Notes on punishment, solidarity, and identity

The Pleasure of Punishment

• Core thesis: punishment is motivated by a pleasure derived from its perceived utility, not only by its actual effects. The authors state the central claim plainly: "Simply stated, punishment pleases." The motivation to punish arises because punishment is believed to be useful and that belief itself provides emotional satisfaction.
• The dialectic: two linked propositions drive the analysis
  • People may desire punishment because they think it has social utility (public good).
  • People may want to believe punishment has utility because of the way it makes them feel (emotional relief, belonging).
• Key terms to track throughout: utility, solidarity, hostile solidarity, self-identity, symbolic punishment, and the shadow of punishment.

Theoretical Foundations: Hume, Durkheim, and the sociology of solidarity

• Hume’s inspiration for the argument: Why utility pleases is tied to social sentiments and public utility, not just rational calculation.
  • Hume’s view: moral judgments are conditioned by notions of utility; utility pleases because it serves public good and promotes peace, harmony, and order via sympathy and humanity within us.
  • The authors interpret this as suggesting punishment could be publicly useful in a way that is emotionally pleasing, even if the specific public good is contested.
• The problem of “dogmatic functionalism” in punishment studies (Garland): avoid treating punishment purely in terms of deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, or rehabilitation without exploring its social meaning and emotional dimensions.
• Durkheimian foundation: punishment as a function of social solidarity, not just a mass of legal sanctions
  • Durkheim argued punishment reinforces normative values and collective conscience, especially after violations, through ritual re-affirmation and the reinforcement of group solidarity.
  • Three Durkheimian points highlighted by Garland:
    1) Punishment reframes crime and punishment as parts of a social process rather than a simple penal mechanism.
    2) The primary subject of punishment is the law-abiding citizen reflecting social order, not merely the offender.
    3) Durkheim’s non-rational, emotional dimension of social relations underpins punishment, grounded in solidarity rather than rational calculation.
• The critique: modern, plural societies challenge Durkheim’s unitary view of social solidarity; solidarity is fluid, contested, and distributed unevenly across groups.
• Social imaginaries and the malleability of law
  • The idea that shared moral conceptions are fluid and contingent; law is experienced differently by different people and groups, contributing to solidarity or schism depending on circumstances.
  • Works cited: Taylor’s concept of social imaginaries; Ewick & Silbey on diverse experiences of law as impartial norm, obstacle, or game for self-interest.
• Contemporary correlations between solidarity, inequality, and punitive attitudes
  • Scholarship notes that periods of social insecurity and anxiety tend to raise punitive attitudes and punitive policies.
  • Some studies show possible inverse relationships between broad social solidarity and punishment levels in modern contexts; others link high solidarity within groups to punitive attitudes toward outsiders.
• The broader aim: connect punishment to contemporary problems of solidarity, precarity, and fragmentation in liberal democracies, and see how punishment helps shape or reflect social imaginaries.

Rituals of criminalisation and the production of solidarity

• Punishment as a ritual and symbolic practice
  • Punishment involves a set of rituals (e.g., trials, denunciation) that communicate shared moral beliefs and elicit emotions reinforcing those beliefs.
  • The moment of criminalisation is crucial: it creates a clear image of social order and identifies who belongs and who is excluded.
• The symbolic reduction of social complexity
  • Punishment frames identities as totalities: law-abiding citizens, victims, and criminals; this simplification enables strong emotional responses and collective identification.
• The role of the trial and other ceremonial elements
  • While trials are a focal point for collective identification and emotional responses (denunciation, censure, blame), the ritual’s symbolic power begins earlier, with broader cultural practices that define harmful or dangerous behavior.
• The “total” identity problem
  • The solidarity produced by punishment can paradoxically rely on antagonism toward an external Other (the criminal), which can foster a security-obsessed, risk-averse social order if overextended.

The hostile solidarity of punishment: hostility as the engine of belonging

• Mead’s psychology of punitive justice
  • Mead argued that punitive justice fosters solidarity largely through hostility to crime and criminals: the sense of citizenship excludes the transgressor and restrains tendencies toward crime in the self. Direct quote: "The revulsions against criminality reveal themselves in a sense of solidarity with the group, a sense of being a citizen which on the one hand excludes those who have transgressed the laws of the group and on the other inhibits tendencies of criminal acts in the citizen himself" (Mead, 1918: 586–587).
• The formation of an antagonistic community
  • Punishment creates an image of community bound against crime and criminal threats. This community’s identity is constructed through hostility toward outsiders and fear of crime.
• The limits of hostility-based solidarity
  • A society driven by hostile solidarity risks becoming overly security-focused and may depend on punishment for its maintenance, rather than addressing underlying social problems.
• The implications for modern liberal societies
  • Punishment and criminalisation can be used to reinforce a narrative of civil order, even when they contribute to climate of insecurity or legitimate state impotence.

