Chapter 17 Kissinger part 2
Notes: The Beginning of the Cold War (Page 433)
Truman's Position and Initial Approach
Transition from Roosevelt's Vision:
Truman struggled to reconcile Roosevelt’s vision of the "Four Policemen" (U.S., U.K., USSR, and China ensuring global peace) with growing tensions due to Soviet actions in Eastern Europe.
Truman lacked a clear policy to address Soviet conduct at this stage.
Balance of Power vs. Idealism:
America was reluctant to embrace the balance of power as a necessary element of international order.
The U.S. still clung to Wilsonian ideals of cooperation and collective security, opposing "spheres of interest."
Potsdam Conference (July 17–August 2, 1945)
Location and Significance:
Held at Cecilienhof in the Soviet zone of occupation.
Chosen for its accessibility (Stalin avoided flying) and security.
American Delegation’s Stance:
Adhered to wartime ideals, opposing the establishment of spheres of influence.
The State Department briefing paper:
Claimed spheres of interest threatened world peace.
Proposed addressing the root causes that made nations feel insecure.
Failed to outline a practical alternative for dealing with Stalin.
Key Interactions at Potsdam
Joseph Davies’ Role:
An adviser to Truman, Davies advocated for indulgence toward Stalin.
Notably passed a note to Truman during a heated exchange, urging him to “be nice” to Stalin, asserting that Stalin's feelings were hurt.
Truman’s Approach:
Initially favored Stalin's blunt manner over Churchill's verbose style.
Attempted to build rapport with Stalin:
Emphasized U.S. intentions for peace, security, and goodwill.
Sought to assure Stalin that America had no hostile ambitions.
Truman’s Reflections:
Private Dinner (July 21, 1945):
Truman sought to convey sincerity and goodwill to Stalin, aiming to establish trust.
Later confided to Davies about his efforts to show that the U.S. was "on the level" and sought a peaceful, friendly world.
These notes reflect the tensions, contrasting ideologies, and diplomatic maneuvers that shaped the early Cold War period during the Potsdam Conference.
Notes: The Beginning of the Cold War (Page 434)
Truman's Diplomacy at Potsdam
Attempt to Build Trust with Stalin:
Truman emphasized joint responsibility for a peaceful world, asserting America’s disinterest in territorial ambitions.
Truman believed his efforts to assure Stalin were successful, though Stalin's worldview left little room for such declarations of disinterest.
Potsdam Conference: Structural Approach
Contrast with Versailles:
Avoided detailed negotiations under time pressure.
Focused on general principles; left detailed peace agreements to foreign ministers.
Scope of Agenda:
Reparations, the future of Germany, and the status of Axis allies (e.g., Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Finland).
Stalin expanded the agenda with Soviet demands:
Improved transit rights through the Straits.
A military base in the Bosporus.
A share of Italy’s former colonies.
Key Diplomatic Conflicts
Spheres of Influence:
Stalin sought to consolidate Soviet control in Eastern Europe, particularly in Bulgaria and Romania.
Truman and Churchill opposed Soviet-imposed governments and demanded free elections.
Stalin refused to yield on Eastern European elections.
Reparations:
Stalin demanded $20 billion in reparations from Germany (half for the Soviet Union).
The U.S. and Britain vetoed this demand, refusing to use their zones' assets for reparations.
Boundary Disputes: Poland’s Borders
Ambiguity of Yalta Agreement:
The Yalta decision to use the Oder and Neisse rivers as Poland’s western border was imprecise due to the existence of two Neisse rivers.
Churchill assumed the eastern Neisse would be the border.
At Potsdam, Stalin revealed Poland would receive territory between the eastern and western Neisse rivers, extending its borders further west.
Stalin’s Calculation:
By extending Poland's borders into German territory, Stalin sought to create lasting enmity between Poland and Germany, ensuring dependence on Soviet support.
These notes highlight the escalating tensions and unresolved issues that defined the Potsdam Conference, contributing to the early stages of the Cold War.
Notes: The Beginning of the Cold War (Page 435)
Poland's Borders and German Expulsions
Territorial Acquisitions:
Poland gained historic German territories, including Breslau.
Approximately 5 million Germans were expelled from these regions.
Western Reaction:
American and British leaders accepted Stalin’s actions with a weak reservation to reconsider borders at a future peace conference.
This stance reinforced Poland’s reliance on the Soviet Union, as the expelled Germans made the territorial changes irreversible.
Churchill’s Exit and British Leadership Change
Disruption at Potsdam:
The British delegation paused the conference on July 25, 1945, to await the results of the UK general election.
