Gene Sharp's Theory of Power: A Feminist Critique of Consent
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Topic: Review of Gene Sharp’s theory of power (Social Power and Political Freedom, 1980) from a feminist perspective by Kate McGuinness, Journal of Peace Research (1993).
Purpose: Assess the relevance and usefulness of Sharp’s theory of consensual power for understanding gender relations under patriarchy.
Structure of McGuinness’s critique (three parts):
1) Use Pateman’s claim that women are not fully constituted as individuals in civil society to test consent-based power.
2) Link Lipsitz & Kritzer’s critique (power in relation to ruler’s aims) with two feminist perspectives: Guillaumin on the appropriation of women’s bodies in patriarchy and Kelly on feminist theory of sexual violence.
3) Question the possibility of shared political culture where consent is predicated, contrasting with Gilligan (1989) on different worlds shaped by women’s vs. men’s experiences.Conclusion preview: Sharp’s theory is biased toward male experience; it has little value for understanding power in gender relations or for altering patriarchy.
Keywords to track:
Consent as a central mechanism in Sharp’s power theory
Loci of power (external sources of power in society)
Non-violent action grounded in consent withdrawal
Patriarchy, gender relations, sexism, sexual violence
Exam focus: how consent operates (or fails to operate) in gender relations; feminist critiques of power theories; implications for non-violent movements.
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Sharp’s theory of power aims to provide a usable theory for non-violent action.
McGuinness emphasizes two contributions of Sharp:
Classification of nearly two hundred types of non-violent direct action to reveal an invisible history.
A pluralist, relational conception of power that contrasts with monolithic views.
Key definitions by Sharp (from 1973 and 1980):
Social power: the capacity to control the behavior of others, directly or indirectly, through group action that affects other groups.
Political power: social power exercised for political objectives, especially by governmental institutions or actors in opposition to/support of such institutions.
Core claim: power is not inherent to leaders but has external sources (loci of power) in society; the ability of rulers to govern depends on obedience and cooperation of others.
Central thesis: obedience and submission are the heart of political power; obedience is essentially voluntary and rests on consent (even under terror, in Sharp’s view).
Consent can be withdrawn, which underpins non-violent action: withdrawal of consent by those who are governed can challenge power abuses (dictatorship, genocide, war, oppression).
Implications of consent-based power:
Human agency: Sharp’s model is an actor-based view (individuals/actors decide to obey or disobey).
Shared political culture: consent presupposes some common understanding of what is being agreed to; withdrawal requires a shared basis to mobilize.
Instrumental redefinition: power can be redefined to achieve goals without structural societal overhaul.
Three parts set up for critique: applicability to gender relations, limitations of consent, and potential alternatives to Sharp’s framework.
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Introduction to the feminist critique: applying Sharp’s theory to gender relations, i.e., patriarchy.
Argument: gender relations involve a deeply rooted oppression; power in gender relations cannot be fully captured by Sharp’s consensual framework.
Structure reminder: (1) describe Sharp’s theory and role of consent; (2) apply to gender relations; (3) conclude on inadequacy and implications for non-violent action.
Important clarifications:
Sharp’s theory is relational and pluralist, not systemic/structural.
Power is not simply about domination through coercion; it is about the consent and cooperation that sustain social orders.
Preview of feminist sources integrated: Pateman (The Sexual Contract), Guillaumin (The Appropriation of Women), and Kelly (feminist theory of sexual violence); Gilligan (1982) and Margolis (1989) provide feminist perspectives on moral voice and social patterns.
Goal: show that consent-based power cannot adequately characterize power in gender relations or offer effective avenues for changing patriarchy.
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Section 3: A Feminist Critique of Consent begins.
Subsection 3.1 Consent and the Social Contract connects Sharp to social contract theory (Rousseau, Hobbes, Machiavelli, Montesquieu).
Carole Pateman’s critique (The Sexual Contract, 1988): civil society is a modern form of patriarchy; the social contract is incomplete without acknowledging the sexual contract.
Pateman’s key claim: women are not fully constituted individuals in civil society; thus consent is not a privilege they hold; civil society’s political rights derive from a sexual contract embedded in patriarchal marriage.
Pateman’s concept of sexage: dependence of women through marriage and domestic sphere; marriage replicates state of nature in patriarchy; conjugal rights are private and reproduce domination (women as objects within the family and public-private divide).
Implication for Sharp: if women are not fully constituted as individuals, power based on consent lacks universal applicability to gender relations; withdrawal of consent by women cannot be a meaningful lever to challenge patriarchy.
Acknowledgment that women do resist and that non-violent actions exist, but consent-based withdrawal might not address structural oppression.
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Continuation of 3.1: Pateman’s argument details.
Marriage as the private sphere, separate from the public, reproducing patriarchy; civil society does not fully liberate women but reproduces their oppression.
The sexual contract is submerged in civil society via marriage; it is the original dimension of patriarchy, where paternal rights presuppose male sex rights (no conjugal rights without sexual intercourse).
If women are not fully constituted individuals, consent loses its universal applicability in gender relations; thus Sharp’s project of using withdrawal of consent as a mechanism for change faces a structural constraint.
This section also notes that women do participate in non-violent resistance (consciousness-raising, etc.), suggesting alternative pathways to empowerment beyond withdrawal of consent.
Conclusion: Sharp’s theory is limited by not addressing gender-differentiated experiences and patriarchal constructions of reality.
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Subsection 3.2 Consent and the Aims of the Ruler complements the Pateman critique with Lipsitz & Kritzer’s critique (1975).
Lipsitz & Kritzer argue there are forms of power that do not require consent/obedience when rulers’ aims do not involve people directly:
Rulers may seek to control resources or territory rather than people (e.g., in sparsely populated regions).
In densely populated areas, it may suffice to outnumber the population to control territory, potentially bypassing consent from the local population.
Conclusion from Lipsitz & Kritzer: power does not always require deference, depending on aims; this is relevant to gender relations where patriarchal aims may not rely on women’s consent.
For gender relations, the parallel with Sharp’s “two aims” is drawn: control of resources vs. control of bodies via patriarchy; these aims can render consent a less central feature.
Note: Lipsitz & Kritzer’s critique applies to gender relations by challenging the universality of consent as the basis of power.
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Subsections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 connect Sharp’s framework to feminist analyses.
3.2.1 The Appropriation of Women (Guillaumin, 1981): Women’s bodies are appropriated in patriarchy (sexage) on four levels:
Time (women’s time is appropriated)
Products of bodies (labor power, children)
Sexual obligation or physical use by men
Physical charge of disabled members and care of healthy male members
Guillaumin identifies five means of appropriation of women: labor market, spatial confinement, show of force, sexual constraint, law and customary right.
Women as natural objects defined by patriarchy; social construction of oppression is obscured if analyzed only via labor power.
If the aim of patriarchy is appropriation rather than simple control, the analogy to Lipsitz & Kritzer’s first aim becomes clearer: territory/resources can be appropriated without consent from individuals, so the power relation may not hinge on consent from women alone.
3.2.2 Sufficient Manpower: There is a high global population parity (roughly one-to-one), enabling male power over women via sexual violence (as a means of social control).
Liz Kelly’s continuum of sexual violence (1988) provides 11 categories, ranging from threats/harassment to rape and incest, illustrating pervasive social control of women.
The prevalence of sexual violence highlights a mechanism of male power that operates independently of women’s consent; power is not reducible to consent withdrawal.
The author cautions about data: Roberts’ estimates of attacker-to-victim ratios are contested, but the point remains that sexual violence is widespread and a mechanism of patriarchal control.
Important nuance: not all men support patriarchy; some resist. However, even resistance by men (withdrawal of consent) if understood as men’s action, still does not center women’s experiences or power in gender relations.
Conclusion for 3.2: consent underpins Sharp’s framework is insufficient to capture gender power dynamics; the concept is context-dependent and not universal across gender relations.
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Subsection 3.3 Consent and Shared Political Culture discusses the assumption of shared political culture in Sharp’s model.
Shared culture underpins consent (terms of government, social organization) and also the strength of withdrawal (requires coordinated resistance and solidarity).
For gender relations, shared culture is problematic because men and women occupy different social positions within patriarchy; distinct moral voices emerge.
Carol Gilligan’s In a Different Voice (1982) introduces a different moral voice for women, contrasting with traditional male-centered perspectives.
Gilligan’s ethics of care vs. ethics of justice: care emphasizes responsibility and relational obligations; justice emphasizes rights and universal principles.
Sharp’s ethical stance is more aligned with justice; power as control of resources and consent relates to rights and claims, not necessarily care-centered reasoning.
Diane Rothbard Margolis (1989) introduces three social systems (exchange, placing, pooling) that reflect different moral orders and power configurations, offering a feminist reframing of power beyond Sharp’s model.
Gilligan and Margolis challenge the assumption of a universal shared political culture and show alternative moral reasoning in women’s lives.
The section warns that Sharp’s framework, focused on consent and exchange, may not map onto placing (women’s dependent-care roles) or pooling (collective resources) in meaningful ways.
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3.3.1 A Different Moral Voice (Gilligan): Women’s moral development centers on care relationships; traditional theories (Freud, Piaget, Kohlberg) privilege justice and universal principles, often male-centric.
Gilligan contrasts ethic of care with ethic of justice and explains how care-based reasoning addresses different truths and constraints.
Sharp’s model emphasizes an ethic of justice (rights and claims to resources) and the withdrawal of consent as a mechanism; Gilligan’s care ethic challenges the universality of Sharp’s approach.
This leads to a foundational tension: different moral frameworks produce different understandings of power and change.
3.3.2 Different Social Patterns (Margolis, 1989): Three social systems described—exchange, placing, pooling.
Exchange: resources are commodities; power is about creating scarcity and control; market-like relations.
Placing: resources become symbols of social positions; obligations and claims attach to roles (e.g., caregiver roles); power is tied to social positions and responsibilities; termed generative power.
Pooling: resources valued for common good; contributions are often impersonal; power arises from solidarity and collective action.
Margolis argues that these three systems are present in all societies, but each has distinct patterns of power and legitimacy based on consensus values within that system.
Key contrast: Sharp’s universal consent is at odds with Margolis’ view that consensus is contingent and varies across social systems; patriarchy often operates through placing and pooling in ways not captured by Sharp.
