Logical positivism

LOGICAL POSITIVISM

Definition

  • Logical Positivism: A philosophical stance established in 1931 by A. E. Blumberg and Herbert Feigl, rooted in ideas from the Vienna Circle.
  • Synonymous with terms such as consistent empiricism, logical empiricism, scientific empiricism, and logical neopositivism.

Historical Background

  • Logical positivists viewed themselves as successors of a 19th-century Viennese empirical tradition connected with British empiricism.
  • Key influences included Ernst Mach’s empiricism which emphasized a scientific orientation.
  • In 1907, prominent figures such as Hans Hahn (mathematician), Otto Neurath (economist), and Philipp Frank (physicist) formed an informal group focused on the philosophy of science, blending mathematics and logic with empirical descriptions of experience.
  • They aimed to devise a comprehensive account of science that reconciled Mach's insights on experience with the significance of mathematics and logic.
  • Influences from Jules Henri Poincaré’s “new positivism” helped shape their ideas.
Formation of the Vienna Circle

  • In 1922, Moritz Schlick was invited to Vienna, where the Vienna Circle emerged under his leadership.

  • Schlick’s background in science, particularly as an interpreter of Einstein's relativity, alongside his interest in philosophy, established a collaborative environment.

  • Notable members included:

    • Otto Neurath
    • Friedrich Waismann
    • Edgar Zilsel
    • Béla von Juhos
    • Felix Kaufmann
    • Herbert Feigl
    • Victor Kraft
    • Philipp Frank
    • Karl Menger
    • Kurt Gödel
    • Hans Hahn

  • In 1926, Rudolf Carnap became a key figure in the discussions, recognized for his writings and contributions, influenced by physicists and logicians like Frege and Russell.

  • Wittgenstein and Popper were not members but engaged with Circles, influencing them, especially through the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.

Influence of Wittgenstein
  • The verifiability principle attributed to Wittgenstein states that:
    • "The meaning of a proposition is identical with the method of verifying it."
    • This means a proposition's significance is tied to the set of experiences confirming its truth.
  • Wittgenstein suggested that logic and mathematics consist of tautologies and claimed that although they are independent of experience, they lack substantive content.
  • The Vienna Circle, however, overlooked distinctions between tautologies and identities.
Opposition to Metaphysics
  • The Vienna Circle was a minority within a larger philosophical landscape dominated by German idealism.
  • Neurath advocated for a political approach to challenge traditional metaphysics, aiming to undermine what he viewed as socially regressive ideas.
Establishment of the Ernst Mach Society
  • In 1928, the Verein Ernst Mach (Ernst Mach Society) was founded to promote scientific insights and modern empirical tools.
  • In 1929, a manifesto titled Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung, Der Wiener Kreis was produced on Schlick’s return from Stanford, linking their views to historical figures such as Hume, Mach, Helmholtz, Poincaré, Duhem, Einstein, Leibniz, Russell, and moralists like Epicurus and Mill.
  • Notable Absence: The manifesto notably omitted participation from the established German philosophical tradition, focusing instead on empiricism and science.
Projects and International Relations
  • The Circle organized congresses to disseminate their ideas, the first held in 1929 in Prague. This kind of engagement facilitated connections with groups like the Society for Empirical Philosophy in Berlin.
  • Expansion of international connections included American and British philosophers drawn to logical positivism, including C. W. Morris, Ernest Nagel, W. V. Quine, and A. J. Ayer.
  • Logical positivism also found followers in France and Scandinavia, with similar thinkers in support of the movement’s principles.

Disintegration of the Vienna Circle

  • The group began disbanding in the early 1930s, marked by individual migrations (e.g., Carnap and Feigl to the USA, Carnap's departure for Chicago, Schlick’s murder in 1936).
  • The Ernst Mach Society was dissolved in 1938, and publications became impossible to distribute in the German-speaking world.
  • The journal Erkenntnis transitioned to Journal of Unified Science in The Hague, ceasing operations in 1940.

Problems of Logical Positivism

  • The verifiability principle's ambiguity raised questions about the nature of statements:
  • Is the assertion that 'The meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification' a meaningful scientific proposition?
    • Logical positivists proposed understanding this principle as a recommendation rather than a strict definition, leading to critiques of metaphysics.
    • The principle facilitated the rejection of unverifiable metaphysical claims, although this left ambiguity regarding its applicability to different philosophical categories.
Consequences on Scientific Laws
  • Scientific laws, by nature, cannot be conclusively verified, thereby challenging their meaningful status under the verifiability principle.
  • Schlick suggested understanding scientific laws as “inference-licenses” or rules rather than mere statements, drawing objections from Neurath and Carnap.
  • A shift towards confirmability and testability occurred, transitioning from strict verifiability.
Question of Uniformity in Science
  • Both Mach and Carnap sought to unify fields like psychology and physics, addressing issues of subjectivity in scientific verification.
  • Schlick proposed the distinction between content and structure of experience, suggesting the importance lies in agreed structures (e.g., color charts) rather than subjective experiences.
  • He argued that scientific content transcends public observation, complicating verification attempts for shared experiences.

Legacy of Logical Positivism

  • Though logical positivism has lost its distinct identity, its essence remains influential in contemporary discussions of empiricism.
  • The movement's contrasts (e.g., metaphysics vs. science, logical vs. factual truths) have been increasingly questioned in ongoing philosophical discourse.
  • The remnants of logical positivism are evident in principles advocating clear definitions, precise language in philosophy, and the utilization of logic in scientific discourse.
  • The decline in Germany contrasts against its broader acceptance in the United States, Britain, Australia, and Scandinavia, emphasizing a divergence in philosophical perspectives.