Churchill was defeated and replaced by Clement Attlee as Prime Minister, with Ernest Bevin becoming Foreign Secretary.
Outcomes of the Potsdam Conference
Stalemates and Rejections:
Stalin's key demands were denied:
A Soviet military base in the Bosporus.
Trusteeship of Italian African territories.
Four-power control of the Ruhr.
Recognition of Soviet-backed governments in Romania and Bulgaria.
Truman’s proposal to internationalize the Danube was also rejected.
Partial Agreements:
A four-power mechanism was established to address German issues.
Reparations policy: Each power could take reparations from its occupation zone in Germany.
The question of Poland's western border (Oder-Neisse Line) was deferred, with future revision theoretically possible.
Stalin promised Soviet involvement in the war against Japan.
Truman's Revelation of the Atomic Bomb
Private Disclosure to Stalin:
Truman informed Stalin about the atomic bomb during a private conversation.
Stalin's Reaction:
Already aware of the bomb's existence through Soviet espionage, Stalin feigned indifference and displayed no curiosity.
Truman later noted Stalin’s lack of interest in his memoirs, interpreting it as nonchalant behavior.
Key Takeaways from Potsdam
The conference highlighted the diverging goals of the Allies and underscored the inability to resolve key postwar issues.
Significant ambiguities remained, leaving unresolved matters to future negotiations among foreign ministers.
The revelation of the atomic bomb symbolized a shift in power dynamics, planting seeds of distrust and competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
Notes: The Beginning of the Cold War (Page 436)
Stalin’s Reaction to the Atomic Bomb
Stalin’s Response:
Upon Truman's private disclosure of the atomic bomb, Stalin expressed minimal interest, simply stating he hoped it would be used effectively against Japan.
This stance reflected the Soviet tactic of downplaying nuclear weapons until achieving their own nuclear capability.
Churchill’s Perspective on Potsdam
Churchill’s Hypothetical Approach:
Churchill later claimed that, had he remained in office, he would have forced a settlement with Stalin at Potsdam.
However, such a settlement was unlikely without extreme pressure, something American leaders were unprepared to deliver.
American Dilemma Post-War
Public Sentiment:
Post-war, the American public desired an end to confrontation and a return of troops, showing little appetite for risking further conflict over Eastern Europe.
Unpreparedness for Confrontation:
U.S. leaders avoided direct military threats or nuclear brinkmanship over Stalin's actions in Eastern Europe.
Gromyko on Soviet Aggression
Berlin Blockade Insight:
Gromyko revealed Stalin's confidence during the Berlin Blockade despite U.S. nuclear monopoly:
Belief that the U.S. would not use nuclear weapons over Berlin.
Preparedness to resist U.S. convoys using the Autobahn.
Decision-making reserved for Stalin in case of a full U.S. attack.
Outcome of Potsdam
Division of Europe:
Potsdam initiated the division of Europe into two spheres of influence, a scenario U.S. leaders had aimed to prevent.
Foreign Ministers’ Role:
Subsequent meetings of foreign ministers (starting in London) were largely ineffective.
Molotov, constrained by Stalin’s strict instructions, lacked flexibility, making negotiations fruitless.
Notes: The Beginning of the Cold War (Page 437)
Foreign Ministers' Conference (September–October 1945)
Purpose:
Draft peace treaties for Finland, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, former allies of Nazi Germany.
Key Issues:
American Stance: Secretary of State James Byrnes demanded free elections in these nations.
Soviet Stance: Molotov categorically refused, maintaining the Soviet grip on Eastern Europe.
Impact of the Atomic Bomb:
Byrnes hoped the U.S.'s demonstration of atomic power would strengthen negotiations.
Molotov's obstinate behavior proved the bomb alone was insufficient without aggressive diplomacy.
Byrnes on Soviet Relations:
Shift in Soviet Attitude:
Byrnes observed a stark change post-war: the Soviets, no longer reliant on U.S. supplies, adopted an increasingly aggressive stance on political and territorial issues.
Truman’s Navy Day Speech (October 27, 1945):
Key Messages:
Reiterated traditional American foreign policy values:
No territorial ambitions.
Commitment to justice and righteousness in global affairs.
Efforts to incorporate the Golden Rule into international relations.
Optimistic appeal for Soviet-American cooperation, stating:
No irreconcilable differences among Allies.
Conflicts could be resolved amicably.
December 1945 Conference:
Stalin's "Concession":
Proposed allowing Western commissions in Romania and Bulgaria to suggest democratic cabinet members.