Margolis introduces the concept of the power to name (define) as a critical form of social power, shaping identities and the boundaries of relationships.
Implication for Sharp: sharp’s framework does not easily accommodate the nuanced power relations found in placing (care work) and pooling (collective solidarity).
Overall takeaway: Margolis’ reformulation exposes limits of Sharp’s universal consent model and highlights gendered power structures not reducible to consent alone.
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Continued elaboration of Margolis’ three systems and their implications for power in gender relations.
In exchange, power is control over commodities; in placing, power is tied to roles and obligations; in pooling, power is collective and solidarity-based.
Margolis emphasizes that legitimacy and trust are bases of power across all three systems, but the path to consensus is not uniform across systems; asymmetrical relationships can be normalized through social identities and norms.
The notes imply that Sharp’s universal consent approach cannot account for placing or pooling, where consent mechanisms operate differently (e.g., care obligations or collective norms).
Margolis’ evidence suggests that knowledge and care-based labor (often gendered) may be devalued as a form of power in placing, challenging Sharp’s assertion that knowledge is always a potential source of power.
The critique argues that relying solely on consent under Sharp’s model misses critical structural dimensions of power in gendered social arrangements.
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Synthesis: Margolis’ generative power and the power to name reveal structural dimensions of power that Sharp’s theory tends to overlook.
Generative power creates and sustains social life (e.g., reproduction, care work) and is exercised through social positions and norms, not just through overt consent/obeyment dynamics.
Margolis’ analysis shows that consent can be insufficient or even inappropriate as a mechanism for change in gendered systems.
The section argues that Sharp’s theory remains within a narrow functional framework, focusing on relations of control over resources and consent rather than the constitutive power of social identities and roles.
It’s noted that some feminists argue for incorporating women's daily experiences and structural oppression into power theory rather than simply adding them as an afterthought to Sharp’s model.
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Section 4: Conclusion, with subsections 4.1 and 4.2.
4.1 Limitations to Analysis:
The analysis is narrowly focused on consent in power relations; it does not attempt a full rehabilitation of Sharp’s theory in gender contexts.
The use of Sharp’s framework may limit the integration of broader feminist theories of power.
The analysis uses the category of ‘woman’ and ‘man’ as unified categories for critique; acknowledges internal diversity and context-specific differences but notes the limitations of universalizing categories.
4.2 Summary:
The central question is whether Sharp’s usable theory of power can explain gender relations and support non-violent change.
McGuinness argues Sharp’s theory fails to account for patriarchy and gendered oppression; Sharp’s consent-based approach does not map onto women’s experiences of power.
Feminist theories (Pateman, Guillaumin, Kelly, Gilligan, Margolis) offer structural perspectives that reveal limitations of Sharp’s model.
The main value of Sharp’s work lies in its historical contribution to non-violent action theory, not in providing a complete account of social power in patriarchal contexts.
The conclusion asserts that power theories anchored in everyday experiences of the oppressed (e.g., women in patriarchy) require structural foundations beyond Sharp’s consent framework.
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Recap of how the feminist critique unfolds across the argument:
By tying Sharp’s consent-based power to social contract theory, Pateman undermines the universality of consent for all individuals, especially women.
Guillaumin’s sexage and the appropriation of women’s bodies illustrate how power can operate without requiring women’s consent, particularly in patriarchy.
Kelly’s continuum of sexual violence demonstrates a pervasive mechanism of social control over women that operates independently of consent withdrawal.
Gilligan’s care ethics and Margolis’ three social systems (exchange, placing, pooling) reveal distinct moral and organizational frameworks that shape power differently from Sharp’s model.
The argument emphasizes: structural oppression, not merely relational consent, is essential for understanding and changing patriarchy.
The author asserts that Sharp’s theory is male-biased and insufficient for addressing women’s experiences; feminists should ground power analysis in women’s lived experiences and structural dimensions of oppression.
Final stance: Sharp is not a reliable source for power analysis or for guiding change in patriarchal gender relations; feminist theory offers more viable core concepts (e.g., generative power, power to name, ethics of care).
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Final notes on the broader implications:
Power theory must address how social structures sustain oppression beyond consent dynamics.
Non-violent action remains valuable, but strategies require recognition of the specific structures of gender oppression (patriarchy) and alternative pathways to empowerment beyond withdrawal of consent.
The feminist critique supports developing a more pluralistic, structurally aware theory of power that includes care, identity, and social positioning.
References and scholarly context:
Pateman (1988), Guillaumin (1981), Kelly (1988), Gilligan (1982), Margolis (1989), Lipsitz & Kritzer (1975), Roberts (1984), Hartsock (1983, 1990), and others cited to support the feminist critique.
Overall takeaway for exam preparation:
Understand Sharp’s core claims: social/political power is plural, based on loci of power, and maintained through consent; withdrawal of consent enables non-violent change.
Recognize the feminist challenge: gender relations in patriarchy involve forms of power (e.g., appropriation of women’s bodies, sexual violence, care labor) that can operate independent of consent; shared political culture is not universal across genders; moral reasoning differs (ethics of care vs. justice).
Be able to articulate how Pateman, Guillaumin, Kelly, Gilligan, and Margolis expand or critique Sharp, especially in terms of structural analysis, the role of social contracts, and alternative power concepts (e.g., power to name, generative power, placing, pooling).
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Key definitions and concepts to remember:
Social power: capacity to influence others, via group action that affects other groups; political power: power exercised for political objectives by states or groups.
Loci of power: external sources of power within society; six loci identified by Sharp (1973, 1980).
Consent: voluntary obedience; can be withdrawn; central to Sharp’s non-violent action framework.
Sexage: Guillaumin’s term for the complete appropriation of women by men within patriarchy.
Ethic of care vs. ethic of justice: Gilligan’s framework for moral reasoning differences between women and men.
Three social patterns (Margolis): Exchange, Placing, Pooling; each with distinct power dynamics and legitimate bases.
Generative power (Margolis): power attached to social roles that generate life/continuity (care, reproduction).
Power to name (Margolis): the ability to define social reality and establish identities within power relations.
Ethical implications:
The critique argues for recognizing the limits of consent-based strategies in patriarchal systems.
Emphasizes the need for structural and ethical considerations that reflect women’s lived experiences and diverse identities.
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Notable methodological and epistemological points:
The analysis uses Pateman, Guillaumin, Kelly, Gilligan, and Margolis as key feminist sources to reframe power.
The author cautions against overgeneralizing about women and men; emphasizes context, race, class, culture, and time in shaping patriarchy.
The conclusion argues for integrating feminist perspectives into power theory rather than simply adding them to Sharp’s framework.
Final assessment:
Sharp’s theory is historically important for non-violent action but insufficient for explaining or changing patriarchy.
A feminist power theory should incorporate structural analysis, the social construction of identities, and the varied patterns of social relations beyond consent-based models.
References (selected): Pateman (1988), Gilligan (1982), Guillaumin (1981), Kelly (1988), Margolis (1989), Lipsitz & Kritzer (1975), Roberts (1984), Hartsock (1983, 1990), and many others as listed in the article.
A review of Gene Sharp’s theory of power, as presented in "Social Power and Political Freedom" (1980), from a feminist perspective by Kate McGuinness in the Journal of Peace Research (1993), aims to assess the relevance and usefulness of Sharp’s consensual power theory for understanding gender relations under patriarchy. McGuinness structures her critique in three parts: first, by using Pateman’s claim that women are not fully constituted as individuals in civil society to test consent-based power; second, by linking Lipsitz & Kritzer’s critique (power in relation to ruler’s aims) with two feminist perspectives—Guillaumin on the appropriation of women’s bodies in patriarchy and Kelly on feminist theory of sexual violence; and third, by questioning the possibility of a shared political culture where consent is predicated, contrasting this with Gilligan (1989) on different worlds shaped by women’s vs. men’s experiences. The critique concludes that Sharp’s theory is biased toward male experience, offering little value for comprehending power in gender relations or for altering patriarchy. Key concepts explored include consent as a central mechanism in Sharp’s power theory, loci of power (external sources of power in society), non-violent action grounded in consent withdrawal, and the understanding of patriarchy, gender relations, sexism, and sexual violence. The analysis focuses on how consent operates (or fails to operate) in gender relations, feminist critiques of power theories, and implications for non-violent movements.
Sharp’s Theory of Power and its Foundations
Sharp’s theory of power provides a usable framework for non-violent action. McGuinness highlights two significant contributions from Sharp: his classification of nearly two hundred types of non-violent direct action, which illuminates an invisible history, and his pluralist, relational conception of power, contrasting with monolithic views. Sharp defines social power as the capacity to control the behavior of others, directly or indirectly, through group action affecting other groups, while political power is social power applied for political objectives, especially by governmental institutions or opposing/supporting actors.
The core claim of Sharp's theory is that power is not inherent to leaders but derives from external sources (loci of power) within society; a ruler’s ability to govern depends on the obedience and cooperation of others. His central thesis states that obedience and submission form the essence of political power, and this obedience is essentially voluntary, resting on consent even under terror. Crucially, consent can be withdrawn, which forms the basis of non-violent action, allowing challenges to power abuses such as dictatorship, genocide, war, and oppression. This consent-based power has several implications: it supports a view of human agency, where individuals choose to obey or disobey; it presupposes a shared political culture with common understanding for meaningful consent and mobilization; and it allows for an instrumental redefinition of power to achieve goals without needing a complete societal overhaul. The critique specifically sets out to examine the theory’s applicability to gender relations, the limitations of consent, and potential alternatives to Sharp’s framework.
Feminist Critique of Sharp’s Theory
Applying Sharp’s theory to gender relations, particularly patriarchy, reveals significant limitations. The argument is that gender relations involve a deeply rooted oppression whose power dynamics cannot be fully captured by Sharp’s consensual framework. While Sharp’s theory is relational and pluralist rather than systemic or structural, it views power as sustained by consent and cooperation, not merely domination through coercion. This critique integrates insights from feminist sources such as Pateman (The Sexual Contract), Guillaumin (The Appropriation of Women), and Kelly (feminist theory of sexual violence), with Gilligan (1982) and Margolis (1989) providing feminist perspectives on moral voice and social patterns. The overarching goal is to demonstrate that consent-based power is inadequate for characterizing power in gender relations or offering effective avenues for changing patriarchy.
