Notes on IR Theories: Interests, Interactions, Institutions

Puzzles and Big Questions in International Relations

• What explains why, despite scientific consensus on climate change, international cooperation is slow or blocked?
  • Why do some countries join climate agreements (e.g., Paris Agreement) while others stay out or withdraw at times?
  • Broader question: why do some individuals or states reject scientific consensus while others accept it?
• Climate and trade puzzles as gateways to theory:
  • UN climate summit dynamics; US participation and withdrawal from the Paris Accord.
  • Why do some countries comply with international agreements and others not?
  • Why do countries erect trade barriers even when economists generally agree free trade increases welfare?
  • A real-world anecdote: a 50% tariff on Brazil raising Brazilian coffee costs, illustrating how policy choices can have wide domestic/global effects.
• Additional broad puzzles:
  • Why are some countries rich and others poor?
  • Why do some Latin American countries dollarize while others do not?
  • Why does military oppression or democratic backsliding get punished in some cases but not in others?
• The normative dimension: how theory helps us think about what should be done to improve outcomes (growth, stability, rights, etc.).
• Strategy for the course: use theory to understand broad patterns, not only individual events; theory as description, prediction, and prescription.
• Core methodological note: distinctions among independent (cause) and dependent (effect) variables; deriving hypotheses from relationships; testing and refining hypotheses based on evidence.
• Preview of the three core IR theories to be covered briefly:
  • Realism: self-interested states competing for power and security; an anarchic world where power is the central currency.
  • Liberalism: power is not the only driver; economic interests, institutions, and markets matter; cooperation and interdependence are possible.
  • Constructivism: ideas, norms, and discourse shape state behavior; not just material power.
• Core idea of actors, interests, and instruments:
  • Each theory specifies who the main actors are, what their interests are, and what instruments they can use to pursue those interests.
  • These form the basis for hypotheses about behavior and outcomes.
• How to derive theories from observations:
  • Observational learning: derive assumptions from watching the world.
  • Case inference: infer assumptions from other cases and generalize patterns.
  • Relationship framing: study the relationship between an independent variable and a dependent variable, e.g. what form of government might promote faster economic growth.
• The role of abstraction in theory:
  • The world is complex; theory abstracts to identify broad patterns and relationships that help explain multiple cases.
  • Theories can describe, predict, and prescribe policy recommendations.
• Beyond describing, the course emphasizes applying theory to policy decisions (normative implications) and to strategic interactions between powers.

Three Core Theories: Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism

• Realism (central claims)

  • Actors: states are the primary and most important actors; individuals and NGOs are less central.
  • Interests: states seek security and power; survival in an anarchic system.
  • Instruments: military and economic power; coercion and deterrence are key.
  • World is anarchic; no overarching authority above states.
  • Predictions: a resurgence or persistence of power competition among great powers; balance of power dynamics.

• Liberalism (central claims)

  • Actors: not just states; institutions, markets, and non-state actors matter as well.
  • Interests: economic welfare, prosperity, institutional guarantees, and cooperation can align with security goals.
  • Instruments: economic exchange, diplomacy, international institutions, and rules-based cooperation.
  • Predictions: more cooperation, spread of free markets, and growth of international institutions and regimes.

• Constructivism (central claims)

  • Actors: states but also individuals, groups, and transnational networks; emphasis on norms and ideas.
  • Interests: shaped by beliefs, identities, and discourse; norms can constrain or enable action.
  • Instruments: discourse, norms, and ideas as guiding forces; less emphasis on hard power.
  • Predictions: ideas and norms spread over time; content of ideas matters and can shift preferences.

Units of Analysis

• Realism: focus on the state as the primary unit of analysis.
• Liberalism: broaden to include institutions and markets; non-state actors become relevant.
• Constructivism: include subnational actors, organizations, domestic groups, cross-border actors, and transnational networks.

Instruments and Methods (What each theory uses to realize its ends)

• Realism: instrumental use of economic and military means to gain power and security.
• Liberalism: economic exchange, institutions, and multiple, non-zero-sum interactions; markets and cooperation as pathways to peace.
• Constructivism: emphasis on ideas, discourse, and norms shaping state behavior.