Interpretation:
A strategic move reflecting Stalin's confidence in the Communist dominance over these satellite states.
Highlighted Soviet control rather than genuine willingness for reform.
Top of Form
Bottom of Form
Notes: The Beginning of the Cold War (Page 438)
Stalin’s "Concessions" and Democratic Procedures
Stalin's Offer:
Proposed inclusion of democratic representatives in Romanian and Bulgarian governments.
Viewed as superficial gestures ("fig leaves of democratic procedure") masking true Stalinist control, per George Kennan.
Byrnes’ Reaction:
Interpreted Stalin’s actions as fulfilling Yalta agreements.
Recognized Romania and Bulgaria before peace treaties, angering Truman.
Resulted in tensions between Byrnes and Truman, leading to Byrnes’ eventual resignation in 1947.
Foreign Ministers' Meetings in 1946:
Locations:
Paris and New York.
Outcomes:
Concluded subsidiary treaties.
Marked increased Soviet consolidation of Eastern Europe into a Soviet political and economic bloc.
Cultural and Ideological Gaps:
American Approach:
Relied on moral and legal arguments, expecting them to influence Soviet policy.
Truman's rhetoric about the "Golden Rule" resonated with American audiences but was meaningless to Stalin.
Stalin’s Vision:
Advocated for Pan-Slavism supported by communist ideology.
Aimed to solidify Slavic unity, creating an unassailable bloc against external forces.
Stalin's Strategic Concerns:
Soviet Devastation:
Territory west of Moscow severely damaged by scorched-earth policies during retreats.
Estimated Soviet war dead: over 20 million (including civilians).
Total death toll from purges, collectivization, and gulags: estimated at 20 million, with another 15 million surviving imprisonment.
Atomic Bomb Threat:
Stalin viewed the U.S.'s technological breakthrough as a potential existential threat.
Feared the capitalist world might use its new military superiority to impose its dominance over the Soviet Union.
Notes: The Beginning of the Cold War (Page 439)
Stalin’s Post-War Strategy
Projection of Strength:
Despite the USSR's internal exhaustion and devastation, Stalin pretended the Soviet Union was operating from a position of strength.
Believed admitting vulnerability would invite further demands and pressures.
Maintained the Red Army in Central Europe and established Soviet-controlled puppet governments.
Propagated an exaggerated image of Soviet ferocity, fueling fears of a Soviet march to the English Channel (later recognized as exaggerated).
Downplaying American Power:
Dismissed the strategic impact of the atomic bomb, both publicly and in propaganda.
Stalin's Statement (1946): Described atomic bombs as tools to intimidate, not to determine war outcomes.
Marshal Konstantin Vershinin (1949): Criticized the perceived overemphasis on atomic weapons and air forces by Western powers, dismissing their deterrence capacity against the USSR.
Soviet Propaganda and Narrative:
Framed atomic weapons as "transitory" in strategic importance compared to the "permanent" resilience of the Soviet state.
Rejected the idea that nuclear weapons could dominate military strategy or intimidate the USSR and its allies.
Stalin’s Domestic Calculations:
Avoiding Societal Relief:
Refused to ease the burdens on Soviet society despite post-war exhaustion.
Feared that granting respite would lead to societal questioning of communist rule and the legitimacy of the regime.
Emotional Address to Red Army Commanders (May 1945):
Recalled the hardships of 1941–42, emphasizing the USSR's resilience.
Suggested that other nations might have overthrown their governments in similar circumstances, but the Soviet people endured and supported their leadership instead.
Significance:
Stalin's strategy of projecting strength while suppressing dissent set the tone for early Cold War tensions.
His dismissal of nuclear deterrence as a "transitory" factor reflected a refusal to acknowledge Western technological superiority.
Notes: The Beginning of the Cold War (Page 440)
Stalin's Post-War Ideological Shift
Return to Party-Centric Leadership:
After May 1945, Stalin stopped addressing the Soviet people as a national leader and reverted to his role as General Secretary of the Communist Party.
Public speeches shifted to praising the Communist Party exclusively for Soviet victory, sidelining recognition of the broader Soviet populace.
Post-War Vision (Speech, February 9, 1946):
Declared the superiority of the Soviet social system:
The war proved the stability and vitality of the Soviet model.
Asserted that the Soviet system was superior to non-Soviet forms of governance.
Positioned the Soviet victory as ideological validation of socialism over capitalism.
Analysis of the War's Causes:
Framed the war as a product of capitalist contradictions:
Capitalist System Dynamics:
Capitalism inherently creates crises and wars due to uneven economic development.