3.1 Consent and the Social Contract
Section 3 begins with a feminist critique of consent, initially linking Sharp’s framework to social contract theory (Rousseau, Hobbes, Machiavelli, Montesquieu). Carole Pateman’s critique in "The Sexual Contract" (1988) posits that civil society is a modern form of patriarchy, where the social contract is incomplete without acknowledging the underlying sexual contract. Pateman argues that women are not fully constituted as individuals in civil society, thus they do not possess the privilege of consent in the same universal sense; civil society’s political rights effectively derive from a sexual contract embedded within patriarchal marriage. Her concept of “sexage” describes the dependence of women through marriage and the domestic sphere, where marriage replicates a state of nature under patriarchy. Conjugal rights, being private, reproduce domination by treating women as objects within the family and by reinforcing the public-private divide.
The implication for Sharp’s theory is profound: if women are not fully constituted individuals, power based on universal consent lacks applicability to gender relations, and the withdrawal of consent by women cannot serve as a meaningful lever to challenge patriarchy. While acknowledging that women do resist and participate in non-violent actions, the critique suggests that consent-based withdrawal alone might not address structural oppression. Pateman’s argument emphasizes that marriage, as a private sphere distinct from the public, perpetuates patriarchy, with the sexual contract being submerged within civil society through marriage. This original dimension of patriarchy means paternal rights are predicated on male sex rights, denying conjugal rights without sexual intercourse. Consequently, if women are not fully constituted individuals, Sharp’s reliance on withdrawal of consent as a mechanism for change faces fundamental structural constraints, limiting its universal applicability in gender relations. This section concludes that Sharp’s theory is inadequate due to its failure to account for gender-differentiated experiences and patriarchal constructions of reality, even as it acknowledges women’s participation in resistance like consciousness-raising.
3.2 Consent and the Aims of the Ruler
This subsection builds on the Pateman critique by incorporating Lipsitz & Kritzer’s critique (1975), which suggests that certain forms of power do not necessitate consent or obedience when rulers’ aims do not directly involve people. For example, rulers might seek to control resources or territory rather than populations, especially in sparsely populated regions, or simply outnumber a local population to control territory without requiring their consent in densely populated areas. From Lipsitz & Kritzer, it is concluded that power does not always require deference, depending on the ruler’s aims. This is highly relevant to gender relations, where patriarchal aims may not rely on women’s consent. A parallel is drawn between Sharp’s “two aims” (control of resources vs. control of bodies) and patriarchal control, suggesting that these aims can reduce the centrality of consent. Lipsitz & Kritzer’s critique thus challenges the universality of consent as the basis of power when applied to gender dynamics.
3.2.1 The Appropriation of Women
Subsections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 further connect Sharp’s framework to feminist analyses. Guillaumin’s (1981) concept of the appropriation of women, or “sexage,” highlights how women’s bodies are appropriated in patriarchy across four levels: their time, the products of their bodies (labor power, children), sexual obligation or physical use by men, and the physical charge of disabled and healthy male members. Guillaumin identifies five means of women's appropriation: the labor market, spatial confinement, the show of force, sexual constraint, and law/customary right. She argues that women are defined as natural objects by patriarchy, obscuring the social construction of oppression when analyzed solely through labor power. If patriarchy’s aim is appropriation rather than simple control, it aligns with Lipsitz & Kritzer’s first aim: territory/resources can be appropriated without individual consent, meaning the power relation might not hinge on women’s consent alone.
3.2.2 Sufficient Manpower
Subsection 3.2.2, “Sufficient Manpower,” addresses the high global population parity (roughly one-to-one), which enables male power over women through pervasive sexual violence as a means of social control. Liz Kelly’s continuum of sexual violence (1988), detailing 11 categories from threats to rape and incest, illustrates this pervasive social control. The widespread nature of sexual violence underscores a mechanism of male power that operates independently of women’s consent, demonstrating that power is not reducible to consent withdrawal. While some data on attacker-to-victim ratios (e.g., Roberts’ estimates) are contested, the core argument remains that sexual violence is a widespread form of patriarchal control. It is important to note that not all men support patriarchy; some resist. However, even male resistance, interpreted as withdrawal of consent, does not center women’s experiences or power within gender relations. The conclusion for section 3.2 is that consent, while underpinning Sharp’s framework, is insufficient to capture complex gender power dynamics, as the concept is context-dependent and not universally applicable across gender relations.
3.3 Consent and Shared Political Culture
Subsection 3.3 addresses Sharp’s assumption of a shared political culture, which underpins consent (terms of government, social organization) and the effectiveness of consent withdrawal (requiring coordinated resistance and solidarity). For gender relations, this assumption is problematic because men and women occupy different social positions within patriarchy, leading to distinct moral voices. Carol Gilligan’s “In a Different Voice” (1982) introduces a distinct moral voice for women, contrasting with traditional male-centered perspectives. Gilligan’s ethics of care emphasizes responsibility and relational obligations, while the ethics of justice emphasizes rights and universal principles. Sharp’s ethical stance is more aligned with justice, as power—defined as control over resources and consent—relates to rights and claims, not necessarily care-centered reasoning. Diane Rothbard Margolis (1989) further complicates this with three social systems (exchange, placing, pooling) that reflect different moral orders and power configurations, offering a feminist reframing of power beyond Sharp’s model. Both Gilligan and Margolis challenge the assumption of a universal shared political culture, revealing alternative moral reasoning in women’s lives. The section warns that Sharp’s framework, focused on consent and exchange, may not adequately map onto placing (women’s dependent-care roles) or pooling (collective resources) in meaningful ways.
3.3.1 A Different Moral Voice
Specifically, Gilligan argues that women’s moral development centers on care relationships, contrasting with traditional theories (Freud, Piaget, Kohlberg) that privilege justice and universal principles, often from a male-centric viewpoint. Gilligan’s ethic of care addresses different truths and constraints than the ethic of justice. This creates a foundational tension: different moral frameworks produce different understandings of power and change. Sharp’s model, with its emphasis on an ethic of justice (rights and claims to resources) and consent withdrawal, struggles with the universality of Gilligan’s care ethic.
3.3.2 Different Social Patterns
Margolis (1989) details three social systems: exchange, where resources are commodities and power involves creating scarcity and control in market-like relations; placing, where resources are symbols of social positions, obligations, and claims attached to roles (e.g., caregiver roles), and power is tied to social positions and responsibilities (termed generative power); and pooling, where resources are valued for the common good, contributions are often impersonal, and power arises from solidarity and collective action. Margolis posits that these systems exist in all societies, each with distinct patterns of power and legitimacy based on system-specific consensus values. A key contrast emerges: Sharp’s idea of universal consent is inconsistent with Margolis’s view that consensus is contingent and varies across social systems, especially since patriarchy often operates through placing and pooling in ways Sharp doesn't capture. Margolis introduces the “power to name”—the ability to define social reality and establish identities within power relations—as a crucial form of social power. This implies that Sharp’s framework does not easily accommodate the nuanced power relations in placing (care work) and pooling (collective solidarity). Margolis’s reformulation exposes the limits of Sharp’s universal consent model and highlights gendered power structures not solely reducible to consent.
Building on Margolis’s three systems, the critique shows that in exchange, power is control over commodities; in placing, it is rooted in roles and obligations; and in pooling, it is collective and solidarity-based. Margolis stresses that legitimacy and trust are universal bases of power, yet consensus paths differ across systems, allowing asymmetrical relationships to be normalized via social identities and norms. This suggests Sharp’s universal consent approach cannot account for placing or pooling, where consent mechanisms vary significantly (e.g., care obligations, collective norms). Margolis’s work also indicates that knowledge and care-based labor (often gendered) may be devalued as power in placing, challenging Sharp’s assertion that knowledge is always a potential power source. Ultimately, relying solely on consent under Sharp’s model overlooks critical structural dimensions of power in gendered social arrangements.
Margolis’s concepts of generative power (power linked to roles that create and sustain social life, like reproduction and care work) and the power to name (the ability to define social reality and identities) reveal structural dimensions of power largely overlooked by Sharp’s theory. These forms of power are exercised through social positions and norms, not merely overt consent/obeyance dynamics, indicating that consent can be insufficient or inappropriate as a mechanism for change in gendered systems. The section argues that Sharp’s theory remains within a narrow functional framework, focusing on control over resources and consent rather than the constitutive power of social identities and roles. Many feminists advocate for integrating women's daily experiences and structural oppression directly into theories of power, rather than merely adding them as an afterthought to models like Sharp’s.
Conclusion
4.1 Limitations to Analysis
The analysis is narrowly focused on consent in power relations, without attempting a full rehabilitation of Sharp’s theory in gender contexts. The use of Sharp’s framework may limit the integration of broader feminist theories of power. The critique uses 'woman' and 'man' as unified categories, acknowledging internal diversity and context-specific differences while noting the limitations of universalizing these categories.
4.2 Summary
The central question explored is whether Sharp’s usable theory of power can explain gender relations and support non-violent change. McGuinness argues that Sharp’s theory fails to account for patriarchy and gendered oppression, as his consent-based approach does not align with women’s experiences of power. Feminist theories by Pateman, Guillaumin, Kelly, Gilligan, and Margolis offer structural perspectives that expose the limitations of Sharp’s model. The primary value of Sharp’s work lies in its historical contribution to non-violent action theory, rather than providing a comprehensive account of social power in patriarchal contexts. The conclusion asserts that power theories anchored in the everyday experiences of the oppressed, such as women in patriarchy, require structural foundations beyond Sharp’s consent framework.
The feminist critique consistently demonstrates how Sharp’s consent-based power is undermined by Pateman’s social contract theory, especially for women’s universality of consent. Guillaumin’s concept of sexage illustrates that power can operate under patriarchy without women’s consent, particularly through the appropriation of their bodies. Kelly’s continuum of sexual violence highlights a pervasive social control mechanism over women independent of consent withdrawal. Furthermore, Gilligan’s care ethics and Margolis’s three social systems (exchange, placing, pooling) reveal distinct moral and organizational frameworks that shape power differently from Sharp’s model. The argument consistently emphasizes that structural oppression, not merely relational consent, is crucial for understanding and changing patriarchy. The author concludes that Sharp’s theory is male-biased and insufficient for addressing women’s experiences, suggesting feminists should base power analysis on women’s lived experiences and structural dimensions of oppression. Therefore, Sharp is not considered a reliable source for power analysis or guiding change in patriarchal gender relations; feminist theory provides more viable core concepts like generative power, the power to name, and the ethics of care.