The allure of hostile solidarity: identity, psychology, and political culture

• The three cognitive biases linked to punitive climates (as discussed by Ainsworth)
  • Illusion of control: belief that one can control diffuse threats, reinforcing punitive responses.
  • Gothic populism and culture of control: sensational crimes and fear-driven politics fuel punitive attitudes.
  • Illusion of order: punishment provides a sense that social order is legitimate and under control.
• The social-psychological appeal of punitive belonging
  • Hostile solidarity gives individuals a sense of order, control, and belonging, especially in insecure times, by aligning with a group that condemns outsiders.
• The comforting function of punitive storytelling
  • Punishment narratives offer stories of right and wrong, justice prevailing, and order being restored, which can be particularly appealing when real-life experiences feel messy or unjust.
• The “shadow” of punishment and projection
  • Punishment attitudes reveal more about the punisher than the punished; a social shadow transfers anxieties onto criminals.
  • The authors link this to Jungian ideas of the shadow and Durkheim’s focus on collective emotions, arguing that punitive attitudes reflect internal anxieties projected outward.
• The illusion of order and civilizational self-image
  • Punishment helps the community feel civilised and responsible, but this feeling often masks deeper social inadequacies and unresolved tensions.
• The broader political-cultural consequence
  • Punitive thinking migrates beyond criminal justice into migration, borders, education, health, and other social institutions, broadening the domain of punitive discourse.

Implications, risks, and a research agenda

• Three major implications from the hostile solidarity perspective
  • The utility of punishment becomes instrumentally linked to emotional satisfaction: people may support punishment because it feels effective or necessary, even if it is not.
  • Punishment can serve as a legitimating device: it supports political narratives of power, action, and threat management, often without addressing root causes.
  • The punitive logic can diffuse into broader social contexts, extending beyond criminal justice into migration, education, health, and public policy.
• Potential for self-reproduction of punitive logics
  • The solidarity generated by punishment relies on hostility; it tends to sustain itself even if it fails to address underlying social problems.
  • Punitive attitudes can be a coping mechanism for broader insecurity and anxiety, rather than rational responses to crime.
• A proposed methodological shift: a critical penology of the self
  • The authors advocate for microsociological research on lived experiences of punishment to understand how punishment and identity interrelate at the level of individual life stories.
  • They call for a method that investigates how punishing feelings spill into identity and politics, including the links to Brexit, US elections, and authoritarian developments in Europe.
• An explicit research agenda
  • Study the relationship between punishment, identities, and politics to understand how hostility shapes current political climates.
  • Develop a critical penology of the self and a penology of the shadow, focusing on how punitive attitudes form part of individual trajectories and moral economies.
• Policy and ethical implications
  • If punishment primarily satisfies emotional needs, reforms should consider addressing emotional and social drivers, not just punitive outcomes.
  • Recognise the risk that punitive policies may provide a false sense of order, while failing to address structural causes of crime and insecurity.
  • Be wary of expanding punitive logic into non-criminal realms as a default governance strategy.

Conclusion: Why punishment pleases and why it matters

• Restatement of the central claim: the motivation to punish relies on punishment generating a kind of solidarity that allows emotional release and a sense of belonging, without requiring individuals to confront their initial alienation or insecurity.
• The key theoretical contribution: punishment is a social and emotional practice that creates hostile solidarity, which is attractive in insecure times and can become a dominant logic in liberal democracies.
• Practical and theoretical implications:
  • Punishment’s appeal is not merely about crime control; it is about identity, belonging, and emotional relief.
  • The symbolic and ritual dimensions of punishment are central to its social function and political resonance.
  • There is a need for critical inquiry into how punitive attitudes are reproduced and spread across institutions and political discourse.
• Final note on research directions: the piece invites a broader program of study into punishment, identity, and politics, including empirical micro-sociological work on lived experiences and a critical examination of the “shadow” in punitive discourse.

Notes (selected footnotes referenced in the text)

• Note 1: Hume’s perspective aligns with modern findings that rational decision-making relies on emotion and cognition; emotions provide a sense of the utility of options. See Damasio and Turner for neurocognitive perspectives on affect and utility.
• Note 2: Third-party punishment experiments suggest people punish altruistically when it benefits others or when they believe punishment serves personal gain.
• Note 3: Carlsmith (2008) shows people can be motivated to punish even when they rationalize actions inconsistently with outcomes, supporting a distinction between utility beliefs and practical outcomes.

References for further reading (selected from the article’s bibliography)

• Durkheim, E. (2013, 2014). The rules of sociological method; The Division of Labor in Society. New York, Free Press.
• Hume, D. (1998). An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Garland, D. (1990a, 1990b, 2001, 2013). Frameworks of inquiry; Punishment and Modern Society; The Culture of Control; Punishment and social solidarity.
• Mead, G. H. (1918). The psychology of punitive justice. American Journal of Sociology, 23(5), 577–602.
• Sykes, G. (1958). The Society of Captives. Princeton University Press.
• Sontag, S. (1966). Against Interpretation. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
• Taylor, C. (2004). Modern Social Imaginaries. Duke University Press.
• Turner, J. (2009). The sociology of emotions. Emotion Review, 1(4), 340–354.
• Various authors cited throughout (Garland, King & Maruna, Pratt, Sparks, etc.) as listed in the reference section of the original article.