The Lake Framework: The Three I’s (Interest, Interactions, Institutions)

• Purpose: A malleable framework to judge theories by usefulness, not just by dogmatic allegiance to realism, liberalism, or constructivism.
• Three building blocks:
  • Interests: actors’ desires or preferences over outcomes; different actors have different priorities (e.g., governments, businesses, voters).
  • Interactions: the combinations of choices by two or more actors that produce political outcomes; can be cooperation or bargaining (or both).
  • Institutions: rules and norms that structure behavior, reduce transaction costs, verify compliance, and resolve disputes.
• Relationship among the I’s:
  • Interests drive behavior, interactions produce outcomes, and institutions shape and constrain feasible interactions and outcomes.
  • Institutions can bias outcomes in favor of powerful actors, but may still be beneficial overall relative to leaving the system without agreed rules.
• Key questions under the Lake framework:
  • Are the actors’ interests aligned or conflicting?
  • What kinds of interactions are feasible given the institutions in place?
  • How do institutions constrain or enable cooperation and bargaining?
• Why this framework matters:
  • It helps compare theories on common ground, assess their usefulness, and avoid over-committing to a single lens.
  • It provides a structured way to understand post-Cold War dynamics and ongoing global puzzles.

Interactions: Cooperation vs Bargaining

• Cooperation (non-zero-sum, Pareto improvements)

  • Definition: multi-agent interactions where at least one actor is better off and no one is worse off relative to the baseline.
  • Graphical intuition: Pareto frontier – moving from one allocation to another on the frontier can make someone better off without making others worse off.
  • Examples from IR: NATO (mutual defense), environmental agreements, joint counterterrorism information sharing.
  • Important concepts:
  • Incentives to defect: even if cooperation is beneficial, individual incentives might tempt parties to cheat or not comply.
  • Number of actors and relative size: more actors and power asymmetries complicate cooperation.
  • Iteration and linkage: repeated interactions and linking issues across different regimes can sustain cooperation.
  • Information and observability: monitoring compliance reduces cheating; information sharing can enable reciprocity.

• Bargaining (zero-sum or one-side-wins)

  • Definition: parties choose outcomes where one party’s gain comes at another’s expense; often involves costs, concessions, or payoffs being traded off.
  • Examples: emissions controls across heterogeneous countries; negotiating defense spending and burden-sharing within alliances (e.g., NATO cost-sharing).
  • Key features:
  • Available alternatives: if smoother substitutes exist, bargaining power shifts.
  • Coercion and coercive threats: ability to impose costs to influence opponent’s choices.
  • Agenda setting: who sets the starting point and the terms of negotiation.

• Interactions can combine both cooperation and bargaining

  • Real-world example: security cooperation (e.g., defense against aggression) coupled with bargaining over who pays for it and what policies are implemented.
  • The concept of “games” where both cooperation and bargaining are present at different moments or across different issues.

• Quick illustrative examples from the transcript

  • US-Latin America: cooperation in trade and shared security (e.g., trade liberalization, information sharing); bargaining over defense burden-sharing and political influence (e.g., NATO-like arrangements, security commitments).
  • The Panama Canal: historically cooperation in economic and strategic terms, with bargaining over control and revenue sharing across time (US control, lease, then transfer to Panama; later debates about ownership).
  • Cuban remittances and visitation: potential cooperation on family ties and economic flows; bargaining over political controls and sanctions.

Case Examples and Post-Cold War Predictions

• Realism after the Cold War: resurgence of great-power competition; the system remains anarchic, and major powers seek security and relative gains.
• Liberalism after the Cold War: increased cooperation, spread of free markets, and stronger international institutions and regimes.
• Constructivism after the Cold War: ideas and norms shift in ways that are not entirely predictable; some new norms may constrain or enable different policies.
• A pragmatic synthesis (the three I’s) used in the course:
  • Interest: what do states and other actors want?
  • Interactions: how do they interact given the incentives and costs?
  • Institutions: what rules govern their interactions, and how do those rules bias outcomes in favor of some actors?

A Mal­leable Framework for Analysis: Practical Guidance

• Assumptions to specify when building theory:
  • Who are the actors that matter (and who can be ignored for the purposes of a given analysis)?
  • What are their principal interests and ordered preferences over outcomes?
  • What are the potential outcomes and how might they be ranked by each actor?
• The goal of theory in this class:
  • Describe broad patterns (not just single cases).
  • Predict likely consequences of certain interactions under given institutions.
  • Provide prescriptions for policymakers about how to achieve desired outcomes (e.g., growth, stability, or influence).
• The approach to building hypotheses:
  • Start from a general relationship (e.g., democracies and economic growth) and derive testable hypotheses (e.g., democracies will grow quicker than non-democracies).
  • Test these hypotheses; refine or revise underlying assumptions if tests fail.
• Important caveats:
  • The world is complex; theory is a simplification that emphasizes patterns and relationships.
  • Theories are tools for understanding and guiding action, not definitive truths.