Broader Implications and References
Power theory must address how social structures sustain oppression beyond consent dynamics. Non-violent action remains valuable, but strategies need to recognize the specific structures of gender oppression (patriarchy) and pursue alternative empowerment pathways beyond consent withdrawal. The feminist critique advocates for developing a more pluralistic, structurally aware theory of power that incorporates care, identity, and social positioning. Supporting references include works by Pateman (1988), Guillaumin (1981), Kelly (1988), Gilligan (1982), Margolis (1989), Lipsitz & Kritzer (1975), Roberts (1984), Hartsock (1983, 1990), and others, providing scholarly context. For exam preparation, it’s important to understand Sharp’s core claims: social/political power is plural, based on loci of power, and maintained through consent, with withdrawal enabling non-violent change. Crucially, recognize the feminist challenge: gender relations in patriarchy involve forms of power (e.g., appropriation of women’s bodies, sexual violence, care labor) functioning independently of consent; shared political culture is not universal; and moral reasoning differs (ethics of care vs. justice). Be able to articulate how Pateman, Guillaumin, Kelly, Gilligan, and Margolis expand or critique Sharp, especially concerning structural analysis, social contracts, and alternative power concepts like the power to name, generative power, placing, and pooling.
Key Concepts and Ethical Implications
Key definitions include social power (capacity to influence others via group action), political power (power for political objectives by states or groups), loci of power (external sources of power; six identified by Sharp), and consent (voluntary obedience, withdrawable, central to Sharp’s non-violent action). Other important terms are sexage (Guillaumin’s term for complete appropriation of women by men), ethic of care vs. ethic of justice (Gilligan’s framework for moral reasoning differences), three social patterns (Margolis’s Exchange, Placing, Pooling, each with distinct power dynamics), generative power (Margolis’s power attached to roles generating life/continuity), and power to name (Margolis’s ability to define social reality and identities). The ethical implications of the critique highlight the limits of consent-based strategies in patriarchal systems and underscore the need for structural and ethical considerations reflecting women’s lived experiences and diverse identities.
Methodological and Final Assessment
The analysis primarily uses Pateman, Guillaumin, Kelly, Gilligan, and Margolis as key feminist sources to reframe power, while cautioning against overgeneralizing about women and men, emphasizing context, race, class, culture, and time in shaping patriarchy. The critique concludes that feminist perspectives should be integrated into power theory rather than merely added to Sharp’s framework. The final assessment states that while Sharp’s theory is historically important for non-violent action, it is insufficient for explaining or changing patriarchy. A feminist power theory, therefore, should incorporate structural analysis, the social construction of identities, and the varied patterns of social relations beyond consent-based models, drawing from selected references such as Pateman (1988), Gilligan (1982), Guillaumin (1981), Kelly (1988), Margolis (1989), Lipsitz & Kritzer (1975), Roberts (1984), and Hartsock (1983, 1990).
Kate McGuinness’s review of Gene Sharp’s theory of power, presented in his 1980 work "Social Power and Political Freedom," critiques its utility in understanding gender relations under patriarchy from a feminist perspective. The core purpose of her assessment is to determine if Sharp's consensual power framework adequately explains and offers solutions for gender-based oppression. McGuinness structures her critique in three main parts: first, by analyzing consent-based power through Carole Pateman's argument that women are not fully constituted individuals in civil society; second, by connecting Lipsitz & Kritzer’s idea that power aims can bypass consent with feminist concepts like Guillaumin's appropriation of women's bodies and Kelly’s theory of sexual violence; and third, by challenging the notion of a shared political culture where consent is presumed, drawing on Gilligan's distinct moral voices. Her overarching conclusion is that Sharp’s theory, being biased towards male experience, holds limited value for comprehending or transforming power dynamics within patriarchy. The critique emphasizes how consent operates, or rather fails to operate, in gender relations, highlighting the need for feminist power theories in non-violent movements.
Sharp’s theory, while offering a usable framework for non-violent action and classifying numerous types of non-violent direct action, conceptualizes social power as the capacity to control behavior through group action, and political power as social power applied for political objectives. A central tenet is that power is not inherent to leaders but stems from societal sources, depending on the obedience and cooperation of others. Sharp asserts that obedience is voluntary and based on consent, even amidst terror, and that the withdrawal of this consent can challenge abuses of power. However, McGuinness’s critique questions the universal applicability of this consent-based model, particularly in the context of deeply rooted patriarchal oppression.
The Feminist Critique of Sharp’s Theory begins by asserting that the power dynamics in gender relations cannot be fully captured by a consensual framework. Although Sharp's theory is relational and pluralist, focusing on how consent sustains social orders rather than just coercion, feminist scholars argue it misses critical structural dimensions. McGuinness integrates perspectives from Pateman, Guillaumin, and Kelly, alongside Gilligan and Margolis, to demonstrate the inadequacy of consent-based power for characterizing gender relations or providing effective strategies against patriarchy.
One significant point of critique is detailed in "3.1 Consent and the Social Contract," where Sharp's framework is linked to social contract theory. Carole Pateman’s "The Sexual Contract" (1988) argues that modern civil society is patriarchal, with its social contract incomplete without acknowledging an underlying sexual contract. Pateman contends that women are not fully constituted as individuals in civil society and thus do not universally possess the privilege of consent in the same way men do. Her concept of “sexage” illustrates women’s dependence through marriage, which she views as replicating a state of nature under patriarchy, where private conjugal rights perpetuate domination by treating women as objects. This profoundly impacts Sharp’s theory: if women are not fully recognized as individuals, universal consent is inapplicable to gender relations, rendering the withdrawal of consent by women an ineffective lever against patriarchy. While women do engage in non-violent resistance, consent-based withdrawal alone may not address structural oppression.
"3.2 Consent and the Aims of the Ruler" extends the critique by incorporating Lipsitz & Kritzer’s (1975) argument that some forms of power do not require consent or obedience, especially when rulers’ aims are not directly focused on controlling people (e.g., controlling resources or territory). This is highly relevant to gender relations, as patriarchal aims might not rely on women’s explicit consent. Subsections "3.2.1 The Appropriation of Women" and "3.2.2 Sufficient Manpower" further develop this. Guillaumin’s (1981) concept of “sexage”—the appropriation of women’s bodies—demonstrates how patriarchal power operates on multiple levels (time, labor, sexual obligation, caregiving) through means like the labor market, spatial confinement, and sexual constraint. This form of power, akin to controlling territory or resources, often operates without requiring women's consent, challenging Sharp's universal emphasis on consent. Similarly, Liz Kelly’s (1988) continuum of sexual violence illustrates a pervasive mechanism of male power that operates independently of women’s consent, serving as a form of social control that isn't reducible to consent withdrawal. Thus, consent, a foundation of Sharp’s framework, is deemed insufficient for capturing complex gender power dynamics.
"3.3 Consent and Shared Political Culture" scrutinizes Sharp’s assumption of a shared political culture necessary for effective consent and its withdrawal. McGuinness argues this assumption is problematic in gender relations due to the distinct social positions of men and women within patriarchy, which lead to different moral voices. Carol Gilligan’s “In a Different Voice” (1982) highlights women’s ethic of care, which emphasizes responsibility and relational obligations, contrasting with Sharp's justice-oriented ethical stance that aligns with rights and claims over resources. Furthermore, Diane Rothbard Margolis (1989) introduces three social systems—exchange, placing, and pooling—to describe different moral orders and power configurations. Margolis’s framework reveals that consensus is contingent on these varied social systems, with patriarchy often operating through 'placing' (roles tied to obligations like caregiving) and 'pooling' (collective resources for common good) in ways Sharp's universal consent model does not capture. Margolis also introduces concepts like 'generative power' (power from roles that create life and continuity) and the 'power to name' (defining social reality and identities), revealing structural power dimensions overlooked by Sharp. These critiques collectively argue that consent can be insufficient or inappropriate as a mechanism for change in gendered systems, as Sharp’s theory remains within a narrow functional framework focused on control over resources.
In conclusion, McGuinness explicitly states that Sharp’s usable theory of power fails to explain gender relations effectively or support non-violent change within patriarchy. Feminist theories offer structural perspectives that expose the limitations of Sharp’s model, demonstrating that power theories for oppressed groups, like women under patriarchy, necessitate structural foundations that extend beyond Sharp’s consent framework. She argues that Sharp’s theory is male-biased and insufficient for addressing women’s experiences, and feminists should ground power analysis in women’s lived experiences and structural dimensions of oppression. Therefore, Sharp is not considered a reliable source for power analysis or guiding change in patriarchal gender relations; feminist theory, with its concepts like generative power, the power to name, and the ethics of care, provides more viable core concepts. Power theory, to be comprehensive, must address how social structures sustain oppression beyond mere consent dynamics, integrating care, identity, and social positioning. For quiz preparation, it is crucial to understand Sharp's core claims (plural power, loci of power, consent for non-violent change) and, more importantly, the multifaceted feminist challenge to these claims: that gendered power operates independently of consent through mechanisms like body appropriation and sexual violence, and that shared political culture and moral reasoning are not universal across genders. Be prepared to articulate how scholars like Pateman, Guillaumin, Kelly, Gilligan, and Margolis critique and expand upon Sharp’s framework, specifically regarding structural analysis, the social contract, and alternative power concepts.
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Topic: Review of Gene Sharp’s theory of power (Social Power and Political Freedom, 1980) from a feminist perspective by Kate McGuinness, Journal of Peace Research (1993).
Purpose: Assess the relevance and usefulness of Sharp’s theory of consensual power for understanding gender relations under patriarchy.
Structure of McGuinness’s critique (three parts):
1) Use Pateman’s claim that women are not fully constituted as individuals in civil society to test consent-based power.
2) Link Lipsitz & Kritzer’s critique (power in relation to ruler’s aims) with two feminist perspectives: Guillaumin on the appropriation of women’s bodies in patriarchy and Kelly on feminist theory of sexual violence.