Economic imbalances lead to competition over raw materials and markets, often resolved through armed conflict.
Blamed capitalism, not solely Hitler, for the outbreak of war.
Implications for Future Conflict:
Stalin viewed the post-war period as a temporary armistice, not genuine peace:
Saw capitalist states, including the USSR's wartime allies, as fundamentally driven by the same forces that led to the war.
Prediction: A new war was inevitable due to the flaws of capitalism.
Soviet strategy: Build strength to deflect future capitalist conflicts away from the USSR and into intra-capitalist wars.
Significance:
Stalin's rhetoric marked a return to ideological confrontation:
Rejected the notion of lasting peace with capitalist nations.
Set the ideological groundwork for the Cold War, viewing the Soviet Union as locked in an existential struggle against the capitalist world.
Notes: The Beginning of the Cold War (Page 441)
Stalin’s Domestic Focus and Ambitions
Economic Goals:
Heavy industry prioritized over consumer goods or improving living standards.
Ambitious targets set:
Pig iron: Tenfold increase in production.
Steel: Fifteen-fold increase.
Oil: Quadrupling of output.
These goals were expected to require three Five-Year Plans, ensuring prolonged hardship for Soviet citizens.
Continuity of Policies:
Collectivization of agriculture continued.
Internal opposition was actively suppressed.
Stalin’s leadership style reverted to pre-war patterns, employing threatening rhetoric against unnamed "enemies."
Stalin’s Perspective on Confrontation
Policy of Confrontation Re-established:
Despite ongoing Allied negotiations, Stalin viewed peaceful coexistence as incompatible with Soviet Communism.
His policies were shaped by the need for strength in an inevitable diplomatic showdown with the West.
Creation of Satellite States:
Stalin likely aimed to consolidate Soviet influence in Eastern Europe as leverage in diplomatic negotiations rather than explicitly to create an "Iron Curtain."
The Soviet military occupation evolved into a network of satellite regimes, with minimal direct resistance from Western powers.
The Nuclear Monopoly and Strategic Environment
Western Nuclear Monopoly:
Despite possessing nuclear weapons, the West failed to use its strategic advantage to challenge Stalin’s actions in Eastern Europe.
Stalin's regime spread propaganda that nuclear weapons did not change strategic realities.
This rhetoric was mirrored in Western thought, as American scientists and military leaders also downplayed the decisiveness of nuclear weapons.
American Military Dynamics:
U.S. military branches resisted defining nuclear weapons as decisive to avoid diminishing their roles.
This bureaucratic tendency contributed to a perception that strategic bombing and nuclear weapons were not transformative in military strategy.
Implications:
Stalin’s policies and ambitions deepened Cold War tensions, reinforcing the divide between East and West.
The failure to assertively challenge Soviet consolidation in Eastern Europe set the stage for a prolonged geopolitical stalemate.
Churchill's Warning and Nuclear Strategy (1946)
Early Nuclear Strategy Misconceptions:
Nuclear weapons viewed as:
Enhanced conventional explosives
Extension of WWII strategy
Led to flawed assessments:
Overestimated Soviet conventional strength
Undervalued nuclear deterrence
Echoed 1930s miscalculations
Churchill's Fulton Speech (March 5, 1946):
Key Concepts Introduced:
"Iron Curtain" metaphor
Defined Soviet sphere from Stettin to Trieste
Warned of Communist expansion
Critical Analysis:
Highlighted Soviet control of occupied territories
Criticized US concessions of German territory
Warned of German potential to play sides
Proposed Solutions:
Short-term Strategy:
US-British Commonwealth alliance
Immediate response to Soviet threat
Long-term Vision:
European unity
German reconciliation
Inclusive European system
Churchill's Strategic Assessment:
Soviet Intentions:
Not seeking direct war
Desired "fruits of war"
Aimed for doctrinal expansion
Required Actions:
Urgent settlement needed
Rejection of appeasement
Proactive democratic response
Key Developments Timeline
March 5, 1946: Fulton Speech
1946: Formation of Iron Curtain
1946: Recognition of Soviet expansion pattern
Key Takeaways
Churchill emerged as first major voice warning of Soviet threat
Demonstrated shift from anti-German to pro-German reconciliation
Emphasized urgency of democratic response
Highlighted prophetic nature of strategic warning
Identified fundamental misunderstanding of nuclear deterrence
Soviet Strategy and Eastern European Control (1945-1947)
1. Churchill's Strategic Position:
o Historical pattern of rejection:
