); trend moving toward imposing the same duty as non-educational entities in many contexts (modern cases become more protective of student safety).

  • Key cases illustrating shifts in duty and liability for negligent acts of employees or nonemployees:

    • Foster v. Board of Trustees of Butler County Community College, 771 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Kan. 1991): a college may be liable for the negligent actions of a student driver hired to recruit a recruit; jury awarded damages; college argued non-liability under agency theory; court found employment status by policy noncompliance as creating a “gratuitous employee” in some circumstances.

    • Gehling v. St. George's University School of Medicine, 705 F. Supp. 761 (E.D.N.Y. 1989): generally cannot hold medical school liable for injuries caused by medical students unless related to a school-sponsored athletic event; indicates limits on liability for student acts outside employment.

    • Computer security liability as an emerging area of negligence due to data/privacy concerns.

  • Premises liability (3.2.2.2) in depth:

    • Core duty: owners/landlords owe a duty to invitees to maintain a reasonably safe premises.

    • If a dangerous condition is obvious, there may be no duty to warn; foreseeability is key in determining duty.

    • Notable premises cases:

    • Shimer v. Bowling Green State Univ., 708 N.E.2d 305 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1999): student fell into an open orchestra pit; college won because plaintiff knew stage pit location.

    • Kadlec v. Louisiana Tech Univ., 208 So.3d 992 (La. Ct. App. 2016): slip at dorm entry; issues of notice/knowledge.

    • University of Texas v. Bellinghausen, 2016 WL 462735 (Tex. Ct. App. 2016): no speculation that university had actual knowledge of dangerous sidewalk condition; foreseebility matters.

    • Sampson v. University of Texas, 500 S.W.3d 380 (Tex. 2016): professor’s trip over an extension cord at tailgate—no knowledge of dangerous condition by university; negligence not proven.

    • Almarante v. Art Institute of Fort Lauderdale, Inc., 921 So.2d 703 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006): student injured crossing a highway on campus; held negligence claims possible.

    • Foreseeability and knowledge as central: Pitre v. Louisiana Tech University (La. Ct. App. 1995) vs. reversed by La. Supreme Court on foreseeability; sledding example (obvious vs. foreseeable danger).

    • Off-premises/elsewhere liability examples and nuances: the university’s duty may extend to injuries arising on property it controls or over which it has a special relationship, even if property is not owned by the university (e.g., roof over a swimming pool; climbing on roofs; satellite or study site liability).

  • Off-campus courses and supervision (3.2.2.4):

    • Institutions face liability for injuries in off-campus settings when they maintain or supervise the course and assign students to sites with known risk; the duty arises from the relationship and the university’s reasonable care in assignments.

    • Delbridge v. Maricopa County Community College District, 893 P.2d 55 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994): college offered a course with adjunct faculty at SRP site; student injured; court held a special relationship existed; remanded for trial to determine breach of duty.

    • Gross v. Family Services Agency and Nova Southeastern University, Inc., 716 So.2d 337 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998): off-campus practicum assignment; university duty to warn about foreseeable risks; Supreme Court of Florida affirmed reasonable-duties in making assignments and requiring warnings; Nova Southeastern University v. Gross, 758 So.2d 86 (Fla. 2000) clarified the duty to warn about off-site internship risks.

    • Rinsky v. Trustees of Boston University, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136876: university liable for negligence and harassment claims related to internship site safety; importance of precautions even when off-campus.

    • Stockinger v. Feather River Community College, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 385 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003): college may assign off-campus internships without creating liability for transportation accidents; the priority is reasonable care in assignment, not control over transportation.

    • Study-abroad programs: courts increasingly require colleges to take reasonable precautions to protect students; notable settlements and cases in Guatemala (St. Mary’s College), Bloss v. University of Minnesota (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (sovereign immunity protected government entities in some study-abroad contexts; immunity did not bar all safety claims where actions breached duty).

  • Cocurricular and social activities (3.2.2.5):

    • Liability can arise from college-sponsored events or activities related to official school life; consequences depend on whether the college supervised or controlled the activity.

    • Bishop v. Texas A&M University, 35 S.W.3d 605 (Tex. 2000): student stabbed during a university-sponsored play; faculty advisors’ supervision and university involvement created potential liability; Texas Supreme Court later clarified sovereign immunity issues (Texas 2005).

    • Whitlock v. Univ. of Denver, 744 P.2d 54 (Colo. 1987): fraternity-sponsored social activity; university’s role as landowner/lessor did not create a special relationship to supervise private social activities; later cases varied by jurisdiction (Paul Smith’s College snowmobile case, Guest v. Hansen, etc.).

    • If an activity is sponsored and supervised by the institution, a special relationship may exist beyond invitee status; example: Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College, 989 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1993): college had a duty to provide medical treatment in medical emergencies during athletic practice under a special relationship.

    • Furek v. University of Delaware, 594 A.2d 506 (Del. 1991): pervasive hazing regulation created a duty to protect students from hazing injuries; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A used to justify duty as an undertaking to regulate dangerous student activities.

    • Knoll v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Nebraska; Morrison v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity (La. Ct. App. 1999): hazing cases with varying outcomes; Apfel v. Huddleston (D. Utah 1999) reaffirmed limiting liability for off-campus social activities not under university control.

    • Overall, outcomes are highly fact-specific; outcomes depend on foreseeability, degree of university control/participation, and the presence of a special relationship.