3) Question the possibility of shared political culture where consent is predicated, contrasting with Gilligan (1989) on different worlds shaped by women’s vs. men’s experiences.
Conclusion preview: Sharp’s theory is biased toward male experience; it has little value for understanding power in gender relations or for altering patriarchy.
Keywords to track:
Consent as a central mechanism in Sharp’s power theory
Loci of power (external sources of power in society)
Non-violent action grounded in consent withdrawal
Patriarchy, gender relations, sexism, sexual violence
Exam focus: how consent operates (or fails to operate) in gender relations; feminist critiques of power theories; implications for non-violent movements.
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Sharp’s theory of power aims to provide a usable theory for non-violent action.
McGuinness emphasizes two contributions of Sharp:
Classification of nearly two hundred types of non-violent direct action to reveal an invisible history.
A pluralist, relational conception of power that contrasts with monolithic views.
Key definitions by Sharp (from 1973 and 1980):
Social power: the capacity to control the behavior of others, directly or indirectly, through group action that affects other groups.
Political power: social power exercised for political objectives, especially by governmental institutions or actors in opposition to/support of such institutions.
Core claim: power is not inherent to leaders but has external sources (loci of power) in society; the ability of rulers to govern depends on obedience and cooperation of others.
Central thesis: obedience and submission are the heart of political power; obedience is essentially voluntary and rests on consent (even under terror, in Sharp’s view).
Consent can be withdrawn, which underpins non-violent action: withdrawal of consent by those who are governed can challenge power abuses (dictatorship, genocide, war, oppression).
Implications of consent-based power:
Human agency: Sharp’s model is an actor-based view (individuals/actors decide to obey or disobey).
Shared political culture: consent presupposes some common understanding of what is being agreed to; withdrawal requires a shared basis to mobilize.
Instrumental redefinition: power can be redefined to achieve goals without structural societal overhaul.
Three parts set up for critique: applicability to gender relations, limitations of consent, and potential alternatives to Sharp’s framework.
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Introduction to the feminist critique: applying Sharp’s theory to gender relations, i.e., patriarchy.
Argument: gender relations involve a deeply rooted oppression; power in gender relations cannot be fully captured by Sharp’s consensual framework.
Structure reminder: (1) describe Sharp’s theory and role of consent; (2) apply to gender relations; (3) conclude on inadequacy and implications for non-violent action.
Important clarifications:
Sharp’s theory is relational and pluralist, not systemic/structural.
Power is not simply about domination through coercion; it is about the consent and cooperation that sustain social orders.
Preview of feminist sources integrated: Pateman (The Sexual Contract), Guillaumin (The Appropriation of Women), and Kelly (feminist theory of sexual violence); Gilligan (1982) and Margolis (1989) provide feminist perspectives on moral voice and social patterns.
Goal: show that consent-based power cannot adequately characterize power in gender relations or offer effective avenues for changing patriarchy.
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Section 3: A Feminist Critique of Consent begins.
Subsection 3.1 Consent and the Social Contract connects Sharp to social contract theory (Rousseau, Hobbes, Machiavelli, Montesquieu).
Carole Pateman’s critique (The Sexual Contract, 1988): civil society is a modern form of patriarchy; the social contract is incomplete without acknowledging the sexual contract.
Pateman’s key claim: women are not fully constituted individuals in civil society; thus consent is not a privilege they hold; civil society’s political rights derive from a sexual contract embedded in patriarchal marriage.
Pateman’s concept of sexage: dependence of women through marriage and domestic sphere; marriage replicates state of nature in patriarchy; conjugal rights are private and reproduce domination (women as objects within the family and public-private divide).
Implication for Sharp: if women are not fully constituted as individuals, power based on consent lacks universal applicability to gender relations; withdrawal of consent by women cannot be a meaningful lever to challenge patriarchy.
Acknowledgment that women do resist and that non-violent actions exist, but consent-based withdrawal might not address structural oppression.
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Continuation of 3.1: Pateman’s argument details.
Marriage as the private sphere, separate from the public, reproducing patriarchy; civil society does not fully liberate women but reproduces their oppression.
The sexual contract is submerged in civil society via marriage; it is the original dimension of patriarchy, where paternal rights presuppose male sex rights (no conjugal rights without sexual intercourse).
If women are not fully constituted individuals, consent loses its universal applicability in gender relations; thus Sharp’s project of using withdrawal of consent as a mechanism for change faces a structural constraint.
This section also notes that women do participate in non-violent resistance (consciousness-raising, etc.), suggesting alternative pathways to empowerment beyond withdrawal of consent.
Conclusion: Sharp’s theory is limited by not addressing gender-differentiated experiences and patriarchal constructions of reality.
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Subsection 3.2 Consent and the Aims of the Ruler complements the Pateman critique with Lipsitz & Kritzer’s critique (1975).
Lipsitz & Kritzer argue there are forms of power that do not require consent/obedience when rulers’ aims do not involve people directly:
Rulers may seek to control resources or territory rather than people (e.g., in sparsely populated regions).
In densely populated areas, it may suffice to outnumber the population to control territory, potentially bypassing consent from the local population.
Conclusion from Lipsitz & Kritzer: power does not always require deference, depending on aims; this is relevant to gender relations where patriarchal aims may not rely on women’s consent.
For gender relations, the parallel with Sharp’s “two aims” is drawn: control of resources vs. control of bodies via patriarchy; these aims can render consent a less central feature.
Note: Lipsitz & Kritzer’s critique applies to gender relations by challenging the universality of consent as the basis of power.
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Subsections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 connect Sharp’s framework to feminist analyses.
3.2.1 The Appropriation of Women (Guillaumin, 1981): Women’s bodies are appropriated in patriarchy (sexage) on four levels:
Time (women’s time is appropriated)
Products of bodies (labor power, children)
Sexual obligation or physical use by men
Physical charge of disabled members and care of healthy male members
Guillaumin identifies five means of appropriation of women: labor market, spatial confinement, show of force, sexual constraint, law and customary right.
Women as natural objects defined by patriarchy; social construction of oppression is obscured if analyzed only via labor power.
If the aim of patriarchy is appropriation rather than simple control, the analogy to Lipsitz & Kritzer’s first aim becomes clearer: territory/resources can be appropriated without consent from individuals, so the power relation may not hinge on consent from women alone.
3.2.2 Sufficient Manpower: There is a high global population parity (roughly one-to-one), enabling male power over women via sexual violence (as a means of social control).
Liz Kelly’s continuum of sexual violence (1988) provides 11 categories, ranging from threats/harassment to rape and incest, illustrating pervasive social control of women.
The prevalence of sexual violence highlights a mechanism of male power that operates independently of women’s consent; power is not reducible to consent withdrawal.
The author cautions about data: Roberts’ estimates of attacker-to-victim ratios are contested, but the point remains that sexual violence is widespread and a mechanism of patriarchal control.
Important nuance: not all men support patriarchy; some resist. However, even resistance by men (withdrawal of consent) if understood as men’s action, still does not center women’s experiences or power in gender relations.
Conclusion for 3.2: consent underpins Sharp’s framework is insufficient to capture gender power dynamics; the concept is context-dependent and not universal across gender relations.
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Subsection 3.3 Consent and Shared Political Culture discusses the assumption of shared political culture in Sharp’s model.
Shared culture underpins consent (terms of government, social organization) and also the strength of withdrawal (requires coordinated resistance and solidarity).
For gender relations, shared culture is problematic because men and women occupy different social positions within patriarchy; distinct moral voices emerge.
Carol Gilligan’s In a Different Voice (1982) introduces a different moral voice for women, contrasting with traditional male-centered perspectives.
Gilligan’s ethics of care vs. ethics of justice: care emphasizes responsibility and relational obligations; justice emphasizes rights and universal principles.
Sharp’s ethical stance is more aligned with justice; power as control of resources and consent relates to rights and claims, not necessarily care-centered reasoning.
Diane Rothbard Margolis (1989) introduces three social systems (exchange, placing, pooling) that reflect different moral orders and power configurations, offering a feminist reframing of power beyond Sharp’s model.
Gilligan and Margolis challenge the assumption of a universal shared political culture and show alternative moral reasoning in women’s lives.
The section warns that Sharp’s framework, focused on consent and exchange, may not map onto placing (women’s dependent-care roles) or pooling (collective resources) in meaningful ways.
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3.3.1 A Different Moral Voice (Gilligan): Women’s moral development centers on care relationships; traditional theories (Freud, Piaget, Kohlberg) privilege justice and universal principles, often male-centric.
Gilligan contrasts ethic of care with ethic of justice and explains how care-based reasoning addresses different truths and constraints.
Sharp’s model emphasizes an ethic of justice (rights and claims to resources) and the withdrawal of consent as a mechanism; Gilligan’s care ethic challenges the universality of Sharp’s approach.
This leads to a foundational tension: different moral frameworks produce different understandings of power and change.
3.3.2 Different Social Patterns (Margolis, 1989): Three social systems described—exchange, placing, pooling.
Exchange: resources are commodities; power is about creating scarcity and control; market-like relations.
Placing: resources become symbols of social positions; obligations and claims attach to roles (e.g., caregiver roles); power is tied to social positions and responsibilities; termed generative power.
Pooling: resources valued for common good; contributions are often impersonal; power arises from solidarity and collective action.
Margolis argues that these three systems are present in all societies, but each has distinct patterns of power and legitimacy based on consensus values within that system.
Key contrast: Sharp’s universal consent is at odds with Margolis’ view that consensus is contingent and varies across social systems; patriarchy often operates through placing and pooling in ways not captured by Sharp.
Margolis introduces the concept of the power to name (define) as a critical form of social power, shaping identities and the boundaries of relationships.
Implication for Sharp: sharp’s framework does not easily accommodate the nuanced power relations found in placing (care work) and pooling (collective solidarity).
Overall takeaway: Margolis’ reformulation exposes limits of Sharp’s universal consent model and highlights gendered power structures not reducible to consent alone.
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Continued elaboration of Margolis’ three systems and their implications for power in gender relations.
In exchange, power is control over commodities; in placing, power is tied to roles and obligations; in pooling, power is collective and solidarity-based.