§ 1930s: Called for armament during appeasement
§ 1940s-50s: Urged diplomatic confrontation
§ Only heeded during direct threats
2. Kennan's "Long Telegram" Analysis:
o Stalin's Priorities:
§ Avoid direct confrontation with US
§ Focus on Soviet reconstruction
§ Prevent intervention "at all costs"
o Strategic Assessment:
§ Western European invasion unlikely
§ Stalin would back down from serious US challenge
§ Used existing Red Army positions
3. Soviet Control Implementation:
o Initial Communist Takeovers (1945-1947):
§ Only Yugoslavia and Albania established immediate dictatorships
§ Other territories maintained coalition governments
o Coalition Phase Countries:
§ Bulgaria
§ Czechoslovakia
§ Hungary
§ Poland
§ Romania
4. Zhdanov's Classification (September 1947):
o "New Democracies":
§ Yugoslavia
§ Poland
§ Czechoslovakia
§ Albania
o Secondary Category:
§ Bulgaria
§ Romania
§ Hungary
§ Finland
Key Developments Timeline
· 1945: Initial Red Army occupations
· 1945-46: Multi-party elections in Czechoslovakia and Hungary
· Sept 1947: Zhdanov's Cominform speech
· 1947: Continued coalition governments in most Eastern Europe
Key Takeaways
1. Soviet expansion proceeded gradually rather than through immediate takeover
2. Stalin balanced opportunism with risk avoidance
3. Initial post-war period-maintained facade of democratic processes
4. Communist control consolidated through staged process
5. Soviet caution reflected awareness of US power potential
Stalin's Eastern European Strategy and US Relations (1945-1947)
Stalin's Diplomatic Ambiguity:
Finnish Model Possibility:
Democratic but Soviet-aligned states
National independence with Soviet influence
Uncertain due to closed Soviet archives
Contradictory Actions:
Told Hopkins (1945) wanted friendly Poland
Actually implemented communist control
Words vs. actions discrepancy
Marshall-Stalin Meeting (April 1947):
Context:
After 18 months of deadlocked meetings
Following Greek-Turkish aid program
During Western German zone consolidation
Stalin's Position:
Called conflicts "reconnaissance skirmishes"
Claimed all issues negotiable
Emphasized need for patience
Strategic Miscalculation:
Stalin's Errors:
Misunderstood democratic psychology
Pressed too hard
Lost American trust
Unintended Consequences:
Led to Marshall Plan
Creation of Atlantic Alliance
Western military buildup
Timing and Opportunities:
Churchill's Assessment:
Best settlement chance immediately post-war
Dependent on proposal timing
Required serious consequences for refusal
Declining Western Position:
US retreat from Europe
Weakened bargaining position
Until Marshall Plan and NATO revival
Key Developments Timeline
1945: Stalin-Hopkins discussion on Poland
1947: Marshall-Stalin meeting
1947: Implementation of Marshall Plan
1947-48: Formation of Western alliance system
Key Takeaways
Stalin's actual intentions for Eastern Europe remain historically ambiguous
Contradiction between diplomatic statements and actions eroded trust
Failure to understand US psychology led to strategic overreach
Timing of settlement attempts proved crucial
Stalin's actions inadvertently strengthened Western unity
End of Early Cold War Period: Policy Solidification
Western Strategic Dilemma:
Theoretical Options:
Unite democracies while negotiating with USSR
Pursue dual-track diplomacy
Practical Constraints:
Fragile Western cohesion
Risk of communist political gains
Fear of negotiation undermining unity
Internal Western Challenges:
Political Instability:
Strong communist parties in France and Italy
German neutrality debate
Peace movements in US and Britain
Economic Concerns:
Slower European recovery than expected
Evidence of "disintegrating forces"
Urgency of economic stabilization
Marshall's Decisive Speech (April 28, 1947):
Key Points:
Rejected Stalin's compromise hints
Emphasized time factor
Called for immediate action
Central Message:
"Patient is sinking while doctors deliberate"
Cannot await compromise through exhaustion
Need for immediate response
Policy Resolution:
American Choice:
Prioritized Western unity
Rejected East-West negotiations
Adopted containment strategy
Long-term Impact:
Containment became guiding principle
Shaped next 40 years of policy
Established Cold War framework
Key Developments Timeline
April 28, 1947: Marshall's radio address
1947: Adoption of containment policy
1947-48: Western unity prioritization
Next 40 years: Containment strategy implementation
Key Takeaways
America chose unified Western bloc over Soviet negotiations
Internal Western vulnerabilities shaped policy choices
Time pressure influenced strategic decisions
Containment emerged as dominant strategy
Decision established framework for entire Cold War era