  • Student suicide (3.2.2.6):

    • Suicide is a major concern for colleges; data from CDC shows high rates among ages 15–24 and college students.

    • Emerging trend: courts recognize a duty to warn/protect or to take affirmative action under special-relationship theories in certain circumstances.

    • Jain v. State of Iowa, 617 N.W.2d 293 (Iowa 2000): rejected “special relationship” to require notifying parents of student’s destructive behavior; staff encouraged counseling and sought parent contact with patient’s consent.

    • Schieszler v. Ferrum College, 236 F. Supp. 2d 602 (W.D. Va. 2002): aunt alleged special relationship; court found sufficient facts to support a duty to protect the student from foreseeable self-harm.

    • Shin v. MIT, No. 020403 (Mass. Cmmw. June 27, 2005): Massachusetts case allowing a settlement; later Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (2018) in Nguyen v. MIT held that, under certain circumstances, a special relationship may create affirmative duties to rescue or prevent suicide, particularly when university has knowledge of the student’s attempts or plans to harm themselves.

    • Nguyen v. MIT, 96 N.E.3d 128 (Mass. 2018): outlined seven factors for analyzing special-relationship duties related to suicide prevention, including foreseeability, reliance, degree of certainty of harm, burden on defendant to act, mutual dependence, moral blameworthiness, and social policy considerations; held that actual knowledge of intent or a prior attempt can trigger duty to take reasonable protective steps in certain circumstances; not triggered by mere ideation without stated plans.

    • Wright State University; Connor v. Wright State University (Ohio App. 2013): reliance element important in establishing a special relationship.

    • FERPA emergency exception: emergency health/safety exceptions allow disclosure to relevant parties; no private right of action under FERPA after Doe v. Gonzaga University; proactive communications to protect student safety encouraged.

  • Educational malpractice and related claims (3.2.3):

    • Educational malpractice claims seek to hold educators responsible for failure to teach or for miseducation; courts are reluctant to recognize these as tort claims.

    • Ross v. Creighton University, 740 F. Supp. 1319 (N.D. Ill. 1990); 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992): educational malpractice claims rejected in favor of contract-based theories; students/deemed actions not within standard of care; court found student responsible for results.

    • Moore v. Vanderloo, 386 N.W.2d 108 (Iowa 1986): patient harmed by chiropractor trained at Palmer College; educational malpractice claim rejected; concerns about standard of care for educators and the breadth of potential damages.

    • Missouri: Dallas Airmotive v. Flightsafety International, Inc., 277 S.W.3d 696 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008): similar rationale; no duty to protect students from harm due to alleged miseducation.

    • Johnson v. Schmitz, 119 F. Supp. 2d 90 (D. Conn. 2000): Yale case involving misappropriation of a student’s dissertation ideas; court allowed some negligence/fiduciary/duty-to-protect theories to proceed against a faculty member, indicating potential for non-educational-malpractice negligence claims in faculty misconduct cases.

  • Defamation (3.2.4):

    • Defamation involves publication of statements to third parties that harm a person’s reputation; can be directed at administrators, faculty, or students; letters of reference and evaluations can be defamatory if they are false and harmful.

    • Opinion privilege: statements framed as opinions (not stating facts) may be protected.

    • Qualified/conditional privilege for fair comment and criticism: communications made in good faith related to a matter of common interest or duty may be protected; Olsson v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 571 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991): a professor’s letter of reference was protected by qualified privilege if made in good faith for a legitimate purpose; still possible to lose privilege if malice or improper disclosure occurs.

    • Internal grievance hearings: findings and statements in internal grievance proceedings may not be protected by absolute or qualified privileges (Overall v. Univ. of Pennsylvania, 412 F.3d 492 (3d Cir. 2005)); private institutions may not receive quasi-judicial privilege for internal grievances.

    • Governmental/constitutional privilege: executive/administrative officers of government have a qualified privilege in communications made in the performance of official duties (Shearer v. Lambert, 547 P.2d 98 (Or. 1976)); this protection is limited to official duties.

    • Public figures and actual malice standard: individuals who are public figures have to prove “actual malice” to succeed in defamation claims; private figures face a lower standard.

    • Cases illustrating defamation dynamics:

    • Doe v. Gonzaga University, 24 P.3d 390 (Wash. 2001), reversed on other grounds, Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002): involved university administrators hearing rumors of sexual assault and denying certification; defamation claim involved; federal vs. state law outcomes.

    • Moore v. University of Notre Dame, 968 F. Supp. 1330 (N.D. Ind. 1997); Campanelli v. The Regents of the University of California, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 891 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); McGarry v. University of San Diego, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 467 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007): holdings that statements of opinion or protected privilege can shield defendants from defamation liability when communications are not presented as factual assertions of harmful acts.

    • Publisher liability and computer networks: institutions that publish defamatory material in official publications or transmit defamatory content online may be liable; computer service providers may be immune under 47 U.S.C. § 230 (Communications Decency Act), depending on the context.

    • True/false: Truth is an affirmative defense to defamation in many jurisdictions; the Doe v. Gonzaga case and other examples illustrate the defense value of truth in defamation claims.

    • Sexual misconduct cases: numerous defamation claims arise when students or staff allege sexual misconduct and the university or staff respond with statements about credibility; outcomes depend on privilege, opinion vs. fact, and whether statements are made in the ordinary course of duties.

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3.2 Institutional Tort Liability: Overview, Negligence, Educational Malpractice, and Defamation (Key Concepts, Cases, and Applications across Higher Education)