Margolis emphasizes that legitimacy and trust are bases of power across all three systems, but the path to consensus is not uniform across systems; asymmetrical relationships can be normalized through social identities and norms.
The notes imply that Sharp’s universal consent approach cannot account for placing or pooling, where consent mechanisms operate differently (e.g., care obligations or collective norms).
Margolis’ evidence suggests that knowledge and care-based labor (often gendered) may be devalued as a form of power in placing, challenging Sharp’s assertion that knowledge is always a potential source of power.
The critique argues that relying solely on consent under Sharp’s model misses critical structural dimensions of power in gendered social arrangements.
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Synthesis: Margolis’ generative power and the power to name reveal structural dimensions of power that Sharp’s theory tends to overlook.
Generative power creates and sustains social life (e.g., reproduction, care work) and is exercised through social positions and norms, not just through overt consent/obeyment dynamics.
Margolis’ analysis shows that consent can be insufficient or even inappropriate as a mechanism for change in gendered systems.
The section argues that Sharp’s theory remains within a narrow functional framework, focusing on relations of control over resources and consent rather than the constitutive power of social identities and roles.
It’s noted that some feminists argue for incorporating women's daily experiences and structural oppression into power theory rather than simply adding them as an afterthought to Sharp’s model.
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Section 4: Conclusion, with subsections 4.1 and 4.2.
4.1 Limitations to Analysis:
The analysis is narrowly focused on consent in power relations; it does not attempt a full rehabilitation of Sharp’s theory in gender contexts.
The use of Sharp’s framework may limit the integration of broader feminist theories of power.
The analysis uses the category of ‘woman’ and ‘man’ as unified categories for critique; acknowledges internal diversity and context-specific differences but notes the limitations of universalizing categories.
4.2 Summary:
The central question is whether Sharp’s usable theory of power can explain gender relations and support non-violent change.
McGuinness argues Sharp’s theory fails to account for patriarchy and gendered oppression; Sharp’s consent-based approach does not map onto women’s experiences of power.
Feminist theories (Pateman, Guillaumin, Kelly, Gilligan, Margolis) offer structural perspectives that reveal limitations of Sharp’s model.
The main value of Sharp’s work lies in its historical contribution to non-violent action theory, not in providing a complete account of social power in patriarchal contexts.
The conclusion asserts that power theories anchored in everyday experiences of the oppressed (e.g., women in patriarchy) require structural foundations beyond Sharp’s consent framework.
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Recap of how the feminist critique unfolds across the argument:
By tying Sharp’s consent-based power to social contract theory, Pateman undermines the universality of consent for all individuals, especially women.
Guillaumin’s sexage and the appropriation of women’s bodies illustrate how power can operate without requiring women’s consent, particularly in patriarchy.
Kelly’s continuum of sexual violence demonstrates a pervasive mechanism of social control over women that operates independently of consent withdrawal.
Gilligan’s care ethics and Margolis’ three social systems (exchange, placing, pooling) reveal distinct moral and organizational frameworks that shape power differently from Sharp’s model.
The argument emphasizes: structural oppression, not merely relational consent, is essential for understanding and changing patriarchy.
The author asserts that Sharp’s theory is male-biased and insufficient for addressing women’s experiences; feminists should ground power analysis in women’s lived experiences and structural dimensions of oppression.
Final stance: Sharp is not a reliable source for power analysis or for guiding change in patriarchal gender relations; feminist theory offers more viable core concepts (e.g., generative power, power to name, ethics of care).
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Final notes on the broader implications:
Power theory must address how social structures sustain oppression beyond consent dynamics.
Non-violent action remains valuable, but strategies require recognition of the specific structures of gender oppression (patriarchy) and alternative pathways to empowerment beyond withdrawal of consent.
The feminist critique supports developing a more pluralistic, structurally aware theory of power that includes care, identity, and social positioning.
References and scholarly context:
Pateman (1988), Guillaumin (1981), Kelly (1988), Gilligan (1982), Margolis (1989), Lipsitz & Kritzer (1975), Roberts (1984), Hartsock (1983, 1990), and others cited to support the feminist critique.
Overall takeaway for exam preparation:
Understand Sharp’s core claims: social/political power is plural, based on loci of power, and maintained through consent; withdrawal of consent enables non-violent change.
Recognize the feminist challenge: gender relations in patriarchy involve forms of power (e.g., appropriation of women’s bodies, sexual violence, care labor) that can operate independent of consent; shared political culture is not universal across genders; moral reasoning differs (ethics of care vs. justice).
Be able to articulate how Pateman, Guillaumin, Kelly, Gilligan, and Margolis expand or critique Sharp, especially in terms of structural analysis, the role of social contracts, and alternative power concepts (e.g., power to name, generative power, placing, pooling).
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Key definitions and concepts to remember:
Social power: capacity to influence others, via group action that affects other groups; political power: power exercised for political objectives by states or groups.
Loci of power: external sources of power within society; six loci identified by Sharp (1973, 1980).
Consent: voluntary obedience; can be withdrawn; central to Sharp’s non-violent action framework.
Sexage: Guillaumin’s term for the complete appropriation of women by men within patriarchy.
Ethic of care vs. ethic of justice: Gilligan’s framework for moral reasoning differences between women and men.
Three social patterns (Margolis): Exchange, Placing, Pooling; each with distinct power dynamics and legitimate bases.
Generative power (Margolis): power attached to social roles that generate life/continuity (care, reproduction).
Power to name (Margolis): the ability to define social reality and establish identities within power relations.
Ethical implications:
The critique argues for recognizing the limits of consent-based strategies in patriarchal systems.
Emphasizes the need for structural and ethical considerations that reflect women’s lived experiences and diverse identities.
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Notable methodological and epistemological points:
The analysis uses Pateman, Guillaumin, Kelly, Gilligan, and Margolis as key feminist sources to reframe power.
The author cautions against overgeneralizing about women and men; emphasizes context, race, class, culture, and time in shaping patriarchy.
The conclusion argues for integrating feminist perspectives into power theory rather than simply adding them to Sharp’s framework.
Final assessment:
Sharp’s theory is historically important for non-violent action but insufficient for explaining or changing patriarchy.
A feminist power theory should incorporate structural analysis, the social construction of identities, and the varied patterns of social relations beyond consent-based models.
References (selected): Pateman (1988), Gilligan (1982), Guillaumin (1981), Kelly (1988), Margolis (1989), Lipsitz & Kritzer (1975), Roberts (1984), Hartsock (1983, 1990), and many others as listed in the article.
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Source: Kate McGuinness, Journal of Peace Research, 1993. Review Essay of Gene Sharp, Social Power and Political Freedom (1980). The article analyzes Sharp’s theory of consensual power through a feminist lens focused on gender relations and patriarchy.
Central aim: evaluate whether Sharp’s theory of power, grounded in consent and withdrawal of consent, can effectively analyze and alter gender oppression.
McGuinness defines a usable theory of power as one that can change relations of domination to benefit the traditionally powerless. It should be relational and grounded in actual experiences, not merely abstract possession by the powerful.
Sharp’s theory underpins his approach to non-violent change and non-violent action: power is not a monolithic possession but a plural, relational set of social powers.
McGuinness outlines a three-part analysis to test Sharp’s theory in gender relations:
1) Pateman’s argument that women are not fully constituted individuals in civil society, limiting the application of consent.
2) Lipsitz & Kritzer’s critique of Sharp about power in relation to a ruler’s aims, linked to feminist perspectives (Guillaumin on appropriation of women’s bodies; Kelly on sexual violence).
3) The possibility of shared political culture and whether consent-based power can be imagined in women’s and men’s different worlds (Gilligan; Margolis).Conclusion (anticipated): Sharp’s theory is of limited value for characterizing power in gender relations or for altering patriarchy; it is male-biased and fails to account for women’s experiences.
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The introduction clarifies that domination/subordination relations give rise to critical global problems (dictatorship, genocide, war, social oppression such as sexism, racism, classism).
A usable theory of power should empower those who are traditionally powerless and redefine power relationally (not as a fixed possession of dominants).
Sharp’s contribution is twofold: (i) classification of nearly two hundred types of non-violent direct action, making invisible history visible; (ii) a pluralist, relational view of power that contrasts with a monolithic view.
Sharp’s pluralist view defines social power as the capacity to control the behavior of others through group action that affects other groups; political power is the form of social power used for political objectives, involving government or opposition to government (pp. 7–8, in Sharp’s works).
He locates external sources of power in society, the so‑called loci of power (six loci), which are the mechanisms through which those without power can influence those in authority.
A key claim: obedience and submission are the heart of political power; obedience is voluntary and consent to governance is the norm, even under totalitarian regimes (though fear can complicate this).
Consent is withdrawable; withdrawal of consent is a method for disadvantaged groups to challenge power, particularly in the non-violent action framework.
Implications of power-as-consent:
Human agency is foregrounded (an actor-model of social interaction; subjects choose to obey or disobey).
Assumes some shared political culture/values; requires common experiences of power for broad withdrawal of consent.
Suggests power can be redefined to achieve instrumental ends without radical social restructuring (McGuinness cites Summy [1983] on this point).
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2. Gene Sharp's Theory of Power (continued)
Sharp is a key theorist on non-violence, systematizing non-violent action and elaborating a theory of power that supports non-violent change.
Sharp distinguishes two views of political power: a monolithic view (power resides in the state and those who enforce sanctions/violence) and a pluralist view (power as relational, residing in social channels and the behaviors of many groups).
Sharp’s definition of social power: the capacity to control the behavior of others, directly or indirectly, through action by groups of people, which impinges on other groups of people. Political power is the form of social power wielded for political objectives, especially by governmental institutions or by people in opposition to or in support of such institutions. This definition emphasizes external sources of power (“loci of power”) and the need for cooperation/obedience to realize power.
Because power is not inherent in leaders, Sharp locates power in external social sources; the control of power depends on obedience and cooperation of others. The famous assertion: “The most important single quality of any government, without which it would not exist, must be obedience and submission of its subjects. Obedience is the heart of political power” (Sharp, 1973, p. 16).
Consent, when given, can be withdrawn (Sharp, 1973, pp. 30–31). The withdrawal of consent creates a tangible mechanism to resist abuses (dictatorship, genocide, war, oppression).