Concrete Theory-In-Action: The United States, Latin America, and China

• Actors and their interests (illustrative exercise from the lecture):
  • United States: interests include wealth, power, trade, natural resources, regional stability, maintaining influence, and broader strategic goals such as promoting democracy (debatable as a true interest vs. a means to other ends).
  • Latin American countries: interests include economic growth, regional stability, independence from external influence, international respect, sovereignty, security, and access to foreign aid and investment.
  • China: interest in becoming a larger international power; economic expansion through Belt and Road; infrastructure investment; gaining influence such as securing recognition (e.g., with Taiwan) and expanding economic ties with Latin America.
• Shared and divergent goals:
  • Common goals across US and Latin America include economic growth and regional stability.
  • Differences arise around political ideology, governance, and tolerance for external influence.
  • Latin American countries emphasize sovereignty, independence, and policies that avoid over-dependence on any single external power.
• Interactions and possible outcomes:
  • Cooperation scenarios: trade liberalization, investment, infrastructure projects, information sharing on security.
  • Bargaining scenarios: cost-sharing for defense, terms of trade, and alignment with external powers on ideological issues.
  • Mixed scenarios: collaboration on some issues (e.g., trade, anti-terrorism) while bargaining over others (e.g., military bases, sanctions, or governance preferences).

Factors That Make Cooperation More Likely (and How They Work)

• Incentives to defect: the temptation to free-ride on others’ efforts when benefits are shared broadly.
• Number and relative size of actors: more actors increase complexity and potential for holdouts; the relative power of the largest actor shapes outcomes.
• Iteration and linkages: repeated interactions create reputational effects and the possibility to trade cooperation on one issue for concessions on another.
• Information and observability: better monitoring and transparency reduce cheating and increase trust.
• Linkage across issues: success in one domain (trade) can help secure cooperation in another (environment, security).

Factors That Shape Bargaining Outcomes

• Available alternatives: if parties have credible alternatives, each can demand better terms; if not, they may accept poorer terms.
• Coercion and the capacity to impose costs to influence others’ choices.
• Agenda setting: who sets the starting points and terms of negotiation.
• The role of coercive leverage and potential threats or rewards that can reframe negotiations.

Institutions: Rules That Shape Interactions

• Definition: institutions are sets of rules that structure political interactions (e.g., constitutions, parliaments, and international organizations like the WTO).
• Functions of institutions:
  • Set standards of behavior (shared norms on how to proceed).
  • Verify compliance (monitor and report noncompliance).
  • Reduce the costs of joint decision making (provide a ready-made dispute-resolution pathway).
  • Resolve disputes (provide a mechanism for settling disagreements).
• Why institutions matter:
  • Institutions bias outcomes toward the preferences of the powerful or most capable actors, but can still provide net benefits relative to no institution at all.
  • People and states may tolerate biased rules if the overall benefits (stability, predictability, security) outweigh the costs.
• Examples and implications:
  • Security Council features: permanent members and veto power; who gets a seat reflects power dynamics of past victory; why others (e.g., India, Brazil) may seek influence via alternative routes.
  • BRICS: regional and global ambitions can influence reform discussions (e.g., UN Security Council reform).
  • Compliance and leaving institutions: if a country dislikes an institution, it can try to leave, but that often comes with high costs and uncertainty; many actors prefer to live with biased rules rather than creating new institutions.
• How institutions interact with the three I’s:
  • Interests drive participation in institutions; institutions constrain and shape feasible interactions and outcomes; and the interplay among actors within institutions can redefine interests over time.

Putting It All Together: Why the Theories Are Useful (and Not Absolute)

• The question is not which theory is “right,” but which theory is most useful for explaining or predicting a given pattern.
• The three I’s (Interest, Interaction, Institutions) provide a flexible toolkit to analyze complex international events without being locked into a single lens.
• The course emphasizes empirical testing and critical evaluation of theories, acknowledging that different theories may offer valuable but partial explanations.

Closing Guidance and Next Steps

• Readings emphasized: Smith, Talons of the Eagle (and other listed readings on the syllabus).
• Prepare to apply the three I’s framework to post-Cold War developments; anticipate how realism, liberalism, and constructivism would yield different predictions about ongoing geopolitical shifts.
• Be ready to discuss concrete examples (e.g., NATO, Panama Canal, US-Latin America dynamics, and US-China-Latin America relations) in terms of interests, interactions, and institutions.
• Remember the practical aim: use theory to describe, predict, and prescribe policy actions that improve outcomes while acknowledging the limits and biases of each approach.