Implications of Sharp’s view:
Strong human agency in politics; an actor-centered model rather than a strictly structural perspective.
Assumes some level of shared political culture/values to enable broad consent and broad withdrawal of consent.
Suggests power can be redirected or redefined for instrumental purposes without necessarily transforming the entire system.
McGuinness foreshadows three critiques that she will develop in the feminist critique: lack of structural analysis, empirical concerns about consent-based power, and gender bias in assuming universal applicability of consent.
Page 4
3. A Feminist Critique of Consent
McGuinness foregrounds several lines of critique:
Sharp’s theory lacks a structural analysis that would reveal how power operates within patriarchal systems.
The empirical base of consent-based power can be questioned (Lipsitz & Kritzer; Summy cite limitations and alternative power dynamics).
A central critique: Sharp’s theory does not account for women’s experiences of power in patriarchy, even though women have engaged in non-violent resistance that does not rely on withdrawing consent (e.g., feminist processes of consciousness-raising).
The overall claim: consent-based power is not a universal descriptor for power relations, especially in gender relations where patriarchy structures power in ways not reducible to consent/withdrawal.
The analysis proceeds in three moves: (1) place Sharp in the social contract tradition; (2) apply Lipsitz & Kritzer to gender relations, drawing on Guillaumin (appropriation of women’s bodies) and Kelly (feminist theory of sexual violence); (3) contrast shared political culture with feminist insights from Gilligan and Margolis about women’s experiences and moral/power schemas.
3.1 Consent and the Social Contract
Sharp’s work is linked to social contract theory (Rousseau, Hobbes, Machiavelli, Montesquieu). The core contractarian question: how can government by one man be legitimate if, in the natural condition, all men are born free and equal? The answer in social contract theory is that political rights arise through agreement.
Pateman’s The Sexual Contract (1988) challenges the idea that civil society is the full story of political rights; she argues that the social contract is incomplete without the sexual contract, which is rooted in gendered arrangements that maintain patriarchy.
Pateman argues that women are not fully constituted individuals in civil society; political rights depend on a prior sexual contract and marriage, which preserves private, conjugal rights and reproduces patriarchy. This means consent to governance is not a universal or neutral act for women; it is socially structured within a patriarchal private sphere.
Implication for Sharp: if women are not fully constituted as individuals, then the notion that political consent underwrites power is fundamentally limited for understanding gender relations. Women may resist through action that does not withdraw male consent in the public sphere; they may engage in feminist processes that do not rely on withdrawal of consent.
McGuinness notes that Sharp’s willingness to assume universal consent is biased by gendered assumptions and fails to recognize different social constructions of reality for women.
3.2 Consent and the Aims of the Ruler
Lipsitz and Kritzer (1975) critique Sharp by asking whether consent is always necessary, depending on a ruler’s aims. They propose two situations where power may not require consent:
A ruler may desire to control resources or territory rather than persuade or govern people directly (e.g., colonization where the ruler wants land or resources and can displace or kill inhabitants without relying on their cooperation).
In densely populated areas, an occupier can command enough manpower to control a population without the cooperation of the indigenous population.
The point for gender relations: even if a subjugated group withdraws the consent of a ruler’s supporters, this does not necessarily imply the withdrawal of consent by the group that is being governed. In gender relations, similar logic suggests that consent-based power may not capture the core dynamics of patriarchy where the primary form of oppression concerns control over women’s bodies, labor, and sexual life.
McGuinness argues that these critiques help illuminate similarities in gender relations: there are forms of power that do not rely on women’s consent or cooperation, particularly in contexts of appropriation and violence.
3.2.1 The Appropriation of Women
Colette Guillaumin’s analysis (1981) centers on the appropriation of women’s bodies in patriarchy, a concept she terms sexage. This process occurs on four concrete levels:
The appropriation of women’s time;
The appropriation of the products of their bodies (children, labor power);
Sexual obligation or physical use by men; and
The physical charge of disabled members and care for healthy male members.
Guillaumin identifies five means by which men appropriate women: in the labor market, through spatial confinement, display of force, sexual constraint, and law and customary rights.
Women are defined as natural objects within the system of sexage, which obscures the social construction of oppression. If patriarchy aims at appropriation rather than control, this parallels Lipsitz & Kritzer’s first critique and challenges Sharp’s emphasis on consent as the sole mechanism of power in gender relations.
This perspective suggests that men can exercise power over women without women’s consent and that this power is rooted in social structures, institutions, and gendered bodies.
3.2.2 Sufficient Manpower
In gender relations, there is a high ratio of men to women globally, giving the impression that men have enough manpower to control women without relying on women’s consent.
Liz Kelly’s feminist theory of sexual violence provides a key context: sexual violence serves as a mechanism of social control over women and supports male dominance. Kelly’s continuum of sexual violence includes an eleven-category spectrum from threats and harassment to rape and incest, illustrating how pervasive threats and acts of violence shape women’s behavior.
The continuum highlights the pervasive social control of women and shows that consent is not a reliable organizing principle for understanding the power dynamics in gender relations.
The discussion also notes that precise numbers are difficult to establish (due to underreporting, definitional shifts, and state complicity), but even conservative estimates show significant male advantage in power dynamics.
Roberts’ statistics (1984) are cited as provocative but contested: she proposed a one-to-one correspondence between attackers and victims, leading to estimates like 55–65% of males as assailants; McGuinness notes this as an illustration rather than a precise empirical claim.
Overall, the argument is that even if not all men support patriarchy, the structural benefits to men as a group persist, and concentrating on individual agency risks obscuring the structural advantages that patriarchy confers.
Some men resist patriarchy (anti-discrimination campaigns, anti-rape campaigns, caregiving roles). If such resistance is framed as a withdrawal of consent, it would attribute the change to men rather than to the women who experience oppression; this reinforces the need to center women’s experiences when evaluating power.
3.3 Consent and Shared Political Culture
Sharp’s theory relies on the idea of a shared political culture enabling both consent and withdrawal of consent across a population.
McGuinness notes potential problems with shared political culture in gender relations: patriarchy constructs masculine and feminine identities as near-opposites with different value assignments, limiting shared understandings of problems and solutions. Gilligan’s work on women’s moral voice (1982) and Margolis (1989) on social patterns support this claim.
3.3.1 A Different Moral Voice (Gilligan)
Gilligan argues that traditional psychological theories (Freud, Piaget, Kohlberg) depict women as lagging in moral development, portraying women as oriented toward care rather than universal justice.
Gilligan introduces the ethics of care versus the ethics of justice:
Ethics of care: morality grounded in responsibility and relationships; the self is defined in relation to others.
Ethics of justice: morality grounded in rights, impartial rules, and individual autonomy.
Sharp’s ethic is typically framed as an ethic of justice: power as control of resources, with rights-based claims to sources of power and an emphasis on consent as the mechanism to balance claims.
The ethical difference suggests that Sharp’s abstract framework may miss women’s experiential moral reasoning and relational contexts, challenging the presumption of a shared political culture capable of sustaining consent-based power in gender relations.
3.3.2 Different Social Patterns (Margolis, 1989)
Diane Rothbard Margolis describes three social systems that reflect different moral orientations and power patterns: exchange, placing, and pooling.
Exchange: resources as commodities; power is about scarcity and self-interest; individuals exchange control of power for favorable governance.
Placing: resources as social positions; power tied to positions and the claims that accompany them (care work, motherhood, etc.); includes obligations to dependents.
Pooling: resources valued for the common good; contributions are not tied to particular individuals; power is embedded in solidarity and collective action.
Margolis argues that power can be legitimate through consensus but is not uniform across the three systems. She stresses the role of naming and identity in constituting power dynamics (the power to define boundaries and identities).
Relationship to Sharp: Margolis shows that three distinct social patterns produce different forms of power and different mechanisms for achieving legitimacy, often not compatible with Sharp’s universal consent framework.
In particular, placing (care-focused) is poorly aligned with Sharp’s exchange-based, consent-driven model, because the power relations in placing rely on social obligations and care responsibilities that do not easily map onto voluntary consent or withdrawal of consent.
Margolis also emphasizes that knowledge and social roles (e.g., nurturing and care) can become barriers to power rather than sources of empowerment for those in dependent positions, challenging Sharp’s premise that power comes from control of sources (including knowledge).
Overall, Margolis demonstrates that Sharp’s universal consent model fails to account for diverse social forms and power configurations, especially those central to women’s lived experiences.
Page 4 (and beyond): Conclusion and Limitations
4. Conclusion
4.1 Limitations to Analysis
McGuinness acknowledges several limitations of her feminist critique:
The analysis focuses narrowly on consent in power, potentially neglecting how consent operates in gender relations in ways not captured by Sharp’s framework.
The use of Sharp’s framework may constrain the development of feminist theories by anchoring analysis to Sharp’s assumptions about power.
She uses broad categories (women, men) that gloss over diversity within groups; there is a tension between analytic coherence and acknowledging diverse experiences.
The aim is not to propose a complete replacement theory but to identify essential inadequacies in Sharp’s account for gender relations and to argue for incorporating women’s everyday experiences into power theories.
4.2 Summary
Sharp’s usable theory of power provides a valuable historical and practical contribution to non-violent action but fails to account adequately for gender relations under patriarchy.
McGuinness argues Sharp’s theory is male-biased, because it centers consent and collective withdrawal as the main lever of change, while ignoring structural oppression and women’s lived experiences.
Feminist theorists (Pateman, Guillaumin, Kelly, Gilligan, Margolis) offer frameworks that highlight the social construction of power, the appropriation of women’s bodies, sexual violence as a tool of social control, and divergent moral patterns that cannot be reduced to a single, universal notion of consent.
The concluding judgment is that Sharp’s theory, while historically important and useful for understanding non-violent action, does not provide a robust account of power in gender relations or an effective method for dismantling patriarchy.
McGuinness ultimately emphasizes the need to ground theories of power in the lived experiences of the oppressed, drawing on Nancy Hartsock’s argument that oppressed perspectives constitute world-views rather than mere margins of dominant discourse.
The article closes with a firm stance: Sharp’s theory is inadequate for gender relations, and a feminist approach offers essential insights for understanding and transforming power in patriarchy.
Key References (selected)
Pateman, Carole. The Sexual Contract (1988) – central to the social vs. sexual contract distinction; women’s lack of full civil status.
Guillaumin, Colette. The Practice of Power and Belief in Nature, Part I: The Appropriation of Women (1981) – sexage; four levels of appropriation; five means of appropriation.
Kelly, Liz. Surviving Sexual Violence (1988) – continuum of sexual violence (eleven categories).
Gilligan, Carol. In a Different Voice (1982) – ethics of care vs ethics of justice; gendered moral development.
Margolis, Diane Rothbard. Considering Women’s Experience: A Reformulation of Power Theory (1989) – exchange, placing, pooling; power to name; normative consensus and identity formation.
Lipsitz, Lewis & Kritzer, Herbert. Unconventional Approaches to Conflict Resolution (1975) – critiques of consent-based models; invasion/occupation examples (one-to-ten ratio in Norway).
Roberts, Barbara. The Death of Machothink (1984) – provocative estimates of violence against women; cautions about one-to-one counts.
McGuinness, Kate. Gene Sharp's Theory of Power: A Feminist Critique of Consent (Journal of Peace Research, 1993) – the present synthesis and critique.
Note: Page-by-page structure in this set of notes follows the major sections and subsections of the transcript. Numerical references are presented in LaTeX-compatible format where appropriate (e.g., $200$, $6$, $11$, $1:1$, $1:10$, etc.). The notes capture key arguments, counterarguments, and implications, along with the connections to foundational feminist theory and to Sharp’s non-violent action framework.
Gene Sharp's Theory of Power
Sharp defines power not as a monolithic possession but as a plural, relational set of social powers.
Social power is the capacity to control the behavior of others through group action affecting other groups.
Political power is a form of social power used for political objectives, involving government or opposition.
He identifies external sources of power in society, called loci of power, which allow those without formal authority to influence those in power.
A core assertion is that obedience and submission are the heart of political power, and obedience is largely voluntary, implying consent to governance.
This consent is withdrawable, providing a key mechanism for disadvantaged groups to challenge power, especially in non-violent action.
Implications of this view include foregrounding human agency, assuming a shared political culture, and suggesting that power can be redefined without needing radical social restructuring.
McGuinness's Feminist Critique of Sharp's Theory of Power
Central Aim: To evaluate if Sharp’s theory of power, grounded in consent, can effectively analyze and alter gender oppression.
Overall Conclusion: Sharp’s theory is of limited value for characterizing power in gender relations or for altering patriarchy; it is male-biased and fails to account for women’s experiences.
McGuinness organizes her critique into three main points:
Critique based on Pateman’s argument about women’s status in civil society:
Sharp's work is linked to social contract theory, which posits political rights arise through agreement (consent).
Carole Pateman’s The Sexual Contract ($1988$) argues that the social contract is incomplete without a prior sexual contract, rooted in gendered arrangements that maintain patriarchy.
Pateman contends that women are not fully constituted individuals in civil society; their political rights are structured by patriarchal gender arrangements like marriage.
Implication for Sharp: If women are not fully free individuals, then their consent to governance is not a universal or neutral act, fundamentally limiting Sharp's consent-based power model for understanding gender relations.
Critique based on Lipsitz & Kritzer concerning the aims of the ruler:
Lipsitz and Kritzer (1975) argue that power may not always require consent, especially if a ruler’s aim is to control resources/territory or if they possess sufficient manpower to control a population without their cooperation.
Application to Gender Relations:
The Appropriation of Women (Colette Guillaumin's sexage): Guillaumin (1981) describes sexage as the appropriation of women’s bodies on four levels: their time, products of their bodies (children, labor), sexual obligation, and physical charge of disabled/male members. This form of power, focused on appropriation, does not rely on women's consent, directly challenging Sharp’s emphasis.
Sufficient Manpower (Liz Kelly's theory of sexual violence): The pervasive male-to-female ratio gives the impression that men can control women without relying on their consent. Liz Kelly’s (1988) continuum of sexual violence (encompassing categories from harassment to rape) illustrates how widespread threats and acts of violence shape women’s behavior and serve as social control. This demonstrates that consent is not a reliable organizing principle for power dynamics in gender relations, as structural benefits to men persist regardless of individual women's consent.
Critique regarding shared political culture:
Sharp’s theory relies on the premise of a shared political culture necessary for collective consent and its withdrawal.
McGuinness, drawing on Gilligan and Margolis, argues that patriarchy constructs masculine and feminine identities as near-opposites, limiting shared understandings of social and political issues.
A Different Moral Voice (Carol Gilligan): Gilligan (1982) proposes an ethics of care (grounded in responsibility and relationships, often associated with women) versus an ethics of justice (based on rights and impartial rules, aligned with Sharp’s framework). This ethical difference suggests Sharp’s abstract framework misses women’s experiential moral reasoning and relational contexts, thus challenging the assumption of a shared political culture.
Different Social Patterns (Diane Rothbard Margolis): Margolis (1989) describes three distinct social systems: exchange (Sharp’s model fits here, power based on scarcity and self-interest), placing (power tied to social positions and obligations, like care work), and pooling (power in solidarity for common good). Margolis shows that power and legitimacy differ across these systems. The critique highlights the need to reconsider the dynamics of power and consent, emphasizing that traditional models may exclude or undervalue women's contributions and perspectives, which are often rooted in relational and context-specific experiences.
In particular, placing (care-focused) is poorly aligned with Sharp’s exchange-based, consent-driven model, because the power relations in placing rely on social obligations and care responsibilities that do not easily map onto voluntary consent or withdrawal of consent.
Margolis also emphasizes that knowledge and social roles (e.g., nurturing and care) can become barriers to power rather than sources of empowerment for those in dependent positions, challenging Sharp’s premise that power comes from control of sources (including knowledge).
Overall, Margolis demonstrates that Sharp’s universal consent model fails to account for diverse social forms and power configurations, especially those central to women’s lived experiences.
Page 4 (and beyond): Conclusion and Limitations
4. Conclusion
4.1 Limitations to Analysis
McGuinness acknowledges several limitations of her feminist critique:
The analysis focuses narrowly on consent in power, potentially neglecting how consent operates in gender relations in ways not captured by Sharp’s framework.
The use of Sharp’s framework may constrain the development of feminist theories by anchoring analysis to Sharp’s assumptions about power.
She uses broad categories (women, men) that gloss over diversity within groups; there is a tension between analytic coherence and acknowledging diverse experiences.
The aim is not to propose a complete replacement theory but to identify essential inadequacies in Sharp’s account for gender relations and to argue for incorporating women’s everyday experiences into power theories.
4.2 Summary
Sharp’s usable theory of power provides a valuable historical and practical contribution to non-violent action but fails to account adequately for gender relations under patriarchy.
McGuinness argues Sharp’s theory is male-biased, because it centers consent and collective withdrawal as the main lever of change, while ignoring structural oppression and women’s lived experiences.
Feminist theorists (Pateman, Guillaumin, Kelly, Gilligan, Margolis) offer frameworks that highlight the social construction of power, the appropriation of women’s bodies, sexual violence as a tool of social control, and divergent moral patterns that cannot be reduced to a single, universal notion of consent.
The concluding judgment is that Sharp’s theory, while historically important and useful for understanding non-violent action, does not provide a robust account of power in gender relations or an effective method for dismantling patriarchy.
McGuinness ultimately emphasizes the need to ground theories of power in the lived experiences of the oppressed, drawing on Nancy Hartsock’s argument that oppressed perspectives constitute world-views rather than mere margins of dominant discourse.
The article closes with a firm stance: Sharp’s theory is inadequate for gender relations, and a feminist approach offers essential insights for understanding and transforming power in patriarchy.
Preparation for Quiz: Gene Sharp's Theory and Feminist Critique
To prepare for your quiz on Kate McGuinness's review of Gene Sharp's theory of power, focus on the following key areas:
Understand Sharp’s Core Claims:
Nature of Power: Social and political power is plural and relational, not inherent to leaders.
Source of Power: Power comes from external sources in society, known as loci of power (Sharp identified loci).
Mechanism of Power: Power depends on the obedience and cooperation of the governed; consent is central to this, even under terror.
Non-violent Action: The withdrawal of consent by the governed is the fundamental mechanism for challenging power abuses (e.g., dictatorship, oppression).
Implications: Sharp's model emphasizes human agency, assumes a shared political culture for effective consent/withdrawal, and suggests power can be instrumentally redefined without radical societal overhaul.
Recognize the Feminist Challenge to Sharp's Theory:
Overall Critique: McGuinness argues Sharp’s theory is male-biased and insufficient for understanding gender relations under patriarchy or for altering it.
Why it fails: It overlooks structural oppression and women’s lived experiences, which cannot be fully captured by a consent-based framework.
Articulate How Key Feminist Theorists Critique and Expand Upon Sharp:
Carole Pateman (The Sexual Contract, 1988):
Critique: Argues civil society is a modern patriarchy, and the social contract is incomplete without acknowledging a prior sexual contract.
Key Claim: Women are not fully constituted individuals in civil society, meaning consent doesn’t apply universally to them. Their dependence (sexage) through marriage perpetuates patriarchal domination.
Implication for Sharp: If women aren't full individuals, their consent withdrawal is not a meaningful lever against structural patriarchy.
Lipsitz & Kritzer (1975):
Critique: Power doesn't always require consent, especially when ruler's aims are to control resources/territory or if they have sufficient manpower to control a population (e.g., outnumbering local populations).
Application to Gender: This applies to patriarchy where control over women (their bodies and labor) can occur without their consent, akin to controlling territory.
Colette Guillaumin (The Appropriation of Women, 1981):
Concept: Sexage – the complete appropriation of women’s bodies in patriarchy on four levels (time, products of bodies, sexual obligation, physical charge of others).
Means of Appropriation: Labor market, spatial confinement, show of force, sexual constraint, law/customary right.
Critique: Shows how patriarchal power operates structurally through appropriation, largely independent of women’s consent, thus challenging Sharp’s focus on consent.
Liz Kelly (Surviving Sexual Violence, 1988):
Concept: Continuum of sexual violence (identifies categories from harassment to rape).
Critique: Demonstrates that sexual violence is a pervasive mechanism of social control over women that operates independently of women's consent, highlighting that power is not reducible to consent withdrawal. The high male-to-female ratio contributes to this perceived